

**TIBET FACTOR IN THE HOMOGENIZATION
PROCESS IN BHUTAN, 1960S-1980S**

A Thesis Submitted to

Sikkim University



In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Bindhiya Rai

Department of International Relations


School of Social Sciences

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Date: 31/12/2020

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I, **Bindhiya Rai**, hereby declare that the research work embodied in the titled "**Tibet Factor in the Homogenization Process in Bhutan, 1960s-1980s**" submitted to Sikkim University for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** is my original work. This thesis has not been submitted in any part or for any other degree of this or any other university.



Bindhiya Rai

Regn. No. 16/Ph.D/INR/02

Department of International Relations

School of Social Science

समदुर, तदोंग -737102
सिक्किम, भारत
-03592-251212, 251415, 251656
फैक्स -251067
वेबसाइट - www.cus.ac.in



सिक्किम विश्वविद्यालय
SIKKIM UNIVERSITY

6th Mile, Samdur, Tadong -737102
Gangtok, Sikkim, India
Ph. 03592-251212, 251415, 251656
Telefax: 251067
Website: www.cus.ac.in

(भारत के संसद के अधिनियम द्वारा वर्ष 2007 में स्थापित और नेक (एनएएसी) द्वारा वर्ष 2015 में प्रत्यापित केंद्रीय विश्वविद्यालय)
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All the assistance and help received during the course of the investigation have acknowledged by her.

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Supervisor
Dr. Sebastian N.
Assistant Professor
International Relations
Sikkim University

HOD in-Charge of the Department
Mr. Ph. Newton Singh
Assistant Professor
International Relations

सिक्किम विश्वविद्यालय
सिक्किम, भारत
फोन - 03592-251212, 251415, 251656
फैक्स - 251067
वेबसाइट - www.cus.ac.in



सिक्किम विश्वविद्यालय
SIKKIM UNIVERSITY

6* Mile, Samdur, Tadong -737102
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"Tibet Factor in the Homogenization Process in Bhutan, 1960s-1980s"

Submitted by Ms. Bindhiya Rai under the supervision of Dr. Sebastian N., Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University, Gangtok, India, 737102.

Signature of the Scholar

Ms. Bindhiya Rai

Dr. Sebastian N.

Supervisor

Vetted by Librarian

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Bindhiya Rai
Bindhiya Rai

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Abbreviations

BPP	-	Bhutan People Party
BRO	-	Indian Border Road Organization
BSC	-	Bhutan State Congress
CIA	-	Central Intelligence agency
CLWAS	-	Centre for Land Warfare Studies
CNN	-	Cable News Network
CTRC	-	Central Tibetan Relief Committee
GNH	-	Gross National Happiness
GNLF	-	Gorkha National Liberation Front
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
JVT	-	Joint Verification Team
MHA	-	Ministry of Home Affairs
NEFA	-	North East Frontier Agency
NOC	-	No Objection Certificate
RGB	-	Royal Government of Bhutan
SAARC	-	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
UN	-	United Nations
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commission for Refugee
WB	-	World Bank
WTO	-	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The focal point of this study is the impact of Tibetan factor in the *Bhutanisation*¹ process during the 1960s to 1980s. By doing an in-depth analysis of the Tibetan factor which is largely ignored by scholars, this study re-examines the popular notion that the *Lhotshampas*² were the core target in the *Bhutanisation*, the cultural homogenisation process of Bhutan. The study also looks into the way Bhutan, during the 1960s to 1980s, tried to protect the country from the Chinese interest and managed its internal fraction. Lastly, the study also analyses the major implications of Chinese invasion on Tibet on Bhutan's socio-political system particularly, how the influx of Tibetan refugees influenced the national policies of Bhutan. It also briefly reflects on the fate of *Lhotshampas*, the largest minority group in Bhutan, in the cultural homogenisation.

Bhutan, a tiny state located in the Eastern Himalayas is well known internationally for its unique policy of Gross National Happiness (GNH), that measures growth/development/progress based on the wellbeing of its citizens. However, while claiming such a fame, the state has lacked in the ground when the UN Human Rights Council criticised it for not respecting the universal norms of human rights vis-a-vis its minorities. Bhutan is considered as one of the major source countries of refugees in South Asia and the decades old Bhutanese refugees' problem in the region is still remaining unresolved. The country is even not able to give any clear response to the issues of refugees.

Broadly, cultural homogenisation is one of the major aspects of the nation-building process and therefore the process of nation-building involves violent conflict in

¹*Bhutanisation* is a cultural homogenisation process initiated by the Royal Government of Bhutan during late 1980s in order to protect the Bhutanese national identity, where they promoted the culture of *Ngalong* community upon other existing communities in the country.

²*Lhotshampas* means southerners - the people from southern parts of the country which includes the population of Nepali community.

different states in the region due to the significant presence of minorities in the region. Many scholars argue that homogenisation in connection with the modernisation ideology take over the conflicting pluralities (Gellner, 1992; Conversi 2007; Smith 1996). However, such homogenizing tendencies under the modernisation process sometimes lead to ethnic nationalism and subsequently, conflicts among different ethnic groups. Similarly, the state-led homogenisation process, in the name of state nationalism or national identity also became the cause for ethnic conflict. In the process of homogenisation, generally, the state as an institution plays the role to initiate the assimilation process.

According to Gellner, assimilation is possible only in those societies which consist of shared language and culture (ethnicity). But in multi-ethnic societies where there is no shared language and culture (ethnicity), such an assimilation process turn out into the exclusionist form. In a multi-ethnic context, ideally, the process of nation-building should be none other than national integration or national unification through providing equal opportunity and rights to all ethnic groups. Being a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religion country, Bhutan has paved their full priority towards modernisation under the leadership of third King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk (1952-72) and *Lochen* (Prime Minister) Jigmie Palden Dorji³.

The homogenizing tendency of modernisation and the restructuring of the governmental system⁴ and life-style seems to be very isolationist and therefore it eventually created a clear fractional fight between the traditional elements and the modernist elements within the political elites of Bhutan. Following the assassination of Prime Minister (Jigmie Palden Dorji) and the sudden demise of the Third King⁵, the new King Jigmi Singey Wangchuk was forced to ally with the powerful

³*Lochen* Jigmi Palden Dorji also known by the name of Father of modern in Bhutan.

⁴King has abolished slavery and serfdom, introduced land reforms and adopted Five Years Plans since 1961, established the *Tshogdu* (National Assembly) in 1953, *Lodoi Tshogde* (Royal Advisory Council) in 1965, the *Thrimkong Gongma* (High Court) and *Lhengyel Tsok* (Council of Minister) in 1968 and the *Lhenhyel Shungstog* (State Committee) in 1972 (Phuntscho, 2013: 568).

⁵The Third King of Bhutan Jigmi Wangchuk Dorji was under treatment heart problem and he died in 1974 due to sudden heart attack.

traditionalist fraction. This intensified the homogenisation process and the state became the *Ngalong*⁶ dominated one. The ruling elites had adopted the assimilationist homogenisation policies which marginalised other ethnic and cultural groups from the national mainstream. This is the context in which this study looks into the Tibetan issue as a core factor in the cultural assimilation or *Bhutanisation* process.

Geographically, Bhutan is a very small country with an area of approximately 18000 sq. miles. The geographical location and landlocked status of Bhutan isolates her from the rest of the world. Bhutan is situated along the southern slopes of the greater Himalayan range. On the north, it is bounded by the land of Tibet, on the southern part it is surrounded by the India - plain of *Jalpaiguri* district of West Bengal, and *Golpara*, *Kamrup*, and *Darrang* districts of Assam. Bhutan is sandwiched between *Chumbi* valley of Tibet, Sikkim, and Darjeeling in the west and *Kameng* district of Arunachal Pradesh in India on the east side. Sandwiched between two gigantic neighbours - India and China, Bhutan was forced to maintain her relationship with both the countries so that it does not meet the same fate as Tibet⁷.

A very small-land mass - The Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan - become strategically important for both the Asian giants (India and China), because of its geostrategic location. As the country just has begun to open her border to the outside world, it found itself caught between the diplomatic battles of India and China. The major issues between Bhutan and China are related to territory; the disputed areas covers North West and Central parts of Bhutan: they are *Jakarlung* and *Passamlung* valley in the *Wangdu Phodrang* district of Central Bhutan, and the *Dolkham*, *Sinchulung*, *Damana* and *Shakhatoe* in *Samtse*, *Paro*, and *Haa* districts of North West Bhutan

⁶Also known as Drukpa, live in central and north-western districts of Bhutan. The King of Bhutan and most of significant government officials are belong of this community and holds the socio-cultural and political power of the country.

⁷During 1950s there were greater uprising in Tibet against the Communist China, which was lasted till 1959 until the forceful annexation of Tibet into Chinese territory. Consequently, many Tibetan were brutally killed, important religious sites and properties are destroyed and many Tibetans were fled to neighbouring areas.

(Bisht, 2010). The Chinese interest on these areas is due to its proximity to Tibet, as well as their historical claims.

On the other side, India's Centre for Land Warfare (CLWAS) describes the strategic importance of the region as, "the *Doklam* Plateau lies immediately east of Indian defences in Sikkim. Chinese occupation of the *Doklam* would turn the flank of Indian defences completely (Katoch, 2013). This piece of dominating ground not only has a commanding view of the *Chumbi* Valley but also overlooks the *Siliguri* Corridor⁸ further to the east". If Chinese were to gain possession of the *Doklam* plateau, in the event of hostilities it would have the ability to essentially 'cut-off' India's land access to 40 million citizens in its northeast territories. Similarly, Bhutan has a deep and long standing relationship with India based on the 1949 Treaty of Friendship.

1.1 Background of the Study

The history of Bhutan is deeply wrapped in the mystery of the past. Fire, earthquake, flood, and recurrent wars have unfortunately destroyed most of the records. The available records of Bhutan are based on reports from the early British and Indian travellers (Coelho, 1971; 59). The contemporary history of Bhutan, according to the reports of J.C White says that there are two phases of existence of Bhutan state. First, was during the reign of Raja Kurtoi and Naguchhi of Sindhu, who were later converted to Buddhism by the Indian saint Guru Padmasambhava⁹. Second and the more influential one is the advent of Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal (Nawang Dugom)¹⁰.

The later history, which is contemporarily predominant in Bhutan, is closely influenced by the origin and the growth of the *Drukpa* sect of Buddhism which was

⁸The *Siliguri* Corridor, also known as Chicken neck, is a narrow stretch of land that connects India's north-eastern states to the rest of India.

⁹The Lotus-born, also known as Ugyen Guru *Rinpoche* introduced Buddhism in Bhutan since 8th century. He was a teacher of *mysticism* at Nalanda University in northern India and was well versed in *tantricism*. He was also known as second Buddha, who was believed to be born from a lotus in the lake of *Dome Kosha*, which is presently situated in the country of *Odiyana* or modern Swat Valley in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2013; 18).

¹⁰The first Dharma Raja of Bhutan.

founded by the Yeses Dorji at *Ralung* (Tibet). Then the *Drukpa* formed originally one of the subdivisions of the *Nyingmapa* sect and it has been recorded that it was entirely due to Yeses and his followers that Bhutan began to move to a distinct entity. This led to the rapid influx of *Lamas* (monks) to Bhutan and many monasteries were set up in different parts of the land¹¹.

One of the prominent lamas was Phajo Dugom Shigpo, who made the *Drukpa Kagyu* School dominant in Bhutan during the 13th century A.D (Rahul, 1971; 19). The person of Bhutan still regards him as the predecessor of the present *Druk Kagyu* School of Buddhism in Bhutan. Later, in 1616 A.D., Lama Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal the head of *Drukpa Kagyu*, came to Bhutan after a bitter sectarian dispute over reincarnation in *Ralung* (Phuntsho, 2013; 215). He further strengthened the *Drukpa Kagyu* School in Bhutan and made himself the supreme political and religious head of Bhutan.

Today, the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet is mostly understood on the basis of common cultural and religious tie. Tibet has been treated as the cultural capital of Bhutan because Buddhism in Bhutan originally came from Tibet and both the countries practice the same religion which is Mahayana Buddhism. Besides, Bhutan had close trade relations with Tibet till the 1950s and it used to provide a free market for Bhutan's surplus rice and other items like woollen materials and musk (Kharat, 2005; 65).

Earlier, Bhutan has been considered as part of Tibet by many writers (Aris Micheal, 1979). The origin of the name of the country i.e. *Bhutanta* expresses the end of Tibet (Kholi, 1982; 132) or the region at the borderland of Tibet. It has been claimed that Bhutan was considered as a dependency to Tibet during the reign of British India in the region and the Panchen Lama of Tibet wrote a letter to Warren Hastings for peace in 1774 on behalf of Bhutan's Deb Raja (Kohli, 1982; 16). However, such

¹¹Lamas like Gyawa Lhanangpa, Phajo Dugom Shigpo, Longchenpa Drime Ozer, and Kunga Phajo who came to Bhutan from Tibet in 1200 A.D. (Rahul, 1971; 19-20).

interpretations can also be seen as loose commitment due to their strong cultural and religious affiliations and the influence of the theocratic system as well.

Today, Bhutan has become politically and strategically important for the Himalayan region. Compared to other states in the region, Bhutan's issue remain always a sensitive one especially in her relationship with China because of Tibetan fate. The relationship between Bhutan and China remains contradictory in their claims.

China had started claiming its suzerainty over Bhutan in 1885, and the Chinese/Tibetan government started expressing their right to intervene in the affairs of Bhutan (Kholi, 1982; 128). Such suzerainty claims of China came to an end when Bhutan signed the Treaty of *Punakha* with the British Indian government in 1910. By this, Bhutan accepted the British guidance in her external matters. China has never accepted the treaty of *Punakha* and had continued their claims on *Ladakh*, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, and Arunachal Pradesh which were the lost territories of the *Quing* dynasty. They further push the five finger policy that Tibet as a palm and these states are as fingers together is a hand of the *Quing* dynasty (Rahul, 1971; 104). After the establishment of the Peoples Republic in 1949, China published a map in the book *A Brief History of China*, depicting a sizeable portion of Bhutan as a 'pre-historical realm of China'.

During the 1950s, there was constant interference by the Chinese army in Tibet threatening the autonomous status of Tibet. It resulted in a revolution in Eastern Tibet against China in 1954-55. By 1958, the Tibetan rebellion (*Khampa*) started spreading from eastern to central Tibet and further to *Tonsa* (a place close to the north part of Bhutan border). Subsequently, the Chinese presence increased in the border areas and eventually developed as a threat to the security and stability of the northern border of Bhutan. The first Chinese move in this direction was to snap the easy route from India

to *Punakha*¹², the capital of Bhutan. In quest of their coercive diplomacy towards Bhutan, the Chinese blocked the communication track through the Tibetan sector in 1959¹³.

China has entrenched herself in Tibet and tried to exploit Bhutan's backwardness. But the Bhutan government took it as a challenge and has made plans for all-round development (modernisation). The Indian Government had to come to the rescue of Bhutan. Bearing all the costs required of construction as India's aid to Bhutan, a motor able road was built speedily from *Punchholing*, a place at southern border of Bhutan with India to *Paro* in Bhutan. By the end of 1961, an alternative route to Bhutan's capital, without touching Tibet, was completed.

After consolidating their power in Tibet by 1959, China claimed that Bhutan was dependent upon Tibet, pointing the historical ties. In 1960, the Chinese leadership issued a statement, "Bhutanese, *Sikkimese* and *Ladakhis* form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine" (Tilak, 2013; 4). This statement made a serious concern for Bhutan and responded harshly by closing off its border, cut trade, and all diplomatic ties with China as well as Tibet.

In the late 1960s, China realised the fact that it was difficult for them to isolate Bhutan from India by any coercive tactics (Bhutan's economic development was totally dependent upon India). Therefore, it adopted certain soft tactics and other means. Due to closing the border with Tibet and imposing ban on trade with its northern neighbour, Bhutan's economy faced a huge set back. The obstacle led to widespread hostility among the Bhutanese citizens, and China has tried to exploit the situation by offering a high price for Bhutanese smuggled goods (Kharat, 2005; 126).

¹²This important communication track start from the Indian borders passed through *Gangtok*, the capital of Kingdom of Sikkim, and then cross the *Nathula* Pass to enter the Tibetan territory for about eight miles before it entered Bhutan.

¹³The Chinese forces harassed and ill-treated the mail couriers of Bhutan on their way to Sikkim's *Chumbi* Valley. They also took away the arms of the Bhutanese administrator in the Bhutanese estates in the region of Mount Kailas in Western Tibet (Kharat, 2005, 127).

China has repeatedly offered economic aid to Bhutan but Bhutan has shown little interest to accept it (ibid; 128). Though the Chinese theory of lost territories is completely baseless, China continued claiming Bhutan as part of her Tibetan territory, based on cultural closeness.

It is true that Bhutan share close cultural affinity with Tibet in ethnic, linguistic, and religious terms; Tibet has been considered as the mother of Buddhism in the Himalayan region. The national culture of Bhutan (*Drukpa*) look their origin in Tibet (*Ralung*) and the national language (*Dzongkha*) is also belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family. The *Dzong* style of architecture of Bhutan and Tibet indicates the intimate cultural intercourse between them.

Even though Bhutan shares close ties with Tibet in terms of culture and religion, it is wrong to consider the country as the expansion of Tibet or to claim Tibetan suzerainty over Bhutan. The relationship between Bhutan and Tibet can indeed be seen as dependencies due to their theocratic political system but Bhutan has never accepted or pays their political homage to Dalai Lama (head of *Gelugpa* School) (Rose,1977; 60). There was confusion regarding sending gifts from Bhutan to Dalai Lama, but that was understood purely a religious gesture rather than political.

However, all those claims of the Chinese government were vague or lack of physical evidence but Bhutan was conscious about their vulnerability with the presence of the Chinese force in other parts of the border. After the 1959 crisis in Tibet, many Tibetans came to Bhutan and resided as refugees. They, including a few with marital ties to prominent Bhutanese families, settled in Bhutan and had taken up whatever occupation was available to them. After a decade of their arrival, the Tibetan refugees were able to establish strong community networks of Tibetans and expanded their political influence in Bhutan. Later, problems started in Bhutan in late 1960s on the reliability of Tibetans became a factor in domestic politics and were regularly suspected to have helped to encourage some of Bhutan's internal upheavals (Rustomji, 1978; 68).

Although Tibetans in Bhutan owe respect to Bhutan's political and religious institutions, their primary allegiance remained with Dalai Lama. This was considered as dangerous by Bhutan ruling elite as they thought, because of this, there was a chance that China would see Bhutan become a shelter for Tibetan political activists who may possibly use the Bhutanese territory for actions against China. In short, Bhutan was not in a position to bear the Tibetan resistance movement inside the country. To eliminate any possible threat to the country from China in this regard, Bhutan banned the organisation of any movement by Tibetans in their territory. Similarly, in 1979, the Bhutanese National Assembly decided that, the Tibetans who arrived in Bhutan after 1959, had to mandatorily choose between the options, becoming Bhutanese citizens or leave the country. Approximately 4000 Tibetan refugees did not choose to become Bhutanese citizens and therefore had to leave the country.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

At base, this study is on the Tibetan factor in *Bhutanisation*, the cultural homogenisation process in Bhutan. Homogenisation indicates a single and unified social system, culture, and tradition. In simple words, adopting homogenisation policies indicates the condition of a society where the people of two or more groups with their respective culture and traditional practices were used to live together, have suddenly, interacted and intermingled in such a manner to lose their cultural identities and merged into one uniform culture which does not show any traces of diversity among the people (Kingzhouyang, 2012). One can relate it with the reduction of cultural diversity, through the popularisation and diffusion of a wide array of cultural symbols, not only the physical object but also the customs, ideas, and values (Prashad and Prashad, 2007; 13).

However, practice of homogenisation has been prevailed in the pre-modern era, but the concept got much popularity only with the French Revolution. It was Gellner (1992) who argued that the cultural homogenisation and nationalism are the

consequences of industrialisation. According to Gellner, in modern and industrialise society, there is a need for common language for easy communication that make the work very smooth. Daniel Conversi (2007), who described cultural homogenisation as subtractive process, involving the negation of the existence of separate groups, cultures, beliefs, language, tradition, and ideas within the same polity (Conversi, 2007; 388).

Today, Cultural homogenisation can be recognised as a form of cultural globalisation or the spread of global culture. The contemporary debates on cultural homogenisation or global culture contend that globalisation is essentially a Westernisation or Americanisation process (Yale and Richard, 2010). The spread of global culture is equated with the spread of US culture, the process cultural homogenisation can be seen in the context of the dominance of western, American, or capitalist culture (Daghrir, 2013, 19).

The ideas of Americanisation of global culture provide the empirically specific version of the cultural homogenisation argument (Holton, 2011; 195). The American culture dominate the global culture through the ownership in crucial resources including satellite systems, information technology manufacture, news agencies, the advertising industry, television program production, exports, and the film industry. In this sense, one can link the idea of cultural homogenisation with the dominant American culture based on American holds on the multi-media business, global export television programmes and films, hardware and software applications including social networking sites and news agencies(Holton, 2011; 196). This globalisation of American culture was also become the subject of criticism for eliminating the local and indigenous culture.

Apart from the global culture or Americanisation aspect of globalisation, concept cultural homogenisation has also been discussed in the theories of nationalism. Homogenisation has always been an important tool for every nationalist movement. Nationalism is an ideology and movement that focuses on the promotion of the

interests of a particular nation, especially to the exclusion or disadvantage of the interests of other nations, to gain and maintain sovereignty. Nationalism rely on self-determination, where each nation should rule itself, free from outside interference and sovereignty that a nation is a natural and ideal basis for a polity and that the nation is the only rightful source of political power. It further aims to build and maintain a single and homogeneous national identity based on shared social characteristics such as culture, language, religion, politics, and belief in a shared singular history (Triandafyllidou, 1998; 596).

Nationalism is a complex subject and has a wider meaning ranging from being the defining ideology of political movements seeking some form of independent statehood; of groups determined to achieve or to improve their cultural, political, social, and economic rights within a given state; of protest movements on the part of communities threatened by either state policies or by other social groups; to the core ideology employed by the state to stimulate public support for its policies or to reaffirm its legitimacy (Smith , 1981). It originated in the eighteenth century in the western countries (after the French revolution), and spread all over the Europe by the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century it has become a world-wide movement including Asia and Africa.

Broadly, there are two types of nationalism acknowledged by scholars. Hans Kohn (1944), in his famous work *Two Types of Nationalism*, clearly made the distinction between western nationalism and non-western or eastern nationalism (Kohn, 1944; 574), which is later described by Anthony D. Smith on *The Ethnic Origin of Nation* (1986) into the Western territorial or civic nation and Eastern ethnic or 'ethnie' concept of nation (Smith, 1986; 488). The civic or western nationalism is more known as a unifying force, very inclusive and liberal in form, which bring together people of diverse backgrounds at the price of subordinating their ethnic identities to the larger territorial unit dominated by the secular state. In opposite, the non-western or ethnic nationalism is more hostile, illiberal, oppressive, and dangerous. It is more irrational

and mystical which looked back to the past in search of its roots and the lost folk-soul or folk-spirit as a blueprint for its regeneration (Smith, 1991; 33).

The nationalism or nation-state has been seen as old and globalisation as new in contemporary world politics. There are questions regarding the importance or the role of nation-state and nationalism in the context of globalisation. Holton (2011) claim, that nationalism and globalisation are interrelated and nationalism is not vanishing from the global field (Holton, 2011; 160).

In this era of globalisation, nationalism has been emerged in to form of political mobilisation and institution building from one context to another. The major consequences of globalisation like the flow of information and ideas, cross-border labour migration, the influx of immigrants (legal or illegal), and refugee movement are creating national consciousness among people in different parts of the world.

In the late 20th century, there is a visible rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and North America. The trend was further fuelled by increased terrorism activities in the West (the September 11 attacks in the U.S. being a prime example), there were increasing unrest and civil wars in the Middle East, and waves of Muslim refugees flooding into Europe (as of 2016, the refugee crisis appears to have peaked). In this wake, Germany's *Pegida*, France's National Front, and the Independence Party of UK gained prominence in their respective nations by advocating restrictions on

Immigration to protect the interests of local population's¹⁴. Similarly in India, Hindu nationalism has gained ground due to the rise of *Bharatiya Janata Party*, projecting Hinduism as a guiding principle (Stratford, 2016).

¹⁴In a 2006 referendum, the majority of British voted to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union (the so-called *Brexit*). The result had been largely unexpected and was seen as a victory of populism. Trump's slogans "Make America Great Again" and "America First" exemplified his campaign's negation of globalism and its staunchly nationalistic viewpoint. The Above incident of nationalism is proof that the process globalisation and nationalism go hand in hand(Clark, 2015).

As discussed, homogenisation is an important aspect of globalisation and also of nationalism. Practicing cultural homogenisation in the societies of developing world sees rather the state-led policy intending to impose the culture of the dominant elite group over the 'other'. Among civic and ethnic nationalism, the ethnic character of nationalism is dominant in most of the countries in South Asia including Bhutan. The ruling elite in Bhutan adopted homogenisation policies to secure sovereignty over the 'other' and to avoid perceived threats from cultural diversities to the coherent national identity based on the identity of the majority.

In developing countries, cultural homogenisation through ethnic nationalism based on culture and identities has given rise to many serious ethnic conflicts. In this context, the cultural homogenisation process collaborates with nationalism. Rosenau (2006) observed that nationalism has become "a form of exclusionary localism" because "it emphasizes boundaries and the distinction between us and them (Scholte, 2002; 125). The homogenisation project of state nationalism has taken into account the major causal factor of ethnic conflict in Bhutan during late 1980s.

While contextualising the concept homogenisation, in Bhutan, it is evident that homogenisation process in Bhutan has more inclined towards nationalism, where the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) adopted the *Bhutanisation* policy to emphasis national identity. Their major claims were related to the threats posed by the demographic changes posed due to growing migration from its southern border. Interestingly, during 1960s, under the reign of the King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, Bhutan was more flourished in terms of its civic nationalism. Moving away from the isolationist policy, the King has opened *Tshogdu* (National Assembly) and *Lodoe Tshogdu* (Royal Advisory Council)¹⁵ for all groups and encouraged public participation in the decision-making process of the country. Through the reforms in

¹⁵Earlier the National Assembly was secured only for the King's men and the process of decision-making was also very narrow which includes a small number of officials which especially belonged to elite family. Now it's distributed and shared with the relevant groups.

National Assembly, King has broken the tradition of elite domination in the decision-making process¹⁶.

The King has also abolished the serfdom and brought an egalitarian system by promoting equal rights and opportunities. He encouraged the assimilation of marginalised Nepali immigrants into mainstream Bhutan by providing them citizenship under the title of *Lhotshampas* (Bhutanese Nepali) and also started appointing them in the administrative departments of the country.

However, after the sudden death of the third King, the process has been reversed and taken into the form of ethnic nationalism. The new King Jigme Singye Wangchuk adopted a homogenisation policy in the nation-building process based on the principle of ethnic nationalism (through the assimilation of other existing ethnic groups into the *Drukpa* or *Ngalop* culture). The extreme modes of *Bhutanisation* process such as promulgation of “*Driglamnamzha*” (one nation one culture), and the amendments of Citizenship Acts¹⁷ eventually led to an ethnic conflict in the country.

While imposing cultural homogenisation based on the principle of ethnic nationalism, the condition of minorities would always become vulnerable; they were left with two choices- either get assimilated into the majority or get expelled from the country. The decision of Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) on the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies created chaos among the *Lhotshampas* and the Tibetan refugees. Both *Lhotshampas* and Tibetan refugees protested and alleged the RGB for violating human rights. The incident led serious unrest in the country, where, apart from the issue of Nepali immigrants, the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) and the officials

¹⁶After the modification of decision-making process, the house demanded new skills and capacities which led to the entry of officials from the non-elites families into the administrative system of the country.

¹⁷Which includes the Citizenship Act of 1977, The Marriage Acts 1980, the Bhutan Citizenship Act of 1985, and the census which were conducted based on 1985 citizenship act.

of Dalai Lama involved in the controversy over the citizenship issue of Tibetan refugees¹⁸.

This is the overall theoretical context in which, this study approach the *Bhutanisation* process. While discussing the Tibetan factor in *Bhutanisation* process, this study attempts to unravel the internal upheavals in Bhutan with the assassination of Prime Minister Jigme Dorji (1964). In the whole episode, the Bhutanese Government has been suspicious on the involvement of the Tibetan refugees¹⁹. Externally, Bhutan Government expected a clear threat from the Chinese side with the extra-territorial political link between the Tibetan refugees and *Dharamsala*²⁰. Internally, Tibetan refugees in Bhutan were continuously suspected of encouraging Bhutan's internal upheavals. After the assassination of Prime Minister Jigme Dorji, the King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk has also faced an attack on his life but escaped narrowly. After the death of the third King, there was another plot for the assassination of new King Jigme Singye Wangchuk and investigation proved that it was the Tibetan refugees who were behind this plot²¹.

On the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* or *Drukpanisation*²² policies, there are contradictory claims among the Bhutanese officials, Tibetan refugees, and Dalai Lama officials of *Dharamsala*. The crux of the controversy is the insistence of the

¹⁸On behalf of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan, the officials of Tibetan government in exile alleged the officials of Bhutanese government that they were harassing, detention, and torturing the Tibetan refugees who has rejected the offer to become Bhutanese citizen. In response, the officials of Bhutanese government rejected those allegations and claimed that while interfering in their matter the Tibetan government in exile was making the life difficult for Tibetan refugees in Bhutan. They also claimed that Tibetans taking the Bhutanese citizenship totally voluntarily.

¹⁹It is alleged that some Tibetan refugees including Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup allegedly conspired with the King's mistress, Ms. Yangki to murder the P.M.

²⁰The Dalai Lama's establishment always prefer that Tibetan refugees stay stateless, with their allegiance to His Holiness, instead of opting to be citizen of another country.

²¹Prominent among them were the Deputy Home Minister Phuntso Dhondup (responsible for the issue of identity card to Tibetan refugees in Bhutan), Tibetan Refugees Rehabilitation officer Kungo Lhedhing (a Tibetan refugee), the Commandant of the Royal Bhutan Police Tamshing Wangdi (commonly known as Tortola, a Bhutanese national) and the other were all Tibetan refugees and businessmen of *Thimpu*. Among them Tortola revealed that they had been working for the organisation of Gyampo Thondup a well-known Tibetan residing in Darjeeling (*Kunsel*, 1974).

²²The Homogenisation policy in Bhutan has promoted the *Drukpa* culture, which is largely followed by the ethnic *Ngalung* community of Bhutan, as the national culture of Bhutan and the *Dzaongka*, the language of *Ngalung* people, as the national language of Bhutan.

Bhutan Government that the Tibetan refugees should take Bhutanese citizenship or else be treated as foreigners and to leave the country. On the one hand, the stateless Tibetan refugees, with a hope to return to their home country, (Tibet) were not ready to accept the offers of Royal government of Bhutan. Rather, they accused Bhutanese officials of harassment, and the Royal Police arresting those who refused to accept Bhutanese citizenship. They also complained that, in the name of resettling, the Bhutanese Government is trying to scatter them (India Today, 2013). Bhutanese officials rejected these charges and stated that accepting Bhutanese citizenship is purely a voluntary thing. The refugees had already tied with the mainstream in Bhutan and a majority of them had willingly accepted Bhutan as their future home. They accused that the officials of Dalai Lama were the one who created problems for the Tibetans by fomenting discontent in Bhutan, otherwise a peaceful country (India Today, 2013).

1.3 Review of Literature

There are various works done on the relationship between China, Tibet, and Bhutan. Some of the important books and articles among them have been reviewed here. These books and articles are helpful to understand on Bhutan's history and transformation and especially the historical ties of Bhutan and Tibet and the deriving factors on Bhutan's modernisation process. The book written by Karma Phuntsho (2013) *The History of Bhutan*, is a comprehensive work on the history of Bhutan. It provides a deeper knowledge on the politics and culture of Bhutan.

The book Coelho, *Sikkim and Bhutan* (1971) is more a documentary type of work on Bhutan and Sikkim. It provides basic information about the land, people, customs, and their past and present administrative system. In the section on Bhutan, the author talks about the isolationist history of the country and her relationship with Tibet. It discusses the scenario of how the revolt of the 1950s in Tibet jerked Bhutan out of isolation and into closer cooperation with India. This results in the advent of

modernisation into the country through the gigantic tasks of reconstruction and rebuilding.

The book *Treasure of the Thunder Dragon: A Portrait of Bhutan*, by Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuk (2007), discuss Bhutan's history, where the author as a queen of the country shares her delight in some of the hidden treasures of her country, which she discovered during her journeys on foot to every corner of Bhutan. Her portraits the country as a captivating blends of personal memoir, history, folklore, and travelogue. The book provides unique and intimate insights into Bhutanese culture and society with its vivid glimpses of life in Bhutan's villages and hamlets, monasteries, and palaces. Her engaging account of her childhood, growing up in a village and the changes she witnessed when the country decided to end its isolation also tells the larger story which helps the study to understand the background and history of the country.

In the book *Bhutan: Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma*, A. C. Sinha (1998), discuss the political transition in Bhutan from the *Lamaist* monk ruler to regional feudal chiefs to contemporary nascent strategic elite controlling the destiny of the Bhutanese nation-building. The book has provided information that can help the study to understand the major forces in contributing to the political transformation in Bhutan from traditional to modern. It discusses the dilemma in Bhutan's transition from traditional to modern. The author has discussed the emerging national dilemma of Bhutan under the topics 'national versus ethnic identity', 'King versus national assembly', 'elitism versus populism', and 'frontier particularism versus universal modernity'.

The edited volume by Micheal Aris and Micheal Hutt, *Bhutan: Aspect of Culture and Development* (1994), is on Bhutan's traditional order in a way to deal with the change, after the departure of about 85,000 Nepali speaking people of Bhutan. This book places the wider context of contemporary Bhutan and also considered some of the dimensions of the broader issue of culture and development in Bhutan. Thierry

Mathou's *The Growth of Bhutanese Diplomacy, 1961-1991: Opportunities and Challenges*, explains the growing diplomacy of Bhutan since the seventeenth century, where the most isolated country in the world developed a formal relation with many nations and joined the international organisations.

The book *Bhutan: Dilemma of Change in a Himalayan Kingdom*, by B.C Upreti (2005), discuss the contemporary dilemma of Bhutan to modernize and develop the country but at the same time to preserve its traditional and cultural uniqueness. The author said that the outcomes of Bhutan's wants of socio-economic modernisation with cultural isolation was the contradiction that generated needs and pressures on the political system for change. A.C Sinha's *Dynamics of the Bhutanese Policy and Emergent Foreign Relations*, discusses the dynamics of Bhutan polity and talk about the major factors of Bhutan's transformation process. Mathew Joseph's book, *The Problems of National Identity Formation in Bhutan*, examines the challenges to the process of national identity formation and nation building. Mathew has discussed the conflict between the Nepalese immigrants and *Ngalong* dominated the Bhutanese state, which helps the study to understand the outcomes of the *Bhutanisation* process which, by and large, originated due to the quest for cultural preservation by the Bhutanese ruling elite.

Nari Rustomji, in *Bhutan: The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (1978)(the author of this were also the political officer of Bhutan during the 1960s-70s and was a very close friend of Bhutan's former Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji) argues that it was the Dorji's main contribution to start the modernisation process in Bhutan. Rustomji and Dorji had worked together on various events of Bhutan's developmental programs. The information provided in this book helps the study to understand the internal fraction in Bhutan's political system. The book carries a detail account of the controversies related to the Tibetan mistress and assassination of Jigmie Dorji. The author also briefly talks about the Tibetan factor in Bhutan's internal instability.

The book *The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong: The Untold Story of My Struggle for Tibet*, based on the struggles of Gyalo Thondup (brother of Dalai Lama), translated by Anne F. Thurston, offers the account of conspiracy, secret organisation, struggles, and role of foreign countries when Tibet was overrun by Communist China. Apart from the whole struggle he has been gone through, this book has also discussed about the controversy of Bhutan from the perspective of alleged Gyalo Thondup which helps the study to elaborate and analyse the issue further.

The book *Foreign Policy of Bhutan*, written by Rajesh S. Kharat (2005), provides reliable information on India-Bhutan relations and also its impact on her relation with China. It has also discussed the China factor in Bhutan's foreign policy. How the presence of China in Bhutan's border led to the changes in Bhutan's foreign policy determinants and objectives. Most significantly, the chapter five of the book talked about historical, traditional and cultural relations between Bhutan and Tibet region of present China, the implication of Chinese aggression on Tibet from 1951 to 1959, and the question of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan. These are very important and useful information for the current study.

The Kingdom at the Centre of the World: Journeys into Bhutan, by Omair Ahmad (2013), the book tell the story of Bhutan's emergence since the seventeenth century under the Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal who united Bhutan. Alongside, the book also examines the events around Bhutan that had affected it extremely, like the rise and fall of Tibet, the Mongol and the British empires, the spread of Nepali origin people, an influx of Tibetan refugee, Sikkim's dramatic loss of sovereignty, Gorkhaland movement for a separate state and the conflicting territorial ambition of India and China. Most fascinating of all, the book argues that, it is in Bhutan more perhaps than any other nation that, alternative mode of government and progresses are being tested in an increasingly homogenized system.

The book *Ancient Bhutan: A Study of Early Buddhism in the Himalaya*, written by Blanche C. Olschok (1971), provides the complete history of the advent of Buddhism

into the Himalayan region, which covers the way of Bhutan state was formed and their link with Tibet and China. The author called *Bumthang* and *Paro* instead of Bhutan where the first Buddhist missionary came in the 16th century. It talks about the history before the existence of the state Bhutan where Sindhu Raja was the ruler of *Bumthang*.

The book "*The Politics of Bhutan*", by Leo E. Rose (1977), discusses the transformational process in the political system of Bhutan from traditional to modern. It is about Bhutan's experiences with the development process which were different from most of the other Asian states in some significant respect. According to the author, Bhutan is of comparatively smooth and efficient early-stage transition from a society in which the preservation of traditional institutions and customs was the primary task of government to one in which the process of modernisation and change has become integral to the political system. The book has provided salient information on the changing dimensions of Bhutan's political system, adaptation of modernisation, and its major factors since the first Dharma Raja (Shabdrung Namgyal) till the fourth *Druk Gyalpo* Jigme Singye Wangchuk. It helps the study to look upon the internal factors and the factionalism among elite groups, community groups and so on which may force such changes in Bhutan.

The article "*A Preliminary Study of the Triangular Relationship between Bhutan, China and India*", of Kui-hsiang Hsu, discusses the triangular relationship between India Bhutan, and China, where after realising the strategic importance of Bhutan, several talk about the territorial dispute on different aspect had been taken place between Bhutan and India and between Bhutan and China. This article helps the study to identify China's priority of teaming up with Bhutan.

Settlement and Dispute: China's Approach to Territorial Issues, by Neville Maxwell (2006), is based on the records of China's territorial issues where China had dealt with delicate and potential issues on territorial ownership. It says that China get success to settle its land boundaries with all its neighbour countries except India and

Bhutan. The article also discusses the causes of unsettled boundary dispute between China, India, and Bhutan.

John Bray's article *Bhutan: Dilemma of a Small State* (1993), says on the dilemma of Bhutan which is common to other developing countries too, that how to balance tradition with modernity. It talks about the result of Bhutan's government decision and policies to preserve national identity and culture. It highlights the growing Nepali movements in southern Bhutan and their issues.

The book by Om Pradhan, '*Bhutan: The Roar of the Thunder Dragon*', is a complete history of the country from the perspective of Bhutanese people. The author of this book belongs to *Lhotshampas* community and has served various dignitary posts under the Royal Government of Bhutan. The book discussed the Buddhist sect system and its impact on Bhutan-Tibet relations. The author claims that the Royal Government of Bhutan was never against the Nepali people rather the third and fourth King has tried every possible measure to integrate them into the mainstream. He denied all the observation and claims made by the scholars on the act of ethnic cleansing in Bhutan during late 1980s. He argued that all the refugees in Nepal's camps were not from Bhutan, and also denied the merger of Sikkim as the causal factor behind the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies.

Expansionist Bases of China's Policy: A Legal and Political Case Study in Relation to Sikkim and Bhutan, by V.P Gupta (1968), talks about the Mao's strategic plan to conquer most of the Asian lands and his expansionist intention towards the south-eastern direction. Contemporary Chinese attempts to regard Bhutan and Sikkim as Chinese territory amount to falsifying history grossly and displaying expansionist appetites. It has bare the strategic design of expansionist China toward the Himalayan states of Bhutan and China.

TilakJha's *China and Its Peripheries: Limited Objectives in Bhutan* (2013), is based on the contemporary nature of Chinese policy toward Bhutan. Where the Chinese

realise the extent to which Bhutan can go against India and does not expect an incline to China's side. It talks about the Chinese hope that Bhutan might look up to China as an effective and reliable counterbalance to contain the inevitable Indian domination.

Bhutan-China Relations: Towards a New Step in Himalayan Politics by Thierry Mathou (2002), offers information on the relationship between Bhutan and China. It confers about the different phases of their relationship from ancient to contemporary. It has talked about the Tibetan factor in the relationship between China and Bhutan. The article also discussed India's involvement in the Sino-Bhutan disputes and Bhutan's keen interest in normalising their relations. It talks about China's strategy in restoring Tibet as a trading bridge into the Himalayan region in order to change the whole geopolitical settings of the region.

There are several works on the concept homogenisation and to understand and elaborate the concept homogenisation especially in the context of Bhutan. At first, homogenisation is used as a synonym with global culture or cultural aspect of globalisation. To understand the connection between the process homogenisation with globalisation, this study uses the work of Giddens (1991) *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. The author of the book discussed the global impact of modernity and due to its dynamism how the process is undercutting the traditional culture, habits, and custom. He discusses that how the process has alters the general nature of daily life and personal aspect of human activity. Giddens analyse that there is growing interconnection between globalisation influence and the local culture, which lead that individuals are creating their own self-identity which is homogeneous in nature in the era of modernity and it's completely different from the traditional understanding of self-identity.

Cultural homogenisation is defined as the aspect of cultural globalisation with a single global culture and the global culture is equated with American culture. Today the concept or idea of cultural homogenisation has been described as Americanisation and this Americanisation aspect of cultural homogenisation has been criticised for

destroying the cultural diversity, distinctiveness, and local identity. Daghrir's article, '*Globalisation as Americanisation? Beyond the Conspiracy Theory*', is a complete debate on the impact of American culture in the world. Daghrir argues that how America dominates the world through information and ideas, the American music, movies, news channel, television shows, American food (McDonald) and software are so visible and available in every part of the world. Therefore, there is growing insecurity among the other nations in losing their local culture and national identity into unsound American consumerism.

The book written by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Globalisation: The Key Concepts*, has discussed the homogenisation character of identity politics in the era of globalisation. He argued that the era of modernisation and globalisation marked the complex process of homogenisation and differences simultaneously. There are some differences which are vanished but some emerge. While talking about identity politics in the era of globalisation, he claims that the culture and the cultural identity are the important tools in the hand of the leaders or the spokesperson to achieve their political legitimacy. He has offered various reasons that how the process globalisation creates the condition for localisation through entities like countries (nationalism and separatism), faith systems (religious revitalisation), and cultures (linguistic and cultural movement). In this phase of globalisation, he argued that the more similar they become, the more different they try to be and identity politics is a trueborn child of globalisation.

The edited book by B.N Patnaik and S. Imtiaz Hasnain, *Globalisation: Language, Culture and Media*, has provided the role of media in the way of creating cultural and linguistic hegemony in the era of globalisation. By discussing the role of media or the internet, the book talks about the ambivalence of globalisation, globalisation through media creating a common platform for the people around the world in hand, and on the other hand it has also creating consciousness among the people about their cultural distinctiveness. The book has critically discussed the idea of Americanisation in the

context of culture, how the process globalisation revitalised and pluralised the western culture and present them un-problematically universal and further evokes the insight that the Western belief system is tolerable and the 'Rest' as intolerant.

As the ideas of Americanisation of global culture in the age of globalisation has been a specific version of cultural homogenisation debate, the book by Robert J. Holton on *Globalisation and the Nation State* is giving answers to the critics on the negative impact of globalisation in the local culture and depleting role of the nation-state in the world order. In the popular version of homogenisation argument i.e. the cultural homogenisation means as Americanisation or Westernisation and where the process globalisation plays the role to impose Western cultural imperialism on the non-Western world, the author argued that it is clear in the 21st century that there is widespread cross-border cultural encounters, conflicts, exchanges of technology, profession, religions, music and sports and there are also the wide range of processes including global migration, travels, communication and so on which have a multi-centred impact on global complexity rather than direct domination by the West to the Rest. Instead of Americanisation or Westernisation, author claim that the global culture is the hybrid product of different cultures.

The concept homogenisation has been used in the study of nationalism subsequently and one of the major theorists of nationalism is Ernest Gellner, who linked the concept homogenisation in the theory of nationalism. The edited volume by Malesevic and Mark Haugaard, *Ernest Gellner and Contemporary Social Thought*, is a complete collection of Gellener's works and his contribution to social and political analysis. The contributors of this book identify the main themes of Gellner's theory of nationalism based on Gellner's interpretation of the significance of nationalism which is important for the study. However, the book is not only about Gellner's life works, here the contributors also draw their understanding on these themes which led some criticism on Gellner's arguments of his ontological, epistemological and socio-historical flaws.

This study has used the work of Kohn (1944) *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, as this book comprehensively analyse the emergence of the idea of nationalism in its universal implications from the time of Hebrews and Greek antiquity to the eve of the French revolution. In this book, Kohn represents the single most influential articulation of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. It helps the study to apply the idea in the context of Bhutan.

The book *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, and History*, by Anthony D. Smith provide a new dimension in the conception of nationalism. Here the author has discussed very briefly about his theory and focuses more on the theoretical contribution from different disciplines. This book is a revised and updated version of contemporary development and the latest scholarly works in the field of nationalism. It has provided a brief and accessible introduction to the main concept and discusses various types of nationalist ideology and analyse the major competing paradigms and theories of nations and nationalism.

Article by Daniel Conversi on “Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should be we Still Read Ernest Gellner?”, also talk about the importance of Gellner’s theory in the contemporary nationalism studies. It has restated Gellner’s enduring relevance and summarize his key views on the theory of nationalism and cultural homogenisation i.e. language-centeredness and ‘High Culture’. The author has also identified those aspects of culture which lend themselves to be easily standardised. After restating the relevance of Gellner’s works, the author of this article also discussed the lack in Gellner’s theory of homogenisation and nationalism about their connection with the militarisation process. He further claims that homogenisation was sought in a contest of war and mass conscription.

Article by Andre Lecours “Ethnic and Civic Nationalism: Toward a New Dimension”, has discussed the new dimension in civic-ethnic distinction and determined the civic as objective and ethnic as subjective conception of nationalism which are related to socio-economic and intellectual condition to a particular historical and spatial

dimension. He argued that ethnic nationalism usually associated with socio-economic structure and civic nationalism is mostly inclined with the intellectual condition. Without ignoring the socio-economic structure and intellectual fabric, the author has also signified the importance of the goals of the nationalist movement and their definition of nationalism. According to him the movement which asks for autonomy is better able to frame their discourse in territorial and non-ethnic terms. But the secessionist movements necessarily stress on cultural distinctiveness for them it is very difficult to have the goals of a rational and universal concept of political liberty. Their leaders need to provide cultural markers with subjective meaning to build internal consistency and to formulate the most powerful arguments for secession. Their major goal would be to create their ethnic group as a majority in their own country.

The above reviews of major available literature on Bhutan's relation with Tibet and China and related issues reveals the existing knowledge gap on Tibet factor in Bhutan's transformation and cultural homogenisation. There are very few works discusses the Tibetan factor and the role of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan's homogenisation process, and that too, not in a coherent manner. In fact, except Omar Ahmed's book, *The Kingdom at the Centre of the World*, where the author briefly discusses the internal crisis created by the Tibetan immigrants, there are no other works that study and reflect on how Tibetans came as a factor in the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policy. While focussing on Tibetan factor, this study attempts to examine this in detail.

1.4 The Frame work of Analysis

This study examines the Tibetan factor- the role of Tibetan refugees - in the socio-political transformation of Bhutan and particularly in the *Bhutanisation* process. Most of the available literature on the relationship between China and Bhutan discuss about the issue of the border dispute. Hence, the study will discuss about the impact of Chinese aggression over Tibet on every transformation process of Bhutan, through

revisiting the entire process from modernisation to *Bhutanisation*, analysing every events and incident on Bhutan's domestic politics, and examining the Tibetan factor (those of who migrated in Bhutan after 1959) in Bhutan.

The problem in which the study concern is, after opening her border to the outside world, from the 1960 to 1971, from the membership of the Colombo Plan to the member of United Nations and SAARC, we can find Bhutan in the high swing of departure from its isolationist policies towards modernisation. But what would be the matter that the country in such a situation of rapid modernisation had suddenly turned back and started adopting such traditional and sophisticated assimilation policies²³? The available literature indicates that, it is due to the growing number of Nepali immigrants who were pouring into Bhutan from the southern border. However, it has been seen that the problem between the Nepali population and the Royal Government of Bhutan had been more or less resolved with the amendment of the 1958 Citizenship Act, through issuing the first class citizenship card to the Nepali population²⁴. The RGB to differentiate the Bhutanese Nepali from other Nepali people offered them a unique identity and called them '*Lhotshampas*' (the southerners).

When discuss the incident of Sikkim's merger with India, it is understood that Bhutan had been afraid of being in the same fate. But the situation of Bhutan and Sikkim are qualitatively different both in political and legal terms. Moreover, India-Bhutan relations are based upon the Treaty of 1949 in which Bhutan's independence is especially acknowledged²⁵. Further, Bhutan is a full-fledged member of the United Nations, which Sikkim's *Chogyal* always dreamed but unable to achieve. With the

²³Policies like *Driglamnamza* (one nation one culture), and the renewal of the 1958 Citizenship Act, etc..

²⁴The news of Sikkim's merger into Indian Territory after the downfall of *Chogyal* dynasty in Sikkim with the support of Nepali community in 1975, led the king of Bhutan to be more suspicious towards his Nepali subjects.

²⁵During his first visit to Bhutan Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1958 state that, "Though India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan is a small one, she wished Bhutan to remain independent country".

membership of United Nations, Bhutan has got equal foot in international forum and if a country should foresee any threats to its survival, it may raise its voice.

However, the Royal Government of Bhutan realised the threat from the political developments in her neighbour states. In this context, the study places the problem of presence of Tibetan refugees and the perceived Chinese threat in Bhutan. In 1959, after the great uprising in Lhasa, Chinese forces were deployed in its border with Bhutan. Tibetan refugees, who started pouring into Bhutan from 1959, were first welcomed by the Kingdom. Cultural and religious relations facilitated their installation. During the 1960s, the Tibetan community prospered in Bhutan. Several Tibetans started businesses and opened shops in *Thimphu*, *Trongsa*, *Trashigang*, and *Bumthang*. In 1973, the Tibetan community in Bhutan represented approximately 6,300 refugees (Mathou, 2013).

The Chinese, as part of the expansionist policy, constantly claimed suzerainty over Bhutan. After failure in production of any solid historical evidence for the same, their claim was completely based on the Tibetan lineage. In the ongoing tension between Bhutan and China, in 1961, the Royal Government of Bhutan announced that “they neither want to be friends or nor foe” with China (Kharat, 2005; 129). For that purpose, Bhutan has never shared any diplomatic relation with China nor the country wanted to take any risk to play the role of the foe by supporting/promoting the cause of free Tibet. In some respects, the complexity of the relations between Bhutan and ancient Tibet has survived through the ages. The *Drukpa* sect has remained independent from the *Gelugpa* establishment. The Chinese authorities, however, have all reasons to be satisfied with the RGB's policy that exclude all kind of official contacts with *Dharamshala*. Dalai Lama, who travels a lot as a prominent Buddhist leader, has never visited Bhutan. As the only Mahayana Buddhist state in the world, with strong cultural, religious, and historical links with ancient Tibet, Bhutan has sympathy for modern Tibet. However, the RGB has never advocated a pro-active policy in any international body in favour of the demand for free Tibet.

But the problem actually began in the late 1960s; the Tibetans in Bhutan were predominantly from the *Gelugpa* sect, while in Bhutan, the *Drukpa* tradition held sway. The Tibetans also have believed that they came from a superior civilisation. Even though they respected Bhutan's religion and traditions, they always used to pay their loyalty towards the religious head of the *Gelugpa* sect (Dalai Lama). This has led a negative vibe among Chinese which see Bhutan a shelter for Tibetan political activists work against China. Suspicion was nurtured by the growing influence of Tibetans in business circles and in the associates of the King which created strong resentment among Bhutanese. That situation coincided with an atmosphere of conspiracy²⁶ that prevailed on the internal scene.

In 1979, the National Assembly of Bhutan decided that Tibetans, who had arrived in Bhutan after 1959, had to choose between becoming Bhutanese citizens and leaving the country. About 2,300 people accepted to make allegiance to the *Druk Gyalpo* and therefore became Bhutanese citizens. The situation of the remaining 4,000 refugees proved to be a difficult question to be solved (Kuensel, 1976). Being a multi-ethnic, multi-religion, and multi-lingual nation, the policies of assimilation had not only affected the Tibetans but other respective communities including *Lhotshampas*.

Overall, this study discusses the strategic move of Bhutan's ruling elite and how do they divert China's attention from Tibetan refugee activities in Bhutan, and they enforce homogenisation policy more on the Nepali population in southern Bhutan. The Nepali population became a soft target factor in the entire situation of tension between the Bhutan, Tibetans, and China, which in turn, became favourable for the Bhutan government, after tagging the Nepali people the illegal immigrants and forced them to leave Bhutan.

²⁶Conspiracy of Jigmie Dorji assassination in 1964, nobody knows the detailed story, but according to Nari Rustomji India's political officer of Bhutan, it was the Yangki a Tibetan mistress of the third king behind the plot.

1.5 Rationale and Scope

Regarding the adaptation of modernisation in the country, it is said that Bhutan had observed the high-level of development in her neighbour countries, that's why Bhutan decided to undo its centuries-old isolationist policy and adopted modernisation policy for all-round development. The existing literature on reasons behind the adaptation of cultural homogenisation in Bhutan claims that the last *Shangri-La* become important for Bhutan to preserve and protect its culture from the forces of modernisation. Therefore, Bhutan's ruling elite had adopted such assimilation policies. Lastly, some critical works claim that Bhutan's ruling elite had felt threat to their position due to the ongoing political development in their neighbouring countries.

The scope of this study is that it looks upon the Tibetan factor in the homogenisation process in Bhutan. Tibet factor is always there even from the birth of the country and it still exists in the form of culture and religion in the Bhutanese society. Since the Tibet factor has been marginalised from the mainstream discussions on the process of *Bhutanisation*, this study provides a scope of discussing such a much covered/ignored chapter and provides the information which can help to fill the knowledge gap on the issue.

1.6 Objectives of the Study

1. To discuss the concept homogenisation in the context of Bhutan.
2. To explore the historical link between Bhutan and Tibet.
3. To examine the impacts of Chinese aggression over Tibet in the socio-political transformations in Bhutan.
4. To analyse the causes of adaptation of cultural homogenisation policies in Bhutan.
5. To discuss whether and how Tibetan Refugees (those who migrated after the 1959 crisis in Tibet) become a factor in Bhutan's cultural homogenisation process.
6. To locate the *Lhotshmapas*' issue in Bhutan's homogenisation process.

1.7 Research Questions

1. What comprises cultural homogenisation in Bhutan?
2. What are the major forces behind Bhutan's transformation process?
3. How does the Tibetan factor influence the policies of modern Bhutan?
4. What is the connection between Tibetan refugees with *Bhutanisation* process?
5. During the ongoing process of cultural homogenisation by targeting the *Lhotshampa* people, does Bhutan's ruling elite have the intention to divert the Chinese attention?

1.8 Methodology

The study is about understanding, re-examining, and analysing the incidents which were happened in the past. So, this study is based on the historical-analytical method and explanatory in nature. To find out the precise timeline of Bhutan's homogenisation process, it reviewed the documents from public records and relevant Acts; consulted newspapers, websites, policy manuals, and private documents and letters; studied articles from journals and online articles, books etc. For data collection, the study mainly used qualitative methods such as conducting informal interviews with a focus group (Bhutanese citizens, Tibetan refugees, and Nepalese refugees) and interacting people from the similar groups to understand the problem from their perspectives. However, some matters were controversial and could not discuss in open places and therefore, one-on-one interviews has also been conducted for getting detailed information and in-depth understanding.

Since the issue is still very sensitive and controversial, the questions were kept open-ended. To find out the answer to the research questions, the study utilized both primary and secondary sources from different institutions, libraries and archives. It has also used audio-visual materials like videos from online sources and social media, oral history projects, photographs from Tibetan museum (*Kalimpong*), Bhutan Arts and Handicraft (*Paro*) and Tibetan library and museum (*Dharamshala*). Audio

recordings of respondents have been done and later used them to verify the information. For verification to answers of the respondents, it used telephonic and e-mail survey.

1.9Chaptarisation

- 1.Introduction:** This chapter is a brief introduction of the whole study. It consists of introduction section, literature review, research questions, and objectives of the study, rationale and scope, methodology, background of the study, theoretical framework and the subsequent chapters of the study. It described the historical background of the country. It has also discussed the history of existing communities and their art and culture, tradition, religion, and language.
- 2. Historical Origin and Developments in Bhutan-Tibet Relations:** This chapter is based on the history of religious and cultural links between Bhutan and Tibet. It deals with the history of the existence of Buddhism in Bhutan and Tibet from different periods of time, their hierarchical system, different sects, and the existence of the theocratic system. This chapter has also discussed the history of socio-political and cultural relationship between Bhutan and Tibet. It has also discussed the origin of *Drukpa* school of thought and its emergence in Bhutan.
- 3. Bhutanisation: The Cultural Homogenisation in Bhutan:** This chapter discuss the concept homogenisation in a broader sense and bring it into the context of Bhutan during the period of 1960s to the 1980s. It has also discussed the circumstances under which Bhutan adopt the homogenisation process. It has discussed in details the homogenisation policies adopted by Royal Government of Bhutan through the amendments of Citizenship Act in 1977 and 1981, and also through the implementation of Marriage Act in 1988 and the Code of '*Driglamnamzha*' ('one nation one culture') in 1989.

- 4. The Tibetan Factor in the Homogenisation Process in Bhutan: An Examination:** this chapter has discussed the Tibetan refugees, mostly those who migrated after the 1959 crisis, as a factor in the relationship between Bhutan and China and also the *Bhutanisation* process. It gives a very detail account of the incidents and events lead to the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji and the alleged role played by the Tibetan community in Bhutan in it. The chapter discusses various political developments in Bhutan in which the Tibetan community played an active role that has critical impacts on the domestic politics as well as the implementation of cultural homogenisation policies in Bhutan. The chapter effectively links the Tibet factor with the new assimilation efforts of the state under *Bhutanisation*.
- 5. The *Bhutanisation* Process and the *Lhotshampas*: Becoming the Soft Target Factor:** The chapter describe the origin of ethnic conflict in Bhutan. It has discussed the origin of Nepali population in Bhutan, their social life, culture and belief system. It has also discussed how *Lhotshampas* reacted to the assimilation policies of Bhutan's government, and why they were targeted by the state. It has further discussed situations which forced the Nepali people to leave the country.
- 6. Conclusion:** After restating the research questions, this chapter summarise the major findings and the implications of the study.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Origin and Developments in Bhutan-Tibet Relations

2.1 Introduction

To understand the historical roots and routes of the relations of Tibet and Bhutan, this chapter closely examines the early history of Bhutan. The chapter also discuss the impacts of Tibet upon Bhutan through analysing the origin and meanings of different names of the country. Since the political history of Bhutan is closely linked with the religious history, this chapter also discusses the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet from the perspective of diffusion of Buddhism into Bhutan.

As being the last *Shangrila*¹, Bhutan has been always try to preserved and maintained its culture and traditions (Rai, 2020; 60). Tibetan influence in Bhutan can be traced mainly on its religion and culture. Both the countries profess the same religion i.e. Mahayana Buddhism² and consequently, the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet have been cemented based upon the common cultural and religious ties. The state has adopted Buddhism as its national religion and emphasises about the significance of the principles of Buddhism in the nation building process. The monastic Buddhism has provided necessary institutional foundation and dynamism for the eventual unification of the country under the first Dharma Raja (Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal).

¹It is a fictional place described by a British author James Hilton in 1933 in his novel *Lost Horizon*. He described the term *Shangri-la* as a mystical, harmonious valley, gently guided from a lamasery, enclosed in the western end of the Kunlun Mountains. It is also mentioned in the ancient Tibetan scriptures as *Nghe-beyuls*, according to scriptures there are seven such hidden lands similar to *Shangri-la*, which was created by Guru Padmashambhava in the 9th century as idyllic, sacred places of refuge for Buddhist during the time of strife. At present there are four such places in the Himalayan region which are considered as the centre Buddhism they are *Ladakh*, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. First, *Ladakh* in 19th century came under the rule *Dogra* King of Kashmir and later as the part of Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1959, China took over the Tibet and Sikkim was annexed into Indian Territory in 1975. Bhutan is the only one which has survived as an independent state till today.

²After the death of Buddha, Buddhism was divided into two sects namely Mahayana and *Hinayana*. The Mahayana sect of Buddhism believes in the heavenliness of Buddha and believes in the idol worship. This sect is spread from India to several other nations such as China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Mongolia. It believes in mantras, its main principles were based on the possibility of universal liberation from suffering from all beings it allows salvation through having faith and committing oneself to Buddha.

Before the advent of first Shabdrung, Bhutan was divided into many small Kingdoms ruled by different Kings and it has been written that some of them were from Tibet.

Bhutan and Tibet shares a very special historical link and Bhutan has undeniable historical ties with Tibet. Tibet is also considered as the cultural capital of Bhutan (Sinha, 1991; 73). It has been claimed by many scholars that, Buddhism in entire region of Eastern Himalaya (Bhutan, Sikkim, *Ladakh*, and Arunachal Pradesh) is spread from/through Tibet (Richardson and Snellgrove, 1968; Aris, 1997). Ever since the development of Buddhism in Tibet, the country has earned the religious leadership by sending Buddhist missionaries or monks to Bhutan and Sikkim, two Himalayan Kingdoms. The Tibetan origin of Bhutan's traditional elites and its theocratic political system has symbolised strong cultural and political ties between the two countries (Rai, 2020; 60). Most of the Bhutanese civil and ecclesiastical officials' inheritance can also be traced back to Tibet. Therefore, Tibetan influence had been of great importance in Bhutan from several centuries which remained as a critical factor in the evolution of its political social and cultural institutions.

The prominent *Drukpa Kagyupa* form of Buddhism, which is considered as the national religion of Bhutan, has been practiced by the elite community in Bhutan (Rai, 2020; 65). The rise of *Gelyugpa* in A.D 16th and 17th centuries and its vigorous proselytising activities undermined the strongholds of old sects like *Nyingmapa* (commonly known as the red hat sect because of the red hats of their adherents) and made them migrate towards the south of the Himalaya, particularly to Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. The Nawang Namgyal (1594-1651)³, a scion of the house of *Gya* of *Druk* and *Ralung* and the head of the *Druk* sub-sect of the *Kargyupa*, had fled to Bhutan and founded the southern branch of *Drukpa* in Bhutan called *Lho Drukpa* (Rahul, 1969; 102). He proclaimed Bhutan a theocracy and himself as its supreme

³For his religious work in Bhutan, Nawang Namgyal came to be known as Shabdrung Rimpoche (Dharma Raja and spiritual ruler). The name was used in his own lifetime both by lamas and laymen. It has been believed that he took rebirth frequently generation after generation. He had several aliases, but the name Nawang Namgyal was the one commonly used. The expression Dujom Dorji was more an honorific than the part of his name.

spiritual head (Rose, 1977; 23). Bhutan had also developed close trade relations with Tibet in the past, where Tibet provided a free market for Bhutan's surplus rice and other items like woollen materials and musk⁴.

The early political history of Bhutan is closely interlinked with its religious history. As it is in Tibet, the Government of Bhutan is the guardian and chief patron of Buddhism and has always ruled by its principles. The monastic Buddhism imported from Tibet had provided the institutional vigor and foundation for the ultimate unification of the country under the first *Rimpoche* (Rose, 1977; 24). The title Dharma Raja as the Shabdrung Namgyal (*Rimpoche*) of Bhutan was mostly known to the East India as, "King of righteous law", which means, a King who rule according to the tenets of Buddhism⁵. The first Dharma Raja (Shabdrung Namgyal) travelled all the way from Tibet and, established the Tibetan pattern of theocratic system in the country. Bhutan was a theocratic state from 1616 to 1907 period, and Shabdrung *Rimpoche* was the supreme authority with religious and political powers of Bhutan were there at his disposal (Rai, 2020; 61). The Shabdrung *Rimpoche* was succeeded as an incarnation like the Dalai Lama of Tibet. Unlike Tibet, Bhutan was not a total theocracy as there were some powerful aristocratic families usually dominated the political affairs of the country.

Despite the familiarity in the political system, the political relationship between Bhutan and Tibet was not very smooth. The rivalry between Bhutan and Tibet were the common features, even before and after the advent of Shabdrung Namgyal. During the Anglo-Tibetan war of 1888-89, Bhutan supported the British East India

⁴However, with the Chinese occupation in Tibet in 1959-60, the trading pattern has been changed entirely and almost all kind of trade with Tibet and China came to an end. Bhutan has blocked her northern border permanently and started exporting her products into southern neighbour (India), which in return also supplies items required for it (Coelho, 1971; 91).

⁵Buddhism requires that a king, if he is fond of Dharma, should find the path to happiness both in this and in future lives by acting in accordance with its tenets. Subsequently, the subject will as the ruler and therefore the ruler should strive to learn Dharma.

Company against Tibet. There are several factors⁶ responsible for Bhutan to support British India against Tibet (Kharat, 2005; 124). Consequently, the Bhutanese cooperation with British India against Tibet made the Chinese to proclaim that Bhutan directly came under their jurisdiction. They insisted that the Chinese *Amban* in Tibet should be allowed to check the resources of Bhutan. Although Bhutan has never allowed any Chinese *Amban* into the country, but on the basis of such historical claims, China still stresses its historical suzerainty on Bhutan. Apart from the impact of Chinese proclamation in Tibet, there are other areas where we find the Tibetan influence in Bhutan, including the origin of the name of the country.

2.2 The Country with Different Names

Bhutanese have etymologies for nearly all their places names. Throughout Bhutan, one can find even today a rich tradition of using *typonyms* to tell historical and religious narratives. Bhutan has been called by various names and in each of these names have Tibetan referents. The origin of the name Bhutan has been explained by various scholars. Some claimed that the name Bhutan is derived from the Sanskrit word *Bhotanta* meaning the end (*anta*) and the border land of *Bhota* (i.e. Tibet) (Chakravarti, 2003; 1). There is another group of scholars who claim that the name Bhutan is derived from the word *Bhutanam* means the country of the *Bhotas* - the people who speak Tibetan dialects.

According to traditional Bhutanese historians, before the advent of Buddhism in Bhutan, the country was known by the name *Lhoyul* (southern country) or *Lhomon* or *Mon Yul* (country of the Mon). Earlier, the meaning of *Mon Yul* refers to 'dark country', where the Tibetan believed that the countries of the southern Tibet is in darkness because they did not receive the enlightenment of Buddhism (Chakravarti, 2003; 2). The inhabitants in the southern part of the border were known to the central

⁶According to J.C White, Tibet failed to support Bhutan in the war against British in 1864 and they didn't oppose the annexation of Bhutan's Duars by the British government. During 1869-1907, there were ongoing civil wars between different *Penlops* in Bhutan, so the *Tsongsa Penlop* Ugen Wangchuk decided to take the British support against his political rivals.

Tibetans as *Monpa* or dark people because they were considered to live in a condition of socio-spiritual darkness. Unlike in Central Tibet, where Buddhist civilisation had reached its peak by the middle of the eighth century A.D, the people in the southern borderland were in darkness without the light of Buddha's wisdom (Phuntsho, 2013;2)

The term *Mon* and *Monpa* are names used with no fixed referent. The Chinese called some Tibetans *Mon* or barbarians, the Tibetan certainly used the term to refer to people from their border areas who they considered dark and uncivilised (Phuntsho, 2013; 3). In case of the name being used for Bhutan, it is more plausible that the term was used loosely to describe the primitive and rural people from the borderlands. The use of the name *Mon* for ancient Bhutan and its etymology are based on a very Tibet centric worldview. Since, Tibet is considered to be the centre of Buddhist civilisation, Bhutan and other Himalayan hinterlands are assumed to be at the peripheries of this civilised world. As the superior country describes its smaller neighbours condescendingly, the term *Mon* also carries a derogatory connotation to Bhutan.

Another name by which Bhutan was known in the past centuries is *Lhomonkhazi* (the southern *Mon* of four approaches) (Rahul, 1971; 2). This name was commonly used to refer Bhutan in ancient time, even today; the name is frequently used in its modern variation: "the Dragon Country of Four Approaches". Even, the name *Lhomonkhazi* has played an important role by providing the country's a distinct geographically centred identity. One of the enumerations of the four approaches is *Dungsamkha* to the east, *Pasakha* to the south, *Dalingkha* to the west and *Taktsherakha* to the north-places located in the four corners of the country and roughly corresponding to the current state boundary of Bhutan (Phuntsho, 2013; 4).

However, the name *Lhomonkhazi* is also used to refer to a country with its loose domain extending as far as *Khaling* to the east, *Chumbi* valley to the west, India to the south and *Pahari* to the north (Phuntsho, 2013; 5). According to the local oral tradition, the name *Lhomonkhazi* is not understood as the southern *Mon* of four

approaches, rather as the four southern Mon approaches. This claim, the name instead of implying a unitary land with four approaches, refers to four individual places which lies south of Tibet and served as significant doors or approaches to Tibet in ancient time (Phuntsho, 2013; 5).

The country has also been known by the name of *Menjong*, ‘the land of medicinal herbs’. This name was used to refer to the area of *Paro* valley even as early as the A.D. 13th century. Located on the southern slopes of the Himalayan watershed, Bhutan enjoyed immense botanical richness compare to the Tibetan plateau. An herb like paper was highly valued in Tibet, throughout the ages; Bhutanese sent freight loads of herbs and paper to Tibet as both in the form of gift and trade items. The second *Desi* ruler of Bhutan (Tenzing Drukdra, 1602-67), for instance, made mass distribution of herbs to all the doctors of Tibet twice during his reign (Phuntsho, 2013; 5). The botanical prosperity of the country is considered in some way as the work of the great Tibetan dynastic period⁷.

The most common name of Bhutan which is mostly used by both the Bhutanese people and their neighbours is *Druk*⁸ means Thunder Dragon, and by extension, *Drukkyul*, ‘Land of Thunder Dragon’ or *Druk Gyalkhab*, the ‘Thunder Dragon Country’ (Phuntsho, 2013; 8). Like other names of Bhutan, the name *Druk* also has its origin in Tibet. There is a prevailing story about the Tsangpa Gyre Yeshe Dorji⁹ who founded the *Drukpa* school of Himalayan Buddhism in Tibet around 12th century A.D after witnessing nine dragons rising between the earth and sky from the high mountain (Ahmad, 2013; 2). He was visiting the *Nam* area following the prophetic

⁷However, there is an interesting story which proclaims the Tibetan origin for the herbal richness of the country. Long ago, when princess Wencheng, known to Bhutanese as Ashe Jaza, came to Tibet as bride for the King of Tibet Songtsen Gempo. She also carried with her a pouch of medicinal seeds, which she cast into the sky upon her arrival in Tibet with prayers that they may spread across the land. Few seeds landed on *Chagpori* while the rest were carried by the north wind to the southern mountains of *Lhomon*. *Chagpori* later became well-known for medicinal and astral studies in Tibet and the southern land became rich for medicinal herbs (Phuntsho, 2013; 7).

⁸The dragons in Bhutan, Tibet and China are not the exaggerated monster of western legends. In fact, spiritually they represent the higher nature that imbues all humanity and inspires us to rise above worldly concerns.

⁹A renowned meditation master and ancestor of Bhutan’s founding father.

instructions of his teacher and tutelary deities to set up a spiritual centre. He reported that nine dragons were there and as he approached, the dragons flew off, triggering a clap of booming thunder in the sky and it rained flowers. He observed these as an auspicious signs for the foundation of his centre and thus name the place *Druk* or Dragon (Phuntsho, 2013; 9).

With a major *Drukpa* centre located at *Ralung* (Tibet), which is nearer to Bhutan's northern border, the tradition has quickly found its way to the western valleys of modern Bhutan. Phajo Drukgom Shigpo is considered as the first lama who brought this tradition into the valley (Rahul, 1971; 19). He was from eastern Tibet who journeyed south on a religious mission, following the instruction of his master¹⁰. Some local historians claim that Bhutan was called *Drukyul* and her people *Drukpa* after the conversion of most of the people into the *Drukpa* School by Drukgon Shigpo (Phuntsho, 2013; 10). The people of Bhutan consider him as the precursor of the present *Drukpa Kagyu* School of Buddhism in Bhutan. Drukgon Shigpo successfully managed to establish himself in the western valley by using Buddhism, diplomacy, sorcery and warfare. By the end of his life, he has established the *Drukpa* tradition in the western valley of modern Bhutan (Rahul, 1971; 19).

All the names which are discussed above were unknown for the country's southern neighbours (Assam, Bengal and Bihar). They used to call the people from the northern highlands *Bhoteas* or *Bhutias*, the term which used to refer to people of Tibetan (Mongoloid racial group) origin. However, the present name of the state Bhutan has a British legacy as well. The British had very little information about Bhutan when they took over Bengal and Assam plains located in Bhutan's southern neighbourhood. The Portuguese Jesuits Estevao Cacella and Joao Cabral were the first Europeans who visited Bhutan and in their report dated 4 October 1627, they call the country *Cambirasi* (Phuntsho 2013; 12). At that time, Bhutanese used to call the name

¹⁰There were other lamas like Gyawa Lhanangpa, Longchenpa Drime Ozer, Barawa, Gyaltzen Pasang and Kunga Pajo, who came to Bhutan from Tibet for missionary work after 1200 AD, exercised a measure of nominal temporal control in Western Bhutan.

of the country as *Lhokhashi* and according to Phuntsho (2013), due to the difficulty in pronunciation in Portuguese, both *Cambirsi* and *Lhokhashi* might carry the same meaning (Phuntsho, 2013; 12). Jesuits seem to have made a clear distinction between Bhutan and Tibet by using *Cambirasi* for Bhutan and *Potente*¹¹ for Tibet.

An adventurous English merchant, Ralf Fitch is said to have sighted ‘*Bottaner*’ to the north of Bengal around 1586 and a book by Giovanni Peruschi published in 1597 contained a map showing a ‘*Botthantipopuli*’, undoubtedly referring to the Tibetan people. After that, the Italian cartographer *Cantelli*, in his maps produced in 1682 and 1683. Placed ‘*Boutan*’ in a number of locations between India and the Tartars and used the names *Boutan*, *Thibet* and *Barontola* in a number of ways. Thus, Romola Gandolfo, who carried out a detailed study of the name Bhutan on European maps and concluded that ‘all supposed references to “Bhutan” based on western historical sources produced before 1765 should be understood as having nothing to do with present-day Bhutan, rather, they refer to the whole of Tibet, or at least to that large portion of it which was called Greater Tibet and had Lhasa as its capital (Romola Gandolfo, 2004).

However, until 1765, in spite of Jesuits report of 1627, the European explorers and cartographers did not really know about the geopolitical existence of two separate states in the region. They used the names *Boutan* and *Thibet* interchangeably and were not aware of a small *Drukpa* state to the north of Bengal but independent of Tibet. It was in 1774, when the first British mission to Tibet led by George Bogle and his team made their journey through modern Bhutan, where they stayed for about four months and met the 17th Deb Raja, and finally reached the place of 3rd Panchem Lama (also called the Teshoo Lama after his monastic seat of *Tashilhunpo*) (Phuntsho, 2013; 13).

¹¹*Potente* was one among the combination of those names which was referred by early European explorers as the mountainous area of north of Bengal and Assam plains extending as far as China. Apart from *Potente*, the other names include *Bottan*, *Bottaner*, *Botton*, *Boutan*, *Bootan*, *Butan*, *Botenti*, *Pettent*, *Bhutanta*, *Porangke*, *Tobat*, *Thebet*, *Thibet* and *Barontola*. These names were used to designate either the whole of the Tibetan world or part thereof (sometimes two or three of these names appear on the same map referring to different regions and other times they are applied, often synonymously, to the same place).

It was during the course of the mission, which Bogle learnt that there were two different countries with distinct political jurisdictions, and referred to the first one initially as the Deb raja's country and the other as the Teesho Lama's country. Then, he seems to have fluctuated between the Deb Raja's country and *Boutan*, perhaps not being able to make up his mind about which name to choose, and turned towards using *Boutan* for the Deb Raja's country and Tibet for the Teesho Lama's country. In the report dated 30 September 1775, which he wrote after returning from Tibet and while staying in Bhutan, that he determinedly secured the name of the country. He wrote, 'this country, which I shall distinguish by the name *Boutan*', referring to the Deb Raja's country (which is now call Bhutan) (Phuntsho, 2013; 13).

2.3 Early History of Bhutan

The early history of Bhutan is uncertain and vague. There are contradictory claims on the origin of the country and its early history. J.C White and Coelho have talked about the natural calamity like fire, earthquakes and flood and internecine war are some reliable reason behind the gloominess of early history Bhutan (White, 2005; 99). According to White, the accidental burning of *Punakha* in 1832 and the widespread destruction of building by the earthquake of 1897 were particularly responsible for the vagueness of the Bhutan's early history. There were total destruction of the library of the present *Tongsa Penlop* and only a few of the manuscripts were saved, from which White was able to gather some information (Rai, 2020; 64). He talked about the legends of early Bhutan named Sagaldip who came from the region of *Kooch*. In 7th century A.D Sagaldip conquered the countries of Bengal and Bihar, fighting against Raja Kedar of *Lakhnaute* or Gaur and was later defeated by Piran Viash, General of *Afrasaib*, and King of *Turan* or Tartary (Coelho, 1971; 59). The later part of the early history of Bhutan is dominated by the diffusion of Buddhism in the Himalayas especially in Tibet.

The pre-Buddhist religion of Bhutan was *Bon* and it is believed that Bon originally came from *Zanzun* (a country near to the mountain *Kailasa* and *Manas Sarovar*)

(Chakravarti, 2003; 30). Initially, the religion was brought into Tibet by Senrab. It is believed that, the religion had come to Bhutan through the mountain passes of Tibet or from India through *Duars*. The old Tibetan 'Bon' has following meanings; (1) to invoke (a verb); and (2) to seed (a noun). Again, *Bonis* said to be the Tibetan synonym of the *Shanshung* word 'gyer' which means chant (Rampel, 1999; 15).

The *Bon* religion included the local divinities (*sa-bdag*) in its pantheon from the indigenous religion is evident from the reproach of the *Bon* text *gzibrjid* not to forget these old divinities. Hence, the contemporary Bhutan's Buddhism accepted and included such divinities as the protective deities of the faith. It is the ancient belief of about the mountain *Chomolhari* or *Jomolhari* was seat of the goddess *Jo-mo-lhari*¹², which is still shared by many Bhutanese today (Chakravarti, 2003; 31).

Significantly, the history of Bhutan is one or other way interrelated to Tibet. Ram Rahul in his book *Modern Bhutan* (1971), argues that there is incomplete information and uncertainty of early history of Bhutan. According to him, Bhutan as a country came into existence, when the political instability shook in north-eastern part of India after the death of *Bhaskaravarman* of *Kamarupa* in A.D. 650 after this, Bhutan, which had till then been part of *Kamarupa*, became a separate entity (Rahul, 1971; 18). In this regard, Rose wrote that the *Kamaruppa* Empire who used to control the north eastern region of India to the south of Bhutan until the seventh century A.D and that subsequently was incorporated into the Tibetan empire (Rose, 1977; 24). However, there is no oral tradition, much less reliable documentary or archaeological evidence available on this, and lack of any historical record, both with the *Kamarupa's* and Tibetan's as supporting evidence specifically on this point (Phuntsho, 2013; 101).

¹²*Jomolahari* is known as the bride of Mt. Kangchenjunga, a mountain in the Himalayas with 8,900 feet and straddling into the border between *Yadong* country of China, and *Thimpu* district of Bhutan. The mountain is the source of the *Paro Chu* (*Paro River*) which flows from the south side and *Amo Chu* (*Amo River*) which flows from the north side.

According to Karma Phuntsho (2013), very little has been written on the history of Bhutan and to a large extent of what is written is reproduction of earlier works. There is deficiency of a comprehensive study on the specific period of the Bhutanese history. According to him, the time before the mid-eighth century is not characterised as much by historical features due to- the lack of history. Apart from scattered *lithic* tools, there is hardly any historical evidence tied to a historical place, time and person. Since, there is lack of known historical record, either in writing or oral forms, which is or is alleged to be from this period. He used the term early history for the period between seventh to the mid-seventeenth century (Phuntso, 2014; 64). The history of Bhutan is closely linked with the development of Buddhism and Phuntsho has further divided the introduction of Buddhism in Bhutan into two periods. The acclaimed founding of the two famous temples of *Jampa Lhakhang* in *Bumthang* and *Kyerchu Lhakhang* in *Paro* by the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo in the seventh century AD and the arrival of guru Padmasambhava in Bhutan considered as the early diffusion of Buddhism of Bhutan. And the emergence of Buddhism in Bhutan, through the various monks from Tibet until the unification of the country by Shabdrung considered as the later diffusion of Buddhism (Rai, 2020; 63).

2.4 Early Diffusion of Buddhism in Bhutan

The claim of ancient connections between Bhutan and Tibet is mostly mythical or conjectural due to the lack of substantive material evidences. However, there is a plethora of historical evidence, including oral accounts, written works and material artefacts, which help to confirm Bhutan's early link with Tibet. The first of the important Buddhist sects to make its appearances in Bhutan was the *Nyingmapa* (the old sect of Himalayan Buddhism). The popular claim of the Tibetan influence on

Bhutan is traceable during the reign of the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo¹³ (630-649 A.D) who built the two temples of *Jampa Lhakhang* in *Bumthang* and *Kyerchu Lhakhang* in *Paro* (Das, 1973; 5). The Tibetan sources claim that the King *Srontsen Gampo* had declared Buddhism as the State religion of Tibet. He had constructed 180 monasteries in and around Tibet, out of which two monasteries are situated in Bhutan (*Kyerchu Lhakhang* in *Paro* and *Jampa Lhakang* in *Bumthang*) in 7th century A.D¹⁴. The story of the foundation of these monasteries by the Tibetan King is so well known to the Bhutanese that Bhutan's known history has begun with this event. The monasteries are also the important part of Bhutan's historical and religious consciousness, as they are standing at the prominent place of religious worship (Phuntsho, 2013; 76).

The book *Mani bkabum*¹⁵, a written sources which promotes the idea of Songtsen Gampo as an incarnation of *Avalokitesvara*, the Bodhisattva of compassion along with his two queens from Nepal and China who were presented as incarnation of two versions of the female deity called *Tara*. The book contains accounts of *Avalokitesvara's* career as a Bodhisattva, the genesis of the Tibetan people, the life story of Songtsen Gampo and a large number of his testament. On the basis of the information from this book, we can portray Songtsen Gampo as a great Buddhist King and the pioneer of Tibetan Buddhist civilisation and Bhutanese temples are attributed to such a religious King (Rai, 2020; 63).

¹³Songtsen Gampo was one of the greatest kings of ancient Tibet. The old Tibetan sources such as the Old Tibetan Chronicle and Old Tibetan Annals, deals with his great military successes as an imperial ruler. Songtsen Gampo became the King of Tibet just as Tibet was emerging as a strong military power in the region. Under his rule, the Tibetan empire rose to become a powerful player in Central Asia along with China and Arabs. He was able to extend his dominion across the entire Tibetan plateau and beyond.

¹⁴The legendary version of this fact is that a malignant demoness were used to cause fear and suffering to the ignorant people in Central Asia, therefore, the King got her nailed to the ground with the help of thunderbolt (*Phurbus*) at the twelve places and built twelve temples over the outstretched body of the huge demoness lying with her heart at Lhasa and grasping the border lands. The left hind foot of the demoness is supposed to have stretched over Bhutan (Chakravarti, 2003; 91).

¹⁵The book is a rediscovered treasure, a text which is believed to have been written and hidden in earlier times and later discovered by a treasure discoverer. Today, the book is the result of cumulative compilation, its core part dates back to at least the 12th century.

The history of two major Buddhist temples in Bhutan is related to the advent of Songtsen Gampo's Chinese wife in Tibet. The story of Wencheng's (the Chinese queen of Songtsen Gampo) journey from Tang court to Lhasa and her arrival in Tibet is told very poignantly in the later Tibetan written and folk oral literature (Phuntsho, 2013; 78). Even in Bhutan, folk songs and stories about Wecheng, locally known as *Ashe Jaza* (Chinese Lady) was famous. According to the traditional Tibetan accounts, when Wencheng arrived in Lhasa, she brought a Buddha statue with her as a parting gift, which got stuck in the marshlands of Lhasa. The cart, it was said that, was pulled by two strong men from China (who later become the ancestors of the family to which the founder of Bhutan belonged) who were not able to move the cart despite all efforts. Then Wencheng spread out the geomantic and divination chart, which she carried with her from China and conducted a geomantic survey of the land. Wencheng's geomantic analysis revealed that the country of Tibet lay on a supine *demoness*. The *demoness*'s body stretched across the Himalayan landscape causing it to breed savagery and diabolic forces¹⁶ (Phuntsho. 2013; 79).

Wencheng describe the lake of *Othang* was the blood of her heart, the two hills around Lhasa symbolised her breast and her limbs extended to the distant territories. For any prospect of civilisation in Tibet and particularly for Buddhism to flourish, the demonic landscape had to be tamed through building a series of temples. The lake of *Othang* had to be suppressed by a pivotal chapel and the *demoness* pinned down with temples on her vital points and limbs (Phuntsho, 2013; 80-81). It led Songtsen Gampo and his Nepali and Chinese queens to build a series of temples in the region. The first temple of Rasa *Thrulnang*, popularly known as the *Jokhang* and as *Tsuglhakhang* to the local resident of Lhasa, was built on the lake of *Othang* by Songtsen's Nepali wife¹⁷. Wencheng built her temple, known as *Ramoche*, facing China and installed her

¹⁶Wencheng is often attributed with the introduction of these sciences to Tibet, although the scholars now think that it was not her but Princess Jincheng who followed her a few generations later and promoted the Chinese culture.

¹⁷According to the narrative the Nepali queen demanded her right to build the first temple as she was the senior. Being granted the right and after many difficulties, she successfully built her temple facing Nepal.

Buddha statue in it¹⁸. Today, the *Jokhang* cathedral, which was built by his Nepali queen but which houses the Buddha brought by Chinese queen is ‘the Tibetan Holy of Holies’ and the most popular destination of Buddhist pilgrimage next to the Buddhist sites in India (Rai, 2020; 68).

To subdue the *demoness*, further twelve temples were built: four to pin down the keys points of the shoulders and hips known as ‘four suppressing the districts’, four on the elbow and knees known as ‘the four taming outer frontiers’. The temple in *Jampa Lhakhang* in *Bumthang* is listed among the temples taming the borders and *Kyerchu Lhakhang* in *Paro* is among the temples taming outer frontiers. *Jampa Lhakhang* falls on the left knees and *Kyerchu Lhakhang* on the left foot of the *demoness* (Phuntsho, 2013; 80).



Fig 1: A traditional Tibetan depiction of a supine demoness and temples.

Source: *The History of Bhutan*, Karma Phuntsho, 2013.

¹⁸The statue was swapped at the later times to confuse the Chinese soldiers who came to recover Wencheng’s Buddha statue.




Fig.2, Sketch impression of supine demoness and thirteen temples based on *Punakha* print of *Manibkbum*. Source: Karma Phuntsho, *The History of Bhutan*, 2013.

2.5 Diffusion of Buddhism in the region and the myth of Guru Padmasambhava

The next milestone of the early diffusion of Buddhism in was the arrival of Guru Padmasambhava, the famous Buddhist teacher from India, sometime in the middle of the 8th century. Padmasambhava, or *Guru Rimpoche* (precious teacher) as he popularly known in Bhutan, is without any doubt the most important and universal of all historical and religious figures in Bhutan, who holds a central position in Bhutan's religious history. He occupies a special place in the history of Bhutan, that he can be considered as the patron saint of Bhutan. To most of the Bhutanese, he is like both a precious¹⁹ teacher and the quintessential divinity. He is often describe as the second Buddha and perceived as the embodiment of the enlightened wisdom, compassion and power of all *Buddhas*. A great number of Bhutanese religious festivals, ceremonies

¹⁹There are about a dozen of *Kathang* hagiographies, all of which are considered to be treasure text hidden in the eight century and revealed in later times.

and prayers have him as their focal point of worship or meditation²⁰. In fact, traditional Bhutanese historians unanimously argue that Bhutan is the destined field of activity for Padmasambhava just as Tibet is for *Avalokitesvara* (Rai, 2020; 65)

According to *Kathangs* (a biographical account of Padsambhava), Padsambhava is said to have travelled to China and some Kathang also claim that he appears in the form of a Buddhist monk to convert the war mongering Emperor of *Ashoka* to a peace loving Buddhist. However, it was while he was in a meditation retreat in the *Yangleshod* cave in Kathmandu valley in the middle of eight century A.D. that his journey to Bhutan and Tibet purportedly took place (Phuntsho, 2013; 88).

The Bhutanese have generally accepted the multiple visit of Guru Padmasambhava in Bhutan. However, there are no material evidences for his several visits in Bhutan, not even in early Tibetan sources. Thus, the only existing written source called *tercho* or treasure text from the early 11th century A.D onwards²¹. The texts are supplemented by a mixture of oral accounts, a number of which may predate textual records. The oral narratives of the texts on Padmasambhava's visits in Bhutan are very rich and diverse. They are generally localised stories drawing on local legends, *toponyms* and other aspects of life in the communities. There are many places in Bhutan associated with Padmasambhava's journey in Bhutanese oral accounts. Ugyen Drak in *Zhemgang* is a cliff named after Padmasambhava (the master from Ugyen or Oddiyana), because he blessed it. *Phrumzur* said to be an aberration of *phurzung* or piercing with the dagger, is a spot in the same area where he pierced his dagger into the rock. *Ura*, for which the archaic term is *Urbay*, is said to be the *beyul* or hidden

²⁰*Kathang* the biographical account of Padmasambhava's life and miracles claim that, he is an emanation sent forth to this world by the Buddha Amithabha to help the sentient beings after the historical Buddha passed away. The first mark of his transcendental status is his miraculous birth on a lotus in a middle of a lustrous and immaculate lake, unsullied by the ordinary human womb. He described as a self born emanation without father and mother and his name Padsambhava or Padmakara (Lotus Born) ids derived from this source. The *kathang* literature further reinforced this with a prophecy attributed to the historical Buddha, stating that he would return after eight years in the form of Padsambhava. Thus, the Padsambhava is seen as the immediate incarnation of the Buddha and often given the epithet 'the second Buddha'.

²¹The treasure text are traditionally claimed to have been composed in the 8th century A.D and buried by Padmasambhava or one of his disciples to be revealed by a destined *terton* or treasure discoverer when the time is ripe.

land, named after the Ugyen Padmasambhava (Phuntsho, 2013; 91). The list of such legends and narratives goes on, but it does not leave us any wiser historically.

Apart from the miraculous journeys of Padmasambhava, the majority of texts speak about the two visits of Padmasambhava to Bhutan: first from India before he visited Tibet and subsequently from Tibet. In the two treasure texts discovered by Molmokhyil and Ugyen Zangpo, virtually there is no information about them. Molmokhyil has talked about the story of a King of Mon name Sedarkha, who was engaged in a devil deeds. The eight classes of non-human spirits, led by Shelging Karpo, punish the King by sending forth diseases, drought and other natural calamities in his country (Rai, 2020; 66).

King Sedarkha falls seriously ill and after hearing about the power of Padmasambhava²², he dispatches messengers to invite Padmasambhava. Hence, when Padmasambhava arrives at Sedarkha's bedside, he didn't ask for any material gain rather he proposes that the King and his country to avoid negative deeds engage in virtuous actions and follow his spiritual ways. The King agrees to do so and Padmasambhava meditates for three days at the red cliff of *Dorji Tsegpa*. Using his power through a circular magical chart, he subjugated Shalging Karpo and his coterie of eight classes of spirit. Later the chart is worn by the King, who is freed from the harms done by him by the spirits and the country flourishes (Phuntsho, 2013; 92). However, from the name of the cliff (Dorji Tsegpa), the Mon country that the *Molmokhyil* is talking about is modern day *Bumthang*. The name is used in many other sources to refer to the cliff-cave in *Kurjey* in *Bumthang* (Phuntsho, 2013; 92).

The second source i.e. Ugyen Zangpo recount the story of Padmasambhava's visit in Bhutan and unlike *Molmokhyil* his version has become the dominant narrative of

²²After falling seriously ill, the King proclaim that he will share his country and court with anyone who can cure him of the ailments imposed by the eight class of spirit. A minor ruler from the border district offers to find someone, who can cure him in exchange for a measure of gold. When he was given the measure of gold, he reported that in the *Yangkeshod* cave in Nepal, there is someone called Padmashambhava, who is the master of secret mantras and who can subjugates entire existence with his power.

Padmasambhava's arrival in Bhutan (Phuntsho 2013; 93). The history of the existence of Buddhism in Bhutan is during the period of Sindharaja (ruler of *Bhumthang*)²³ in the middle of 9th century. The story tells about the King Nawoche or Nabudara (literally big nose in classical Tibetan), who invite Padmasambhava to their country and the great master blesses the country by 'turning the wheel of dharma', that is teaching the Buddhist doctrine (Rai, 2020; 65). It was at that time the Sindharaja became ill and invited the Buddhist saint Padmasambhava to thwart the evil forces and re-established peace in his Kingdom which was lost during a prolonged hostility with Nawoche or Nabudara (the King of plains, whose domain seemed to include *Suryapahar*) (Ramphel, 1999; 10).

Ugyen Zangpo has described the details of the iron castle without door of *Bumthang*, which was built by the King Sindharaja. It was from that palace that he started to extent his domain as far as *Dorjidak* in Tibet and *Sindhavari* in India. There were growing hostility between the King Sindharaja and Nabudara/Nawoche over the question of the border between India and Mon (present Bhutan). The Sindharaja took up his arms against the King Nawoche, during the war followed by the King's son, Tala Membar settled his people in the following lands- *Dorje Drag* in Tibet, *Khansar* in Mon, *Lingor* in *Hor* and *Sindhavari* in India (Phuntsho, 2013; 93). At the age of twenty, Tala Membar was killed by King Nawoche in the Indian plains. In retaliation, the King Sindhraja drew up his forces and put to fire a thousand of settlements belonged to King Nawoche, who in turn, captured twenty stronghold of Sindhraja (Chakravarti, 2003; 96).

Sindhraja had a great affection for his son and could hardly accept the loss. It has crippled his initiative and desire to live. He fell ill and was doubted, if he would ever recover from the sock and sickness. It is said that the King used to offer worship and

²³Sindhraja was born a Prince Kunjom to King Singala of *Kapilavastu* in northern India. Due to his wild character and his harassment of the subjects, he was asked to leave the court and pursue a religious life. He initially accepted the proposal but influenced by his wives and attendants, he later rejects it and destroys the thirty villages belonging to the minister who presented the proposal. As a consequence, he and his retinue are banished to the region of *Sindha* which he rules, assuming the new title Sindhraja.

prayer to the guardian deities of *Monyul* before proceeding to war (Phuntsho, 2013; 94). But upset by the loss of his son, Sindharaja gave up worshipping his tutelary deities, instead he desecrates their domain. He organised a counter attack against Nawoche without making first offering and prayer to his guardian deities.

The local deities seemed to have been annoyed for holding them responsible for the King's own strategic errors and tactical blunders in battle. They wanted to punish the King for the disrespect he had shown to them. They had magically taken his *la* (vital strength or essence of life) away²⁴. When a person is deprived of *la*, the person is seriously destabilised and ruptured. Hence, after losing his *la*, the King falls gravely ill and his ministers desperately searched for a solution (Ahmad, 2013; 23)

At this point a Vassal King (who might be a Buddhist himself) from the border suggested that the great lama Padmasambhava²⁵, who was the preceptor of Nabudara, should be called to propitiate the angry deities of *Bumthang* and save the soul of the ailing King and restore peace to the people. At that time, the King Trhisong Detsen of Tibet, on the advice of his priest *Santaraksita*, invited saint Padmasambhava to Tibet for the propagation of Buddhism. Guru Padmasambhava visited Tibet in 747 AD and preached Buddhism there. On his return to India, he paved a visit to his disciple Nawoche around the time of the conflict between Nawoche and Sindhraja (Chakravarti, 2003; 97).

It has said that the messengers were immediately sent to invite Padmasambhava with seven measures of gold dust. In return saint Padmasambhava accepted the invitation of the King Sindhraja and came to *Bumthang* via *Shamgong* (ibid; 97). Sindharaja from his sick bed promises to offer anything in return for his health but the saint or guru ask only for consort with whom he can carry out his spiritual practice to retrieve the *la*. The King has four daughters who bear the mark of *dakini* or spiritually potent

²⁴The *la*, like *wangthang* or charismatic presence and *lungta* often rendered as wind horse, is a pre Buddhist concept of quasi psychological property of life or constituent of a person in addition to the well known psychosomatic components.

²⁵Padmasambhava hailed from *Uddiyana* which is believed was situated to the north-west of Kashmir. He was a renowned teacher of tantric School of Buddhism in the University of *Nalanda*.

women. Bumden Tshomo, the most virtuous of all, is given as a tantric consort to the guru and the guru starts his retreat in the cave of red cliff, *Dorji Tsegpa* (Phunsho, 2013; 94)²⁶.

After seven days of meditation, Padmasambhava left an imprint of his body in the rock face of the cave. Shalging Karpo (chief of the spirit) appears to the Guru and offers an inflated leather pouch in which Sindharaja's *la* and *srog* or life force was trapped²⁷. Padmasambhava and *Bumden* return to the iron castle and placed the pouch next to the King's nostrils, reinstate the King's life essence and life force. The luminous white spider disappears into the King (Rai, 2020; 76).

Some of the oral accounts gives a slightly more dramatic story of Padmasambhava's final subjugation of the King evil spirits. It has been said that in order to destroy the evil power he staged ritual dances of eight forms for over a week, which as the legend goes, attracted the chief of the local Bon deities Shalging Karpo. As the guru enters into a deep meditation to use psychic power to subdue the evil spirit, the chief of the spirits, remain in hiding unwilling to challenge the master. The chief local deity came in the disguise of a lion. The saint immediately realised that it was the lion demon who stolen the King's vital strength.

He quickly transformed himself into Garuda (the divine King of birds) and fought out the lion wresting from him the King's vital strength. He subjugated the lion but did not destroy him; instead he made him a guardian of the faith (Chakravarti, 2003; 97). In the early history, Bhutan was divided into many small provinces, where Bumthang was the prominent among them. The legend of Padmasambhava's arrival in *Bumthang* during the reign of Sindhraja state that the country was never is the part of Tibet. From the early historical period of time Tibet and Bhutan were two independent states.

²⁶It has been believed that the cliff was the main base of the chief of the spirit, Shalging Karpo, who took the king *la*.

²⁷The air in the pouch is the life force and the white spider in it is the life essence (*la*), the spirit said, 'tell the King not to repeat the bad actions. His bad action has led to the punitive illness.'

The narration of guru Padmashambhava and Sindhrajā's story has discarded the historical claim that Bhutan was the part of Tibet. While continuing the story, aftermath guru imparts Buddhist teaching to the King and his court and instructs them to live a virtuous life, by following the Buddhist religion. After hearing the grievances of Sindharaja against Nawoche, Padmasambhava persuades Sindharaja and his ministers to come to the border with him to seek conciliation with Nawoche. Both the Kings and their cortege meet on a spacious ground at the border between Mon and India.

Padmasambhava give them Buddhist teachings and oversees a ceremony of oath taking. Finally, Guru Padmasambhava successfully restored peace by converting both Sindhrajā and Nabudara to Buddhism and set a pillar at *Mua-Thang* (in *Khem*) to demarcate the boundaries. Stone pillar is erected and the two parties take vows to live in peace and to not let their troops cross the border demarcated by the pillar (Phuntsha, 2013; 96)²⁸. Guru had acquired great fame and established a Buddhist sect in Bhutan called *Nyingmapa*. The Bhutanese still consider him an incarnation of Buddha (Das, 1973; 4).

Padmasambhava tells them that he will returns to *Bumthang* to give further teaching in the future but he will come from Tibet rather than India. According to Ugyen Zangpo, that Padmasambhava is said to have returned the *Bhumthang* the year after his first visit. That time he was accompanied by his young Tibetan disciple, Denma Tsemang (whose rebirth Ugyen Zangpo claims to be)²⁹. Padmasambhava came to

²⁸The place, where the peace deal was made, is today identified with the name of *Nabji*, literally 'the open ground of oath', which lies in the southern end of the *Mandgechu* valley. A stone pillar known as *nado* or stone of oath, which is believed to have been erected at the meeting, is still found standing on the site.

²⁹According to Gedun Rinchen and Kongtrul Lodoe Thaye (Bhutan's first modern historians), Ugyen Zangpo has received the prophesy to build a three dimensional *mandala* in *Kurjey* for the welfare of *Bumthang* valleys. In order to clarify the doubts he had about the *mandala*, he transport his consciousness to the presence of Padmasambhava, leaving behind his human body temporarily. Since his returns get delayed by a week and in course of the delay, his attendant discards his corpse in confusion. Unable to re-enter his own body, Ugyen Zamgpo desperately looks for a medium. Finally, using the technique of *drongjug* or transference of consciousness into another body, he enters into the body of a young girl who has just died.

Bhutan from Tibet via *Khenpalung*,³⁰ a region in the northeast corner of modern Bhutan, from where he was also followed by the Tibetan King Khikha Ratho and his subject. Padmasambhava and the royal entourage seem to approach through the valley of Tang where Padmasambhava bestows teachings to the royal party. Most of Khikha Ratho's group settle around *Genye Lhakhang* but the Tibetan King and his queens and seniors officials continue to *Kurjey*. When Padmasambhava arrives in the area of *Kurjey*, he was received by Sindhrajā with much pomp and ceremony. Padmasambhava gives teachings to the two Kings and their subjects at *Kurjey* (Phuntsho, 2013; 101).

The narration of the legend of the advent of Padmasambhava during the reign of Sindharaja has been found the Indianisation in pre-history of Bhutan, the legend advocate that the King was an Indian refugee and a patron of Padmasambhava and the founder of the short lived Kingdom of *Bumthang* (Phuntsho, 2013; 97). Apart from such claim there is no any textual evidence or source predates of Ugyen Zangpo's text supporting the account of Sindharaja except the toponyms of iron castle of *Chagkhar*. In the names of structural remains there left nothing visible in *Chagkhar*. In 1905, when British political agent J.C. White visited the place, he reported that there were ruins of a square structure with surrounding ditches. But the time when Michael Aris visited the *Chagkhar* in 1970s, there was nothing left of such structure but only fallow fields which used for grazing cattle. Historically, such claims are difficult to establish³¹.

The personal accounts of Ugyen Zangpo and Molmokhyil accounts mostly deal with the arrival of Padmasambhava in the context of Indian King Sindharaja, not the Tibetan King Khikha Ratho (Phuntsho, 2013; 101). Ugyen Zangpo portrays that the

³⁰*Khenpalung*, literally means 'the valley of *Artemisia*', evokes a sense of mystery and awe to the Bhutanese. Pema Lingpa (treasure discoverer) and the people who followed him commonly identified *Khenpalung* with the highlands northeast of *Bumthang* and northwest of *Kurtoe* district of Bhutan extending across the current border with China.

³¹As discussed earlier that most of the recorded documents of Bhutan was destroyed by the outbreak of fire in *Punakha dzong* and later with the destruction of *dzong* by earthquake. It is only through archeological findings which can prove their existence in the history.

King as an amiable and deeply religious character. There are available two different versions of Pema Lingpa works; a short one is the *Guide to the Hidden Lands of Sikkim and Khenpalung* and the longer one is the *Guide to the Hidden land of Khenpalung* (Lingpa, 1975; 464-65). However, the Pema Lingpa's detailed accounts of to hidden land of *Khenpalung* presents Khikha Ratho as an inimical and diabolical prince with dog's mouth and a goat skull as his name indicates.

Apart from the account of Sindhraja on the visits of guru Padmasambhava, the myth of Khikha Ratho, forbidden son of 37th King of Tibet delivers the idea on the ancestral connection between Bhutan and Tibet. The story about Khikha Ratho is begin in the court of Tri Songdetsen, King of Tibet, who invited Padmasambhava and Bengali monk *Santaraksita* to Tibet and established Buddhism as the formal religion of the court. It also begin with the completion of the *Samye* monastery around 779 A.D. and the project of translate the Buddhist scriptures into Tibetan text. One of the great translators of that time was Vairocana of *Pagor*. He was trained as a translator and sent to India to bring back the Buddhist doctrines. It has been recorded in Pema Lingpa's account that Vairocana was accused during his return by Za Marjen³² (one of the queens of Tri Songdetsen) and by anti-Buddhist ministers for bringing with him dark magic and harmful spells in the guise of Buddhism. Then the King was forced by the court to send Vairocana into exile (Phuntsho, 2013; 102).

However, Queen Za Marjen, failed to get King's favour and he avoided her for many years. In course of time, the Queen has been overwhelmed by strong sexual urges, copulates with a dog and a got. The result of that connection was the birth of Prince Murum Tsenpo (Khikha Ratho), who had canine mouth and caprine skull. On hearing of prince birth and his inhuman parenthood and appearance, the King asked the Queen to bring the Prince to him. Subsequently, he exiled the Prince with some followers

³²Some accounts have it that the queen made up the accusation as Vairocana, who was handsome but one of the first seven monks to be ordained in Tibet, defied her wish for a sexual liaison with him. Embarrassed by his defiance of her seduction, Za Marjen falsely accused Vairocana of raping her.

and subjects as a *lu* (scapegoat) to the southern borderland³³. Murum Tsenpo or Khikha Ratho suffered such a fate and was first settled in *Lhodark Gyud* but he was again expelled from there to *Khenpalung*³⁴.

After establishing a prosperous community in *Khenpalung*, Khikha Ratho launched a military invasion to Tibet using the Indian support he had garnered. By then in Tibet, King Tri Songdetsen had passed away and his son, brother of Khikha Ratho, Mutig Tsenpa was installed as the ruler of the Tibetan empire. Under the threat of an from Khikha Ratho, Mutig Tsenpa sought after the intervention of Padmasambhava, who in turn, commanded the god Namthil Karpo to create a heavy storm and lightening. Terrified by the lightning flashes, the troops returned to *Khenpalung*. However, Mutig Tsenpo continued to worry that Khikha Ratho might strike again and destroy the Buddhist shrines built by his father and ancestors unless Khikha Ratho was forced out from *Khenpalung* and further away from Tibet, for that end the King again sought after the help of Padmasambhava.

The oral account gives a mystical story about how Padmasambhava has brought out the Khikha Ratho and his entourage from *Khenpalung* to the place called *Karnya* with the help of a magical wooden bird³⁵. Then Padmasambhava returned to *Khenpalung*

³³There were the ritual of sending away scapegoat and ransoms, mainly in the forms of effigies of dough, in order to cast away evil harm doers and misfortunes.

³⁴The literally meaning of *Khenpalung* is 'the valley of Artemisia', evoke a sense of mystery and awe of Bhutanese, Pema Lingpa identified it with the highlands of northeast of *Bumthang* and northwest of the modern *Kurtoe* district of Bhutan extending across the current border with China.

³⁵Padmasambhava travelled to *Khenpalung* and transformed himself into a fearsome black man. He deceived Khikha Ratho into believing him to be a non Buddhist rival of Padmasambhava called Hara *Nagpo*, who wished to destroy the works of Padmasambhava. Being convinced by Padmasambhava, Khikha Ratho requested the black man to help him to build a temple as great as the temple built by his father and Padmasambhava in Tibet. The black man, however, offered to build something even more wondrous than the temple: a wooden bird holding five hundred people to party with all kinds of enjoyments. Immediately carpenters were gathered and the large wooden bird was built. For the inauguration, the king and his entourage were all invited to the party in it. When all the Khikha Ratho's court was in it, the black man went on the top of the wooden bird and hit with a hammer the nail, which triggered the unsettling wind. The wooden bird soared to the sky and Khikha Ratho duly discovered that the black man was none other than Padmasambhava had tricked him. The wooden bird flew out of *Khenpalung* to *Bumthang* and when the nail which triggered the settling wind was hit, it landed in a place called *Karnya*.

and bury all the property of Khikha Ratho and his court. He sealed the entire hidden land so that no one could find the place until the right time had come. Unable to find their place again, Khikha Ratho and his court settled in *Kyizum* village in Tang. Today, there are still a household who claims the descended from Khikha Ratho (Phuntsho, 2013; 105).

Apart from the mystical narration of the story, there seems to be traces of historical events which can justify a claim that a Tibetan prince lived in the north-eastern part of Bhutan around the beginning of 9th century A.D. There are many references in the Tibetan historical events, which talk about the stories of Vairocana's exile and the notoriety of Queen Za Marjen of *Tsepong* are well known among Tibetan historians (Phuntsho, 2013; 105). Even though Khikha Ratho was portrayed as evil figure, but one cannot denied the fact on the existence of Tibetan lineage through him in Bhutan.

In fact the idea of *Khenpalung* was not only limited to Pema Lingpa's work, rather about a half century before him, Godkyi Demthruchen (1337-1409 A.D), opened a hidden land of *Khenpalung* near the Everest region of north of the *Arun* valley and south of the *Lato Lho* region of Tibet (Rai, 2020; 68). The people across the southern Tibet and the Himalayan areas are still believed that the hidden land associated with the name of the Tibetan King Khikha Ratho is waiting to be opened by a destined person. It seems like both Godkyi Demthruchen and Pema Lingpa were also exposed by this idea and went on to identify it in different location.

On the basis of these narrations one can understand that there were no mutual relations among the Kings of the entire region. The areas of Bhutan became the subject of incursion and battle field for the Kings of north as well as south³⁶. It was only after the advent of Buddhism and Guru Padmasambhava which make calm and established harmonious relation between them. However, the story of the legends like Khikha Ratho and Sindhraja is still popular in Bhutan's history but it does not hold

³⁶Before the advent of Shabrun, it has written in the early history of Bhutan that many kings ruled the provinces of Bhutan, e.g. Kamarupa and Sindhraja from southern part and Songtsen Gampo Naguchi, Khikha Ratho from the North.

any strong evidence. On the basis of the above narrations it would be wrong to *Indianise* or *Tibetanise* Bhutan or cannot establish the historical linkages between Bhutan and Tibet or Bhutan and India from such narration.

Unlike the legends of Sindhraja and Khikha Ratho, the legends of Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo hold the strong evidence about his control over Bhutan. There is no disagreement among the scholars regarding the origin of the monasteries *Jampa Lakhang* and *Kyerchu Lakhang* as the early diffusion of Buddhism. Even, the architectural and iconographical styles of the temple which shares close resemblance with other temples of Tibetan dynasty, which clearly proclaim their foundation during the reign of Songtsen Gampo (Phuntsho, 2013; 82).

The Tibetan rule over Bhutan is also discussed in the reign of *Kamarupa*, where the political instability that shook north-eastern India after the death of Bhaskaravarman of *Kamarupa* in 650 A.D has exposed Bhutan to incursions from the north and became the ultimate Tibetan occupation³⁷ (Rahul, 1971; 18). It was during the 8th century AD, when Bhutan was occupied by the followers of King Tri Ralchan of Tibet.

Bhutan during the reign of Tibetan King Tritsun Desten (commonly known as Ralaphchen 816-836 A.D)³⁸ came to be known as *Milog*. During King Tritsun Desten era Tibetan troops came to Bhutan on the invitation of some Bhutanese who wanted the Tibetan assistance to drive out some of the invaders from the neighbouring Kingdom. The Tibetan sway in Bhutan ended with the collapse of central authority in Tibet by 840 A.D during the reign of King Lang Dharma (Rahul, 1971; 18).

³⁷The centuries old arrangement was thus disturbed after the death of Bhaskaravarman and Kamarupa itself got disintegrated. No single king was able to impose their authority over the whole Bhutan and the country split into several small and big units which fell as easy prey to the Tibetan incursion.

³⁸Songtsen Gampo, Tri Songdetsen and Tri Ralaphchen are remembered by posterity as the royal trio, who respectively introduced, widely propagated and consolidated the Buddhist system in Tibet. With Khikha Ratho Tri Songdesten had three sons they are the Prince Tsangma who was eldest among the three, since, he has the strong religious inclination which made him to pass the throne to his brother. The second brother Udum Tsenpo alias Lang Dharma is said to have been denied the throne on the grounds of his character. However, the throne went to Tri Ralaphchen, the last among the three sons.

A war took place in 824 A.D between the Tibetan King and Indian ruler of Bhutan. Tibetan troops successfully drove out the Indian ruler from Bhutan and named it *Milog*, which means they will not return (Das, 1973; 7). Ralpachen and Lang Dharma were brothers, and it has been believed that Lang Dharma murdered his brother and became the King of Tibet. During his reign, King Lang Dharma indulged a large scale of Buddhist persecution in Tibet, which lead to a considerable influx of Tibetans in Bhutan. Then the Tibetan influence began to grow in Bhutan and slowly Bhutan came under the Tibetan cultural influence (Phuntsho, 2013; 116). This was the beginning of changes in the ethnic and cultural transformation of Bhutan.

Later, number of Tibetan's slowly increased in Bhutan. During 12th century AD, many Lamas started pouring into Bhutan. The name of first Lama was Gyalwa Lhanangpa of the *Nyo* lineage, who was a student of Dri King Jigten Gonpo's (Rahul, 1971; 18). Lhanangpa was the originator of *Lhapa Kaygyupa*, a sub sect of the *Dri King Kargyupa*. First, *Lhapa* controlled only *Paro*. Later, the *Lhapa Kagyupas* became active around *Thimphu* and near *Bumthang* in the east (Rahul. 1971; 19). *Lhapa Kargyupa* applied the *Dzong* system of Tibet in Bhutan subsequently and built the famous *Tangu* monastery which is located 14km., to the north of the capital Thimpu (Chakravarti, 2003: 24).

2.6 Lineages of *Drukpa* School of Buddhism

Drukpa school of thought belongs to red hat sect of Tibetan Buddhism and is also the national culture of Bhutan. The history of the emergence of *Drukpa* tradition in the region is very important to understand the cultural link between Tibet and Bhutan. The journey from its home *Ralung* to Bhutan, the *Drukpa* tradition has been modified many times by various monks from Tibet. To discuss the each modification phase of the *Drukpa* provides the significant knowledge about the Bhutan-Tibet relations. The history of the emergence of Buddhism in Bhutan also concerned with the origin and spread of *Drukpa* sect which was founded by Yeshe Dorji (1160-1210 A.D) at *Ralung*. His Guru Pema Dorji came from *Lingpa* and founded the *Lingpa Kaju* sub-sect. When

Yeshe Dorji was building a monastery called *Seva Chang Chhup* a dragon appeared in the sky. From this he changed the name of his sub sect *Lingpa Kaju* to *Drukpa Kaju*. Lamas of *Drukpa* (red hat sect or the offshoot of *Nyingmapa* school of Buddhism) also get started coming into Bhutan partly for missionary work and partly due to the persecution suffered by them from the rival yellow hat sect of *Gelukpa* in Tibet (Rai, 2020; 69). The red hat sect of *Drukpa* Buddhism was founded by Yeshe Dorji³⁹ at *Ralung*, a famous monastery about 30 miles east of *Gyantse*.

Yeshe Dorji was succeeded by a young Lama Sangye-on who was given the name of Phajo-Druk gom-Shigpo. He was the student of Wonre Darma Senggee (1177-1237 A.D) and studied at *Ralung* at first and later sent to Bhutan where he settled at *Cheri Dordam*. In a brief period of time his popularity and Lhapa Lama who was settled in Bhutan became jealous. After the unsuccessful attack on Cheri, Lhapa Lama came down to the *Am-mp-chu* valley where the villagers accepted him. At the very time Phajo-Druk aroused in power and further assisted to the conversion of Bhutanese from other parts of the country into Buddhism. Shigpo and his companion succeeded in establishing themselves in Bhutan and by the end of 13th century, he had built a small *dzong* named *Dongon dzong* (blue stone *dzong*) on the right side of the upper *Wang-chu* (Das, 1973, 14). This can be the starting point of the emergence of separate and distinct church of Bhutan which persisted through the centuries and still remain as the dominant Buddhist sect in Bhutan.

The tradition of spiritual line of famous *Drukpa* School is still alive in every corner of the monastery of Bhutan. In fact, the Royal Government of Bhutan has declared the *Drukpa* as the national religion of Bhutan in the Citizenship Act of 1978 (Rai, 2020; 69). If we look into the major steps taken to the introduction of the *Drukpa* school of Buddhism in Bhutan, they were mostly accomplished by the devoted spiritual descendants of the 'Great Man of Mar', i.e. Marpa (*Mar-pa*) (1012-1097) (Ramphel,

³⁹Yeshe full name was Gro-Gong-Tshangpa-Gyal-ras, was born in 1160 and died in 1210 AD.

1999; 51). He was the disciple of *Mahasiddha* Naropa and the spiritual ancestor of the leading religious school in Bhutan.

The 'Eighty Four *Mahasiddhas*' and their legends are depicted in wonderful Bhutanese wall paintings, and represented especially often are those who become Gurus of the *Drukpa* sect (Ramphel, 1999; 51). In the iconographical art of the country their images are to be seen in the form of sculpture as well as in painting, both in single representation and in groups. Therefore, it seems to be satisfactory to remember the main facts of their lives handed down in the popular legends of the circle of the *Mahasiddhas*.

Tilopa was a learned Indian Guru and his teachings were very much appreciated. It was at that time Naropa came to serve the great master as a disciple. Naropa was born in 1016 in *Bhangala* (Ramphel, 1999; 51). While searching for spiritual development, he was attracted by the fame of Tilopa. After many difficulties Naropa succeeded in his search for Tilopa, but at first Guru refused to teach him. Nevertheless, Naropa served him patiently for twelve years. Finally, Tilopa agreed to teach him the precepts. After six months of intense meditation Naropa realised the state of consciousness of *Siddhi* and became the founder of a long line of spiritual followers (Chakravarti, 2003; 12).

With his disciple Marpa, Naropa began the tradition of *Kagyü* (*bKah-Brgud*), the holder of the 'Thread of the word of Buddha'. Milrapa was the most famous disciple of Marpa, who lived from 1040 to 1123 A.D. Among other disciples of Marpa, two were special, first was Rachungpa (*Ras-chung-pa*), who lived from 1084 to 1161 A.D and whose spiritual light shone like the moon, but he doesn't have time for organisation. For this, Milrapa's second most famous disciple became important. He was *Gampopa*⁴⁰ (1079-1153), who was known by the name as the 'Physician of Dakpo'. He became the initiative guru of different branches of the *Kagyü* tradition (Ramphel, 1999; 52).

⁴⁰Gampopa was said to be an incarnation of the religious king Songtsan Gampo.

Four main branches sprang from Milrapa's disciple Gampopa and his spiritual follower Phagmo Dupa: the *Karma Kagyupa* (*Kar-ma-bKah-brgyud-pa*), founded by Gampopa's disciple Chodzin Gephe (*Chos-hdzin dGe-hphel*) of Kham, the founder of the *Tshurphu Monastery* (*mTshur-phu*) in *sTag-lung* to the northwest of Lhasa, the original seat of Karma hierarchy. The *Digung Kagyupa* (*hBri-gung bKah-brgyud-pa*), who had their centre in *hBri-gung* situated to the northeast of Lhasa, were founded by *hjih-rten mGon-po*, a disciple of Pangmo Dupa (Phuntsho, 2013; 138-139). The *Dakpo Kagyupa* (*Dvags-po bKah-brgyud-pa*), which was the branch of the *Digungpa*, which was developed in *sTag-lung-pa of Kham*, their founder was Talung Thangpa (*sTag-lung Thang-pa*), who was also a disciple of Phagmo Dupa. Finally, the *Dukpa Kagyu* sect (*hBrug-pa bKah-brgyud*), founded by Tsangpa Gyara or Yeses Dorji (*gTsang-pa rGya-ras*) and became decisive in the religious development in Bhutan (Ramphel, 1999; 53).

Tsangpa Gyara founded the monasteries of *Longdo* near Lhasa and *Ralung* east of *Gyanste* in Tsang. The name *Ralung* stand as 'Goat's percept' or 'Goat's omen', is derived from a typical legend describe the foundation of this holy place (Ramphel, 1999; 54). It talks about a wonder working goat. This goat strayed off, and when she found by a shepherd she was bursting her milk on a stone. After the milk had dried up, the three holy syllables became visible '*Om a Hum*'. And the goat omen was taken as for good sign, the vary place was chosen by the Tsangpa Gyara as the site for a new monastery (Ramphel, 1999; 54).

Tsangpa Gyara's foundation of *Druk* monastery became critical for the future development of the introduction of Buddhism in Bhutan. *Druk*, the word standing for 'thunder and lightning' as well as the mystical winged dragon, the roaring symbol of these natural phenomena. According to the legend, a fantastic thunderstorm arose during the construction of the monastery, threatening the growing walls of the edifice. In commemoration of this thunderstorm, which miraculously abated without destroying the partly built monastery, the name *Druk* was given to that holy place.

Then, the monastery of *Druk* became a great attraction for new disciples and adherents to the developing *Drukpa* teaching (Das, 1973; 9).

Pemakarpo incarnation of Tsangpa Gyara, who lived from 1527-1592 became the leading spirit of the *Kagyü* school of Buddhism. According to the tradition of the line of the *Kagyü* gurus, he was twenty fourth in direct succession to the Mahaguru Marpa. His religious name, by which he is said to be better known, is ‘Jewel of the Power of Speech’, Ngawang Norbu. He was indeed bestowed with the power of speech (Ramphel, 1999; 59). He was also a gifted writer and polygraph said to have compiled five thousand volumes. In his rich and distinguished prose, many words of the dialects of eastern Tibet and Bhutan are included.

Pemakarpo was a native of the valley of *Yar-klung*, born in *Chonggya*, the original residence of the Kings of old Tibet (Ramphel, 1999; 60). He also wrote, biographies and countless brief treatises, and he even compiled guides to holy places for ascetics and neophytes, like the previously mentioned guide to *Ralung*. His life and work was important in an epoch during which the ancient sects including the *Kagyupa*, were involved in religious and secular fighting in the struggle for domination and had finally to retreat to the southern Himalayan regions. The fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682 A.D), the victorious leader of the reformed Yellow Cap sects of the *Gelugpas*, declared Pemakarpo as a prominent *Drukpa* incarnation (Ramphel, 1999; 59).

The list of his long journey is given and also the names of the monasteries and principalities where he resided (Rai, 2020; 70). He has wrote the description of the religious life of the best known *Siddha* of the *Kagyupa*, i.e. ‘Biography of the protector of – living being Tsangpa Gyara’ is full of mystic songs, and being a narration of the spiritual path on the ascetic. It follows the esoteric thread introduced by Milrapa. Pemakarpo two well-known works ‘Great Symbol’ and the ‘Memory Book on the Six Tenants’ comprises the basic teaching of *Naropa*. His ‘Diadem of the three Obligation’ is a handbook on monastic rules and the ‘*Kagyukyü Kahbum*’ gives a list of the famous *Kagyü* masters beginning with Dukpa Chenpo, the founder of the

Drukpa school, Tsagpa Gyara, his 'History of Buddhism' is based on many rare sources, giving information not to be found in the usual publication⁴¹. The founder of Bhutan, the first religious King (Dharma Raja) Ngawang Namgyal Dujom Dorjee, as being his followers, was venerated as the true incarnation of Pemakarpo (Ramphel, 1999; 60).

Besides major influence on the advent of the first Dharma raja on Bhutan's religion (Ngawang Namgyal Dujom Dorjee) there are several facts before his arrival which is in a limited region, there was a constant movement of lamas to Bhutan and the period was mostly devoted to spread of Buddhism and its various sects. The traceable fact of the existence of Buddhism through Tibetan lamas in Bhutan was reclined with Gyalawa Lhanampa of *Nyo-Lineage*, who started the *Lhapa Kargyupa* sect and applied the Tibetan *dzong* system in Bhutan.

He started living in *Cheri Dordam*, one of the rival lama called *Lhapa* (belongs to *Dri-Gong-Kargu* sect), attacked him in *Cheri* but was defeated and flee to *Amo Chu* Valley. After defeating *Lhapa*, Sangyeon has sent his disciples to other parts of Bhutan to spread the cult of *Drukpa* sect. He died in 1251 A.D; today most of the aristocracy in Bhutan claim their lineage from Sangyeon.

The subsequent history of Bhutan also talks about the *Sakya* Lama Thimbe Rabyang, who came in Bhutan during 1152 A.D and had built many monasteries including *Chising Gompa* and *Langkar Ritsog*. Unfortunately the *Sakya* sect in Bhutan had limited success and faded away after a short time. During 13th century a group of Tantric lama called Torton or Tertonpas came in Bhutan and settled down in *Paro* Valley. The word '*Ter*' stand for hidden treasure and '*tonpa*' for to reveal and they called themselves Tertons because they could ravel the hidden treasure of Guru Padmasambhava (Das, 1973; 9).

⁴¹His 'Hundred Thousand Precepts' became the religious encyclopaedia of the *Drukpas*. The edition of ten volumes, printed in Bhutan, is very rare, because the wooden printing blocks were destroyed by fire. This was the fate of many irreplaceable treasures of the famous Bhutanese printing centres, situated in *Punakha* and in *Simthokha dzong*.

Many prominent Lamas came from Tibet to Bhutan, and one among them was *Nyingpa*, who came in 1361 A.D and built two *Dzongs* called *Changtsa* and *Jhase*. He had also established the monastic school for propagating the *Nyingpa Kargyupa* teachings. Later, his monasteries changed its affiliation to *Gelugpa* sect, the yellow hat sect of the Dalai Lama. Another prominent Lama who had come in Bhutan and has effective influence in Bhutan was Drukpa Kinley. He came in Bhutan in 15th century and his name is correlated in several places in Bhutan, especially in *Paro* Valley. The legend credit him with supernatural power and his statue is still there in the temple *Chimi Lakhang* situated between *Wangdiphodrang* and *Punakha*.

In spite of number of Lamas having visited Bhutan, they had only served as indication to symbolise the final advent of the Nawang Namgyal, who brought the whole country under one rule and unified it. Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal came to Bhutan in 1616 from *Duk Sanga Choling*, a *Drukpa Monastery* in the south of Tibet with few hundred of his adherents-monk as well as mighty knights (Ramphel, 1999; 60). He was the reincarnation of Lama Lunchen, Pema Karpo, and his origin was from nobility, being the son of Dorji Lenpha Mephram Tempi Nyma, a direct descendent of Lhabom, brother of Yeshe Dorji (Das, 1973; 11).

During childhood, Nawang Namgyal studied under the *Drukpa* Lama, Padma Karpo at *Ralung*. He was the best among the students of *Ralung* and was supposed to succeed to the hierarchy's chair. But a rival petitioner Karma Tenkgong Wangpo, backed by Deba Tsangpa spun so many plotting that Shabdrung-disgusted by this revelation of bitterness and phony ambitions, turn his back to *Ralung*⁴². He left for a long pilgrimage and ultimately landed in Bhutan at the age of 23 (Das, 1973; 13). The

⁴²The *Ralung* establishment and its followers promoted Shabdrung as the incarnation of Pema Karpo based on the *prophecies* which the late master is said to have left behind; the Chogye ignored *Ralung's* decision and formally installed Pagsam Wangpo as the successor of Pema Karpo at *Tashi Thongmon* monastery. The relationship between the two groups turned sour. In 1610, the *Chongye* governor appealed to the *Tsangpa* ruler of Tibet to intervene in the dispute, which the ruler promptly did. Being an important political ally, the *Tsangpa* ruler understandably sided with the *Chongye* governor.

new waves of political and religious development around the region⁴³ facilitated him to build up a new home land for his religious school, its followers and its supporters.

He has brought the whole of the 'Four Southern Mon Districts' under his supremacy and became the first spiritual as well as secular head of Bhutan (Ramphel, 1999; 61). With the title of 'Shabdrung', he has introduced the spiritual line of the Shabdrung⁴⁴ dynasty of *Drukpa*, the 'Dragon country'. It has been claimed that the Dharma Raja from Tibet entered into Bhutan through *Lingzhi* Pass (Ramphel, 1999; 61), from where he proceeded to the mountain bordering *Thimpu* Valley. There is living evidence of half destroyed monuments, which remind the heroic times of the consolidation of the Dragon Kingdom. *Lingzhi* Pass reminds one of the fights of the Bhutanese against the invading Tibetan troops in 17th century, where the Bhutanese successfully pushed back Tibetan army to the *Chumbi* Valley (Sinha, 1991; 85). The first Shabdrung lived for 35 years and died at the age of 58. During those years, he was continuously engaged in wars to consolidate his temporal as well as spiritual hold of the country. While he was staying at a place *Dansa Do Chholing* of *Paro*, the *Depa Tsangpa* sent an invading army against him. With the help of local people, he was able to defeat the invaders. It is also said that due to the repeated harassment by *Deb Tsangpa* ruler of Tibet, he had performed a Tantric ritual at *Yulsarkha*, which annihilated the *Deb* and family (Das, 1973; 13).

His victories spread his eminence to the neighbouring Kingdoms and he started receiving friendly mission from Cooch Bihar, Nepal and *Ladakh*. Later, he started dual administrative system in Bhutan i.e. temporal and secular, where he formed a monastic council with his 30 Tibetan followers and his new local devotees. The duty of the council were to assist him in his rule and spread of religion i.e. Buddhism (Das, 1973; 14).

⁴³There were number of *Drukpa* monks including Shabdrung's father had already established their monasteries and converted the local population into their faith, during his arrival he has been received in grand manner by the local

⁴⁴Sabdrung mean 'Power of speech', 'The Fearless', 'The Victorious Banner of Buddhism', 'The Lion of *Shakya*' and 'The Mighty'.

In 1636, while resided at the small shrine Shabdrung decided to build the famous *dzong* called between the two rivers *Phochu* and *Mochu* in *Punakha*, which come to be known as *Punakha dzong*. It was here where he started his dual system of Government called '*Chossi*' and made *Punakha* the capital. He had also appointed one of his Tibetan monks Payker Jugnay, as the chief *Kenpo* or *Nayten* whose duty were to enforce the strict observance of priestly vows amongst the monks, direct their studies and preside at religious ceremony. Another monk called Tenzin Drukgyal (*Uzme*) was also appointed as the first *Dug Desi* or *Deb Raja*, whose main duties were to attend to the general administration of the state, to deal with foreign affairs, to manage all the financial and economic matters and to look after the needs of Lamas.

Under his rule Nawang Namgyal was able to maintain peace with Tibet in 1639. As a consequence, the son of his adherent rival Lt. Deb Raja (*Tsangpa*), his Council of Ministers and a number of Lamas came to visit *Punakha* to pay their respect to Shabdrung (Nawang Namgyal) (Das, 1973; 15). After a short time of peace, Gushi Khan (King of *Kham*) proclaimed his authority over Tibet and appointed the fifth Dalai Lama as the sole spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. In order to influence Dalai Lama and yellow hat sect, Gushi Khan sent a large army of Mongol and Tibetan to the border of Bhutan. A vicious clash raged with the Bhutanese army near *Kabang dzong*, led by Nawang Namgyal himself and the invading army was defeated (Das, 1973; 15).

By that time Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal was considered as the undisputed ruler of Bhutan. After suppressing his enemy, he had promulgated a new law based on King Songsten Gampo (a Tibetan King) including ten religious and sixteen secular edicts (Das, 1973; 17). He ruled Bhutan effectively with this new law. The dual system of government has greatly influenced the subsequent history of Bhutan. Though system worked effectively only under the rule of Nawang Namgyal, later it subsequently led the civil wars on the question of succession and the control of power. The history of

Bhutan remained full of strife until 1907, when the hereditary monarchical system came into existence.

From the history of the emergence of *Drukpa* school of thought from the period to Yeshe Dorji (1160 A.D) to Shabdung Nawang Namgyal (1616 A.D), it has become clear that the Tibetans, whether it is missionary monks, greatest guru or refugees, have strong impact on the religious development of the country. However, in these four centuries, the *Drukpa* lamas were succeeded in establishing in most part of the country. A large number of Bhutanese, especially from the western part, became the patrons of *Drukpa* School and they used to go *Ralung* for training, which has been stopped after the outbreak of Cultural Revolution in Tibet during 1950s. It can be analysed that Bhutan and Tibet or *Ralung* shared very close and formal connection, which can be described as the relationship between priest and patron, which has firmly built a hierarchical relationship between *Ralung* and the people of Bhutan.

2.7 The Tibetan Refugees in Bhutan

The Tibetan refugees who are mostly in exile from Tibet, arrived and settled in Bhutan, also have some impact on the political transformation in contemporary Bhutan. Bhutan has been a well-known destination for Tibetans, those who were banished from their country, escaping into exile, searching for Buddhist devotees or simply seeking to start a new life. The southern, and eastern borderlands of Tibet being used as the main destination for political exile or deportation. If one can analyse the history of Bhutan with such an understanding or immigration per se, it will be easier to escalate the traditional claim that there was a significant Buddhist culture established in Bhutan during the Tibetan dynastic period through the work of Padmasambhava (Rai, 2020; 72).

It has been recorded in the *Testament of Ba*, the Padmasambhava visit in Tibet during the reign of King Tri Songdetsen, his works of spiritual subjugation of malevolent forces and his close relation with and influence on King made many in Tibetan court

jealous and worried. Due to the misgiving about his presence in Tibet, he was asked to return to India and the Tibetan even plotted a failed ambush on the way to eliminate Padmasambhava (Phuntsho, 2013; 107). It was recorded when he was asked to leave the country, he did so by coming to Bhutan and connection up with Sindharaja who was his former devotee in *Bumthang*.

The two prominent stories in this regard are the story of the arrival of Khikha Ratho and his subject and the arrival of Prince Tsangma⁴⁵ in Bhutan. The story of Khikha Ratho might have seen identically mystical, however, the arrival of Prince Tsangma in Bhutan must be recounted in the context of the Tibetan political and religious conflicts. Prince Tsangma's- younger brother, King Tri Ralpachen has turned out to be a strong ruler who held fast Tibet's territorial integrity and almost fanatically promoted its new court religion⁴⁶. It has been recorded in later stories that he showed uncompromising support for Buddhism, where he attached two stretches of cloth of his tresses and has the monastic and lay Buddhist clergies sit on them as a mark of his deep respect to them. Tri Ralpachen is proudly remembered by later Buddhist for his draconian laws concerning the treatment of Buddhist clergy (Phuntsho, 2013; 111).

During the reign of Tri Ralpachen, monks were appointed as royal tutors, advisers and ministers and monasteries were granted immense privileges. It has been recorded in the later sources that each monk was given seven households for his support and the tradition of monastic estates is supposed to have started during his reign (Phuntsho, 2013; 112). Much of the taxes collected from the people were used to support the monastic community, build monasteries and fund the large Buddhist script translation projects. Those costs for monastic and intellectual projects and expenses for endless military campaigns exhausted the royal resources. As a consequence, such economic

⁴⁵King Desongtsen brother of Murum Tsenpo (Khikha Ratho) had three sons, the modern historian of Tibet generally claim that he was the eldest one. History of Tibet is also agreed that he had a strong religious inclination, which made him pass the throne to his brother Tri Ralpachen.

⁴⁶Today he is well known for the bilingual treaty which he signed with China around 821 or 822, which established the Sino-Tibetan border and pillar erected with inscription of the treaty in Tibetan and Chinese.

crisis generated tensions and conflicts between the Buddhist and followers of old Bon religion.

The supporters of the old religion plotted to oust the King and thereby end the unreasonable privileges enjoyed by the Buddhist clergy. In order to do so, they thought that those who supported the King had to be eliminated first. Therefore, it was decided that the King's brother Prince Tsangma, who used to ascend the throne in the absence of Tri Ralpachen had to be eliminated first. Then, they bribed the renowned astrologers of the country to exclaim unanimously that if Prince Tsangma were to remain in Tibet, a great calamity would occur in nation. This forced the King to send Tsangma into exile and Tsangma being a virtuous figure have happily accepted the proposal (Phuntsho, 2013; 113).

There are various stories available on the arrival of Prince Tsangma in Bhutan after he has been banished from Tibet. According to some account, he was sent off with a number of following and gifts, all of which he sent back when he crossed the *Tsangpo* river. According to many Tibetan sources, he was exiled to *Lhodrak, Bumthang* or thereabouts and the subsequent death through poisoning. However, some claim that he went to the modern Bhutan and left a family line there. According to Nyangral Nyima Ozer⁴⁷, Tsangma has brought a lot of Buddhist texts from Tibet and buried them in the remote places around *Paro* for posterity (Tshewang, 1994; 116).

Text entitled *The Clear Lamp Which Illuminates the History of Royal Clans*⁴⁸ written by a monk named Nawang is considered as the main source for the Bhutanese version on Tsangma story. The author of the text claims to be from the Jar clan which is said to have descended from Prince Tsangma (Phuntsho, 2013; 113). According to the

⁴⁷Ngadak Nyangrel Nyima Ozer was born in 1124 in *Lhodrak.*, who traced his ancestry back to at least the 8th century AD when the members of *Nyang* clan was populated the inner circle of emperors. Having learned to read at a very young age, he showed an uncanny propensity to memorize the various *tantras* and *sadhanas* that formed the basis of the *Nyang* clan's practice lineage. According to hagiographies, he experienced numerous auspicious dreams and visions from the age of seven whereby various magical emanations—including Padmasambhava confirmed his identity and his destiny as a future treasure revealer.

⁴⁸It is basically a genealogical text, transmitted orally or in fragmentary chronicles with the aim at recording the family histories.

text, Prince Tsangma was asked by his brother King Ralpachen to travel along the southern Mon corridors on a tour when the fortune-tellers proclaimed that he had to be banished. He has entered Bhutan via *Chumbi Valley* with five attendants. In *Paro*, he cohabited with a local lady who gave birth to a son. This gave rise to two ancient aristocratic clans in *Paro* and *Thimpu*, which seem to have existed even today (Phuntsho, 2013; 114).

Tsangma continued his journey toward eastward at *Mizimpa* eastern Bhutan and he met Ami Dhondup Gyal, a Tibetan from Lang clan who had left the country due to family disputes. He took Ami Dhondup Gyal's daughter as his wife who gave birth to two sons Trimi Lhayi Wangchuk and Chebu Thonglegtsun⁴⁹. Tsangma's grandson Gongkar Gyal had four sons among whom three gave rise to the clans of *Yede*, *Tungde* and *Wangma*. Nawang gives a fairly detailed genealogy of these different lines which spread out across the eastern Bhutan and *Tawang* (Phuntsho, 2013; 114).

2.8 Conclusion

The foundation of Bhutan-Tibet relation is based on religion. It is undeniable that Bhutan is closely linked with Tibet especially in its religion and culture. Bhutan is even considered as the last bastion of the Tibetan Buddhist civilisation. Every Buddhist sects existed in Bhutan has their origin in Tibet. Tibetan origin of Bhutan's traditional elites and the theocratic political system of the country has symbolised the strong cultural and political ties between the two countries. Bhutan has always looked towards Tibet, sending their children to *Ralung* for training. Bhutanese people have accepted the formal connection of priest and patron between them.

However, the legends of Songtsen Gampo's two monasteries spontaneously claim Bhutan as the expansion of Tibet. It was not only the building of monasteries, rather Songtsen Gampo hold the legacies which have palpable cultural impact on the entire

⁴⁹Trimi was sent as the ruler for *Laong Yulsum* in the modern *Tawang* region. The *Jowo* clan, the line of the kings of this area according to *Nawang*, is the descendent from him. Chebu inherited the castle of *Mizimpa* and had three sons: Triten Pel, Gongkar Gyal and Palkye Dar.

Himalayan region including Bhutan. He was the one who invented the Tibetan scripts, which is used in the entire Buddhist Himalayan region. Songtsen Gampo's major contribution was the system of law and structure of governance, which has been followed by Bhutanese even today. Lastly, his legacy was the creation of efficient civil and military administration. The *dzong* constructed by Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal, which may look like temple but it were not merely a religious sites built for Buddhist piety but rather hold the political statements marking the imperial domain under Songtsen's rule.

On the basis of the historical trajectories of Tibet- Bhutan relationship, it can be observed that the antagonism of past has still impact on their relations. The old days reference to Bhutanese *Monpa* (barbarian, uncivilised, and people living in the dark) by Tibetan still gave the Bhutanese the antipathy toward their northern neighbour. The entrenched rivalries between the *Gelugpa* sect of Tibet and the *Drukpa* sect of Bhutan under the Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal in the past, still upholds the sense of inferiority among the Bhutanese ruler and people. Tibet is considered as the mother of Buddhism and Tibetan lamas were highly revered and enthusiastically welcomed in Bhutan in the past. Such dimension of reverence and loyalties for Tibetan lamas became significant in the past, and determining factor in the relationship between Tibet and Bhutan.

CHAPTER 3

Bhutanisation: The Cultural Homogenisation in Bhutan

3.1 Introduction

The forces and process of homogenisation has been widely discussed in the academic debates in the contemporary world along with globalisation. Generally, practising homogenisation may possess fewer problems to any political system. But specifically, practising homogenisation in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual societies like Bhutan has generated many serious problems. The period between 1960s-80s is the major phase of Bhutan's nation-building and development of national policy based on cultural homogenisation, popularly known as *Bhutanisation*. In fact the country had gone through a massive socio-economic transformation during these periods. In this background, this chapter discusses the concept homogenisation in the context of Bhutan and also analyses the acts and policies implemented by the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) as part of *Bhutanisation* process. While highlighting the important aspects and approaches of nationalism, it also discusses how the process homogenisation has been fostered in collaboration with nationalism and globalisation.

The chapter starts with the broader understanding of the concept homogenisation. It also discusses the concept/phenomenon of cultural homogenisation based on the development of the concept nationalism and cultural globalisation. The chapter also reflect in brief, on two types of nationalism i.e. civic and ethnic nationalism, which are in concert with the process homogenisation. The core aspect of this chapter is the way it affected Bhutan especially when the Royal Government of Bhutan, during the era of 1960s-80s, have adopted and implemented various homogenisation policies and acts in order to assimilate various existing ethnic communities under the dominance of the major ethnic community in Bhutan, *Ngalong*.

3.2 The Concept Homogenisation

The term homogenisation indicates a single and unified social system, culture and tradition. The concept homogenisation can be defined as a condition where the societies of different groups\communities, have suddenly interacted and intermingles into a unified culture which does not show any evidence of diversity or differences in cultures among the people. One can relate it with the reduction of cultural diversity, through the popularisation and diffusion of a wide array of cultural symbols, not only as the physical objects, but also in the form of custom, language, arts, ideas and values (Jennings, 2010; 132).

The term homogenisation has been conceptualised and studied usually in social science and predominantly in nationalism studies. Since the meaning of the term has been defined interchangeably with nationalism and cultural globalisation, the definition of the concept has not been defined specifically by any authors or scholars. The concept is well rendered in French term '*massification*', means to *massif* or to render homogeneous by stamping out cultural specificity (Conversi, 2007; 372). The concept homogenisation is considered as the significant tool in the configuration of nationalism, simultaneously the concept linked with the idea of cultural globalisation or westernisation in contemporary era.

There is the need to distinguish the theories of homogenisation with unification. By definition, both the state leaders and nationalists aim for some sorts of unification, yet not everyone are obsessed with enforcing full-blown homogenisation. With the idea unification of a society or state, one would understand about the process of amalgamation, confederation or alliance rather than assimilation, imposition or elimination (Conversi, 2007; 372).

Predominantly, the concept has been described in the context of a cultural phenomenon. However, it is believed that no society has ever been culturally homogenous. Earlier, the concept homogenisation was more ideological and sociological. In some situation where the political elites indulge in the cultural

engineering, homogenisation can be defined as the socio-political process which deliberately fostering cultural homogenisation. The idea homogeneity presupposes existence of a unified, organic community and does not describe its actual occurrence. In some cases, the process homogenisation can be seen as elite-driven, which attempt to impose socio-cultural changes with an aim of cultural uniformity. However, in the eyes of them, the conformity and standardisation of certain laws meant not only of its functionality and efficiency, rather obedience to common laws.

Simply, the term homogenisation denotes the condition of absence of differences/distinctiveness among the members of a particular society or state. The process homogenisation has been directed heterogeneously or we can say that there is various type of homogenisation (religion, cultural, ethnic etc.) which are conducted based on the interest of the rulers, leaders or some elites. Homogenisation based on the particular culture is predominant in the modern history, especially after the French Revolution or industrialisation by Gellner (1960). However, the processes congruencies and unifying the people has been practised in the different facets of time based on other than culture, like religion, race, ethnicity and ideology.

Practising homogenisation most of the time led some kind of ugly ends; sometime it goes beyond its limits and turn out into the radical homogenisation ended with tragic events like mass killing, and genocide. We can see the ample of cases in pre-modern and even in contemporary/modern history, where there are events like assimilation, eradication, exclusion, mass killings, elimination, and transfer of population and so on¹.

Sometimes, the idea cultural homogenisation has been used by the state with an aim to standardise culture of a particular community (mostly the dominant/-elite) over the

¹One of the cases of pre-modern homogenisation practices is the religious homogenisation between Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, and the *Schmalkaldic* League, particularly the principles of *cuius regio* and *eius religio* (“whose realm, his religion”) after the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Though the Peace of Augsburg was somewhere successful in preventing tension between the empires and increasing tolerance, but marginalised the Anabaptists or the Calvinists from the peace. These minorities did not achieve any legal recognition until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Conversi, 2007: 378).

other, which overlap between the state and culture. Such a process basically consist top to down where the state seek to nationalise the masses. In doing so, they have adopted the measures like, assimilation, eradication, population transfer, ethnocide, and genocide. Terms like *eliminationism* and *eradicationism* are used to encompass various forms of state-led homogenisation practices (Conversi 2010; 719). Historically, such practices of cultural engineering has often been transformed into radical ‘demographic engineering’, leading to mass expulsion and genocide.

Throughout the modern era, there are so many cases including Bhutan, where the states have forced their citizen to conform to common standard and cultural pattern. In most cases, the term ‘cultural homogenisation’ should be preferred over ethnocide and other similar terms. The term ethnocide is erratically utilised to mean the cultural destruction of a group. Hence, this does not necessarily lead to killing but often implies the “intent to destroy a national/ethnic group” (Conversi 2010; 720). During the period of war, especially under the totalitarian regimes, governments were conjured by the idea of nationalising the state. In the early twentieth century, many governments started to see assimilation as insufficient measures for the process. Later they plan for the population shift and the physical elimination of community as it is the case of Nepalese and Tibetan refugees in Bhutan.

Apart from other nationalist theories, Gellner’s (1944) theory of nationalism has proficiently talked about the concept cultural homogenisation. By establishing a triadic relationship between nationalism, homogenisation and industrialisation, Gellner conceived homogenisation as critical precipitate of epochal changes. He claimed that, nationalism is simply happens by itself as a result of new modernising needs brought about by industrialisation, doesn’t need any particular ideology, any agency and institution (Conversi, 2007; 371).

In the age of globalisation, the cultural aspect of the concept which is defined as the diffusion of cultural values and ideas across the national borders is considered as synonymous with the cultural homogenisation. However, a very popular version of

the contemporary homogenisation argument contends that globalisation means Westernisation and the global processes function to impose western cultural imperialism on the non-western world (Holton, 2011; 191). The spread of global culture can be equated with the spread of American culture. Scholte (1993), describes that the spread of mass culture “westernisation or modernisation... a dynamics or whereby the social structures of modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, individualism and so on) are spread the world over, frequently destroying pre-existing cultures and local self-determination in the process” (Dagrir, 2013; 1).

3.3 Homogenisation and Globalisation

Globalisation and its major mechanisms (growing human capital, free market, and cross-border communication) have created a new world order. For Anthony Giddens, globalisation as the growth of the worldwide social relations connecting distant localities in such a way, that local happening are shaped by events happening many thousands of miles away. Hence, every effort at classifying the processes of globalisation necessarily results in oversimplification and a reduction of complexity (Giddens, 1991; 70). Subsequently, the term homogenisation denotes the reduction of diversity and the unification of world into single point whether politically, economically and culturally. The changing scenario of world order with globalisation has incited passionate debates; one of such recent debates is on the influence of globalisation upon culture.

Homogenisation is most likely the process, in both its positive and negative effects, that is most frequently associated with globalisation in normal discussion about the topic. Since, globalisation as a process of homogenisation assumes that its main driving force is to unite the world and make all its different points become similar, whether this is in the cultural, economic or political field. However, in the era of borderless world, the concept predominantly understand as the situation after 1990s, where the process globalisation has swept like a flood, which has eliminated all the

existing cultures of other to create a single global culture. Most of the sociological propaganda on cultural globalisation, defined as the diffusion of the cultural values and ideas across the national borders, sees it as synonymous with homogenisation (Daghrir, 2013; 1).

The process homogenisation in association with globalisation operates in different ways. Through communication revolution, it allows for a greater circulation of ideas around the world. It has the capacity to homogenise, by bringing the actors into more direct contact with each other, either physically or through the media. International institutions like World Bank, WTO, IMF, and UN also plays an important role in the processes of homogenisation, by propagating global rules for all nations to follow². The world economic and financial systems are also the important factors of homogenisation. Like how all the national economies are integrated into the world market (North Korea with few exceptions) and financial markets are the essence of a homogenized market, functioning 24 hours a day and allowing operations all over the globe to be linked through new modes of communication (Holton, 2011; 190). With the rise of free trade, it is now feasible to find similar goods in every country and this is leading to homogenisation of people's behaviour as consumers.

Globalisation has also impacted in homogenizing culture like diffusion of Hollywood movies and global brands that people all around the world aspire to possess. The McDonald, the posters of Hollywood movies and the western clothing brands with social prestige (Levi's, Guess etc.) have inescapable presence leading the world toward the single or homogenized culture. Such brands often not only symbolize the products but also a certain lifestyle. Some of these brands, like McDonalds, have even become synonyms for homogenisation.

The more generalised and more specific version of homogenisation argument probably talks about the idea of the Americanisation of global culture. In the period

²The thrust by the UN for the protection of human rights – whether this is actually effective or not – has meant that this question cannot be ignored by national governments. The IMF, by enforcing similar demands for structural adjustments to countries' public finances during the 1990s also had homogenizing outcome, as does the liberalisation of markets promoted by the WTO.

during the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama (1989) had prominently announced the 'end of history', in the sense that Western capitalism and democracy had been victorious and no other contender for global cultural-political dominance was evident. Contemporary process of cultural homogenisation can be seen in the context of the dominance of American or capitalist culture. The United States dominated the existing global traffic in information and ideas. Even, the American music, movies, television series and American software are so dominant and visible that they are available literally in the market of every nation on the earth (Holton, 2011; 192). American influence is significant in taste, lives and aspiration of every individual too.

Many critics of globalisation claim that the process is nothing more than that the imposition of American culture in the entire world. Even the supporters of globalisation like Thomas Friedman wrote in The New York Times, that the globalisation is "globalising American culture and American cultural icon", he therefore put it:

Globalisation has a distinctly American face: it wears Mickey Mouse ears, it eats Big Macs and drink Coke or Pepsi and it does its computing on an IBM and Apple Laptop, using Windows 98[...]. In most societies people cannot distinguish any more between American power, American export, American cultural assaults, American cultural export and plain vanilla globalisation. They are now all wrapped intone. Many societies around the world can't get enough of it, but others see it as a fundamental threat (Friedman, 1998: 7).

There are number of key elements which testify the American domination thesis. Like in the premises of the predominant American ownership of key resources for the manufacture and transmission of culture, including satellite systems, information technology manufacture, news agencies, the advertising agencies, television programme production and export and film industry (Holton, 2011; 193).

Homogenisation, in this sense, is linked with the predominant role of the USA in the multi-media ownership and the global export of television³, film⁴, computer hardware and software applications, including social networking sites (facebook, twitter, instagram etc.) and information provision including global news (CNN the pioneering global news channel).

The second theme in the Americanisation, homogenisation and globalisation is on diffusion of cultural practices beyond the information and culture industries to the very characteristics of modern social organisation (Ritzer and Malone, 2000; 97). A key example is George Ritzer's (1993) theory of the 'McDonaldisation of Society'. McDonaldisation can be viewed as the Americanisation of the entire globe. This refers not simply to the spectacular worldwide rise of American fast food industry, but more generally to certain broader cultural activities in the economy, organisation and personal life, of which McDonald's is a manifestation⁵. The notion McDonaldisation refers to the worldwide homogenisation of entire societies through the impact of the multi-national corporations. Those who consider that the culture is persistently directing towards the homogenisation believe that so-called global culture follows the global economy and this led such slogans like 'Coca-colonisation' and 'McDonaldisation' (Daghrir, 2013; 2).

Another important factor of homogenisation is the developments of global communications which have made the exchange of goods and ideas near immediate and incredibly easy. From the unpreventable presence of McDonalds and Hollywood movie posters, to the Western clothing brands and the World Bank's dictation of plans and patterns of development throughout the world, the limitless amount of evidence of American-led cultural commodity domination makes "the case for seeing cultural globalisation as 'Americanisation'... a persuasive one" (Tomlinson, 2005; 176).

³The worldwide diffusion of television programmes such as The Simpsons, Friends, Sex and the City etc.

⁴From the early 1990s, film like Terminator 2 and Dance with Wolves dominated the box office worldwide, in 2010 when Avatar and the animated Toy Story 3 did the same, and recently in 2019 Avengers: The End Game dominated the box office worldwide (Holton, 2011; 193).

⁵McDonald's fast food, which began in the USA in 1955, opened its 12000th franchise operation in 1991. In the same year, more new restaurants were opened abroad (427) than in the USA itself.

Advocates of this view usually cite the global presence of the US television and film industries (Ferguson, 1992; 72) and assume the influence of the media hegemony has on a native culture.

In the context of globalisation, homogenisation can be resulted as the breakdown of cultural barriers and global assimilation of a single culture. However, the process homogenisation, in the context of the domination of Western or Capitalist culture, has been criticised as a form of cultural-imperialism and neo-colonialism. Anti-globalism activists (leaders of cultural preservation, political activist, academics, journalist etc.) frequently depict that McDonald, Disney, Apple and Coco-cola corporations as the agents of globalism or cultural imperialism (Daghrir, 2013; 19). Some critics claim that the national identity and culture has been eroded by the impact of global cultural industries and multinational media. Usually, they argue that the Western culture dominating and destroying the other culture.

In tune with the argument global culture as the American culture, Daghrir (2013) claim that, as a nation of immigrants, United States has been a recipient of as much as an exporter of global culture. Hence, it is the influence of immigrant culture which makes the American so popular. The American has reached throughout the world because it has incorporated the foreign styles and ideas. In fact, American culture is the amalgam of influences and approaches around the world. The demographic make-up of the US show that country has been very receptive to external cultural influence and therefore, it has been incorporated into the fabrics of US culture.

The imposition of Americanized uniformity through globalisation is considered as myth for him, rather he claim it is the explosion of cultural exchange. After all, Americans did not invent the fast food culture, amusement park and the cinemas⁶. The key factors behind the universal attractiveness of American culture concern the important features of the American audience. The heterogeneity of America's

⁶Before Mcdonald's Big Mac there were fish and chips, before Disney land , there was Copenhagen's Tivoli garden and in the first two decades of the 20th century, the two largest exporters of movies around the world were France and Italy (Holton, 2013; 195).

population-its regional, ethnic, religious and racial diversity forced the media, from the early years of 20th century, to experiment with message, images and story lines that had a broad multicultural appeal.

Though homogenisation in the context of globalisation viewed negatively, it leads to the reduction of cultural diversity, Tomlinson (2001) believe that homogenisation is not bad thing in itself and benefits of homogenisation may outweigh the good in cultural diversity. Some positive view by the scholars on homogenisation focuses especially on the area of education and says that it produces consistent norms of behaviour across a set of modern institutions, thus tying institutions such as the modern nation state and formal education together in a tight political sphere.

Hence, globalisation on the one hand helps in blanketing the capital and commercialised the culture crosses and connect the world in unprecedented ways. On the other hand, there is an intense fragmenting and reconfiguring of social relations at the level of community and locality. Consequently, in the case of practising cultural homogenisation into the states of developing worlds, seen rather than a state led policy with an aim to impose the culture of the dominant elite group over other existing groups. It can be a top to down process where the ruling elite adopted such method either to secure their sovereignty over others or to avoid the threat from cultural diversity to the survival of national identity. The process homogenisation, especially in developing countries like Bhutan through the nationalism based on culture and identities, has paved the way for serious ethnic conflict.

The process homogenisation has led to serious ethnic violence and conflict, especially in the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and the multi-religious society. South Asia is a home of one-fourth of humanity who is living in seven developing countries of the region with their respective ethnicities, religion, culture and languages. The post-colonial nation-building in South Asian countries is basically focused on creating a unified 'national identity' based on either common political values and citizenship or a recognised majoritarian ethnic identity. According to Krishna, "whenever state elites

in the region have attempted to ride roughshod over the rights and aspiration of so called peripheral minorities (religious, linguistic, regional or other), the result has been either a violent partition\secession or the emergence of ethno-nationalist movement that have attempted to achieve those ends” (Krishna, 1999; 97).

3.4 Homogenisation and Nationalism

Since the concept homogenisation and nationalism has been discussed interchangeably, it is significant to discuss the concept nationalism. In order to build any nation or to create nationalism, a leader always required acting the homogenisation process based on common culture, ethnicity, language, ideology, religion or shared values to mobilise the people. In fact nationalism is the myth to legitimise the state acts of homogenisation. Basically, nationalism is an ideology and movement characterised by the homogenisation process to the promotion of the interest of particular nation with the aim to build and maintain a single national-identity based on shared social characteristics such as culture, language, religion, politics, and belief in a shared singular history and to promote national unity or solidarity (Smith, 2010; 9).

Hence, homogenisation is central in any state-building processes but was not able to grab any attention as it deserves either in social science or any other humanities subjects. It was Gellner who, among the scholars, has first to theorise the linkage of cultural homogenisation with nationalism as a consequence of industrialism. The main aims of nationalism are to build and maintain a single national identity which will be based on shared culture, language, religion, ideology and belief. Nationalism, therefore, most of the times seek to preserve and foster a nation's traditional culture, and cultural revivals have been associated with nationalist movements. Since, the primordial societies are scatter or compose various culture, beliefs and ideas where the process homogenisation plays a crucial role to achieve the goals of nationalist movements.

Nationalism is extremely a complex subject and has a huge meaning ranging from being the defining ideology of political movements seeking some form of independent statehood; of groups determined to achieve or to improve their cultural, political and social and economic rights within a given state; of protest movements on the part of communities threatened by either state policies or by other social groups; to the core ideology employed by the state to stimulate public support for its policies or to reaffirm its legitimacy (Easman, 2010; 28).

According to Ignatief (1993), nationalism is a notion that combines the political idea of territorial self-determination, the cultural idea of the nation as one's primary identity and moral idea of justification of action to protect the right of the nation against the foreign rule. One of the most basic definitions of the term nationalism is define by Ernest Haas, 'a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one (Haas, 1986; 727).

For Gellner, nationalism is the imposition of a high culture on society replacing local, low cultures and most multiculturalism. His most prominent theory on the origin of nationalism starts by regarding the transformation of society from an agrarian based economy and social structure to the one centred industrialism. According to Gellner, the society before nationalism was vertically bound with over 80% of population as being peasant or farmer, where there were strict boundaries between communities (Gellner, 2006; 8). They do not necessarily share common language, culture, myth, religion or even ancestry. Due to the lack of standardised education, there were no economic mobility or social advancement and no imposition of higher culture. However, in industrial society the boundaries between the communities have been broken with the advent of standardised masses and education which allows economic mobility and social advancement (Conversi, 2007; 376).

Anderson (2005), instead of classifying the concept nationalism as an ideology, suggested making things easier by treating it as it belong to 'kinship' and 'religion', rather than with 'liberalism' and 'fascism' (Anderson, 2005; 5). He tries to bring the

basic understanding of the concept by aligning it, not with political ideologies but rather with the large cultural systems that preceded it. The two relevant cultural systems i.e. religious community and dynastic realm, both of these were taken for granted frames of reference very much as nationality.

Nationalism as a concept was not fully recognised until 18th century. There are three paradigms which offer the understanding the origin of nationalism (Conversi, 2007; 372). First paradigm is primordialism/perennialism which mostly talks about the ethnic indicator of nationalism and argue that the nation is ancient and natural phenomena. They assume that ethnic is primordial, which is given to the human condition, and that nation is historical but immemorial. Nation, states, parties, bureaucracies and politics are regarded largely as the public expression of these pre-existing ethnic cleavages and cultural identities (Smith, 1996; 43). Second, the Ethno-symbolism explains nationalism as a dynamic, evolutionary phenomenon and stresses the importance of symbols, myths and traditions in the development of nations and nationalism. Third, the Modernism proposes that nationalism is a recent social phenomenon that needs the socio-economic structures of modern society to exist (Smith, 1996; 446).

Even though the concept nationalism has been originated in the 18th century, there are ample examples of national movement for self-determination, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty throughout the history. In the context of Bhutan, the first Dharma Raja in the 16th century has mobilised people from different parts of the country to fight against the Tibetan army for the cause of territorial integrity and sovereignty, which is still glorified in the political as well as the religious history of Bhutan. Though the Dharma Raja may not be familiar with the idea, but his acts can be considered as an act of nationalism based on religion.

One cannot discuss nationalism without considering what one means by a nation. Yet, there are different approaches in the literature of nationalism which has defined the term nation. According to Smith, the nation as a, “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a

common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991; 14). The territorial self-determination of a particular group is the central part of the most definition of ‘nation’ in the national-ism literature and provides an important criterion for differentiating between nations and other social categories.

Haas proposes that the nation is “a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing them to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state” (Hass, 1986; 726). Many groups hold common myths, values, and symbols (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups, or even professional associations). But nations are not just unified by culture; they are unified by a sense of purpose: controlling the territory that the members of the group believe to be theirs.

For Anderson, nation is an ‘imagined political community’⁷ - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity or genuineness, but rather by the style in which they are imagined. Most of the thinkers on nationalism have related the term nation-state with race and ethnicity. And they made ethnicity one of the central factors-alongside other commonalities such as those language, history and territory. Through which prism race is seen unproblematically as a genetic category, ethnicity is seen as extension of kinship and inherent in the body of the person as born ethnic, and the nation is seen as an extension of ethnicity as the most important variables factor of cultural commonality.

Matyal (1992) called nationalism is an idea based on other ideas such as nation-state, self-determination, national identity and superiority (Matyal, 1992: 311) and there is a need of some process to achieve such ideas. A process of creation of unifying features of the nation or the action that resulted from the action of the group. It defined

⁷It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of the fellow members meet them or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 2006; 6).

nationalism is organised endeavour to control homeland. However, to have their own state through homogenisation is the core idea of nationalism but nationalism is not limited on such ideas only, rather to form a nation-state is also depend on the activities of nationalists.

Meller (1989) define nationalism “the political expression of the nation’s aspiration including control over territory that members of the nation perceive as their homeland by rights” (Meller, 1989, 4-5). Here we can find the amalgamation of ideas with activities of nationalist in nationalism. While concern with territory is necessary component many nations claim to a territory even when the members of the nation are not the majority in that area, which leads extreme nationalism with genocide and ethnic cleansing type of situation. We can find in history after 1989, when communism was collapsed, it left many people with no identity and they found themselves free to choose their nation. Given free choice, long undeveloped conflict rose up and created sources of serious conflict because their political boundaries did not match with the ethnic boundaries, especially in the case of Yugoslavia. Gellner (1992) define such nationalism as “Potato Principle” and says that roughly that group will look back historically to the periods when they were farmers to justify the control of land in the urban and industrial age.

After bringing different vision on nationalism together, Barrington (1997) define the concept as the pursuit-through argument or other activity-of a set of rights for self-defined members of the nation, including, at a minimum territorial autonomy or sovereignty (Barrington, 1997; 714). According to him, there are two common features of nationalism- first, they define, at least roughly, the territorial boundaries that the nation has a right to control and second, they define the membership boundaries of the population that makes up the nation-the group that deserves the territorial control and that is entitled to the supreme loyalty of the other member of the collective. Such membership boundaries are created by the members of the nation by themselves (which include generally intellectuals, political elites or bureaucrats). There the creator of membership boundaries established the ‘we’ that possesses the

right to rule or control the territory, which automatically result the emergence of the 'they' that does not share this rights.

In the mid-1960s the modern study of nationalism has begun with Earnest Gellner. Most significant theoretical works on nationalism do not fail to mention the Gellner's theory. In fact Brendon O'Leary (1998), agrees that 'all worthwhile subsequent writing and research on nationalism will benefit from Gellner's work' (Leary, 1998; 40). According to Gellner, nationalism was the offspring of the marriage between state and culture and later foster by modernity. While industry needs cultural standardisation to operate smoothly, this can be only assured via state sponsored mass-education.

Among the many thinkers of nationalism, Gellner's theory of nationalism can be considered as prominent in the study of cultural homogenisation. The term cultural homogenisation and nationalism has been discussed simultaneously in the Gellner's approach on nationalism, in fact he claim that, both are consistent with each other. He argued that, in industrial society, where the roles of individuals are more flexible and 'a man is not fully identified with his role, and can if he wishes divest himself of his role' (Gellner, 1969; 155), communication via common cultural medium become crucial. Therefore, national culture rather than structure becomes of the greatest importance. Due to this nationalism necessitates a strong tendency towards the homogenisation of culture (Malesevic and Haugaard, 2007; 133).

The industrial revolution in the Western world necessitated a radical change in the relationship between polity and culture, and that this in turn produces nationalism. The salient feature of the preceding agrarian societies was, according to Gellner, cultural diversity and fragmentation in small autonomous sub-communities, each of which lived in its own specific idiom. A peasant had no need to communicate with the elite of high culture who existed beyond his/her experience. The modern industrial and predominantly urban society required mass literacy and a high degree of social mobility to work smoothly, which could only be achieved by nearly universal access

to a state-sponsored 'national' educational system. This, in turn, could only be successful if conducted in a vernacular accessible to the entire population of the country.

Thus, need for cultural homogenisation arose and gave birth to the political doctrine of nationalism, 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'. Nationalism can then be characterised as 'the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous units'. According to Gellner, nationalism is the principle of homogenous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and of the obligatory cultural unity of rulers and ruled - is indeed inscribed neither in the nature of things, nor in the hearts of men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life in general, and the contention that it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self-evident. But nationalism as a phenomenon, not as a doctrine presented by nationalists, is inherent in a certain set of social conditions; and those conditions, it so happens, are the conditions of our times.

Gellner's approach of nationalism focuses more in language and culture and defined as glotto-centric (Conversi, 2007; 376) (language centric or language bounded). The primary feature of his approach is the need for a standardised and single language as the means of means of communication in the modern society. He uses the concept of 'High Culture' extensively and claims that a separate High Culture developed from the industrialisation need to promote a shared communication (language) tool for a whole society. For him the High Culture is the model of human comportment and the medium of feasible industrial system made up of formal and articulated in a definite language (Gellner, 1992; 41-2).

3.5 Homogenisation as Nationalism: The Experience of Bhutan

Bhutan is divided into different administrative districts inhabited by different ethnic groups. As we have already discussed, the Royal Government of Bhutan has adopted several policies leads to cultural homogenisation in the late 1970s to 1980s. Many of

these policies have reflected the elements of majority nationalism. The Bhutanese nationalist movement always highlighted majority national identity. They claimed that, as the country located in between the two powerful countries of Asia (India and China) and sharing a porous border with India, the national identity is in jeopardy. Therefore, they started the movement with the process cultural homogenisation under the banner of *Driglam namzha* (one nation one culture). In Bhutan, the political elites from the majority *Ngalong* community claimed that their culture deserve or have the right to become the national culture of Bhutan by taking the historical legacy of the arrival of the first Shabdrung (Dharma Raja) who was a *Ngalong*.

To set such boundaries for nationalism is not an easy task as the transmission of the ideas of national membership boundaries to the masses are very difficult to manage. The successful claims of one group over the territorial or membership boundaries involve serious struggles with another group and outbreak of conflict within the nation over the competing definition of the boundaries. In Bhutan, the *Ngalong* based membership boundaries of the population has faced a protest from the other competing ethnic community, the *Lhotshampas* (the southerners or Bhutanese Nepali). It lead to the outbreak of severe conflict between the *Lhotshampas* and Royal Government of Bhutan while implementing the cultural boundaries.

Generally, national homogenisation is not predestined; it often pursued for political ends by rulers and bureaucrats and nationalism scholars including Gellner have accepted that homogenisation often pursued unnecessarily and even counter-productively. In Bhutan, the political elite (*Ngalong*) have insisted the centrality of *Dzongkha* language and culture as the quintessence of Bhutanese national identity. As the creed of homogenisation under the *Drukpa* culture has spread to the masses especially after implementing the code of *driglam namzha*, no one was able to escape from the constant pressure of *Bhutanisation*. Ever since, the non-*Dzongkha* speakers especially the Bhutanese Nepali have been looked upon with suspicion and they are marginalised, assimilated and emigrated. Practising cultural homogenisation in

Bhutan has led to a situation of 'entry vs. exit', where entry meant assimilation, without which the only other available option was exit that is emigration and asylum.

By the late 1980's, nearly all the existing ethnic groups began experiencing constant pressures to get assimilate with the majority, in order to show their loyalty to the King and the country. Language and cultural practices became the only values and vessels of nationhood in Bhutan during these periods. The Bhutanese experience of cultural homogenisation validated the Gellner model in which the national language is taken up by an existing set of dominant elites. He argues that, such type of nationalism is the falsity and stress the fraudulent essence of nationalism which is exemplified by the political leaders' romantic but selective endorsement of national language as the language of the people (Conversi, 2007; 375).

There are various definitions of a nation which leads to different strands of nationalism. Historians, sociologists and anthropologist have debated different types of nationalism, especially since 1930s (Louis, 1936; 726). The self-define nature of nation has led to classify the various types of nationalism. In general, there are five types of nationalism; they are humanitarian nationalism, Jacobin nationalism, traditional nationalism, liberal nationalism and integral nationalism (Nowrasteh, 2018). However, such categories are not mutually exclusive and many nationalist movements combine some or all of these components to varying degree. Except civic nationalism, all other nationalism has been predominantly discussed under ethnic nationalism. Nationalism occurs in social conditions which also give rise to democratic and liberal ideas and it often takes illiberal and undemocratic forms, depends on the goal of nationalist movement (Plamentaz, 1973; 23).

Generally, the most common way of classifying nationalism has been to describe movements as having either 'civic' or 'ethnic' nationalist characteristics. This distinction was popularised by Hans Kohn (1944) in 1950s, who described civic nationalism as Western and more democratic, and depicting ethnic nationalism as Eastern and undemocratic. The enlightened Western form of nationalism supportive

of liberal democracy, and the Eastern form of nationalism that is an obstacle to any genuinely democratic society. As in the case of Bhutan, the third King of Bhutan Jigmi Dorji who is also considered as the father of modern Bhutan has adopted the developmental process in the country based on the idea of civic nationalism.

3.6 Civic Nationalism

Civic nationalism defines the nation as an association of people who identify themselves as belonging to the nation, who have equal and shared political rights, and faithfulness to related political actions (Kate, 2001; 391). According to Kohn (1944), Western nationalism is a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future (Kohn, 1944; 574). The principle of nationalism is basically claims that, the nation is not based on common ethnic ancestry, but is a political entity whose core identity is not ethnicity.

Civic nationalism built upon the assumption that individuals need a secure national identity to have a meaningful life. In the Absence of that sense of security, there exists an inherent risk of fragmentation within the society. Unlike exclusive forms of nationalism, membership of a nation should be based upon choice rather than a predetermined ethnic identity. Furthermore, democratic regimes need national identities to function smoothly.

Civic nationalism believed in the sense of shared values amongst its citizens such as openness and inclusivity. It has also shaped by the liberal ideas such as public participation, tolerance and right of the individuals. Given its overly liberal character, civic nationalism facilitates cultural diversity whilst rejecting the xenophobic chauvinism of those organisations further to the right of the political spectrum. Earnest Renan (1882) and J.S. Mill (1861) are often thought to be the advocates of early liberal nationalism.

Civic nationalism believes that, nationalism is originally regarded as the progressive and supportive development of liberal democracy. The liberal defenders of nationalism are mostly indebted to the original enlightenment ideal of the nation as an

agency of democratic power that was able to challenge the old suppressive order of the 'ancient regime'. French and American nationalisms have traditionally been regarded as the epitome of civic nationalism. They were based on the political ideas of revolutionaries who fought for the 'sovereignty of the people' (Auer, 1997; 2). The membership of the community was thus defined primarily in political terms; civic virtues were more important for the new republic than ethnicity, common culture, or even common language. The only means of exclusion were the territorial boundaries of a country. Bhutan has also followed such notion of nationalism, where the country has opened its border for modernisation, abolished the feudal system, included the people from the marginalised section into the mainstream political system, encouraged the marriage between inter-ethnic community, institutionalised the recruitment process of administrative system, and many infrastructural developments.

3.7 Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic nationalism is also known as ethno-nationalism, which is a form of nationalism where the nation is defined in terms of ethnicity. The concept has been built with the understanding that, nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith and a common ethnic ancestry. It also includes ideas of culture shared between members of the group, and with their ancestors. George Schopflin state that, in Central and Eastern Europe there is a long tradition of using or rather abusing nationalism for political purposes, which is opposite of the definition of nationhood (Auer, 1997; 4). Furthermore, nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe shows characteristics that are 'in many respects substantially different from Western Europe (for both historically and contemporary reasons)'.

According to Schopflin, the most important factor influencing current developments is the traditional backwardness of these societies, a consequence of which is 'the weakness of the civic elements of nationhood' (Schopflin, 1997; 49). While in Bhutan, with the implementation of new Citizenship Acts and *Driglam namzha* during 1980s, the ruling elite has also abused the true notion of nationalism. In the name of

preserving the Bhutan' a national identity, they had promoted their own culture and tried to assimilate the other minor ethnic community and those who tried to resist, they had been expelled from the country.

What would actually happen in ethnic nationalism, according to Schopflin, the weakness of the civic elements of nationhood and the emphasis on ethnicity had a number of results with further consequences of their own. In Central and Eastern Europe, the politically conscious sub-elites were small, under 10 percent of the population, and they were not masters of their own fate, because of alien, imperial rule (Schopflin, 1997; 42).

Ethnic nationalism is usually contrasted with civic nationalism, where the membership of the nation is acquired from the common descent or heredity, which often articulated in terms of common blood or kinship. While for the civic nationalism, a nation is ideally conceived of as a voluntary association, the latter is seen as a community of fate (Smith, 1991; 13). Hence, nation-states with strong traditions of ethnic nationalism tend to define nationality or citizenship by *jus sanguinis* (the law of blood, descent from a person of that nationality), and countries with strong traditions of civic nationalism tend to define nationality or citizenship by *jus soli* (the law of soil, birth within the nation- state). Ethnic nationalism is, therefore, seen as exclusive, while civic nationalism tends to be inclusive. Rather than allegiance to common civic ideals and cultural traditions, then, ethnic nationalism tends to emphasise narratives of common descent (Lecour, 2000; 155).

Among these two type of nationalism (civil and ethnic), the civic or western nationalism is known as a more unifying force which brings together people of diverse backgrounds at the price of subordinating their ethnic identities to the larger territorial unit dominated by the secular state, which is also very inclusive and liberal in form (Kohn, 1944; 574). Whereas non-western or ethnic nationalism is more hostile, illiberal, oppressive and dangerous, and it is more irrational and mystical

which looked back to past in search of its roots and the lost folk-soul or folk-spirit as a blueprint for its regeneration.

3.8 Bhutan from Civic to Ethnic Nationalism

Generally, it is the state, whether ancient or modern, play the primary role in the creation of dominant ethnic communities who later become the central identity of nationhood. Certainly the state's political actions play important roles in crystallising ethnic sentiments and national identities, notably through protracted warfare and territorialisation. However, ethnic ties and national sentiments are crested by a variety of factors, like ecological, social and especially cultural and symbolic, such as religion, language and the arts.

Significantly, in the context of Bhutan, during 1960s, the trend of modernisation under the reign of third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk can be seen as the advocate of civic nationalism. After giving up its isolationist policy or nature, country was focusing more on infrastructural development and public welfare, irrespective of any ethnic considerations. The nationalist movement of 1970s to 1980s, which is based on the idea of homogenisation, has been fundamentally contradictory to it and is more fitted into the second definition of nationalism i.e. ethnic nationalism. The people from *Ngalong* elite group of Bhutan tried to assimilate the other ethnic communities under the age old *Drukpa*⁸ community. They started highlighting the ethnic background and blood relation of people to get citizenship of the country.

Till 1950s, Bhutan followed the isolationist policy, monarch was the sole power of the country who successfully maintained status quo (Rai, 2020; 150). When Bhutan's neighbouring countries were passing through the waves of development, the country successfully kept their society isolated, backward, underdeveloped and untouched by the trend of so called modernisation. Their economy was based on pastoral, non-monetised and bartered (Upreti, 2004; 60). Before the reign of the third King (Jigme

⁸*Drukpa* tradition in Bhutan is associated with the Sabdrung Nwang Namgyal, who was believe to be the founder The of Bhutan in 17th century, who unified the Bhutan culturally and politically and he belongs or followed the *Drukpa* sect of Buddhism.

Dorji Wangchuk), Bhutan was a typical medieval state in its character. The most prominent characteristics of medievalism in Bhutan were the role of religion in society. Country's culture, art, governance and worldview were all primarily determined by its spiritual ethos. Religion played an important role in both state administration and ordinary lives (Phuntsho. 2013; 531). After the formalisation of hereditary monarchy in Bhutan in the year 1910, the theory of separation of power between the spiritual (Dharma raja) and temporal head (*Penlop*) had been abolished (Rahul, 1971; 69) and Bhutan shifted from theocracy to Monarchy, with a fully sovereign King as head of state.

Bhutan had a highly centralised system of governance, where the administration was run on an autocratic feudal pattern (Sinha, 2004; 218). The landlords controlled the bulk of the state's income and sent the residue to the government treasury. They introduced the patrimonial system⁹ and higher positions in the government were assigned to the members of the royal family. There were no trained people and illiteracy rate was almost 100% (Rose, 1977; 187). The government was so scattered and isolated, the state administration was limited to a few officials and the capital moved with the Maharaja (King). On the other side, the ethnic demarcation was strictly maintained. Demography of the country has also been designed on the basis of ethnic community (Rai, 2020; 151). *Ngalongs* are dominant in western and northern Bhutan including *Thimpu* (Bhutan's winter capital), whereas *Scarchopas* are dominant in eastern Bhutan and *Lhotshampas* in southern Bhutan. The southerners were not allowed to move and settle in the northern part of the country and the inter-caste marriages between the Nepalese and *Drukpas* were completely discouraged (Phuntsho, 2013; 568).

However, the attitude of the Bhutan's monarchy had undergone a fundamental change especially after 1952. The ideas of modern nation-building, and planned modernisation based on the perception of civic nationalism has begun in Bhutan when the third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck assumed power. The first thing he did after a

⁹They mostly get their bride either from the royal family of Sikkim or from Tibet.

year of ascending the throne was the opening the *Tshogdu* (National Assembly) in *Punakkha* to share the decision-making process, which gave the people of Bhutan a platform to voice their concerns (Phuntsho. 2013; 566).

The *Tshogdu* (National Assembly)¹⁰ was established to share the decision-making powers with the elders in the country. It gave the people a platform to voice their concerns and the King to share his aims and plans with the people (Phuntsho, 2014; 566). The political power, which the earlier Kings secured, was now being redistributed and shared with the relevant groups. This helped the King to mobilise the people and create an efficient governing system. In 1965, he took another step by setting up the *Lodoe Tshogde* or Royal Advisory Council of eight members to advise the King and government. This also serves as a body of review and often deliberated the judicial appeals made to the King (Phuntsho, 2013; 567).

Earlier the decision-making process in Bhutan was very narrow one, involving only a small number of officials from the governmental establishment (Rose, 1977; 213). However, the new system demanded new skills and capacities, which forced the traditional elites either to acquire the required skills and capacities themselves or to recruit from the excluded social groups those, have such skills. Thus, by 1960s, some of the brilliant and efficient people from non-elite groups became top officials in the administration and initiated the introduction modernisation programmes that the King wanted to implement in Bhutan.

In 1965, the government had made an effort to depersonalise the bureaucratic procedures, particularly with respect to appointments and promotions. The National Assembly, for instance, has been assigned a role in the process through its power to approve the appointment or removal of ministers who heads various departments of the government. So far, most of the ministers have come directly from the bureaucracy and their appointment to ministerial status placed them at the top of the

¹⁰The assembly has 138 members including the representatives of the people, monastic and government. The *Tshogdu* was also given the power to remove the King with a two third majority in favour of the next in line of succession (Rose, 1977; 152-53).

administrative system. Making them responsible to the Assembly, however, could serve to expand and depersonalise the appointment process to some extent. The King has also formulated the institutionalisation of the administrative system through the enactment of rules of procedures which are merit based and very specific in defining the criteria on personal matters (Rose, 1977; 218)¹¹.

The reign of the third King witnessed two distinct socio-political developments which significantly changed Bhutan's social structure and demography. The first was the emancipation of bonded labourers. Serfdom was abolished and the former serfs were given land by the state to start new lives (Phuntsho, 2014; 568). The former social order of Bhutan was based on a hierarchical structure, where social class and familial descent was discarded in favour of a generally egalitarian system based on equal rights and opportunities¹². Another development concerned about the immigration and the official bestowal of citizenship to the Nepali immigrants who were settled in southern lowland of the country (Ahmad, 2013; 164). After the demonstration led by the Bhutan state Congress in 1958, the Nepali immigrants were given Bhutanese citizenship and strong encouragement was shown for their assimilation into mainstream Bhutan society¹³. The enactment of Bhutan Citizenship Act 1958, which provided a new status to Nepali population and they are called as *Lhotshampas* (means Southerners in Bhutanese language)¹⁴.

The most encouraging aspect of the modernisation or civic nationalism trends in Bhutan is the success achieved in introducing programmes of political and economic

¹¹The public administration theorists consider the Bhutanese regulations as a model for emulation in other developing countries. But in fact, the bureaucracy in Bhutan is still such an intimate body that broad-scale depersonalisation of its operation is not possible, even if it were desirable. Nevertheless, overt nepotism or patron-client relationships are the exception. A young, ambitious bureaucrat may still require support from above, but in most cases he must also earn his promotion through a good performance record as well (Rose, 1977; 191).

¹²Civic nationalism which is shaped by the liberal ideas generally talks about the people participation, and rights of individual.

¹³The state adopted a conscious policy of assimilating *Lhotshampas* into the *Drugpa* fold; they were encouraged to enter in inter-ethnic marriages by granting financial rewards as incentives.

¹⁴The act provided the reorganisation of their language and it began to be taught in primary schools. They were permitted to build their shrines and teach Sanskrit. Further, the *Lhotshampas* were encouraged to participate in the proceedings of the National Assembly (*Tshongdu*); they were also sent abroad on scholarship for higher studies and appointed as bureaucrats, accorded membership to the Royal Advisory Council and the council of ministers (Sinha, 1998; 227).

change within the framework of the existing political system (Monarchy or the King is the sole power of the country). The successful accommodation of new groups like leading Nepalese –*Lhotshampas* families of southern Bhutan into the elite structure and their absorption into the existing factional system has been particularly impressive.

As Gellner claims, nationalism is the imposition of high culture in the society by replacing the local, low and multiculturalism. According to him, in agrarian society or society before the industrialisation and modernisation, there is no imposition of high culture due to the lack of standardised education. The boundaries are strictly demarcated between the communities and classes and those boundaries have been broken down with the advent of High Culture through standardised education system. Gellner notes that industrialisation would not be favourable for all the communities within a particular state. Therefore, the community which lack behind start felling marginalize and threatened by the process (Conversi, 2010; 380).

Before 1960 the society of Bhutan was strictly demarcated between the communities that the Nepalese people from southern part were not allowed to settle in *Ngalong* and *Sarchopas* dominated districts, they were not allowed to participate in country's administrative system and were no practice of inter-community marriage exist. After the adaptation of modernisation policies, those community and hierarchical boundaries has been fallen and the society was mobilised socially as well as economically on the basis of standardised culture of modernity. On the other side, in Bhutan, the privileged group of traditional elites started feeling marginalized from the process of modernisation. Since, they were less educated and less skilled, they could not fulfil the demands of the standardised culture and they started feeling snubbed in the process.

However, in the case of Bhutan, the fruitful era of modernisation suddenly vanished after the death of third *Druk Gyalpo* (King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk) in 1974, where the unsecured political elites (traditional, less educated in the military and

bureaucracy), in 1977, forced the new King to revise the 1958 Citizenship Act. Consequently, the period late '70s and early '80s marks the period of dominance of ethnic nationalism in Bhutan, which is accomplished through the reversal of 1958 Citizenship Act by the Royal Government of Bhutan. The process modernisation and socio-economic development of the country possesses many challenges. The governing elites perceived threats from demographic forces with the amalgamation of different ethnic community into the administrative function of the country. Subsequently, in the wake of democratisation, there are growing resistance built up among the citizens from other groups to the *Ngalong* monopolisation of positions of authority and privileges.

We can discuss the process ethnic nationalism in Bhutan based on the four approaches of ethnic nationalism, state centred, purification of culture, universalisation of chosenness, and territorialisation of memory offered by Smith's '*Politics of Ethnicity And Nationalism*' (1996). First, the state-centred approaches, which claim that the nation is the product of nationalism, recognise the role of ethnicity and culture as secondary in state-making process. The approach also asserts that the state and political action play an important role in crystallising the ethnic sentiment and national identities through protracted warfare and territorialisation. Politics is about capturing and holding power and nationalism is an argument for doing so. The Royal Government of Bhutan as a state played a crucial to crystallised the ethnic sentiment of *Ngalong* people. State as a nationalist, has mobilised and legitimised its policy of cultural homogenisation for the interest of the *Ngalong* elites and sub-elites in their quest for power.

Second, the purification of culture approach argues that it is a process of purification of a particular culture. Here, the rediscovery of ethnic past which should have the element of inspiration for the contemporary problems of the contemporary community. This is followed by the process of vernacular symbolic code, artefact and achievements. And then they went through the process to reconstruct a picture of collective native life of earliest time, through the present community drive the sense

of dignity and continuity. The *Ngalong* elites of Bhutan purify the *Drukpa* culture by rediscovering history of the advent of Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (First Dharma Raja), his contribution, dedication, teachings and achievements. They authenticate the genuineness of the *Ngalong* culture by identifying it as the earliest one.

The third approach emphasis on the ancient religious concept of chosenness, i.e. the sacred missions is entrusted to the particular community has been universalised by the nationalism doctrine. In the universalisation of chosenness, nationalism fosters the belief that the people who are to form nation are unique and incommensurable. In that sense, they come to see themselves as ‘chosen’ and having a special cultural task to be performed only by them. By universalising the *Drukpa* culture, the ruling elites of Bhutan, especially the *Ngalong* those who are mostly following the *Drukpa* sect of Buddhism, create a sense of belief that the *Drukpa* is a unique and distinct Bhutanese culture among the Bhutanese people. They justified their hold on power on the basis of their ancient achievements, claim of chosen by god to rule the country.

Apart from diplomacy, inheritance, marriage alliances and conquest, the memories of heroic figures and turning points in the history can also determine the boundaries of a state. The subsequent demarcations of historic homeland include sites and territories associated with consciousness of a particular event. Bhutan can be an interesting example of territorialisation of the shared memories. The late 17th century war between the army of Shabdrung Nwang Namgyal and Tibetans (which is discussed in detail in previous chapter) helped to redefine the territory of Bhutan.

Practising ethnic nationalism in multi-ethnic societies like Bhutan pave the way for radical homogenisation which led some serious consequences like, ethnic cleansing, mass expulsion and displacement and generate a huge number of refugees. According to Gellner, there are two possibilities exist in ethnic nationalism; assimilation and lack of assimilation. If both communities share the common language and culture, (‘ethnicity’) then assimilation is possible through standardised education. However, if there is not a shared ‘ethnicity’, then assimilation will not occur, rather leads to

exclusion (Cuff, 2013). In Bhutan, there are three major ethnic groups in which *Ngalong* and *Scharchop* speak different language, but practice common culture and follow the same religion, Buddhism. Whereas, the third major group, the *Lhotshampas* speak a different language i.e. Nepali, mostly follow Hindu faith and share different history compared to other people/parts of the country. Therefore, it became natural for the Bhutanese Nepali is being the distinct community easily excluded from the country. In the case of Tibetan refugees, though also share the common culture but considered themselves superior sect (they are from superior *Gelugpa* sect and *Drukpa* belong to inferior sect *Kagyupa*) and look toward Tibet for their political future, they opposed the assimilation policies of Bhutanese government (Ahmad, 2013; 161).

In the concern of practising standardised education, what Smith calls ‘vernacular mobilisation’, in which the ‘genuine membership’ of the ethnic nation was to be re-educated in the ‘true culture, the pristine culture of their ancestors unsullied by contact with modern civilisation (Smith, 1994; 192). The *Bhutanisation* process has been practiced with the introduction of code of *Driglam namzha* (one nation, one culture), which have extended the social custom and dress of elite and monastic circles to the general populace and made it compulsory for all, including other socio-cultural and ethnic groups. Later, TV satellite dishes and antennae were banned, declared *Dzongkha* (Language of *Ngalong* people) as the national language and imposed it over other groups. Languages like Nepali were banned (which was allowed to teach in primary schools earlier). The state tightened rules and modified the Citizenship Act and Marriage laws to stop inter-ethnic marriages. They further made statement that all Bhutanese should be obliged to remake the formal pledge of loyalty to the King and the *Drukpa* political system that had originally been made when the monarchy was established (The Citizenship Act 1977, see clause 4 of eligibility to grant citizenship). In sum, the 1958 Citizenship Act is reversed by *Driglam namzha*.

Smith claims that the nationalism ‘can so easily end in the exclusion of other non-nationals values and ultimately their barriers, lest they defile the rediscovered and

regenerated original culture and that ‘citizenship becomes coextensive with the membership of the dominant ethnic community (Smith, 1994; 193). He points to the ‘tendency of ethnic nationalism is to single out and categorise minorities within as ‘aliens’ (Smith, 1994; 191). According to Smith;

Ethnic nationalism does not involve a specifically racist component, but manages to exclude non-members within and deny their rights, while preserving their essential humanity. Instead of being exterminated, they are rendered homeless. As indigestible minorities in their own homes, they suddenly find themselves deprived of a home land. They are felt to constitute a threat to the continued existence and purity of the emergent ethnic nation. They must therefore be denied citizenship in their own hand, rendered defenceless and homeless and ultimately driven out (Smith 1994; 195).

The process ‘vernacular mobilisation’ or *Bhutanisation* has created tension among the ethnic minorities of the country (especially among Tibetans and Bhutanese Nepali) and there emerged strong resistance from the Nepali Bhutanese, who had demanded to soften the policies. After the implementation of assimilationist policies, there left the work for Bhutan’s government to justify their acts. Simultaneously, the resistance has been mobilised in southern Bhutan and started getting support from outside the country. In response to this, Bhutan Government has justified their act of mass expulsion resulted in generating a huge number of refugees. Besides, the state classified a large portion of the southern population as illegal immigrants and therefore not Bhutan nationals. The resistance was presented as terrorist activity. They claim that Bhutan faces threat of demographic invasion by Nepalese which is a threat to nation’s survival (Hutt, 1996; 419).

3.9 The Hegemonic *Drukpa* Sub-nationalism in Bhutan

As nationalism talk about territorial sovereignty, the concept of sub-nationalism discusses on a distinct political entity or identity within the existing nation-state. It focuses on a separate regional identity based on religion, language, ethnicity, and

culture. In Bhutan, the *Drukpa* is a culture or tradition belongs to ethnic *Ngalong* people living in the country's central and western districts. Historically, the culture has evolved in Tibet (*Ralung*) in the 13th century A.D. Later, the culture was popularised by a Tibetan refugee and Bhutan's first King in the 1616 A.D in Bhutan. After three-centuries, Bhutan witnessed the re-emergence of sub-nationalism based on *Drukpa* culture by late 1970s. *Drukpa* sub-nationalism essentially served the political interest of the majority-dominant *Ngalong* community.

Generally, the sub-nationalism associated with social developments, promotes social welfare, if its solidarity level is high (Singh, 2015; 506). It encourages solidarity and social development by including the members of different socio-cultural groups. In Bhutan, the emergence of *Drukpa* sub-nationalism during the 1970s-80s was neither based on inclusion nor social welfare; instead, it seems a very aggressive form of nationalism promoted by the *Ngalong* elites, to secure their political interest and to permanently impose their culture on other cultural groups. Though sub-nationalism based on solidarity create social development, but in case of Bhutan's *Drukpa* sub-nationalism, it didn't as assimilation and imposition of *Ngalong* culture was the central strategy. Lack of solidarity and power-centred goals made troubles to other ethnic groups which ultimately lead to ethnic conflicts and riots.

3.10 Homogenisation Process in Bhutan

Among the four Himalayan Buddhist Kingdoms, Bhutan is the only one that has survived as an independent country¹⁵. The Bhutanese people are divided into three broad ethno-cultural and linguistic groups; the *Ngalongs* of the west, the *Scharchops* of the east, and the *Lhotshampas* of the south. There are also many other small ethnic groups in Bhutan. The *Ngalongs* also called the central Bhutanese have occupied most of the senior government positions. Their language, derived from the Tibetan, *Dzongkha*, is promoted as the national language. Both *Ngalongs* and *Scharchops*

¹⁵*Ladakh* came under the rule of the *Dogra* Kings of Kashmir in the nineteenth century and now is the part of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. China took over Tibet in 1950s, and Sikkim was absorbed into India in 1975.

practise Tibetan style of Buddhism. The *Scharchop* and other Buddhist followers of the country (except the Tibetan refugees) have been assimilated with the *Drukpa* culture as part of *Bhutanisation* policies. There remained *Lhotshampas* who speak Nepali language and follows Hindu religion and culture can be considered as a distinct group who constitute the real minority in Bhutan.

The multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religion nation, Bhutan had faced the challenges of violent ethnic conflict, emergence of ethno-nationalist, anti-nationalist movement and the growth of rebellious groups inside its territory, ever since the adaptation of homogenisation policies by the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB). The period between 1960s-1980s, was the critical phase of Bhutan's political development. During this era the Royal Government of Bhutan had adopted various policies and laws to assimilate other communities under the *Drukpa-Ngalong*.

As already discussed, there lies various type of homogenisation process based on religion, culture, and ethnicity and so on. The homogenisation in Bhutan can be considered as a cultural homogenisation where the ruling elites (*Ngalong*) of Bhutan have decided to homogenise or assimilates the citizen of Bhutan through various acts and amendments into the dominant-majority culture of *Ngalong* or *Drukpa*. The Bhutanese government adopted such cultural homogenisation policies that even impose the dress code of *Drukpa* for every citizen and the language of *Drukpa* as the only language for schools/education and to speak/use all official purposes. Further, in 1961, the RGB had already declared the *Dzongkha* (mother tongue of *Ngalong* people) as the national language of Bhutan. In 1977, the RGB has renewed The Citizenship Act of 1958, and brought the Bhutan Citizenship Act 1977, in which they made it very clear that the clause 3, 'the applicant should have the knowledge of the Bhutanese language both spoken and written and the history of Bhutan' is mandatory requirement for the grant of citizenship.

The Citizenship Act of 1958 has been amended again in 1985. The Citizenship Act of 1985 put up more hurdles regarding both attainment and termination of citizenship. It

made evidence of permanent domicile in Bhutan, on or before 31st December 1958, as the basis for a citizenship by registration. Clause 2 of The Citizenship Act 1985 says that only in cases where both the parents are from Bhutan, a child born to such parents will get a Bhutanese citizenship by birth. If a non-national marries a Bhutanese national, the offspring of such marriage and the spouse should have to apply for Bhutanese citizenship. For the non-Bhutanese spouse, it includes 15 years residency, ability to speak, read and write *Dzongkha* proficiently to get citizenship.

A clause relating to the termination from the citizenship includes, ‘any citizen of Bhutan who has acquired citizenship by naturalisation may be deprived from citizenship at any time, if that person has shown any act or speech to be disloyal in manner whatsoever to the King, country and people. The Act has even called into question the nationality of the people who had already been included as citizens in the national census conducted in 1969 and 1979. A new census conducted in 1988 and a large number of people are identified as illegal immigrants.

In 1988, the census has conducted especially in the southern Bhutan and the Bhutan government projected it as a measure to guard the country from illegal immigration due to the porous border with India (Banki, 2014). There was high biasness in the way the census was conducted. Census has been conducted every year only in the southern part of the country and stated that, approximately 1,00,000 of the people resided in Southern Bhutan were illegal immigrants (Ahmad, 2013; 167). The government has categorised the population of south Bhutan into seven categories - F1 to F7, as follows (Ahmad, 2013; 166);

- F1- Genuine Bhutanese citizens.
- F2 Return emigrants.
- F3 Drop-out cases (i.e. people who were not around at the time of the census).
- F4 Children of Bhutanese father and non-national mother.
- F5 Non-national father married to Bhutanese mother and their children.

- F6 Adopted children.
- F7 Non-nationals.

According to Citizenship Act of 1985, the documents which were required to be produced by the people were citizenship card and land revenue receipts or tax receipt. But during 1988 census, the government had made it excessively strict and based on the documents, most of the population has been categorised as returned emigrants (F2) or non-nationals (F7), regardless of whether or not they produced citizenship cards, land tax receipts etc. (Hutt, 1996; 403). The outcome of the 1988 census created serious tensions in the country due to the lack of alternatives with the Bhutan government to deal with the non-nationals (F7) who were very huge in number. The Amnesty International also highlighted it in their report:

Current situation in the south of Bhutan had been exacerbated due to the government failure to specify and make known in advance what would happen to people in southern Bhutan once they had been categorised under F7 (Amnesty International, 1992; 6).

The Royal Government of Bhutan had introduced a strict Marriage Law in 1980 itself, which proposed punitive measures against any Bhutanese married to a non-Bhutanese national. From the day of their marriage, they would be denied promotion in government services, and be treated ineligible for employment in national defence or foreign ministry. They would be ineligible to seek candidacy to contest elections for the National assembly or any local government bodies as well (Pattnaik, 2008; 42). Further, they are deprived off from the privileges provided by the state such as distribution of land, loans, medical treatment, grant for investment of capital and financial assistance for education and training.

Above all, in 1989, Bhutan's Sixth Five-Year Plan introduced controversial royal decree of *Driglam namzha*¹⁶ (One Nation One Culture) where the government elevated the status of the dress code and national language from recommended to mandatory. The *Driglam namzha* can be understood abstractly as 'the principles of Bhutanese traditions, customs, etiquette and values' and, more concretely, as 'national dress and language', with the intention to forge a distinctive Bhutanese national identity on the basis of the culture of ruling *Ngalong*. The elements of dress code required all citizens to wear *gho* (a knee-length robe for men) and the *kira* (an ankle-length dress for women) (Sinha, 1998; 238).

Following are written in the decree:

....inside and outside Dzong premises [fortress-monasteries now used as centres of district administration]; [at] all government offices; at the schools; [at] the Monasteries; at the official functions and public congregations (Code Driglam Namzha 1992).

It has also been stated that the *pundits* and *pujaries* (Hindu priest) and non-nationals would be exempted from this requirement. The rule has been applied by the Bhutanese government to the extent that many Bhutanese could not venture out of their homes in their everyday attire facing the prospects of an on-the-spot fine and imprisonment (Hutt, 1992; 7). It became mandatory for everyone to wear national dress everywhere, and an initial fine of Rs.100 has been quickly rose to Rs.150 (Savada, 1993; 247).

Another aggressive homogenisation step taken by the Bhutan government in order to strengthen the role and status of *Dzongkha* in national life is the promotion of *Dzongkha* as national language and abolishing the Nepali language from school curriculum (Pradhan, 2012; 143). The greater stress began to lay on compulsory

¹⁶The *Driglam namzha* traces its roots directly back to the 17th century pronouncements of Nawang Namgyal, the first Shabdrung *Rimpoche*, who sought to unify Bhutan politically and culturally. He established the guidelines for *Dzong* architecture and established many traditions like 'tshechu' district festival such as the *Cham* dance, which encouraged the emergence of distinct Bhutanese identity.

knowledge of *Dzongkha* and local officials and school staff in southern Bhutan had to attend compulsory *Dzongkha* classes from 1990 onwards. Teaching of Nepali was also discontinued subsequently from schools and all the Nepali curricular materials have been removed immediately.

3.11 Conclusion

Bhutanisation is the name of the cultural homogenisation process adopted by the Royal Government of Bhutan during 1980s. As discussed, the process cultural homogenisation is associated with cultural globalisation and the idea of nationalism. Cultural homogenisation based on the cultural globalisation is considered as synonym with Westernisation or Americanisation, where the process globalisation is creating a global society which is dominated by the American culture. And due to growing American influences, there emerged insecurities of losing their identity among the different nation-states. It leads to growing national consciousness among the people from all over the world. The cultural homogenisation based on the idea of nationalism deals with those national movements who mobilise people to fight for national identity, sovereignty and freedom.

There are two prominent types of nationalism i.e. civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, and it depends on the goals of the leaders in which way they want to turn their movement. On the one hand, civic nationalism - focuses more on individual rights, inclusive in nature, support liberal democracy - give more importance to civic virtues. On the other hand the ethnic nationalism - includes common ethnicity, language, faith and ancestry -focuses more on the shared heritage. The second one supports ethnic virtues and is clearly exclusionary and assimilationist in nature.

As we have seen in the chapter, Bhutan has gone through a major socio-political transformation from 1960s to 1980s. As being a country that followed the isolationist policy, the third King of Bhutan adopted the developmental policies based on the idea of civic nationalism. He included the marginalised section of the population, especially the Nepalese community, in the decision-making process of the state,

institutionalised the administrative system and encouraged inter-community marriages and so on. But after 1980s, the Bhutanese government has suddenly started adopting the new policies based on the idea of ethnic nationalism, where they made the *Drukpa* culture as the national culture of Bhutan. By this, the government of Bhutan forcefully changed the multi-ethnic multi-cultural and multi-lingual character of the country and started forcefully assimilating other cultural groups into the *Drukpa* culture.

As the process cultural assimilation is more troublesome in multi-ethnic societies like Bhutan, there emerged a serious conflict between the state and ethnic minority groups. People those who were approached to the King for concession on policies had been taken into detention¹⁷. Serious unrest began to spread across southern Bhutan from early 1990 onwards¹⁸. The People Forum for Human Rights, the Bhutan People's Party and Students' Union of Bhutan organised mass public demonstrations in Bhutan during September and October 1990, which is unprecedented in the history of Bhutan. After the demonstration, the Bhutan army and police began the task of identifying the participants and supporters and penalise them.

The protestors were arrested and questioned, beaten up badly, tortured and held in detention for months without any trail. Batches of such prisoners were released in amnesties announced by the King and almost all of them had to leave the country and later joined with their relatives in the refugee camps in Nepal. As the routine annual census are in progress, even the people who had been classified as full citizen in an earlier census began to find themselves being evicted from the country because of the participation in agitations. For this, the Bhutan government used Article 7, section C of the Citizenship Act of 1985 which states:

Any person who has acquired citizenship by naturalisation may be deprived of citizenship at any time if that person has shown by act or

¹⁷Tek Nath Rizal (Royal Advisory Councillors of southern Bhutan), conveyed to the King in a lengthy appeal that requested that the 'cut-off date', for citizen be allowed from 1958 to 1985, the year the new Citizenship Act came into force and in response the Bhutanese government imprisoned him for three days on a charge of sedition.

¹⁸Outside the border the Bhutan People's Party formed in 1990, adopted the violent tactics espoused by an extremist of the *Gorkhaland* National Liberation Front.

speech disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, Country and the People of Bhutan.

This provision has been extended to all those who opposed or related to those who opposed the governments new policies.

It is clear that, there is every possibility that a radical homogenisation would lead to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass expulsion. The state led cultural homogenisation in Bhutan resulted in the forceful eviction of Nepali population from that country. The ruling elites of Bhutan who claim the Bhutanese Nepali poses threat to the survival of their national identity and they tried every possibilities to remove that perceived threat permanently from the country by destroying the *Lhotshampas*. In doing so they had even gone to the extent of violating the basic political social cultural and human rights of the people of their own country.

To conclude, the cultural homogenisation in Bhutan comprises based on the notion of ethnic nationalism, where the ruling elites has adopted such *Bhutanisation* policies to foster the interest of ethnic *Ngalong* community. However, as discussed, the ruling elites has legalised their homogenisation act on the basis of the idea of nationalism, where the nationalist leaders demarcated the population boundaries in order to claim their legitimacy to rule the nation. However, in Bhutan also the *Ngalong* elites based on the historical legacy of Shabdrung Namgyal has promoted their culture as the national culture of Bhutan.

CHAPTER 4

Role of Tibetan factor in the *Bhutanisation* Process: An Examination

4.1 Introduction

The last chapter discussed in detail, the homogenisation policies adopted by the Royal Government of Bhutan during 1960s-80s. This chapter examines the causes behind or the factors influenced the adaptation of homogenisation policies in Bhutan. Most of the studies conducted in this regard have addressed the process homogenisation in Bhutan with a focus on the *Lhotshampas* (people of Nepali origin or southerners). On contrast to such established notions, this chapter discuss the whole issue of *Bhutanisation* or cultural homogenisation process in Bhutan from a different perspective i.e. with a focus on the Tibetan issue. As we have already discussed, there are strong historical ties and cultural affinity between Bhutan and Tibet, and Tibet has huge influence on Bhutan's society, politics and in religion/culture.

Predominantly, the studies conducted on homogenisation process in Bhutan have their focus on *Lhotshampas*, the people of Nepali origin who lives in Bhutan. The reasons widely projected in such studies for the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* or homogenisation policies were; a) the influx of illegal immigrants from the southern border of the country, b) growing impact of *Gorkhaland* agitations in the adjacent Darjeeling hills of India, and c) the integration of Sikkim into Indian union in 1975 (Ahmad, 2013; 131-35).

According to this, the *Lhotshampas* or Bhutanese Nepali was the major concern behind the adaptation of such policies. They have provided various measures taken under homogenisation process such as the abolition of Nepali language from schools and the special annual Census conducted in the southern part of the country which is predominantly inhabited by the *Lhotshampas* to highlight that *Lhotshampas* were the main concern/target of Bhutanese elites.

However, apart from *Lhotshampas*, the other minority groups in the country are also equally affected by such policies. The most important among them was Tibetan refugees. Though varying reasons, they also protested against the *Bhutanisation* acts of Royal Government of Bhutan. After the implementation of homogenisation policies, Bhutan has expelled not only the Nepalese people, rather, there is record on repatriation of Tibetan refugees too (Ahmad, 2013; 163). During 1979, the Royal Government of Bhutan and the Dalai Lama's office of *Dharmashala* have involved on a controversy over the citizenship of Tibetans those who had taken refuge in the tiny Himalayan Kingdom after the 1959 upheavals in Tibet (India Today, 2014). There were series of allegations between the RGB and Dalai Lama's officials on this¹.

Various studies have explained the reasons behind the adaptation of homogenisation policies in Bhutan. Even though there rests personal interests of particular sections of the country, they are always able to give seemingly acceptable justifications for such acts, like identity, sovereignty and security reasons. There are number of critical analyses also made by various scholars on the reasons behind the adaptation of homogenisation policies in Bhutan (Hutt, 1996, Evans, 2010, Pattnaik, 2008, Rizal, 2010). However, the official position upheld by the state and the Royal Government of Bhutan was that, their national identity was in jeopardy due to huge influx of illegal immigrants from the/in the southern part of the country (Phuntsho, 2013; 579). Most of the people who had been enlisted as illegal immigrant were from Nepalese community.

In the case of Tibetan refugees, the Bhutanese officials claimed that they had been offered citizenship. But the question remains is that, if they were offered citizenship, then what would be the reason behind their arrest and vicious torture and detention.

¹The officials of *Dharmashala* accused that the Royal Government of Bhutan that in the name of resettlement they are trying to scatter the Tibetan refugees and arrested those who refused to accept the Bhutanese citizenship. The *Tibetan Review*, a journal published by Tibetans living in India, has reported on alleged harassment of the Tibetan refugees in Bhutan who wanted to leave the country. But the officials of RGB rejected these allegations. Their stand was that, taking up Bhutanese citizenship is purely voluntary and the officials of Dalai Lama purposefully creating difficulties, even though the refugees had almost joined the mainstream life in Bhutan and a majority of them accepted Bhutan as their home (India Today, 2014).

Here, as some scholars have pointed out (Ahmad, 2013; Rose, 1977), claiming as superior sect (*Gelugpa*), the Tibetans were unable to pay loyalty to the heads of other sects and Bhutan's King himself, whom, they thought, ethnically and culturally inferior to them. The Tibetan refugees also refused to get integrated themselves into the national mainstream and resisted such moves of RGB (Ahmad, 2013; 161). They maintained their distinct identity with an alleged sense of cultural superiority.

In this context, this chapter analyses how far the Tibetan factor impacts/influences in the *Bhutanisation* process initiated by RGB, especially during 1960s to 1980s. In order to understand the Tibetan factor in *Bhutanisation* or homogenisation process, the chapter focuses particularly on the issues of Tibetan refugees who arrived in Bhutan after the political upheaval in Tibet. The chapter also examines the impacts of the internal tensions between the King and the Prime Minister *Dorji's* family, due to the alleged role of a Tibetan lady Ms. Yangki in the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji and her influence in the administration and illegitimate relationship with the Third Druk Gyalpo King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk. The chapter also discusses the possible threat faced by the Bhutanese government from Chinese forces because of the presence of Tibetan refugees in the country.

4.2 Locating the Tibetan Factor

The Kings of Bhutan were always very conscious about maintaining the sovereignty of country and they successfully guarded it. Historically, Bhutan has been overshadowed by Tibet until the 16th century A.D. and Tibet treated it as part of the country. Thereafter, Bhutan had involved in a series of war against Tibet to enjoy its sovereignty and succeeded in maintaining its status as an independent country.

However, it was only in the middle of 1732 A.D., Bhutan was divided over the line of Shabdrung incarnation, and the Tibetans made another attack, the last Tibetan invasion over Bhutan. Tibetans successfully exploited the factional dispute in Bhutan,

grabbed the opportunity to take over the control of the country by making an intervention as a negotiator (Phuntsho, 2013; 323).

The Tibetan ruler and Chinese *Amban* in Lhasa make the Bhutanese faction to submit peace agreement to the Chinese emperor. After the agreement has been signed, the Tibetan ruler started the Bhutanese representative system (*Lochang*) to Lhasa, which is interpreted in Tibetan as the practice of paying tribute. According to *lochang* tradition, a Bhutanese representative have to present in Lhasa to pay respect to the Dalai Lama during Tibetan New Year festivals (Phuntsho, 2013; 326).

Tibet has always been a crucial factor in determining the internal and external relations of most of the Eastern Himalayan states in different ways. Politically, the relationship between Tibet and Bhutan has remained tenacious from Shabdrung to fourth *Druk Gyalpo* Jigme Singye Wangchuk (1616-1974). But they still shared a very strong bond culturally. In fact, the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet is based on the common cultural and religious ties. Tibet is treated as the cultural capital of Bhutan, because Buddhism in Bhutan is originally brought up from Tibet.

Before the Chinese aggression in Tibet, Bhutan had maintained close trade relations with Tibet, which always provided a free market for Bhutan's surplus rice and other items. Culturally too, both the countries followed the Mahayana form of Buddhism as their official religion. However, there emerged a tension in Bhutan-Tibet relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Bhutan supported the British explicitly and also joined with them in the Anglo-Tibetan war of 1888-89 (Rahul 1971; 45). Although Bhutan and Tibet shares their cultural, political and religious ties, Bhutan has always been assertive while choosing their allies.

During the 18th century, when there was close ties between Dalai Lama's government of Tibet and *Guomindang* government of China², Bhutan was in a cordial relation with British India. Since then, the country has always been seen intimated with their southern neighbour, earlier with the British Government and later with Indian Union, and this has played a crucial role in the political transformation of the country.

During the late eighteenth century, where the pressure from both the side emerged - from north Tibet in association with China and from the south British India - it became important for Bhutan to bring a balance in the relationship with both which they found essential for the protection of their sovereignty and security. At that time, Bhutan realised that, too close relations with either the neighbours can be viewed as threatening, partly because any excessive friendship with one can be viewed with suspicion and can be a concern for the other.

By early twentieth century, Bhutan had concluded that it had no option but to side with the far more influential British, which resulted in the signing of Treaty of *Punakha*, by Bhutan and the British in 1910 and Bhutan accepted British guidance in its foreign relations. As a continuation of this, on 8th August 1949, after two years of India's independence, a new treaty was signed between Bhutan and the Republic of India.

The treaty was the reconfirmation of *Punakha* treaty of 1910, where Bhutan agreed to be further guided by India in its foreign affairs (Phuntsho, 2014; 562). In the beginning, Bhutan's relation with India was more cordial than with the British India.

²Tibet saw the better ties with China as a way to balance the British government, when a *Guomindang* delegation headed by Huang *Musong* attended the funeral of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and presented the Tibetan government a new telegraph system, they were allowed to leave a couple of men behind to run the new machines. Later, Chiang Kai-shek sent another delegation, led by the Wu *Zhongxin* (head of the China's office of Mongolian and Tibetan affairs) to attend the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's enthronement ceremony, the Tibetan government permitted the *Guomindang* government to open a small office in Lhasa, which later became an informal Chinese mission in Tibet (Thurston, 2016, 62).

India even resumed 32 sq. km. tract of *Dewathang* to Bhutan, which was earlier refused by the British³.

4.3 Threat from the Northern Neighbour

There are two ways to look at the issues of Tibetan refugees as a possible factor behind the adaptation of the *Bhutanisation* policies. The first is the Chinese claim of territorial suzerainty over Bhutan based on historical or cultural link between Bhutan and Tibet. The second is the involvement of Tibetans in the conspiracy against the King in Bhutan, which leads to growing national consciousness among the Bhutanese. The greatest threat for the survival of Bhutan's sovereignty was always from her northern neighbour. Bhutan has engaged in various wars with Tibet in the past. Subsequently, Chinese were also consistently trying to prove their historical suzerainty over various Himalayan states including Bhutan, after they took over the control of Tibet. Bhutan had always strongly resisted all such attempts of the Chinese⁴.

Later, after the end of British raj in India in 1947, and the establishment of Peoples Republic in China in 1949, the Chinese started a new strategy of expansionism, coercion and conquest in the Himalayan region where Tibet became their first victim. In 1950, the Chinese forces asserted sovereignty over Tibet and the event lead China and Tibet signing a new treaty called Sino-Tibet Treaty, which granted very limited powers to Dalai Lama over Tibet. In return, the Chinese gave a pledge that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. The Sino-Tibetan Treaty has been followed by the treaty of *Panchsheel* in May 1954, between China and India.

³*Dewatang* is a site where the Jigmi Namgyal father of first King of Bhutan, led the troops in the final battle against the British force in *Buxa* (Duars) in 1884. The site is situated 18km. from *Samdrup Jongkhar* on a small hillock bordering Assam and Bhutan. Even after winning the war Bhutan has lost the entire *Duars* region including *Dewathang* while signing the *Sinchula* Treaty in 1865. British Government claimed that due to the repeated aggression from Bhutan Government and their insulting treatment to the officers sent by the British Government, the whole of the tract known as the Eighteen *Doars*, bordering on the districts of *Rungpoor*, Cooch Bihar and Assam, together with *Taloo* of *Ambaree Fallacottah* and the Hill territory on the left bank of the *Teesta* in maximum Rs.50, 000 as annual allowance.

⁴Treaty of *Punakha* is signed by Bhutan because of the China fear (Kohli, 1982; 183).

Soon after signing the treaty of *Panchsheel*, Chinese ignored the previous Sino-Tibetan Treaty and stationed their army in Tibet. As a consequence, there was an outbreak of full scale revolt against Chinese from the *Kham* region of Tibet in 1954-55. This also led to further deterioration of the relationship between India and China. China also started construction of a new highway from strategically important *Xinjiang* to western Tibet through Aksai Chin, a territory that India claimed as its part. Cautioned by such Chinese activities in Tibet, India treated Bhutan and other Himalayan Kingdom's as regional units within the Indian defence perimeter. To retain control over the strategically important territories of Sikkim and Bhutan, China has adopted a series of diplomatic and military strategies (Rahul, 1971; 102). Consequently, Bhutan was forced to close its northern border with Tibet and all their existing ties with that state which became part of China.

On March 10, 1959⁵, the Tibetans rose up and revolted against the Chinese authorities. But the Chinese suppressed the uprising in the very same day itself (Ahmad, 2013; 158). However, in the midst of chaos, the former ruler of Tibet, Fourteenth Dalai Lama (Tensin Gyatso) escaped to India along with approximately 80,000 of his followers in which few of them escaped through Bhutan (Ahmad, 2013; 158). Foreseeing the danger of such a development, Bhutan immediately sealed its border with Tibet and imposed a ban on trade with Tibet and China in 1959. In 1961, the relationship between India and China further deteriorated on border and Tibetan refugee issues and India also sealed off its northern borders. As a result of this, approximately 3,000 Tibetan refugees in transit via Bhutan to India were trapped inside Bhutan (Ahmad, 2013; 158). The Government of Bhutan set aside land for seven settlements for these refugees with the financial support of the Indian government. After the 1962 India-China war, Bhutan permanently sealed off its Tibetan border to stop any further entry of Tibetans to her land.

⁵National Uprising Day by Tibetan in exile.

During late 1950s, there were aggressive movement of Chinese red army in the northern borders of Bhutan. The Sikkim-Bhutan sections of Himalaya have also become militarily crucial in the light of the China India war. The Tibetan side of Sikkim-Bhutan border is considered as the most explosive part of the Himalayan defences of India. As Sinha (1961) mentioned, China was adopting diverse diplomatic manoeuvres and military tactics to get the strategically important Sikkim-Bhutan territories under its influence.

Bhutan was facing a severe security threat from China in her northern border during 1960s. Bhutan's vital communication track which starts from *Gangtok* (the Capital of the Kingdom of Sikkim), and then crossing the *Nathula* pass to enter to Tibetan territory and pass for about eight miles through Tibet before enters to Bhutan and led to *Punakha* (Capital of Bhutan)⁶. In order to put pressure on Bhutan, China blocked this communication track from Tibetan section in 1959. In that situation, the Government of India had come to rescue Bhutan. Bearing all costs of construction, a motor able road was built by India from *Phuncholing* to *Paro* and to *Thimpu* (Kharat, 2005; 99). By the end of 1961, this alternate route to Bhutan's capital directly from India has been completed.

The Government of the People's Republic of China then published a map showing some part of Bhutan, particularly *Punakha* (the former capital of Bhutan), as part of Chinese territory (Rose,1977;195). The Chinese army entered into Bhutanese territory and humiliated the Bhutanese who lives in the enclaves near western Tibet which had been under Bhutanese jurisdiction for more than three hundred years. The Chinese had seized these enclaves to settle the boundary issue with Bhutan which is approximately 470 km long.

During the India-China war of 1962, China attacked the Indian posts in the *Tashingang* area of Bhutan. Later, it announced a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew its

⁶People were so dependent on this route via Tibet that even the Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru had to cross that part of Tibet in 1958 during his visit to Bhutan.

forces. Since, *Tashingang* areas of Bhutan is very close to Bhutan Tibet border and have easy access to the NEFA area, it had crucial strategic importance for China during the war. Beside this, the area is the only pass in the Eastern Himalayas which remain snow-free even during the winter season. All such developments in the 1962 Sino-Indian war made Bhutan aware of its vulnerable geographic position *vis-a-vis* China.

Later, the Chinese troops and the Tibetan grazers consistently violated the border and intruded into the Bhutanese territory near the southern part of *Chumbi* valley. China always takes the advantage of India's political and economic crisis to put pressure over Bhutan. Chinese Government has never accepted the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 1949. Chinese could not make any solid relationship with Bhutan as Bhutan was always suspicious about the dubious intentions of Chinese. Rather, Chinese consistently made incursions into Bhutanese territory (1966, 1970, 1979 and 1995) and tried to disturb the relationship between Bhutan and India in all possible manner (Kharat, 2005; 132).

After realising India's incapacity to fight against China, a section of political elite of Bhutan expressed their wish to maintain a strict balance between the two on the basis of equal friendship with both (Kharat, 2005; 130). Even though the Royal Government of Bhutan did not agree with the idea initially, later realised that it was necessary and possible to have equally beneficial relationship with its other influential neighbour as well. The Tibetan refugees migrated during the Tibetan uprising of 1959 and had already been able to establish strong community networks of Tibetans in Bhutan remained a hurdle to strengthen relations with China. In order to maintain a positive relation or at least to avoid becoming the next target of China, Bhutan King accused that the Tibetan posed a threat to Bhutan's security, and Bhutan cannot afford to risk of allowing a Tibetan state within Bhutan. This has also influenced Bhutan in changing its citizenship policy and intensifies homogenisation (Ramachandran, 1979; 205).

The Chinese claim of its suzerainty over Bhutan is invalid as there is no historical substantive evidence for such a claim. It is true that the *Ching* dynasty had established authority in Tibet after 1720. However, that merely cannot be projected to make claims on Bhutan. Direct relationship between China and Bhutan did not exist at all prior to the establishment of Chinese *Amban* (resident) in Lhasa in the 18th century. Even after that, Bhutanese used to send their mission to the Dalai Lama, a religious courtesy only, and no such gifts or letters were forwarded to the emperor at Peking (Rose, 1977; 60). Similarly, there is no clear evidence that Peking considered Bhutan as part of the great Chinese motherland. Hence, the Chinese claim on Bhutan is totally based on an indirect connection, that is, their relation with Tibet and the relation between Tibet and Bhutan. What is important here is that, the first one is a political relation and the second is more cultural than political. Peking's alleged historical sovereignty over Tibet is used by them to extend the same to Bhutan as well, and therefore, it is a very weak proposition by any standard.

4.4 Role of Tibet on Sino-Bhutan Relations

Most of the western literature on Bhutan emphasise that Bhutan's traditional elites and its theocratic political system have their origin in Tibet and therefore there is a strong political and cultural tie exist between the two countries. Ever since the 12th century, practically all Bhutanese civil and ecclesiastical officials can trace their family history in Tibet, and there were the practises of intermarriage between the elites of two countries. Both the countries follow/practice the common northern Mahayana Buddhism and the functioning of institution bearing the same name in both the societies (Rose, 1977; 58). One can interpret that the traditional Tibet-Bhutan relationship in terms of a superior-inferior pattern supposedly involving some form of Bhutanese as vassal to the Tibetan ruler, and that institution bearing the same name were necessarily Tibetan rather than Bhutanese in origin.

While accepting the fact that Bhutan has cultural and religious links with Tibet, it would be mistaken to wrapping up the Tibetan supremacy over Bhutan, because the

ancestors of the Bhutanese elite who migrated from Tibet were mostly political refugees who were fighting against the existing political authorities of Tibet rather than their feudatories. There is no prominent historical proof tells us that the Tibetan migrant community in Bhutan has recognised and accepted political obligation and allegiance to Tibetan rulers. In fact, several Tibetan invasions in Bhutan during the 17th and 18th centuries with the aim of contention of Tibetan authority itself justify that Bhutan had never been part of Tibet⁷.

While discussing the relationship between Tibet and Bhutan, one can conclude that there is no formal political relationship between them. Rather, there is no ambiguity in concerning the political implication in their religio-cultural relationship (Rose, 1977; 58). Theoretically, both the countries have theocratic political system, which has comprised a deep form of interdependence. Therefore, Bhutan's such religious subordination toward Tibet's Buddhist establishment on certain aspect constituted a form of political dependency. After 1642, the *gelugpa* sect headed by Dalai Lama⁸ became the superior sect in Tibet and other sects were subordinated by them. Later, the Dalai Lama's army had made several attacks on Bhutan to bring them under the *gelugpa* domination. After negotiating in the factional fight in Bhutan, the Tibetans got hegemony over Bhutan and Bhutanese used to send their representative to *Lhasa* thereafter.

Until 1750, it was customary for the representative of Bhutan to send periodical gift to Dalai Lama and to receive a gift in return. At the same time, in several occasions, the Dalai Lama or his religious co-equal (Panchen Lama) used to write to the British India regarding the issue which implied Bhutanese vassalage (Kohli, 1982; 136). Consequently, the amalgam of such exchanges and the way Dalai Lama treat Bhutan had created confusions on the political significance in the Western literature on Bhutan. On the one side, Bhutan claimed that the gifts to Dalai Lama were just a gift

⁷Bhutan's *Dzong* and monasteries are still filled with Tibetan weapons and armour captured in that various invasions.

⁸The Dalai Lama was the most prestigious of Buddhist reincarnates to whom the greatest degree of deference and respect was due.

not a tribute, which they were presented in terms of his religious rather than political capacity (Rose, 1977; 60). The role of Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama on Bhutan were limited to give advice rather to command them. In fact, Bhutan has never allowed the monastic institution of Dalai Lama's *Gelugpa* (yellow hat) sect of Buddhism in the country. Rather, Bhutan follow red hat sect of Buddhism which is the arch political rival of *Gelugpa* (yellow hat) sect.

After concluding the dominancy of *Gelugpa* sect in Tibet, they started the policy of establishing the *Gelugpa* monasteries wherever its political writs extended. After Lhasa's conquest of *Tsang* province in 1642, the first Shabdrung of Bhutan banned the *Gelugpa* sect from Bhutan. It should also be noticed that, there is no evidence for the claims that Lhasa has exercised its political authority over Bhutan. The relationship between the *Drukpa* sects of Bhutan with its mother monastery in *Ralung* in Tibet indicates a complicated religio-political significance⁹. Bhutan and *Ralung* used to share implicit superior/inferior status in their relationship. There are recorded cases in which *Ralung* provided high-level monastic officials to Bhutan and some of them were occasionally appointed to the top civil posts in the Bhutan government (Phuntsho. 2013; 260). But none of these are explicit evidences for such claims of Tibet's political supremacy over Bhutan.

The political significance of Tibet in Bhutan can be understood from the lens of sect system within Buddhism. There would be some sort of rationale on Tibet's claim on Bhutan, had there been red hat sect dominant political authority in Tibet. However, the red hat were a subordinate sect in *Gelugpa* dominated political system of Tibet and the red hat sect of Tibet occasionally allied themselves with the red hat institutions outside Tibet's borders in their resistance against the *Gelugpa* domination. Hence, to a certain extent, both the Tibetan red hat and Bhutanese *Drukpas* had

⁹As *Ralung* is very significant for the emergence of *drukpa* tradition and Bhutan always look upto *Ralung* for their religious purposes and in Tibet being a follower of red hat sect *Ralung* is inferior or subordinate to yellow hat *gelugpa* sect.

considered *Galugpas* a common opponent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Phuntsho, 2013; 238).

Similarly, the relationship between Tibet and Bhutan was not very smooth during the reign of Shabdrung. There used to be frequent wars between the two countries. The *Gelugpa* dominated political system in Tibet sought to establish its suzerainty over the whole *lamaistic* Buddhist world, including the red hat principalities in Bhutan (Rahul, 1971; 24). In the early decades of eighteenth century, there is *modus Vivendi* in the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet, when they witnessed the British threat from India. This led both Lhasa and *Punakha* agreed upon some degree of cooperation to preserve their independence. This has lasted until the first decade of twentieth century when Bhutan had decided to side with the mighty British. Between 1904 -1947, relation between Bhutan and Tibet were conducted within the context of British “paramountcy” over this buffer area (Rose, 1977; 60). Trade and religio-cultural relations continued, but it was the British that provided a quietly restrained but effective political patronage to both Lhasa and *Punakha* until their withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947.

Later, the Chinese occupation in Tibet in 1950-51 shook and exposed Bhutan, like it did to Nepal, Sikkim and other areas of Himalayan borderland. China had long been included Bhutan in its list of ‘lost territories’ to be recovered from the ‘imperialists’. In extension of the claim that China had made its suzerainty in the case of Tibet, it has also made claim that it was suzerain of Bhutan. Chinese describe that Bhutan and Sikkim were the southern gateways of the middle kingdom; Bhutanese, *Sikkimese* and *Ladakhis* form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and through this, to the great motherland China. They must once again unite and fought the communist doctrine (Centre for Bhutan Study, 2004; 75).

Chinese didn’t have any authentic evidence for their claim on the Himalayan states. All such claims are dependent on the Tibetan cause and the *Peking’s* alleged historical sovereignty over Tibet. However, Bhutan did not face any Chinese intrusion into its

territory up to 1958. After the great uprising in Lhasa in 1959, the red army marched to the border with Bhutan. In late 1959 key centres in southern Tibet were brought under the control of China. The following spring the offensive was extended to *Tsona* district, directly to the north of Bhutan. By the end of 1960, all the major passes in Tibet were patrolled by Chinese border guard (Rose, 1977; 77). A number of minor incidents occurred in this period, usually involving small-scale Chinese incursions into the Bhutanese territory.

It was at this time, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India decided to make his first personal visit to Bhutan- to discuss the policies to be pursued by their respective government with *Druk Gyalpo*. Nehru strongly urged the Royal Government to modify its isolationist policy, at least to the extent of accepting Indian economic aid¹⁰. However, Bhutan hoped to preserve its isolation policy unbroken, but dissipated with the course of developments in 1959 make Bhutan inescapable from a much closer relationship with India (Kharat, 2005; 97).

Bhutan government in their response to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Himalayan region was initially characterised by indecisiveness. Consequently, Tibetan refugees, including few with marital ties to prominent Bhutanese families, were pouring into Bhutan in numbers, beyond the capacity of the Royal Government to handle. Their stories of Chinese atrocities against both the Tibetan people and religious institutions had a strong impact on Bhutanese, since, most of them were devout Buddhist deeply attached to the culture and religion which they shared with the mother monastery of *Ralung* at Tibet (Rose, 1977; 76). The religious supremacy of *Gelugpa* sect of Tibet over others including *Drukpa* sect (dominant in Bhutan) is the only reason of Chinese claim of suzerainty over Bhutan. Therefore, the fate of Tibetans in the hand of communist China has created concerns and national

¹⁰India was particularly interested in the construction of road connecting India with central and western Bhutan which would have strategic and economic significance.

consciousness among the Bhutanese people too, even-though there were no Chinese intrusions on Bhutan over the past few decades.

During 1960s, with the help of CIA, a secret mission of resistance initiated under the guidance of the brother of Dalai Lama, Gyalo Thondup to counter the communist force of China in Tibet¹¹. Due to the limited military equipment supplied by CIA, the resisters were unable to stand against well-equipped Chinese forces. The mission was considered as failure as many of the resisters were killed while fighting, and many were captured by the Chinese. Many of them were imprisoned and some died in combat, some killed themselves as realized an escape is no longer possible.

Later then, out of three resistance groups trained by CIA¹², one group had been dropped into the nomadic area of *Shemtse* in northern Tibet (near *Jang Namtso*, *Jang Ringtso* Lake) (Thurston, 2016; 205). After declaring their mission failed resisters moved toward west and arrived in a tiny and isolated village called Mustang in Nepal¹³. Mustang was quite accessible to Tibet and its climate and its geographical condition were also hospitable. With its anti-Chinese nature of the local population, the place offered new possibilities for resisters to fight again (Thurston, 2016; 206).

¹¹Most of the resisters in India (Darjeeling and *Kalimpong*) were the followers of Andrung Gompo Tashi (a wealthy, patriotic *Kham* trade from *Lithang*). He had established a resistance organisation called *Chushi Gangdruk*, meaning “Four Rivers and six Rangers,” the ancient Tibetan name of *Kham*. He was financing many of the freedom fighters and was soon to become their undisputed leader. Another group of resistance fighters who had fled to *Kalimpong* were monk from the *Labrang* monastery in *Amdo*. Thonden Rinpoche was their leader, and the Gunthang Tsu-trin was his deputy and manager of his *Labrang*. The CIA was prepared to train them as radio operators and guerrilla warriors. During the course of the resistance inside Tibet, eight CIA trained teams were air-dropped into areas where the resistance was strong. Most of the dropped men were followed by the drop of CIA supplied weapons, ammunition, radios and other military equipment (Thurston, 2016; 205).

¹²It was in 1954, when Gyalo Thondup brother Norbu contact and asked them to introduce their operations. In September 1956, the CIA offers more concrete under the M16 director John Hoskins. At first CIA was prepared to train some the Tibetan freedom fighters a radio operator and guerrilla warriors. The CIA proposed three-step process, first the approval of Dalai Lama, second was the training and then dropping the trained radio operators in Tibet (who have to contact directly to CIA Washington for all required information) and on the basis of those information CIA would processed the third step which was training more resistance fighters in guerrilla, warfare and also providing them arms, ammunition and material supports.

¹³During 1950s, the government of Nepal had only nominal control over the area and received minimal taxes from its local elites.

From 1960 onwards, a secret operation was begun again under the leadership of Gompo Tashi (leader of *Gushi Gandruk* operation group) in Mustang. The CIA this time had proposed another secret operation with one thousand men. The responsibility to recruit those one thousand men was on the shoulder of Gyalo Thondup and Gompo Tashi. To fulfill the required quantities of men, hundreds of young Tibetan men were started leaving Sikkim and passes through Darjeeling to Nepal to join the group (Thurston, 2016; 206). But the spread of the news alarmed the Sikkim government. Soon, the Sikkim government has learned about the reasons of exodus of Tibetans. After complaining to the Indian Government, Gyalo Thondup has been banned from *Kalimpong* and Sikkim for a decade (Thurston, 2016; 206).

After few years of successful operations, the secret operation of Mustang has been stopped in 1970s due to growing Chinese influence in world affairs. It was in 1969, the United States of America under the leadership of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor had withdrawn its assistance for those who stationed at Mustang¹⁴. Even after the withdrawal of CIA funding, it took another three years for resettlement and reemployment of the soldiers (Thurston, 2016; 233). But still some fighters continued the operation. Following the meeting between Moa Zedong and new King of Nepal Birendra in Beijing in 1973¹⁵, the Nepal government summoned Wangdu (the leader of Mustang operation) to Kathmandu in early 1974 and demanded the Tibetan fighters to surrender their weapons and leave Mustang (Thurston, 2016; 233).

¹⁴During US-China negotiation in 1969, Chinese government had set two conditions for détente with US, one was sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and other was terminate all contacts with and assistance to groups under the leadership of the Dalai Lama.

¹⁵Chinese leaders were actually asked the King to close the Mustang base.

Lhamu Tsering (deputy to Gyalo Thundop) went to Mustang to help Wangdu, but he was arrested by the Nepal Police along with other six fighters¹⁶. The issue of withdrawal of operations was still unresolved. At last, in July 1974, Dalai Lama himself sent a tape in his own voice to the fighters in Mustang, urging them to lay down their arms and search for peaceful ways to obtain their objectives. Wangdu and his few followers refused to surrender and they secretly escaped from Mustang through Tibet. Later, some of them were trapped and killed by the Nepal army at Nepal-India border (Thurston, 2016; 233).

India, on whom Bhutan depended, has been defeated by the communist China in the 1962 war. After realizing India's inability to protect her from the Chinese force in a possible threat in future and also the growing international influence of China, the Bhutanese government became more alert in dealing with the Tibetan issue. Interestingly, the Tibetan refugees residing in Bhutan were not at all allowed to involve in any such anti-China activities. The Tibetan refugees in Bhutan have enjoyed a favorable time during the reign of third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk. The third King was very sympathetic to Tibetans. He allowed a few thousand Tibetan refugees to reside in Bhutan and helped them to find work. This favorable situation for Tibetan refugees had changed after the unexpected death of the King. Like in Sikkim and Nepal, Tibetan refugees in Bhutan were also losing the favorable atmosphere during 1970s. Few years back, after the incident of Mustang (Nepal), the Royal Government of Bhutan has adopted the homogenisation policies, which led to severe internal crisis in the country and expulsion of huge number of Tibetan ethnic minorities from Bhutan along with the *Lhotshampas*.

¹⁶Lhamo Tsering and that six resistance fighters spent five years in prison without being formally charged or trial. Lhamo Tsering's family was only able to visit him once a year. In 1979, the Nepalese government held a show trial, where the six of the men, including Lhamo Tsering, were sentenced to life in prison and one was sentenced to death. After two years, the Dalai Lama wrote a letter to the Nepalese King appealing for their release, the King granted them amnesty and they were at last released (Thurston, 2016; 234).

At first Bhutan was very sympathetic toward Tibetan refugees. King has provided land and livelihood for them. After a decade, the Tibetan refugees emerged as a strong influential community of Bhutan (Ahmad, 2013; 159). Later, considering the growing number of Tibetan refugees and the incident of Mustang, Bhutan started feeling the threat from the presence of Tibetan refugees in the country. During the 1960s-70s, India, Bhutan's most remarkable savior, was busy in fighting their own battle, and there was a growing Chinese influence internationally and regionally. In this situation Bhutan badly needed to develop a strategy to avoid the threat from China and protect their country through neutralizing it which in fact leads to a fundamental change in their policy towards the Tibetan refugees.

4.5 Tibetans and the Internal Crisis in Bhutan

The Kingdom of Bhutan was going through severe internal strife during 1960s. Bhutan always remained silent in its internal matters. The country has never talked openly about the internal crisis till then. Consequently, it let the floor open to everyone to analyse the situation of the country on their own. During 1960s to 1980s, specifically after the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji in 1964, Bhutan faced severe internal tensions (Phuntsho, 2013; 576-77). By mid 1960s, the peaceful nature of Bhutanese society had been deteriorating with the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji¹⁷. There were always existed mutual trust and respect in the relationship between the King and the Prime Minister. The Third King, His Majesty Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, married Ashi Kesang Choden Wangchuck, the sister of third Prime Minister. When the Third King decided to place the plans for Bhutan's modernisation in 1958, most of the responsibilities were handed over to Jigmie Dorji in his capacity as Prime Minister. But a certain set of events ruined the relationship between the two. The first thing was the ever deteriorating health of Third King; The

¹⁷The Dorjis, as hereditary prime ministers, were based just across the border in the Indian hill station of *Kalimpong*, and handled both foreign relation and modernisation of the country.

King suffered from heart trouble at a very early age and had a severe heart attack when he was barely twenty years old.

Factionalism has always been a major element in Bhutan's politics, sometimes between *Tongsha Penlop* and *Punakha Penlop* (Phuntsho, 2013; 487) and other times between Shabdrung re-incarnation and Wangchuk (Phuntsho, 2014; 553). The major reason behind the assassination of Prime Minister in 1964 was also factionalism (Rustomji, 1978). Some literature on the crisis of 1964 has been explained the situation on the basis of variety of factional conflict-the Wangchuks vs. Dorjis, the traditionalist and the army vs. modernist, anti-Indian forces vs. pro-Indian forces. Even the hand of the Chinese communist was also detected behind the conspiracy by some Indian sources (Rose, 1977: 116). Among all the expected reasons of assassination, the faction between Wangchuks vs. Dorjis and traditionalist vs. modernist remained the predominant.

There are two ways of looking at the story of Dorji's assassination. As the health of King deteriorated and the development of the country speeded up, he often remained absent from the key decisions. All the responsibilities were with the Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji who spent most of his time at *Kalimpong*, which was far more modernised than other parts of Bhutan. Hence, his ideas appealed more to the younger generation of Bhutanese rather than the traditional old guard. Many of the old officials did not understand the changes brought by Dorji and feared that their position would be undercut with the influx of hardworking Nepalese who helped to transform the malarial forest of southern Bhutan into a trade corridor. Most of the traditional elites of Bhutan opposed the moves of Prime Minister, especially his efforts to modernise the army in 1961 (Rose, 1977; 119).

In the case of educational development too, with the help of Jesuit Priests, a new residential school was started near the eastern Bhutan headquarters station of *Tashigang*. The important thing about the region is that the inhabitant of eastern Bhutan are known as *Sharchops* and they do not speak the language spoken at *Thimpu*

and *Punakha*, a language more closer to Tibetan. The decision to invite the Christians in order to assist Bhutan for their educational development has also been criticised as departure from states' traditional policy of discouraging foreign missionaries (Rustomji, 1978; 49).

The conflict of interest between traditionalist and modernist is widely accepted as a possible reason for the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji. Though the factionalism between traditionalist and the modernist has been occurred briefly in the Bhutanese history, it created long term effect with the crisis caused by the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji. It is cleared later that some influential traditional officials in the government and even the monastic body, who were against Dorji's modernisation programme, also supported the conspirators (Rustomji, 1978; 65). It would appear that the motivation of the major participants in the conspiracy had little to do with the public policy *per se*, but rather to their perception of the Prime Minister as a threat to their interests in a political system which began to undergo rapid changes.

Soon after the assassination, the person behind the plot has been arrested; the assassin's confession was very shocking that it was from none less than the Army Chief and King's own uncle, Chabda Namgyal, that the assassin has received orders to fire the fatal shot (Ahmad, 2013; 123). It has been observed that due to the modernisation policy adopted by the Prime Minister, the army was frustrated as fifty of the older officers were forced to retire to make a way for the new generation, who were professionally trained. Chabda Namgyal might have been afraid of losing his position also. Despite being a highest ranked officer in the army, he did not have formal education and knew only *Dzongkha* (Ahmad, 2013; 126).

According to Rustomji (1978) whose work carries a comprehensive knowledge on the crisis, the main person behind the scene of murder of Prime Minister Dorji was Ms. Yangki, the Tibetan mistress of third King. The presence of Yangki created strains in the relationship between King and Prime Minister who is his brother-in-law too. Although, Jigmie was aware that the King entertained a mistress for long time, it has

been kept in a greater secrecy from public. King gave a stern warning to all his subjects that the Queen must never know this. However, it became public when invitations were openly conveyed to all important dignitaries in the capital to celebrate the happy event of Ms. Yangki giving birth to a son of the King.

Thereafter, Ms. Yangki was availing the privilege to such an extent that she considered herself entitled to free use of government transport for her own business/trade and private purposes. At times, the movement of essential supplies between *Phuntsholing* and the capital was being seriously hampered while she used government vehicles. Subsequently, Prime Minister Jigmie had issued orders that the trucks should be transferred from the control of Army to civil administration and not to be utilised for any nongovernmental purposes without the formal authorisation of the Transport Department (Rumtomji, 1978; 53). When Ms. Yangki had taken government for private use next time, the government officers stopped the vehicles and removed the stuff on board.

However, though Jigmie's decision on such an issue seemed to be an entirely reasonable proposition, the traditional/old officials in the army (especially Chabda and old guard of the Army), who were already disturbed by modernisation policy, got further agitated. They saw this as an insult to the honour of the King by a Prime Minister and moreover, found it as an opportunity to win the favour of the lady, and through her, the favour of King. In an absolute monarchy like Bhutan, the favourites of the King enjoy a position of exclusive privilege, and an insult to a favourite of King is treated as an insult to King himself (Rustomji, 1978; 53).

After the assassination of Prime Minister, Chabda and Bacchu Phugel, the Quartermaster General, were arrested and placed under detention in a strong room within the palace compound. Although Chabda gave the formal order, it was the Quartermaster General who was suspected to be the real mastermind behind the plot. Cunning and ambitious, he was known to have been hostile to Jigmie, mainly on the issue of the new policy of inducting young blood into the army (Rustomji, 1978; 65).

It has been surprised, one morning, Bacchu Phugel had been found stabbed to death in his cell (Rustomji, 1978, 65). Later, Chabda and the other culprit had been given capital punishment for their role in the murder of Prime Minister and subsequently shot to death at the army-parade ground in *Thimpu* (Rustomji, 1978; 66).

Jigmie's brother, Lendup, who had been elected to the post of Secretary General in the Planning Department, had threatened to shoot Ms. Yangki, if she makes a public appearance. The lady, on the other hand, seemed rapidly to be gaining influence and most of the senior officers started to pay her court.

Later, the issue, however, assumed a totally unexpected dimension when investigation on the assassination of the Prime Minister unearthed the identity of the pistol that fired the fatal shot. The pistol, it transpired, had been loaned by the assassin from Ms. Yangki, and moreover, it was gifted to her by the King himself (Rustomji, 1978; 68). The suspicion of assassination of Prime Minister was moved to the father of the Tibetan mistress of King. Despite all these, the refugee family from Tibet had started controlling Bhutan's palace politics and emerged as an important force to which a number of aspiring officials attached themselves in order to advance their own interests (Rustomji, 1978; 48).

It has been recorded in the investigation that, Ms. Yangki and her father came to know that the King was consulting the western doctor on the recommendation of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji. They conspired the assassination plot in late 1963 itself as they induced the second heart attack of the King by early 1964 (Rose, 1977; 121). Ms. Yangki's father could convince Chabda Namgyal, the King's uncle and then army chief, that Dorji plans a plot against the future Druk Gyalpo who happens to be his nephew. Then the Brigadier brought a number of his colleagues into the conspiracy in order to provide stabilising force in the interim period between the assassination of Prime Minister and the return of the King to Bhutan (Rose, 1977; 120).

Though the murder had been successfully executed as planned, the plot couldn't succeed completely because the officials involved in it had no plan to grab power. King's immediate return to Bhutan also changed the situation as the conspirators themselves were all personally loyal to the King and therefore had no intention of overthrow the monarchy. The King had been infuriated by the assassination of his close friend and trusted subordinate, Prime Minister Dorji. At one point he had ordered Colonel Tangi to make plans for the elimination of Ms. Yangki, his mistress, and her father in a motor accident, but stopped by the Queen and her mother. Eventually, a number of cover up stories circulated to disguise the involvement of the King's mistress in the assassination conspiracy (Rose, 1977; 121).

In the late 1964, King's health deteriorated further and he was forced to go to Switzerland for medical treatment without resolving the internal political crisis. Lendup Dorji (Jigmie Dorji's brother) was functioning as Prime Minister, which led Yangki and her father to suspect that he would use the period of King's absence from the country to revenge his brother's assassination. They tried to flee to India, but were apprehended and detained at *Geylegphug* at southern Bhutan. It has been recorded, according to Indian sources that Ms. Yangki had been maltreated while in detention. The news reached to the King who was under treatment in Switzerland (Rustomji, 1978; 71) who got disturbed by the happenings in the country. Eventually, Lendup went into exile in Nepal, on the advice of Edward St. George (a British confidant of the king), and never returned to Bhutan during the time of *Druk Gyalpo* Jigme Dorji Wangchuk. Though Brigadier Tangi also fled to Kathmandu, he was allowed to return to Bhutan a few years later by the King. Meanwhile, Ms. Yangki and her father had been released and resumed a prominent position in the court circle. The powerful Yangki faction emerged in Bhutan politics composed of a random selection of officials from diverse backgrounds.

As a result of all these developments, the relationship between Prime Minister Jigmie's family and the King's family got deteriorated soon. Throughout the period,

they worked harmoniously and their integration was the pillar of Bhutan's strength, internal as well as external. After the assassination of the Prime Minister, the situation was falling apart. There emerged factionalism and mistrust between the two families. Rustomji's¹⁸ *The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (1978) says that, during his Zurich visit, the King of Bhutan gave his concerns on the unhappy developments after the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji. The things were not going well in both sides, either internally and with the Government of India. Lendup had been tactless with the officials of the Government of India at a time when Bhutan needed friends and a breathing space for recovery and restoration of stable condition. The King was also distressed that disobedience was being sought to be created by interfering people between himself and the Queen (Rustomji, 1978; 103).

The two members of Dorji's family, Lendup and Tashi Dorji, who were holding prominent positions in Bhutan's administration has unexpectedly blacklisted and were forced to live in exile. In the incident of King's second visit to Switzerland, Lendup Dorji, the acting Prime Minister, has been alleged for mistreating the lady and her father. The King treated it as people take advantage of his absence from country to intimidate and humiliate his favourites. Tashi, on the other hand, claimed that the lady was the main culprit behind the death of Dorji and the execution of Chabda was a deliberate ruse to suppress the truth. She again claimed that it was not strange that the bullet that had killed Jigmie had mysteriously disappeared before ballistic tests which could be carried out to establish whether it had been fired from the same pistol loaned from Ms. Yangki (Rustomji, 1978; 71). The Dorji family was already angered and frightened by the astonishing disclosure of the investigation that the pistol used in the assassination had been loaned to the assassin by King's Mistress, and it was a weapon that was gifted to her by the King himself.

¹⁸Rustomji was served as the first Indian adviser to the kingdom of Bhutan in 1963, whose service has been asked by the King of Bhutan himself. Jigmie and Rustomji was friend from a very long period of time, they were very close to each other family.

The succession of the throne was in jeopardy, because of the presence of the kids of Yangki whose father was the King himself. King had faced, overnight, a security risk. The Crown Prince, it was decided, must be secretly and speedily smuggled out of Bhutan. The unhappy Queen, overwhelmed by problems on every side, decided to move alone for a while to her mother's house in *Namseyling*. Meantime, the lady was holding court at *Bumthang* in Central Bhutan, as if she were the Queen, and she had been seen wearing the Queen's ceremonial head dress, surmounted by its great orb of gold¹⁹. Ms. Yangki started playing an increasingly dominant role in King's personal affairs. She travelled in the style of the great, with full panoply of escorts and pilots and flying the royal standards (Rustomji, 1978; 106). Minister and senior officials found it politic to pay formal calls on her and she was addressed as *Aji*, an honorific generally reserved only for members of the royal family.

The internal situation of Bhutan was further deteriorating; the King was losing his influence on his subjects. Quiet unprecedentedly, people started raising questions on his inefficiency to punish the culprit of Jigmie's murder. Far from prosecuting the lady, the King was not even lifting a finger to control her growing influence. A rumour was also being spread that the King was mad and a man of loose morals, with neither conscience nor sense. His mother, step mother and even her children had also been vilely slandered as co-conspirator in Jigmie's assassination (Rustomji, 1978; 120).

There were growing coldness between the King and the Queen. They had almost fallen apart. The life of the Queen of Bhutan was a trial, except for the company of her children and few of her close friends, she lived in virtual isolation. She resided mostly in her palace at *Paro*, paying occasional visit to her mother at *Namseyling* or *Kalimpong*. The senior officers found excuses for not paying the courtesies due to the Queen for fear they might lose favour with the King. She engaged herself in the

¹⁹The orb of gold had presented to the King by Queen, in order that the gold might be melted down and utilised for preparing the scared symbol to be affixed, in memory of her father, on the roof of the new *Thimphu Dzong*.

compilation of history of Bhutan and spent time in religious discussions with learned and highly enlightened lamas (Rustomji, 1978; 96).

The relationship between King and Queen even worsened, with an attempt on the life of King in November, 1965. It was reported, the King was camping at *Khyichu* monastery, only a few miles from *Paro dzong*. While walking out into the night, he was suddenly startled by a strange sound, like the click of a switch. Suspecting there was mischief going on, he had the presence of mind to throw himself flat on the ground and only just in time to escape being struck by an exploding grenade (Rustomji, 1978; 97). With the help of police dog from Calcutta, and they are able to find the hints to a small shop at *Paro*. The owner of the shop was one Gomtsering, and he had a guest named Shatu, staying with him, who had many years back, been the employ of the Dorji establishment as a cook. Almost immediately after the incident, Gomtsering and Shatu were arrested, along with several others suspected of having links with the Dorji family. On arrival at *Paro*, Queen was distressed to find out that a number of her old family retainers under detention, and worse still to hear that her own sister, Tashi, was under suspicion of having plotted the deed (Rustomji, 1978; 98).

It was on public knowledge that Tashi was violently and fanatically anti King. The cook Shatu, it was being said, had been employed by Tashi in the recent past for various miscellaneous chores, including the selling of wares on commission basis. The cook, it was rumoured, had confessed that he had been engaged by Tashi to assassinate the King (Rustomji, 1978; 98). The Queen avowed her conviction that the cook's confession had been extorted under pain of torture. She pleaded to the King that the cook should be re-examined on her presence, which the King conceded.

On the re-examination, in the presence of the Home Minister and thirty of the People's Representatives from the National Assembly, Shatu declaimed Tashi's involvement and finally broke down under strain. He was in fact playing cards with his friends in *Paro* bazaar at the time of explosion. To force him to utter the truth, he

was administered an ancient and ghastly Bhutanese oath the boded dread ruin and disaster for the perjurer and his descendants. But he execrated none the less, solemnly and unflinchingly, that he had no knowledge of the incident and had not met Tashi for over ten years.

The main party behind the plot was yet to be arrested and the member of Dorji's family including the Queen and the people close to them remained under suspicion. The situation has been analysing in one hand that the Jigmie, the head of the Dorji family, has assassinated allegedly by the pro King elements and the King was unable to punish the real culprit. It has become normal and natural for the Dorjis to avenge the assassination by killing the King. On the other hand, by recalling the incident of Jigmie's assassination, the main intention of the plotter of Jigmie's assassination was not just to kill Jigmie but the entire members of Dorji family. Since, the attempt to kill the King have failed, which gave rise to the suspicion that the attempt was not an attempt at all rather an imitation cunningly enacted by the Anti- Dorji family to cast further disgrace them (Rustomji, 1978; 100). Once they come under scanner of plotting King's assassination, there would be no longer being any question of their claiming any place in the affairs of State.

In the ongoing factionalism between the Dorji and King party, there were other party behind the scene who was taking the advantage of the deteriorating situation of Bhutan (Rustomji, 1978; 106). If we analyse the situation, on the one hand, there were growing distances and distrust between the King and Queen, their reconciliation seems more likely impossible. On the other hand, there was emerging influences of Ms. Yangki publicly; people of the country started addressing her as the second Queen of Bhutan. Yangki's relation with the King was well known for the Tibetans of Darjeeling and *Kalimpong*. She often visit Darjeeling; Tharchin Babu's newspaper Tibet Mirror²⁰ from Darjeeling even published an article about one of her visit there,

²⁰The Tibet Mirror was a Tibetan-language newspaper published in *Kalimpong* and circulated primarily in Tibet and eventually with subscribers worldwide. Gergan Tharchin was the originator, editor and manager of the newspaper.

referring to her the ‘second queen of Bhutan’ (Thurston, 2016: 240). It can be assumed that, had the King assassinated in the grenade attack, the Dorji family would have been under scanner and the mistress of King Ms. Yangki and her fraction would have emerged as the real beneficiaries of the death of the King.

The *Kyichu* incident has brought a distinct turning point in the King’s attitude, all the old suspicions seemed to have been aroused afresh, and with redoubled force, and it became clear from his behaviour that he preferred to keep some distance from persons with known sympathy for the Dorji family. As a result, the relationship between the King and the Queen were under stake. The security measures were tightened to the extremist limits and all persons connected with the Dorji family kept under continual and strict watch.

After *Kyichu* incident, the fears and suspicions on either side had grown out too deep. Queen was unhappy with the King for the victimisation of her relatives, friends and supporters. She complained that they were being harassed and detained without the least cause; they were being ill-treated, starved and tortured in prison cells, thrown out of employment, slandered and subjected to the most humiliating indignities. And the King took the petition that the measure he had ordered were nothing in comparison with the actions the Dorjis had pressurised him in taking against persons suspected of tenuously involvement in Jigmie’s assassination. These two major incidents (Jigmie assassination and *Kyichu* incident) in Bhutan’s history had led to a complete change in the structure and functionaries of Bhutan’s political system. It has created a greater rift between the King and the Dorji family as well as between the Queen and the King (Rustomji, 1978; 101).

However, the vagueness on the successor of the throne of Bhutan has become comprehensible. All doubts and suspicion has been set, with the line of succession which was formally and publicly proclaimed (Rustomji, 1978; 107). The King, though he pandered to the lady’s whims, has been realised that his first loyalty was to his elder children and the pride of his life was his elder son. The King was well aware of

the serious nature of his illness and that he would not survive for many more years. Therefore, he took a series of measures to ensure that there should be a smooth transfer of power to the Crown Prince.

In March 1972, the King had decided to appoint his elder son Jigme Singye Wangchuk as the Governor of *Tongsa (Tongsa Penlop)*²¹. The appointment of the *Tongsa Penlop* set the seal once and for all on the vital question of succession in Bhutan, especially in the context of the fight between King and Dorji family and the influence of Ms. Yangki in the political affairs of Bhutan and also the presence of the illegitimate children of the King. Forgetting all the tension, suspicion and strife King has started grooming his son for the throne. The crown Prince was called to sit regularly with the King when he was giving audience and was also invited to be present during meetings of the Royal Council. He was often deputed to officiate for the King on public occasions besides accompanying his father on most of his state visits.

Incidentally, the King had fallen suddenly and seriously ill at *Phuntsholing* on his way to Switzerland for health examination and died at *Nairobi*. In fact he died by leaving many of the problems in his private life unresolved. However, before his death, King had arranged one of his trusted retainers to marry Ms. Yangki. She was given enough property in *Thimpu* to settle down with her new husband. Though she gave birth to four children of the King, they were never legitimised as princes and not included in the line of succession ordinance issued by the King in 1969. But the King anticipated also the tensions, intrigue and risks that their presence in the capital might give rise after his death, and had the foresight to bequeath to her, in addition an extensive and

²¹To attain the position of *Tsongsa Penlop* is a kind of proclaiming the legal heir of the Crown Prince or the King of Bhutan. The title is reserved for the officially designated heir apparent, which is subject to change by the reigning king. Founder of Wangchuk dynasty or the grandfather of present King Ugyen Wangchuk was the *Tongsa Penlop*, who had bravely fought and attained a decisive victory on the battle of *Changlingmethang*. Bhutan enjoyed peace during the years following the battle. Officially he was the *Tongsa Penlop* and still twenty years away from being crowned prince. He was for all intents and purposes the ruler of Bhutan.

commodious estate in *Nainital* (Uttar Pradesh), to which she might resort in case of any future untoward development in Bhutan.

On his deathbed, however, the king asked the Crown Prince not to take any punitive actions against Ms. Yangki or their children, which was agreed. The document where the *Druk Gyalpo* had dictated and has been countersigned by several top officials in the Royal Government of Bhutan, shortly before his death in 1972, in which he stated to the crown prince:

In my life time I have committed a very big blunder by having an affair with Yangki. Being young, I stayed with her a few times and before I could keep the affairs within limits, not one or two but four children were born, so I could not sever my connection with her. Kesang Wangchuk is completely in the right. She was consecrated with me in the Tashi Ngasol ceremony as my true Queen, and as such children born from her are the legitimate princes and princesses. In the case of Yangki, she is only a girl friend and not a legitimate wife, and as such children born from her cannot be considered royal children but are to be considered as illegitimate children.

You should never give any Government service and status to Yangki's children. If you grant them status, it will create problems for you. It will be enough if you treat them like other Bhutanese subjects.

I have given them adequate wealth, so they should not face any hardship. In case they do face hardships, may be you will help them.

In case I die, let them stay outside the country for a few years; after that do as you deem necessary. The reason why I am saying all this is for your own benefit, Jigme (Rose, 1977; 122-23).

A few days after the death of the King, the Crown Prince had taken the reins of the government and the nation on July 26, 1972 at the age of 17. Then, Ms. Yangki was

allowed to retire to the estates that had been granted to her in the *Bumthang* area and continued to draw income from the extensive investments made for her in India by the late King. After a few months of the coronation of the new King, a plot to overthrow the young King and to blow up the *Tashicho dzong* has been uncovered (Phuntsho, 2013; 577). Ms. Yangki and her Tibetan gang was accused for the so called Tibetan conspiracy organised by Gyalpo Thondup, Dalai Lama's brother which was allegedly plotted the assassination of the King and put one of Yangki's male children on throne (Rose, 1977; 122).

Further, the investigation result had come up with the involvement of thirty persons, most of them were Tibetan in the plot. Prominent among them were the Deputy Home Minister Phuntso Dhondup (related to Tibetan refugees in Bhutan), Tibetan Refugees Rehabilitation Officer Kungo Lhedhing (a Tibetan refugee), the Commandment of the Bhutan Police Tamshing Wangdi (commonly known as *Tortola*, Bhutanese national) and the remaining other were all Tibetan refugees and businessmen of *Thimphu*. Among them *Tortola* revealed that they had been working for the organisation of Gyalpo Thendup a well-known Tibetan residing in Darjeeling (*Kunsel*, 1974).

On the other hand the Tibetans (especially the Gyalo Thondup) were not ready to accept the allegation. They argued that, Ms. Yangki who had close relation with Indian intelligentsia was behind the plot and Tibetans were used as scapegoat. Gyalo Thondup (main accused of the conspiracy), had even claimed that he never met the lady, it was the Indian intelligentsia who had been plotting throughout the period of the third King and they used Ms. Yangki to destabilise the monarchy in Bhutan. According to Gyalo Thondup, the Indian intelligentsia was manipulating Ms. Yangki to influence the King in order to control the political succession in Bhutan (Thurston, 2019: 241).

In this regard, Gyalo Thondup claimed that, when he decided to hold a press conference to clarify the matter, the officials from Sikkim and Bhutan handling the Indian foreign ministry wanted him to hold his tongue (Thurston, 2019; 241). Even

the Governor of West Bengal, Mrs. Naidu has also asked his wife to convince him not to hold the press conference. He also wrote a letter to the New Crown Prince of Bhutan stating that, “*How could I do anything to harm you and your people*”, “*You are chasing a shadow*” (Thurston, 2019; 241). He asserted the Crown Prince that the Tibetans are innocent and appealed to examine the matter carefully.

In the midst of all these problems, Ms. Yangki had fled from Bhutan with her children. It has been said that, she first came to Darjeeling and moved to New Delhi. When the Royal Government of Bhutan came to know about this, they become more suspicious toward the Tibetans. The Bhutanese government felt that the Tibetans misused the hospitality extended to them. Consequently, several Tibetan refugees in Bhutan were arrested and brutally tortured²² and many of the Tibetan refugees who already settled in Bhutan left the country moved to India (Phuntsho, 2014; 578).

The Tibetan administration in exile at *Dharamsala* (Himachal Pradesh) was shocked to know all these developments and demanded evidence for such an accusation²³. Bhutanese officials gave nothing in response, and the prisoners remained locked up. Neither India, nor the Royal Government of Bhutan responded on the allegations of Gyalo Thondup. Bhutan became more conscious about her sovereignty, national identity and independence, particularly after the merger of Sikkim into Indian Union. Once again, factionalism got a different turn in Bhutan’s politics. The King’s faction has seen the presence of Tibetan refugees in the country dangerous, which became one of the major reasons for the adaptation of stringent homogenisation policies.

²²Their captors rolled sizzling hot iron rods across their skin in an attempt to make the prisoners confess. They buried the prisoner in mud up to their necks and interrogated them relentlessly (Thurston, 2016; 240).

²³The first ever Tibetan hunger protest in Delhi is said to be staged against the Bhutanese monarch rather the Communist China.

In the wake of all these developments, the National Assembly of Bhutan amended the 1958 Citizenship Act in 1977²⁴. Since language is the prominent factor of homogenisation process and in the section of condition required to grant the citizenship, the amended act added a third criteria that one should have “the knowledge of Bhutanese language both spoken and written” to get citizenship. Even though the Bhutanese language i.e. *Dzongkha*, belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family, Tibetans generally use a completely different dialect. Due to the differences of language spoken by them, it became difficult for Tibetans to meet these criteria.

The new Act also demanded the criteria, submission to the King and to pledge an oath of allegiance to His Majesty the King of Bhutan, swear to observe all the customs and traditions of the people of Bhutan and not to commit any act against the *Tsa-wa sum* (the country, the people and the King) (The Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1977, Clause 4 (d)). Even though, the Act aimed national integration for Bhutan, for Tibetans, it was a question on their identity.

Although the 1977 cut off clause-4²⁵ have created a difficulty in the case of Tibetan refugees, the fourth King offered them citizenship. However, most of the Tibetan refugees have rejected the offer. Subsequently, in 1979, the Government of Bhutan, ‘charging the Tibetans [with] “creating a state within a state”, resolved that all of the 4,000 Tibetans who did not accept Bhutanese citizenship would be deported to Chinese occupied Tibet . . . [unless] there were countries willing to receive them (Pulman, 1983; 9). The policy adopted by the National Assembly of Bhutan seemed no pressing reason to accept by the Tibetan. Thubten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, did so twice in 1904, to escape the British expedition led by *Younghusband*,

²⁴According to the act, a foreigner could apply for citizenship if he had served in the government for fifteen years without any adverse record. If he or she had not been in government service, then they had to have been a resident for at least twenty years (from 1958). The amendment also stated that the applicant should have knowledge of the Bhutanese language, both spoken and written, as well as some knowledge of the history of the country.

²⁵Clause 4- all those granted citizenship are required to take the oath, to owe allegiance only to His Majesty the *Druk Gyalpo* of Bhutan, observe the laws and regulations of Royal Government with unswerving reverence, observe all the customs and tradition of Bhutan and not commit any act against the country, people and the King of Bhutan.

and in 1910 to escape a Chinese expedition. In the second instance he had spent time at Bhutan House in *Kalimpong*, the official residence of the Bhutanese Prime Minister. Both times Dalai Lama had returned to Tibet, after only a few years in exile. In the second case he had also been able to declare the independence of Tibet, leaving it relatively free from Chinese interference for almost four decades (Ahmad, 2013; 161). In 1959 also Tibetan had little reason to believe that they would be in exile for too long. By expecting a return to Tibet, they perceived that there was no need to take Bhutanese citizenship and abandon their hopes to return for ever. Their language and culture is the only element left for them to hold with them in their struggle for free Tibet and therefore, they did not want to get assimilated with the Bhutanese culture which they think inferior.

Another reason was the question of their allegiance. It has clearly written in clause 3 and 4 of the Citizenship Act that King has the power to grant citizenship but for that, they have to take the oath to owe the allegiance only to *Druk Gyalpo* (King of Bhutan). As belongs to *Gelugpa* sect, the Tibetan refugees pay their allegiance only to the head of their sect i.e., Dalai Lama. They found that such a condition to grant the Bhutanese citizenship is not acceptable.

After the offer to become Bhutanese citizenship was rejected by the Tibetan refugees, the ruling elites of Bhutan again amended the Citizenship Act in 1985, and a new condition was added that 'citizenship of Bhutan can be given only by birth and naturalisation' (The Citizenship Act, 1985, clause 2 and 4). The act further demanded in sub-section (d) that the person must be able to speak, read and write Dzongkha proficiently and (g) for naturalisation, the Ministry of Home Affairs will take necessary steps by checking all the particulars contained in the application. The MHA will also conduct written and oral tests to assess proficiency in Dzongkha and knowledge of the culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan. The decision of the MHA on the question of eligibility for naturalisation shall be final and binding (The Citizenship Act, 1985, clause 4).

However, the Bhutanese government claimed that, taking citizenship was purely voluntary. But the Tibetan refugees alleged the RGB for mass arrest and harassment of those who refused to accept the offer of citizenship. They accused that, in the name of citizenship, the officials of Bhutanese government scattered them into small groups (India Today, 2014). The offices of *Dharamshala* also claimed that due to the alleged harassment, the Tibetan refugees of Bhutan wanted to leave the country²⁶. In response of those allegations, the Royal Government of Bhutan claimed that the office of *Dharmashala* was spreading fake news to create confusion among the Bhutanese (India Today, 2014).

Later, the Royal Government of Bhutan adopted the decree of *Driglam namzha* in 1989 (one nation one culture), one of the strictest form of homogenisation policies ever adopted. By adopting the decree, they have directly attacked the sentiments of various ethnic groups of the country, including Tibetan refugees. In brief, the *Driglam namzha* can be understood as the ‘principles of Bhutanese traditions, customs, etiquette and values’ and, more concretely, as ‘national dress and language’ issued by the King. It was intended to impose a distinctive Bhutanese national identity on the basis of the culture of the *Ngalong*, which includes ‘mandatory wearing of the national costume (*Gho* for men and *Kira* for women) (Sinha, 1998; 238). Failure to abide by the dress code of *Driglam namzha* may result in short-term imprisonment or imposition of a fine. Though, *Drukpa* tradition is also a branch of Tibetan Buddhism, they have a distinct composition. There is no similarity in their dress and culture compared to Tibetans. Therefore, to adopt the *Drukpa* culture and learn the *Dzongkha* language was much difficult for the Tibetan refugees living in Bhutan.

Tibetans are well known for guarding their culture and practises wherever they are/go. Tibetans are emotionally attached to their culture, religious sect (*Galugpa*) and only loyal toward His Holiness Dalai Lama. The question to assimilate into the *Drukpa*

²⁶Ever since the assassination plot in 1974, in which some Tibetan refugees including Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup allegedly conspired with the third king's mistress, Yangki to assassinate the young king, the Bhutanese Government has kept a wary eye on the activities of the refugees.

culture can be seen in one hand to betray their community, culture and religion and on the other hand to give up their hope of returning to their own land. In other sense, to get assimilated into *Drukpa* sect means to become inferior from Tibetans, as, in Buddhism, *Gelugpa* sect is dominant to other sects including *Drukpa*.

However, there were contradictory claim between the Tibetan refugees, Bhutanese officials and the Dalai Lama officials on the method adopted by the Bhutanese officials to implement the Citizenship Act (India Today, 2014). First the Tibetan refugees accused the Bhutanese officials for harassment. They argued that the Royal police arrested some of them who refused to accept Bhutanese citizenship. They also expressed nervousness that, in the name of resettling them, the Bhutanese government is trying to scatter them. And the Bhutanese officials, by rejecting that accusation, said that taking up Bhutanese citizenship is purely voluntary. The officials of Dalai Lama creating problems for the Tibetans in Bhutan, even though the refugees had approximately tied the mainstream of life in Bhutan and a majority of them had accepted Bhutan as their home, according to Bhutanese officials. They accused the Dalai Lama's establishment in *Dharamsala* of fomenting discontent in their peaceful country.

The exodus of huge number of people from Bhutan in the past decade has been seen as the stain in the image of country and it has also considered as the black time in the history of Bhutan. The Royal Government of Bhutan occasionally faces the question on the human rights violation record of the state. The period 1960s to 1980s was very challenging for Bhutan. The state was going through the new direction of modernisation and simultaneously dealing with issues like internal strife and external threat (due to the ongoing political development in their neighbourhood, Tibet/China, Sikkim and Gorkhaland/India).

In the context of ever growing Chinese influence in world politics, many nations, including the United States, India and Nepal withdrew their support to the cause of freedom of Tibet. In such a delicate time, the presence of Tibetans in Bhutan and the

revelations on the plot have created tensions between the Bhutanese government and the Tibetan refugees. Though Tibetans are very small in number as compare to Nepalese, they too alleged the authorities of Bhutanese government for torture and harassment in the wake of homogenisation process of late '70s to '80s. After the mass expulsion of around 4000 Tibetan refugees from Bhutan, most of them moved to India, to *Dehradun*, *Kalimpong*²⁷ and Darjeeling (*Bhutia* busty) (Ahmad, 2013; 163).

Since the issue related to Ms. Yangki is very controversial from the very beginning, no one in Bhutan is eager to discuss about it today. It has also been realised during the research that, nobody in Bhutan, whether Tibetan refugees or Bhutanese nationals, was ready to speak about this issue. During the field visit, it has been observed that, even the Tibetan refugees in India are also very much terrified by the incidents and most of them didn't even respond to the questions related to the issues and developments in this regard. Barely two to four persons from Darjeeling (name confidential) and Gyalo Thondup from *Kalimpong* has responded, but very diplomatically.

To add more in the understanding that the Tibetan refugees are also a factor behind the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies, during the interactions and interviews, it has been clear that, only after the incident of attempt on life to young King, the Tibetan refugees were came under the suspicion of Bhutanese people or officials. They express that how the life of Tibetan refugees has been changed dramatically after the incident. After few years, the Bhutanese government started the retrospective implementation of the homogenisation policies with the amendment of Citizenship Act in 1977. The act, at first, laid the condition to surrender their allegiance to the Druk Gyalpo. The officials from *Dharamsala* contend that there were mass detention, anguish and harassment of Tibetan refugees going on. Only when the situation get further worsened, they came to India. It has also observed that they are not expressing the agony frankly because they are worried about the Tibetan refugees still living in

²⁷From those Tibetan refugees left Bhutan, only one person is alive now. He lives in *Jomgon Kongtrull* III Memorial Home at *Kalimpong*.

Bhutan. According to the latest data published by Central Tibetan Relief Committee (CTRC), there are 1786 Tibetan refugees still living in Bhutan as refugees in different districts of Bhutan (CTRC, 2017).

4.6 Conclusion

Bhutan has under gone through massive changes in socio-political as well as economic structure from 1960s onwards, under the vigorous leadership of third *Druk Gyalpo* Jigme Dorji Wangdi and Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji. Especially from this era, Bhutan, after giving up its old isolationist policy, had adopted many modernisation policies. The period between 1960's to 1980's also marked major political developments in the entire Eastern Himalayan region, which persuaded the Bhutan government to adopt homogenisation policies, mainly for keeping its sovereignty and distinct culture intact. Internally, from the series of plots and conspiracies right from the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji to trail to kill the former King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk and even the plot against the new young King Jigme Singey Wangchuk, has been clear that the Bhutan's political succession was in jeopardy.

While analysing all those issues and developments carefully, it is clear that, the Tibetan factor was also crucial in the cultural homogenisation/*Bhutanisation* process initiated by the RGB in late 1960s and 1970s and further intensified in 1980s through various amendments of the Citizenship Act 1958. The alleged involvement of Tibetan refugees including Ms. Yangki and Gyalo Thondup on such conspiracies against the rulers of Bhutan made the later King's very suspicious. Besides, the continuous Chinese incursions on the border, the issue of Tibetan resisters in Nepal and the Chogyal's of Sikkim ordered on the banned of Tibetan movement in the country have also created insecurities among the Bhutanese political elites on the presence of Tibetan refugees in the country.

According to Rustomji, the reason behind Jigmie's assassination was simply a faction fight between the traditionalist and modernist. By rejecting this account, Rose offers the marital intrigue to explain the tension. After the revelation of the role of Tibetan Ms. Yangki and her father in the plot of assassination of Prime Minister, it became clear that, the real intention behind the murder of Jigmie Dorji was to place one of Yangki's sons as the King of Bhutan (Thurston, 2016; 240). As being the Queen's own brother and the prominent political figure of Bhutan, Jigmie Dorji was the main obstacle for the conspirators to achieve their goal. The subsequent development in Bhutan also underlines this.

However, after the death of Jigmie Dorji, it seems like things are going as per plan of the conspirators. Period during the mission of search and to punish the Jigmie's murderers, the relationship between the King and the members of Jigmie's family worsened even more. While Dorji's family was blaming the King for not punishing the culprit, the whole family members of Dorji and their relatives came under the scanner especially after the attempt on life of King). In fact, some of the members of Dorji's family and their supporters had to leave Bhutan. The things get even worse when there was an attempt on the life of King at *Paro*.

Rustomji's book, *The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* gives a detailed account of the turmoil in Bhutan. He argues that, after the *Paro* incident, the royal marriage was at very low point. There were growing mistrust between the King and the Queen. Tibetan mistress of the King and her fraction were increasingly gaining influence in the rule of Bhutan and people even started considering her as the second Queen of Bhutan. But the decision of the King to assign his son Jigme Singey Wangchuk from the legal Queen as the rightful heir of the throne has foiled the intention of the conspirators. Thereafter, an unsuccessful plot was organised to eliminate the Young King too as a last attempt where they had been ultimately caught in red hand (Phuntsho. 2013; 577).

After discussing the impact of Chinese intrusion of Tibet on Bhutan and the amendment of 1958 Citizenship Act in 1977 and 1985 it can be presumed that, though there would be other vital reasons for the Royal Government of Bhutan to adopt the homogenisation policies, one cannot deny that the concerns raised by the pro-Tibetan faction inside and outside the border has also been a serious factor behind the adaptation of such policies. Later, Bhutan government had been faced many criticisms on the implementation of the amended citizenship act. Not only had the Tibetan refugees, the *Lhotshampas* (Bhutanese Nepali) who are much larger in numbers as an ethnic minority, also accused the Bhutan government for human right violations. The Citizenship question has brought the tiny Himalayan nation near to a civil war like situation.

The analysis of the impact/role of Tibetan factor, both internally and externally, in Bhutan's homogenisation process, has inferred that certain developments related to Tibetan refugees also had some role in *Bhutanisation* process. The major external factors in this connection are the Chinese incursion in Tibet, their move towards Bhutan border, the constant Chinese suzerainty claim over Bhutan and the growing Chinese influence in the region. The internal factors such as the alleged involvement of Tibetan refugees on the conspiracies that lead to the assassination of Prime Minister and the attempt to remove the real heir of Bhutan and place an illegitimate son of the third King to Bhutan's throne are also identified as reasons for *Bhutanisation* process.

CHAPTER 5

The *Bhutanisation* Process and *Lhotshampas*:

Becoming the Soft Target Factor

5.1 Introduction

In the context of the detail account of the internal upheavals of the 1960s given in the previous chapter, the present chapter is an attempt to examine the notion that *Lhotshampas* were only the soft target factor of *Bhutanisation* programme. Meanwhile, the chapter also analyse the situation with a focus on the internal political perspective which has been more or less ignored in the earlier studies conducted on the homogenisation policies in Bhutan/the *Bhutanisation* process. In short, this chapter is an attempt to re-examine the homogenisation events of Bhutan. This chapter has described the issues on how the *Lhotshampas* became the soft target of the political elite in Bhutan. However, the chapter will discuss how they were projected as the main target and how such policies have affected them. It also discusses the way they responded to *Bhutanisation* policies and the consequences that they had to address.

Lhotshampas, or the southerners are the people belong to Nepali ethnic origin resides in Bhutan. They settled mostly in the southern part of the country. It is this group of Nepali people has become the soft target¹ factor of *Bhutanisation* process during 1980s. A severe ethnic conflict was roused up in the southern district of Bhutan after the implementation of homogenisation policies because many Nepali people settled in this area were listed as illegal immigrants. After the outbreak of crisis, the *Lhotshampas* of southern Bhutan became the easy target of Bhutan government. Many of them had to leave the country due to violence. Later, after the survey conducted by the Joint Verification Team from

¹Soft target indicates a community, person or locations which are the easy target of any violent attack during a crisis or conflict situation. The term is predominantly used in the context of terrorist attacks where the places like hotels, cinema halls, parks, religious places and other civilian gatherings are targeted as soft target, where the people became the easy targets of terrorist.

Nepal and Bhutan found them bonifide citizens, the Bhutan government decided to accept them. However, because of the intervention of political groups, they could not go back to Bhutan and forced to remain in the refugee camps outside the country.

Bhutanese society composed multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, where, apart from the three major ethnic groups, i.e. *Ngalop*, *Sharchop* and *Lhotshampas*, various other ethnic minority groups are also existed². The term *Lhotshampas* indicates the Nepalese people in Bhutan, and the literal meaning of the term *Lhotshampas* is the people from the south or southerners. So far, the place of origin of the *Lhotshampas* in Bhutan is concerned; it spread almost all regions of Nepal³. Similarly, they are not a homogeneous social category and rather differentiated in various groups and sub-groups in which the *thakuris* strictly follow the caste system⁴. Nepalese in Bhutan live either in single or extended family. There is no inter-group marriage exist among Nepalese. Nepalese society in Bhutan is patrilineal and both the systems of monogamy and polygene are prevalent among them. The ethnic Nepalese community in Bhutan is inclusive of various sub-cultural stocks of Nepal. Though there is big cultural diversity among Nepalese, their language (Nepali), dress, food, and way of life have unified them into a single ethnic community. In Bhutan also, they have developed a sense of unity and have retained their

²*Brokpas* (a minor nomadic community live in high altitude in central Bhutan, they belongs to Tibetan stock and have their own customs and language), *Mons* (popularly, known as *Monpas*, lives in eastern and south-eastern parts of the country and speak mon dialect), *Khen* (ancient community of central Bhutan speak *khen* dialect *khen-kha*), *Dayas* (it considered as a minor community of Bhutan lives in *Samchi* and they follows animism) and *Tephoos* (they are the indigenous group lives in *Spu-na-kha* of northern Bhutan, they are considered as descendants of the King of Kuch Bihar).

³*Thakuris* of western Nepal (strictly divided among themselves on the Hindu Verna system with the concept of purity and pollution), *Newaris* of Kathmandu valley and eastern Nepal (divided among themselves into a number of occupational castes and following Hinduism and Buddhism, and a combination) and hill *Kiratis* (a generic term for a number of animist, *Lamaist* and Hindu tribes) of eastern Nepal and Sikkim (Sinha, 1998, 40).

⁴The caste system in Nepali community is the traditional social stratification system of Nepal and it defines social classes by a number of hierarchical endogamous groups, the caste system is often called as *jaat*. Among the castes of Nepalese who settled in Bhutan are *Bahun*s, *Thakuris*, *Chettris* etc. who are regarded as higher castes of Nepal. *Kamis*, *Sarkis*, and *Damai* are among the lower castes. Apart from that, there exist many Hindu tribal groups known as *Kiratis*, which includes *Limbus*, *Gurungs*, *Rais*, *Mangars* and other.

own cultural identity, which is distinct from other dominant ethnic communities of the country such as *Ngalops* and *Sharchops*.

5.2 Nepalese in Bhutan: The Roots and Routes of *Lhotshampas*

Lhotshampas, who are living in six foothills districts of southern Bhutan, have migrated from Nepal, Darjeeling and Sikkim. They are different from the people of other parts of Bhutan as they speak Nepali language and practice Hindu religion. A small section of Nepalese are Buddhist (Tamang and Gurung) and animists who follow Mundun (Kiratis-Rai and Limboo)⁵. Nepalese commonwealth comprises three important social groups; *thakuris*⁶ - predominant in western Nepal, *Newari*⁷ and *Kiratis*⁸ - predominant in eastern Nepal and Sikkim. Majority of the Nepalese of Bhutan belong to *Kiratis* stock (*Rai*, *Gurung* and *Limboo*).

Apart from *Kiratis*, there is another group of people of Nepali origin known by the name *Bhupalis* lives in Bhutan who claim themselves as the authentic citizen of Bhutan. But the Royal Government of Bhutan treated them illegal immigrants and anti-nationals. Most of the leaders of the democratic movement in Bhutan belonged to this segment of Nepali population. Due to the agitation for democratic rule in Bhutan during 1990s, they were forcefully expelled from Bhutan. Large chunk of them are now living in the refugee camps at Nepal and some of them in the refugee camps of *Bagrakot*, *Kalchini*, *Looksan*, and *Birpara* tea gardens in *Jalpaiguri* district of West Bengal in India (Sinha, 1998; 241).

The arrival of people of Nepali ethnic group to Bhutan has a long history, predate to the establishment of Bhutan's monarchy. It was part of the massive spread of Nepali people

⁵Also known as *Kirati Mundhum* or *Kiratism*, are the stories recited/sung by the shamans of the *Kirati* ethnic groups; *Limboo*, *Rai*, *Sunuwar* and *Takha* peoples. The practice is also known as Kirat Veda, Kiratkoved. According to Tom Woothach, it is animistic religion or blend of religion.

⁶They strictly divide themselves on basis of Hindu Verna system with the concept of purity and pollution.

⁷They divided themselves into a number of occupational castes and follow the both Hinduism and Buddhism.

⁸*Kiratis* is a generic term for a number of animist, *lamaist* and Hindu tribes.

to the less populated and deeply forested mountains of Himalayan region- where no concept of border existed in the modern sense of the term (Ahmad, 2013; 151). It has been said that in early 1800s, the *Gurkha* state of Nepal had raised dramatically and tearing territory from Sikkim, raiding into Tibet and even parts of North India. Although they had been beaten back by China and later by the British East India Company, the spread of the Nepalese in the region was unable to be contained (Ahmad, 2013; 150).

The expansion of British Empire in South Asia further added the flow of Nepali immigration. The British have developed large areas as cultivable, in order to expand their power and generate additional revenue. These were done by building roads and other forms of infrastructure on the one hand, and developing large-scale plantations of cash crops, especially tea (Ahmad, 2013; 151). Those newly created districts were less populated and therefore, the British brought manpower for such projects from Nepal. Later, large number of them permanently settled in such areas, including the areas of Bhutan, under the British patronage.

The Royal Government of Bhutan argues that Nepalese of Bhutan are only a hundred years old immigrants. In contrast, Nepalese, especially those who are the dissidents live in refugees camps, claim that their presence in Bhutan far back as 7th century AD. The available records reveal that *Lhotshampas* began living in Bhutan after the signing of *Sinchula* Treaty of 1865⁹, which demarcated Indo-Bhutanese frontiers. As a consequence, there were huge influx of immigrants of Nepalese origin, first to Darjeeling, then to Sikkim and *Duars*. The Nepalese expansion to Bhutan's southern foothills could not wait long since these were the region inhabited by few *Mech* tribesmen with a distant Bhutanese control (Sinha, 1998; 37).

⁹With the signing of the *Sinchula* Treaty in 1865, the *Duar* war between British India and Bhutan came to an end. The entire *Duar* tract from Sikkim to Arunachal borders and *Dalimkot* region separating Sikkim from Bhutan was annexed by the British and an annual allowance of Rs. 50000 was fixed for Bhutanese loss.

Nepalese of *Kiratis* stock (*Rais, Gurungs and Limbus* etc.) predominantly concentrated in the south-western and south-eastern Bhutan, like *Samchi* and *Chirang* district. Captain C.J Morris, in his “Report on the Immigration of *Gurkhas* into Bhutan”, describes that Nepalese settlement in Bhutan is prior to the date of 1865. Further, the report highlights that in *Chirang* district, prior to 1910, many Nepalese used to visit the area for the months during summer or in hot weather to tap rubber trees since 60 years ago, i.e. during 1850s. However, after the completion of the work, the group used to return to their homes in eastern Nepal for the rest of the year. They were free to come and settle in *Chirang* district (Sinha, 2004; 95). During 1932, Capt. C.J Morris had made an extensive tour in these two Nepalese settled districts to explore the possibilities of Bhutanese recruitment for armed force. His report highlighted the large scale presence of Nepalese families in these districts. It was recorded in his report that there are 1493 houses in the eastern district and 4000 houses in the western district with an estimated population of 60000 Nepalese (Sinha, 1991; 41). They were completely free to follow their own religion and customs and there was no supervision by any Bhutanese officials of any sort. Nepalese are even permitted to dispose their land and houses to other Nepalese or Bhutanese. However, this has changed later and Bhutanese government banned their further spread and put restrictions on the purchase of property by Nepalese from Bhutanese people (Sinha, 1998; 41).

It was in the year 1933, a report was made by Morris and his team stating that Nepalese occupied the areas of *Samchi* district sixty or seventy years ago. Dalchand Gurung had been able to obtain a concession from the Bhutan government for an area which has turned into now the Nepali populated areas (Sinha, 2001, 96). The boundaries of the area demarcated for concession are as follows; on the east the *Pa Chu* River, on the West the *Dinah* River and on the South the British frontier (Sinha, 2001;99). The North border was not fixed. By the time of Morris visit, there were no Nepali settlements in the north as it

was hills and many places are covered by thick jungle. Therefore, it was a sort of ‘no man’s land’, which clearly separates Nepalese from the Bhutanese (Sinha, 2001; 97).

In the later stage, the migrants of Nepalese origin began to settle in the border areas of Bhutan, particularly in the southern region of the country. It was during 1903-04, that the Kazi Ugyen Dorji was given the administrative responsibilities of the region and he turned as a reliable consultant and an advisor on Indo-Bhutanese relation to the *Tongsa* (Sinha, 1998; 38-39). He had also provided the valuable services to the British during the *Younghusband* expedition to Lhasa¹⁰. The *Druk-Gyalpo*, Sir Ugyen Wangchuk has left the whole administration of the western Bhutan and Indo-Bhutanese relations in the capable hand of his trusted ally, Kazi Ugyen Dorji (Sinha, 1998;39).The administration of southern district of Bhutan was somewhat based on the old Tibetan pattern. The Chief Administrative Officer (in this case the Bhutan Agent) was responsible for paying tax annually in a fixed amount to the central exchequer, with no question to be asked on how much really raised/collected from the people. He received no regular salary and was expected to maintain himself out of the collection/charges (Rustomji, 1971; 161).

As Sinha (1991) indicates, in the middle of the 19th century, the South-western areas were sparsely populated: the region was full of thick vegetation, humid weather and wild beast. The Bhutanese highlander officials were stationed at hill top from where they could come down only in winter season to collect the taxes. To escape from the heavy tax and highhandedness of their ruler, the natives of the region were attracted toward the fastly growing Darjeeling, in search of better economic opportunities (Sinha, 1991; 35-36).

Ugyen Dorji, observing the economic transformation brought in Sikkim, Darjeeling and *Kalimpong* sub-division through the help of industrious and hardworking Nepalese, started recruiting them as contractual labourers and lumberman for clearing forest and

¹⁰By recognising his services rendered to the British, the title ‘Knight Commander of Indian Empires’ was conferred upon him (Kohli, 1982; 165).

timber extraction in the Southern Bhutan (Sinha, 2008; 53). This further intensified the Nepalese immigration into Bhutan. Charles A. Bell reported that, during his survey on western fringe of Bhutan on *Torsa* River for construction of a road from the Bengal *Duars* to Tibet, he found *thickadars* (contractual landlord) *Sipchu* and *Tsangbe Kazis*, Nandalal Chettri, Garjaman Gurung and Lal Singh Gurung controlling 2730 houses and 15,000 people in which 14,000 were reported to be Nepalese in their origin (Sinha 1991; 37-38).

However, prior to *Dorji's* efforts leading to the Nepalese immigration into Bhutan, there were no Brahmins or *Kshatriya* is officially reported to have settled down in Bhutan. Unlike Sikkim, where *Newar* traders extended their mining and minting enterprises along with the commercial transactions, they were not encouraged to penetrate the Bhutanese southern hills. This was mainly due to the Bhutanese officials made extra efforts to maintain their monopoly over the trade in and across their country (Sinha, 1998; 40-41).

Dorji family (Yugen Dorji, Sonam Tobgyal Dorji and Jigmi Palden Dorji) was entrusted with the administration of southern Bhutan by the Wangchuk rulers. Most of the *Lhotshampa* immigrants inhabited in the region were farmers, herdsmen and lumberman. The Dorji's were resided in *Kalimpong* and involved in the matters of the Durbar, the British and their own business. They used to oversee levy and collection of land and house taxes, ensured law and order, investigated and resolved the civil and criminal cases, maintained census data and land records and liaison with the British and Indian officials on behalf of Bhutan administration (Pradhan, 2012; 51). They handed over the administration charge of western and eastern districts to Garjaman Gurung and Jhulendra Bahadur Pradhan (J.B Pradhan) respectively. After the death of Garjaman Gurung, the western part of the southern Bhutan, was also assigned to J.B. Pradhan (Sinha, 2001; 167).

It has been said that, at first, Garjaman Gurung came to Bhutan to mine lime quarries. Later, he made *Samchi* estate for the purpose of tax collection. He eventually settled a number of Nepalese families in his estate. It has also reported that *Gurung* constructed ‘*Saureni Palace*’ at *Samchi* as his residence. During his visit to *Samchi* in 1932, Capt. C.J. Morris found that 25 years old Hemraj (son of Garjaman), handling the business of his father with the help of his two brothers Jasraj and Motiraj. It has been alleged that the Hemraj did not return from his annual trip to *Paro Dzong* in 1947, where he had gone to deposit the revenue collected from the tenants from his estate¹¹. After the death of Hemraj, the Gurungs’ family continued to manage their estate until 1960.

A Bhutanese edict called *Kasho* has been published by Dhakal, which was issued by Bhar Raja and Rimphu Raja of *Paro* to Dalchan and Garjman Gurung in August and September 1887 granting them an estate in perpetuity (Sharma and Sharma, 1998). It is a crucial document which defines the area, purpose for which the edict was granted, the person to whom it was bestowed and its comprehensive scope. The document says:-

“This official document is hereby issued in favour of Sardar Dalchan, Nepali resident of Hamrajmin Chamurchi area. The area extended to the west from Balachuwar Torpa River, and to east from Uchumpato River, is given to Sardar Dalchan Gurung and Garjman Gurung, the father and the son, respectively. It is hereby declared that nobody else is allowed to do anything on the land whether he or she is a noble family or a low class family; and this document legalises the contractual authority of the (aforesaid) father and son. No complaint in this regard is intertwined no matter who they are high class people or low class people.....”

“The River in the east of Balachuwar, eastward from Ujumsa, and further Chunpaha River in the west southward from the source from Chunmati

¹¹It has been suspected that he was poisoned to death in the *Dzong* (Sinha, 2001, 167).

(limestone) on the hill, and northward from the Barus the borderline with the English (British Indian territory). The area within this cardinal demarcation is officially given on contract with due seal and signature. In accordance with it, the fish, clay, stone, wood, bamboo, binding weed, leaf and all product of the land should be delivered to our government store from now onwards (throughout your prosperity use and enjoy them); follow the law; avoid giving trouble and taking undue advantage; make the land fertile and do not leave it barren; encourage habitation and enhance the environment. Sardar Dalchan Gurung and his sons are endowed with the land under this condition. No high class or low class person is allowed to lodge any complaint in this respect. This contractual document is sealed and handed over to both the father and the son everybody, including high and low class people, should bear it understanding. It is hereby permitted to use and enjoy the land....” (Sinha, 2001; 165-66).

Among the earliest notable Nepalese family, Dasho Jhulendra Bahadur Pradhan, popularly known as Neoly Babu/Sipchu Kazi, family also traces its presence in Bhutan since 1880s. The family has been settled down in *Chengmari* in *Samchi* district during the second half of the 19th century. He was recruited as an assistant to the Bhutanese delegation of Sir Wangchuk to the famous Delhi durbar in 1911 at a very young age of 16 years (Sinha, 2001; 167).

The administration of southern Bhutan was patterned in a formal structure during the reign of third Wangchuk King who made J.B. Pradhan as the Commissioner of southern Bhutan and was placed under the Bhutan house of *Kalimpong*, with *Samchi* and *Chirang* under his control. Other two districts were placed under the charge of Deputy Commissioner Jasraj Gurung and Aas Bahadur Subba in west and the east respectively; these are further divided into sub-divisions and were assigned to the respective Sub-

Divisional Officers. This pattern of administration was continued until the assassination of the Prime Minister Jigme Palden Dorji in 1964, and then the administration of southern Bhutan came directly under the King (Sinha, 2001; 167).

J.B. Pradhan was instrumental in encouraging the Nepalese settlement in Bhutan, especially for two reasons. First, to create a revenue base for the state and the second to secure Bhutan borders with India and prevent possible encroachment on the Bhutanese territory¹². At the early phase, the Nepalese migrants are prohibited from settling down in thinly populated inner valleys in central Bhutan. Only the Bhutanese were encouraged to migrate to the central valley to clear forest to start cultivation. Thus, Nepalese settlement began to grow at *Samtse*, *Phuntsholing*, *Gelephu*, and *Jonkhar* region, and they engaged in agricultural activities like raising maize, wheat, pulses, oranges, pineapples, ginger etc. These were the areas which contributed a substantial amount of revenue to the central exchequer of Bhutan.

With polygamous families, the prosperity of a Nepalese family in Bhutan is synonymous with its numerical strength. There are families with head of the household along with four to seven wives with four to five children of each. They live in a frugal life and consume edibles drawn and picked up from the neighbouring hills and forest (Sinha, 1998; 41-42). They were subjected to a classical tenancy pattern. Though they were not supposed to pay taxes in the form of *suma* (the household paying taxes), *wangyon* (levy for blessing), and *thojab* (grain tax on land output), they were not free from labour tax. Dorji collected tax from the head of the families through their contractual officials in the form of cash, on the basis of cultivated lands, number of cattle and fruits etc. There were no tenancy

¹²It was the Commissioner J.B. Pradhan, who was responsible for providing labour and rations for thousands of construction workers engaged in the construction of national highway by the Indian Border Road Organisation (BRO) during 1960s.

rights, the Nepalese settlements were haphazard and huddled bamboo huts after clearing dense forest (Sinha, 1998; 41).

Until 1950s, Bhutan did not have the rules for naturalisation of their aliens; it was only in 1958, where Nepalese people were granted citizenship under 'Citizenship Act of 1958'. In the year of 1958, Bhutan took a giant step in its ethnic policy, where the immigrant Nepalese were granted a regional identity i.e. *Lhotshampas*, which means 'the people of the south or the Nepalese settlers of the southern foothills' (Upreti, 2004; 35). The Citizenship rights gave legitimacy to Nepalese and conferred on them political and economic rights as it is applicable in case of other existing ethnic communities of Bhutan (Phuntsho, 2013; 579).

The National Assembly (*Tshogdu*) which was established in 1953 gave representation to the Nepalese for the first time in 1958, and included them in the decision-making process (Pattanaik, 2008). The southern Bhutanese were represented in the Bhutanese civil services at par with the ethnic Bhutanese. In the National Assembly, other than the national language Dzongkha, the debates were translated into English and Nepali. Till 1985, Nepalese were free to study in their mother tongue and teaching was imparted in Nepali too. They were also taken in the army and police and were included in the Cabinet and Judiciary of Bhutan as well (Sinha, 1998; 237).

In Bhutan, Nepalese are available in doing any type of work and they are nearly omnivorous suited to difficult harsh and extreme climate of the Bhutanese hills. Besides agriculture, they provide the work force for other development programmes. With the emergence of *Samchi*, *Phuntsholing*, *Daga*, *Sarbhog*, *Geylugphug*, *Chirang*, *Samdrup Jongkhar* etc. as the new commercial and modest industrial towns on the southern frontier of Bhutan, the role of the Nepalese in the economy of Bhutan is increasingly becoming articulated.

Until the reign of third *Druk-Gyalpo* (Jigme Dorji Wangchuk), there was no ethnic crisis between the *Lhotshampas* and other existing ethnic groups. Rather, there was a visible improvement in the relationship between the state and the *Lhotshampas*. The state had adopted a conscious ethnic policy to assimilate *Lhotshampas* into *Drukpas* fold by encouraging inter-ethnic marriage by granting some cash incentives. Even after the death of Prime Minister Jigme Dorji, the communication from *Thimpu* to south was restored and administration was recognised under the *Druk-Gyalpo*¹³. The role of J.B. Pradhan remained the same, and he continued to hold the position with privileges and decoration until he died in 1974 (Sinha, 2001; 167).

5.3 *Brugpa/Drukpa* emerging as exclusive National Identity of Bhutan

The major aspect of Bhutanese identity is the *Brugpa*¹⁴ church of Lamaism, a distinct form of Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism, the only *Lamaist* monarchy in the world. It is one of the orthodox and early sects in which prince-abbots were the ruler. Bhutan was a theocratic state, in which *Dzongs* played significant roles and served as the monastic and defence-cum-administrative units. The *Brugpa* political system does not maintain any distinction between the religious and secular domains of the regime. The king is not only the ruler, rather he also represents something religiously respectful. Accordingly, until the establishment of the Wangchuk dynasty in 1907, there was an endless dispute between the officials regarding the identification of effective authority in the land (Sinha, 1998; 212).

The *Brugpa* and Bhutan's identity are inseparable. *Brugpa* Lamaism has been recognised as national religion. Its symbols, values, lores, mythologies and various other aspects and material forms of ancestry were accepted as Bhutanese. The office of Shabdrung is no more existence, but the *Je-Khampo* represented the continuity of the office. Today, the

¹³But the situation had undergone through rapid changes immediately after the death of third *Druk-Gyalpo*.

¹⁴*Brugpa/Drukpa* is a distinct form of Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism; they did not follow the *Gelugpa* sect and Dalai Lama as their religious head.

Je-Khampo is also representing the monastic body to the King so that the *Brugpa* reign maintains their legitimacy. Moreover, the monk body of Bhutan hold important position in the national life. They have their representative in the National Assembly, Royal Advisory council and other state institutions. In Bhutan, all the state functions begin with the *Brugpa* rites (Sinha, 1998; 211).

The *Brugpa* society is mostly traditionally bounded and only system they are aware is that of hierarchical, where faith and loyalty to the superiors go unquestioned. Religion holds a very significant position in Bhutan's national life. Including the symbol of the national flag (Dragon a spirit animal of *Brugpa* sect) and the Bhutanese anthem demonstrate the all-pervasive presence of religion in Bhutanese life (Sinha, 1998; 211).

Bhutan has witnessed a massive transformation between 1960s-1970s in its socio-political structure. After giving up of its isolationist policy, the country has welcomed various modern systems and policies, which has created faction among the traditional and non-traditional officials or elites (Rose, 1977; 119). The attitude of the Third King and Prime Minister Jigme Dorji toward the developmental process have also created a sense of insecurity among the traditional elites has grown as a resentment between the traditional and non-traditional elites in power which ended with the assassination of Prime Minister Jigme Dorji in 1964 . The ongoing social and political changes in its neighbouring states¹⁵, created a serious concern among the traditional elites of Bhutan. As we have discussed in the last chapter, immediately after the death of King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (the third King), the traditional elites of Bhutan, under the leadership of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk and Prime Minister Jigme Thinley, has adopted a series of *Bhutanisation* policies. Their major justification behind the adaptation of such policies is the survival of national identity and preservation of country's culture and tradition.

¹⁵First, the *Gorkha* movement, which have put forward the demand for a separate land for Nepali speaker people in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal (India). Second, the merger of Sikkim state into India.

The distinct Bhutanese identity is evolved around two institutions; the monarchy and the *Drukpa/Brugpa Kagyupa* sect of Mahayana Buddhism. The *Ngalong* dominated western and central Bhutan i.e. *Paro, Thimpu, Punakha* and *Tsongsa* valleys are considered to be ‘Bhutanese politico-cultural core’ (Sinha, 1998; 186). Therefore, the cultural and religious practices, language, dress patterns, food habits and the nomadic pastoral economic tradition of these areas are accepted as the national ones and became symbols of Bhutanese identity (Upreti, 2004; 75).

In order to protect their national identity and culture, Bhutan has evacuated a huge number of immigrants from the country. The two major challenges confronted for the survival of *Brugpa* identity was the presence of Tibetan refugees and Nepalese people of the nation. The Tibetan refugees, after their alleged involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji, were under suspicion. Further, it was also threatening to Bhutan as they were using Bhutan as an oasis for their political activities to fight against the Communist China (Sinha, 1998; 186). From a religious or cultural point of view, the Tibetans considered themselves as superior to *Brugpa* sect, and they believed that they belong to superior civilisation and all the Himalayan Buddhism sects including *Brugpa* are inferior to them (Ahmad, 2013; 161). The second major challenge was posed by the Bhutanese Nepalese, the inhabitants of Southern Bhutan. They followed a completely different religion (Hindu) and their cultural practices were also very different from *Brugpa*'s. They are considered as the later arrivals in Bhutan. Apart from their cultural practices, their growing population in the country also posed a threat to the survival of the *Brugpa* identity. The *Brugpa* elites, after observing the fate of Sikkim's *Chogyal*¹⁶ started sensing threat from the expansion of Nepali population in their country.

¹⁶In 1975 when Sikkim held a referendum on the monarchy system where more than 90% voters chosen to abolish the monarchy and those 90% voter mostly belonged to Nepali community.

The growing national consciousness among the *Brugpas* forced the Nepalese to speak Dzongkha language (Bhutan's official language), marry *Drukpas*, and wear *Gho* and *Kira* (traditional dress of Bhutanese men and women). They are consistently dispossessed/alienated from the land they developed and their complaints to the authorities went unattended. Their religious, social and cultural practices had been discouraged as the state consciously followed a policy to assimilate the Nepalese into *Brugpas* style of life.

The dominant version of Bhutan's history record that, Bhutan came into existence only after the arrival of Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal (first Dharma Raja of Bhutan), who came from Tibet and unified the country. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the Sabdrung Namgyal being the head of *Brugpa* sect of Buddhism, came to Bhutan in search of political asylum due to the controversy of reincarnation of *Tsampa Gyre*.

However, in the case of Bhutan, the distinct *Brugpa* identity emerged around the *Brugpa* sect of Lamaism in the soil of Bhutan as a form of pre-*gelugpa* belief (Sinha, 1998; 210). More than half a dozen of armed encounters between the *Gelugpa* Tibetan rulers and the *Brugpa* rulers in Bhutan helped the later to evolve its distinct Bhutanese traditions. It is true that, Bhutan has heavily borrowed the Tibetan institutions such as *Dzong* system, practice of reincarnation, theocratic model, dialects, written script, scriptures, architect, dress, food habit etc. Western and central Bhutan (especially *Paro*, *Thimphu*, *Punakha* and *Tsongsa* regions) provide a core to the various facets of the formation and institutionalisation of *Brugpa* identity.

The *Brugpa* cultural practices by the *Ngalong* people of western and central Bhutan are able to fulfil some features of Smith's national identity. They are eligible especially in their historical claim and common myth and memories about the arrival of the first Dharma Raja (Shabdrung Nawang Namgyal) and the formation of Bhutan nation under the *Brugpa* cultural base. However, Bhutan's society consist multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religion. Situated in the Himalayas between the Tibet, India and Nepal, the

country used to be a meeting point of Hindus and Buddhist and peoples of different tribes, languages and cultures.

Therefore, in order to develop the *Brugpa* culture and their language (*Dzongkha*), as the culture and language of the masses, the Royal Government of Bhutan has adopted a series of reformation or assimilation policies. At first, they had renewed the Citizenship Act of 1958 in 1977 and 1985, which has been put more hurdles in terms of both attainment and termination of citizenship. In the Citizenship Act of 1985, in the section of ‘citizenship by naturalisation’, it has been mentioned under the sub-sections ‘d’ and ‘e’, that “the person must be able to speak, read and write *Dzongkha* Language proficiently and the person must have good knowledge of the culture, customs, tradition and history of Bhutan (The Citizenship Act 1985). The *Dzongkha* language (mother tongue of *Ngalong* people) was already declared as the national language of Bhutan by the King in 1971 (Gill, 2018). All these have created frustration and worries among some section of the people in Bhutan.

Later, the Royal Government of Bhutan had adopted a more conservative policy called ‘*Driglam namzha*’. The royal decree of *Driglam namzha*, understood abstractly as ‘the principles of Bhutanese traditions, customs, etiquette and values’, and more concretely, as ‘national dress and language. The policy issued by the fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuk in 1989, and enforced by the Royal Government of Bhutan in the same year. It includes the mandatory wearing of the national costume (*gho* for men and *kira* for women) during formal occasion, public place and duty hours. Reports suggest, however, that, the dress code was often applied beyond the stipulations of the King’s decree, extending even to everyday life of people. Failure to abide by the dress code of *driglam namzha*, leads to imprisonment/imposition of fine over the violators (Mathew, 2004; 73).

5.4 Challenges to *Brugpa/Drukpa* Identity

The most prestigious of the *Bhotia* families, which include some legendary aristocrats and reputed monks, of Bhutan has their origin in central Tibet. It is proved that the population of the north-eastern part of Bhutan migrated from *Kham* region of Tibet (Sinha, 1998; 223). In the eastern Bhutan, the abode of the Indo-*Mongloid* ethnic groups, identical to the people of Arunachal Pradesh, does not appear to pose any problem for the *Brugpa* national identity in spite of their distinct dialects, local costumes, dress and food habits. Therefore, the issue of nationalising the *Brugpa* identity has posed problems to the two major ethnic stocks living in Bhutan, the Tibetan refugees and the *Lhotshampas*.

There are two ways to looking into the issue related to Tibetan refugees; first, they seemed no pressing reason to acquire the citizenship as they think that they would not be in exile for long like in the case of their leaders Fourteenth Dalai Lama and Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who finally returned to Tibet after few years in exile. Therefore, they were reluctant to accept the *Drukpa* assimilation policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, post 1960s problems or controversies in Bhutan posed by the Tibetan refugees, who would like to use Bhutan as a sanctuary for their political activities till the time, with a hope to return to their home land Tibet (Sinha, 1998; 186).

Second, on the basis of Religion perspective, Tibetan might have also believed that they came from a superior civilisation (mother civilisation). Tibetans are predominantly from the *Gelugpa* school of Buddhism (which is dominant in Tibet and other sects including *Brugpa* are subordinate to them), while Bhutan follows the *Drukpa* tradition and they consider themselves superior to *Drukpa* (Rose, 1975; 60-61). Like other Himalayan Buddhist society, Bhutan had historically used to send their monks to study in Tibet. Since, Tibetan refugees comprise few in number as compared to *Lhotshampas*, and they did not have a long history of staying in Bhutan, they were not considered as a serious problem in implementing the *Bhutanisation* policies.

The challenges to the *Brugpa* identity mainly perceived from the *Lhotshampas* (Bhutanese Nepalese) the second major ethnic group in Bhutan. As many works on the agitations in Bhutan during 1989-90 has described, there was an attempt for ethnic cleansing by state where the *Lhotshampas* became the major target. The *Lhotshampas* are en masse settled down in a compact region, which they have developed into a most rich and productive part of the country and generates large shares of Bhutanese revenue. It has also argued that in spite of their presence in Bhutan for a century, the Nepalese have preserved and maintained their unique tradition and culture. This is because they belong to a different religious, lingual and socio-cultural group. Moreover, Nepalese, as a distinct cultural group, are very proud of their tradition and, in fact, they look toward Nepal and India as the centres of their civilisation, historical achievements and religious pilgrimages (Sinha, 1998; 226).

They speak Nepali language, which belongs to the Indo-European family and the lingua franca of Nepal. *Dzongkha* languages, on the other hand, fall within the Central *Bodish* group of languages within the greater Tibeto-Burman or Sino-Tibetan family of languages. Other than language, the religion was one particular aspect of the cultural traditions of the Nepali community that made their integration into the Drukpa-Bhutanese state difficult. Bhutan was established as *DrukYul* by the Sabdrung, as a Himalayan Buddhist state with its identity rooted in the *Drugkpa Kagyu* school of thought, and Nepali community was completely unfit in it as they were Hindus.

It might have been difficult for the Nepalese to submerge themselves into the Buddhist system of laws. Nevertheless, Hinduism and Buddhism share strong philosophical roots, and the moral codes taught by Buddhism are not enormously contradictory to those taught in Hindu school of thought. There existed a contender for the attachment and loyalty of the Nepalese. For Nepalese, the King of Nepal is considered as an incarnation of the god Vishnu. Nepalese of Bhutan has also worshipped the King of Nepal. They had

kept the picture of both the King of Nepal and the King of Bhutan in their home which was treated as a problem to the *Brugpa* identity and the supremacy of the Bhutan King.

It has been observed that, after realising the cultural and political malaise of Nepali population and their potential threat to the survival of country's identity, Government of Bhutan has tried to assimilate them into the mainstream *Drukpa* culture. The King has been realised that Bhutan's unique cultural identity, in the absence of military might or economic power, was its only defining strength for its sovereignty. Therefore, Bhutanese or *Drukpa* culture was actively promoted through various homogenisation programmes. This had led a sordid conflict, in the form of ethnic collision, between the *Drukpas/Brugpas* and *Lhotshampas*.

However, Pradhan (2012) argues that, it was not the *Bhutanisation* process of which the *Lhotshampas* felt offended. Rather, in the discussion about the promulgation of *Drukpa* culture in the southern district in the National Assembly, the representatives of southern Bhutan were agreed and even keen to learn *Dzongkha* language and wear the *Drukpa* dress at least for official and ceremonial occasions. He further argued that it was the exercise of the series of annual census in the late 1980s, which led to the agitation in southern Bhutan as huge number of the Nepali people were categorised as illegal immigrants/non-citizens and were asked to leave the country (Pradhan, 2012; 133-34). To him, it is not the issue of adaptation of *Drukpa* culture, but the census and classification of them as illegal residents of the country which created doubt among *Lhotshampas* on the real intention of the Bhutan elites.

5.5 Factors behind Adaptation of *Bhutanisation* Policies: The Dominant Version

Many works on Bhutan's homogenisation policies provide information about the determining factors behind the adaptation of homogenisation policies, such as Sikkim's merger in Indian Union and the *Gorkhaland* Movement. Prominent scholars and

academicians like A.C Sinha (2001), Mathew Joseph (1999), Micheal Hutt (2003), and Dhurba Rizal (2010) have done incredible works on this. They all have focused their study on the Nepalese people whom, they considered as the core factor behind the adaptation of such policies by the Bhutan state.

The political developments in Sikkim and Nepal have certainly had an impact on the policies of Bhutan. One of the most momentous experiences for Bhutan's elite was the merger of Sikkim into Indian Union in 1975, leading to an end of the absolute monarchical rule of the *Chogyal* Dynasty, a Buddhist kingdom in the Himalayas, which has its roots in Tibet. The series of events in 1973 to 1975 that had led to the abolition of the monarchy and later Sikkim's merger into the Indian Union did not digest well with the Bhutanese elites¹⁷. The Sikkim State Congress who were at the forefront of the anti-*Chogyal* movement were predominantly supported by the Nepalese. In the light of Sikkim's annexation with India and the role of Nepalese in it, the Bhutanese ruling elite began to imagine the emergence of a similar situation in their country which persuaded them to marginalise the people of Nepali origin in their own country. The elites in Bhutan feared that the Bhutanese Nepali might also follow the path of their counterpart in Sikkim, and develop a political movement for the abolition of monarchy in Bhutan too.

The fall of Sikkim set off alarm bells to Bhutan's elite. The relationship between Bhutan and Sikkim were not only based on matrimonial (the Queen of Bhutan's sister was the last *Chogyal* mother). Sikkim was the only buffer state between Bhutan and Nepal-a country whose population was fifty times greater than that of Bhutan. There was considerable sympathy of Bhutan for *Chogyal* as well as deep concern for Sikkim's fate. Nepalese constitute over a quarter of the population in Bhutan, and after realising the

¹⁷In 1974, L.D Kazi's (the first Chief Minister of Sikkim) Sikkim National Congress won 31 out of 32 seats in the Parliament. Subsequently, on 27 March 1975, the cabinet passed a resolution to abolish the monarchy and received the backing of the Parliament. On 9 April 1975, the *Chogyal* has been house arrested by the Indian force. On 14 April 1975 Sikkim held a referendum and more than 97% voters voted to abolish the monarchy and merge the country into the Indian Union. On 16 May 1975, L.D. Kazi became the first Chief Minister of the 22nd State of India (Ahmad, 2013; 146).

condition of Sikkim, where the original inhabitants have been outnumbered by the Nepalese immigrants, Bhutan became more conscious on its national sovereignty and need for avoiding a potential uprising by the Nepalese in Bhutan.

The imaginary fear from Sikkim got further intensified with the struggle of *Gorkhaland* Movement in 1980s led by the *Gorkha* National Liberation Front (GNLF) of Darjeeling hills (West Bengal, India) for a separate Nepali-speaking state in India (Padnis and Ganguly, 2001; 67). During 1980s, Nepal had tightened its own immigration policy and had started demanding valid travel documents, such as passports, for those seeking entry into Nepal. Many of those Nepalese living in southern Bhutan did not have any valid document issued by Nepal. This led the Bhutanese officials to set the task of determining exactly who lived in the southern districts and whether they were actually ‘Bhutanese citizens’.

According to Phuntsho (2014), the southern population or mostly Nepalese were not holding the bona fide citizenship of Bhutan. The fertile lowland of southern Bhutan shares the porous border with India had been neglected by the government and mercenary officials in the past many years. The Royal Government of Bhutan argue that there were more than thousands who entered the country illegally through the porous border or else came as labour work on the development projects during 1960s and illegally settled in Bhutan. (Phuntsho, 2013; 579). Phuntsho wrote in his book ‘The History of Bhutan’, that the scenario of growing immigration was due to the demographic mess in the Himalayan foothills. There were enormous and uncontrolled mass of roaming population of Nepali origin looking for greener pastures. At the time, Nepal was bursting with its fast-growing population, Bhutan became most favourable place live with its low population density, ample of fertile land and better social services (free education and healthcare) which attracted a lot of people from neighbouring regions (ibid).

Along with the other problems, the Bhutan government was also found itself insecure with the political changes in Nepal. The monarch in Nepal has been stripped off from power by popular agitations and a new democratic regime was established there. Nepalese were also rising in power in the kingdom of Sikkim and were in agitation for power in Darjeeling and *Kalimpong* districts of West Bengal, very close to Bhutan. Furthermore, the ideas of Greater Nepal i.e. the cultural expansionism of Nepal across the Himalayan foothills from Nepal to Burma (Myanmar) were also floating in the region. The insecurity of getting defeated by the immigrants forced the Royal Government of Bhutan to enforce the retrospective or conservative homogenisation policies.

Another factor added by Upreti (2004) as a reason for the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies is socio-political and economic developments, which took place since 1950s that eventually, become significant in fomenting ethnic crisis in Bhutan. There is cause and effect relationship between the socio-political and economic developments and the adaptation of homogenisation policies. At first, during early 1950s, Bhutan State Congress (BSC) has been formed under the leadership of D.B. Gurung and G.P Sharma. Their major demands were a) the abolition of feudalism, b) formation of democratisation in the polity, c) granting of civil and political rights to all the citizens of Bhutan (Ahmad, 2013; 155). The BSC's movement could not succeed due to the poor organisation and stringent opposition from the government/political elite in Bhutan. Though, their efforts to democratise the Bhutanese society were not successful enough, but their demand has been catered in various reforms brought out by the Bhutanese government during 1950s and 1960s (Rose, 1977; 113).

The demands of BSCs to abolish the feudal system and democratisation of polity in fact paved the way for modernisation policies initiated by the Third King of Bhutan (Ahmad, 2013; 154-56). As a consequence of their agitation, the Nepali people were given citizenship in 1958. The modernisation process has encouraged the migration of people

from outside the country. Due to the migration in 1960s and 1970s, the number of people of Nepalese origin has increased considerably in Bhutan. The growing Nepali migration and their comparatively higher population growth rate became the reason of distress for the *Ngalong* dominated Bhutanese state (Upreti, 2004; 74). This has been addressed by the implementation of a series of retrospective homogenisation policies.

The homogenisation acts of Bhutanese government have called the question of nationality of the people who had been included as citizens in national census conducted in 1969 and 1979. The state has justified their new citizenship policies on the basis of demographic threat posed by the growing illegal immigrants. The 1988 census conducted by the Home Ministry of Bhutan has revealed the presence of large number of illegal immigrants in the country.

The Royal Government of Bhutan has claimed that such demographic pressure rendered Bhutan's *Drukpa* Buddhist culture at the risk of extinction, which necessitated laws and policies designed to address illegal immigration and to retain Bhutan's distinct national cultural identity. After the amendment of 1958 Citizenship Act in 1977 and 1985, on the basis of such Acts, the Royal Government of Bhutan had conducted a census in 1988.

The census team divided the people of southern Bhutan into seven categories from F1 to F7 (genuine Bhutanese to illegal immigrant)¹⁸. After identifying the legal immigrants, they expelled the illegal ones. This option might have seemed the most legally obvious, but it was also one that had become the most explosive. The incident which took place after the new policy was considered the bloodiest of the conflict. The scale and rage of the movement was matched by increasingly harsh measures by the Bhutanese

¹⁸F1- Genuine Bhutanese Citizen, F2- Returned Migrant (people who had left Bhutan and then returned), F3- 'Drop-out cases (people who were not around at the time of census), F4- A non-national woman married to a Bhutanese man, F5- A non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman, F6- Adoption cases (children who have been legally adopted), F7- Non-nationals (illegal migrants or settlers).

government (Ahmad, 2013; 172). Such an enforcement of conservative policies by Bhutanese government had occasioned the rebellion in the southern part of the country.

5.6 The Impacts on the *Lhotshampas*

The fourth King has invited Amnesty International to tour the country in January 1992 to do survey on the crisis in southern district. The most remarkable part of the Amnesty report was on the violence perpetrated by the Bhutanese state and the rebels. During their visit to *Samchi* district, the Amnesty International delegates also investigated on the earlier reports stating that, up to 300 people had been shot dead during the demonstration in *Samchi* town on 19 September 1990. They found no evidence that supporting such reports. According to its investigations, in *Samchi*, only one among the estimated 4000 demonstrators was killed by a bullet which allegedly rebounded off an excavator placed in *Chamurchi* Bridge by the police to prevent the advances of demonstrators to the local administrative building. The bullet was one of the seven fired by a police officer who had been injured by an explosive device thrown by a demonstrator (Amnesty International, 1992).

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘ever since the problem erupted in 1990, the rebels have committed 73 murders, 63 rapes and 241 abductions. Besides, they had indulged in 1029 acts of dacoit and armed robbery and 64 vehicle thefts (Ahmad, 2013; 174). In different incidents, they had attacked and injured 696 people in the southern Bhutan. Further, they had laid 67 ambushes on Bhutanese security forces and had also damaged the basic infrastructures of the country (South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2012).

Driglam namzha was a game changer in every sense. Forcing people to change their language and clothing, to conform to an externally imposed order stroked at the very root of their self-identity. However, in the case of Tibetan refugees, the Fourth King offered them citizenship anyway (according to the Citizenship Act of 1985). But most of the

Tibetan refugees rejected the offer, and the government of Bhutan, charging the Tibetan with “creating a state within a state”... resolved that all the Tibetan who did not accept the Bhutanese subjectship would be deported to Chinese- occupied Tibet.... unless there were countries willing to receive them (Pulman, 1983). Since, India was there to accept them, the Tibetan refugees; those who expelled from Bhutan didn't have to struggle much to find out a destination. Almost all of the Tibetan refugees left mostly for India and became refugees once again (Ahmad, 2013; 163).

Unlike the case of Tibetan refugees, the *Lhotshampas* issue created serious tension to the Royal Government of Bhutan. Tibetan refugees of Bhutan were very less in number as compared to Nepalese and there was a country ready to accept them (Tibetan refugee). The Tibetan refugees had the choice, either integration or departure. But, with the Nepalese people, there were seemingly the third option only, i.e. prove as ‘legal Nepalese’ or get expelled as ‘illegal’ one (Ahmad, 2013; 165). Faced with such an intrusive ordinance, the Nepalese of southern Bhutan were bound to react. The *Driglam namzha* and the Citizenship Act of 1985 have a comprehensible impact on Nepalese identity *vis-a-vis* their existence in Bhutan. First, *Dzongkha* is not their mother tongue and to wear the *Drukpa* dress meant for cold places in such hot and humid place like southern Bhutan created difficulties for them.

In the context of *Driglam namzha*, they accused the government that, the policy is not to preserve the cultural identity of Bhutan, but used as an instrument to harass and suppress the people of Nepali origin. This policy has sought to absorb culturally the *Lhotshampas* within Bhutanese society and eroded their identity as a distinct ethnic group. The new language (*Dzongkha*) policy is also aimed to this end which expanded the use of the *Dzongkha* language and banned teaching Nepali in schools and other sites of crucial human engagements such as offices and any sites of government business including parliament (Wolf, 2012; 9-10). This policy (One Nation One People) attempted to make a

nation not just of, 'One People', but more diacritically of 'One *Drukpa* People'. Because the *Drukpa* elites were using 'One Nation One People', as a platform focuses on the need for a distinct 'national identity'- an ethnically exclusive *Kargyupa*¹⁹ Buddhist identity based on *Ngalong* or *Drukpa* culture (Sinha, 1998; 211-12). This policy seeks explicitly to forcefully wash out the other cultures from the Bhutanese society by imposing the *Drukpa* values, customs, symbols and tradition on other existing ethnic communities.

The Royal Government of Bhutan has been accused in conducting an act of ethnic cleansing of Nepalese community in the name of national identity. The King was accused of cultural suppression and violation of human rights of the people of Nepali origin. There were protests and marches on both sides (inside and outside of the country) of the southern Bhutan border. According to 'A Country Study: Bhutan'-the only public document available on the issue from that time on Bhutan-some anti-government protests 'involved more than 20,000 participants'. For a small country like Bhutan, such enormous number of protesters indicates the intensity of the problem (Library of Congress, 1991).

In response to the government's new policies, some southern Bhutanese formed an organisation to demand respect for their cultural rights. Students and lecturers at the National Institute of Education were involved in the People's Forum for Human Rights (PFHR)²⁰. In April 1989, Tek Nath Rizal (a *Lhotshampa* member of Royal Advisory Council), attempted to alert the King by writing a confidential appeal to the King on growing public unease about the 1985 Citizenship Act and census of 1988. In response, the Bhutanese Government acted swiftly to suppress their resistance. Between October to December 1989, 45 people including Tek Nath Rizal (who were active in organisation protesting the policies) were arrested and detained briefly for their audacity.

¹⁹The red hat sect of Buddhism and most the *Drukpa* culture is also belongs to the *Kargyupa*.

²⁰The organization was established in June 1989 and was headed by Tek Nath Rizal, who later fled to Nepal.

Subsequently, in September 1990, a small group of *Lhotshampas* moved to the streets and held a peaceful demonstration, demanding basic human rights and democracy in Bhutan. But the authorities dismissed their demands and the police used heavy force and extreme methods to deal with the protesters (Sharma and Sharma, 1998; 250).

Following this, in late autumn of 1990, several hundred people, mostly male activists, fled from Bhutan to take refuge in a tea plantation in *Garganda*, West Bengal. They formed Bhutan's People Party (BPP) in 1990 and made the plans to organise the programmes of political action across southern Bhutan with demands of civil rights and political reforms. This has worsened the condition of the *Lhotshampas* in the country. During the first phase of the movement, some *Lhotshampas* activists adopted violent tactics which was similar to those adopted by GNLF (Gorkha National Liberation Front) extremists in India.

However, the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal claimed that it was a peaceful march. In contrast, the Bhutanese authorities claimed that, with the support of Nepal and Nepali Diaspora from India, the demonstration was outburst in southern Bhutan. Many anti-government protests was organised and the protesters burned the national flag of Bhutan, striped Bhutanese officers of the national dress and destroyed the census records which they were carrying (Phuntsho, 2013; 580). Unlike the tactics of democratic or human right movements - as they claim themselves – they engaged in violence majority of Bhutanese viewed it against the very existence of Bhutan as a country and its cultural and political integrity.

After the demonstration, the Bhutanese army and police traced and arrested the participants and supporters of protest. Many of them were held in detention for months without any trial and many new rules and procedures were imposed in the southern

districts²¹. Many *Lhotshampas* found the measures as attempts to attack the economic and social base of their communities. Restrictions were placed even on the transportation of essential commodities. Nepali applicants for the scholarship and job in civil services were asked to produce ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC)²² issued by the Royal Bhutan Police (Evans, 2010; 30-31).

Following the introduction of many draconian laws in the late 1980s, political tensions mounted in southern Bhutan. By 1992, the Bhutan government has been tagged of over 70,000 Nepalese as illegal immigrants. Besides, more than 80,000 Nepalese were stuck in refugee camps of eastern Nepal for many years (Ahmad, 2013; 174). Royal Government of Bhutan and its officials alleged that southern Bhutanese dissidents engaged in violent and subversive activities against the state, which posed ‘a threat to Bhutan’s distinct political and cultural entity.

Royal Government of Bhutan arrested a small number of Nepalese whom they branded criminals and terrorists (Evans, 2010, 31). When large number of southern Bhutanese of Nepali origin began leaving the country, the Bhutan government expressed surprise and claimed that ‘no force whatsoever has been used against them’ and the King had made open appeals to the *Lhotshampas*, not to leave the country. The refugees of the camps claimed that, the southern Bhutanese peacefully objected to the government policies and only requested reform, because they felt their culture and language is directly attacked. In response, the government has branded ‘the entire activist and the supporters as anti-nationals’ and ‘sent the Royal Bhutanese army to crush the movement’. This resulted in

²¹All the participants have been considered as terrorist and anti-nationals and get arrested, and the RGB has further strictly banned any type of organisation in the southern districts. Restrictions were also placed on transportation of essential commodities.

²²The NOC will certified that the holder have clean record like they had not taken part in the opposition activities and are not related to anyone. The NOC was also required for children seeking admission in school, with the result that children whose parents had taken part or they were suspected of taking part in anti-national activities, had difficulties gaining access to formal education.

mass arrest, flogging, torture, rape, arson, looting and plunder, which compelled the *Lhotshampas* villagers to flee from Bhutan (Evans, 2010; 35).

On one hand, the Royal Government of Bhutan claimed that, from mid-1990 onwards, the ‘anti-nationals’ engaged in violent activities like kidnapping and murdering of civilians. However, there was no authentic proof for that. Some refugees in Nepal described a campaign of violence conducted by BPP (not by the *Lhotshampas*) to ensure support for their movement amongst the southern Bhutanese population. They adopted the methods including forced donation in cash or kind, the forced that at least one member of every household to join the party, and kidnapped and attacked those who perceived to be non-supporters, and even theft of animals (Ahmad, 2013; 174). Some refugees described this situation where they had been caught between the government of Bhutan and BPP rebels. Such difficulties caused some southern Bhutanese to ultimately leave the country. To quote a refugee women, “in the area where we lived, the villagers were stuck between the anti-nationals and the Bhutanese government; my father said we could not continue to live like this, so we left” (Sharma and Sharma, 1998; 266). Those arrested has been tortured and ill-treated in jail which even violates a person’s dignity and cultural and religious beliefs (Hutt, 2003)²³.

Many human rights and political activists and influential people in the villages were alleged by the government authorities of being involved in the ongoing movement. They began leaving the country fearing of torture and harassment. Rumours were also circulated that the Bhutanese army was raping girls and women in the southern district, which lead the sense of insecurity amongst the *Lhotshampas*. Later, a woman in refugee camp (Mrs. Dhan Maya) expressed that it was not only the rumours rather she had gone through those panic and trauma of such kind of harassments (Sharma and Sharma, 1998,

²³As one refugee women explained: ‘the army took one of our relative to jail. He was vegetarian but they made him carry meat outside on daytime every day (Sharma and Sharma, 1998, 267).

267). After 1991, it appeared that, ‘a systematic eviction of southern Bhutanese’ has begun through governments’ use of ‘voluntary migration forms’, which pressurised many *Lhotshampas* to sign, ‘involuntarily’, sometimes by physical violence and coercion too (ibid; 264).

5.7 *Lhotshampas*: Becoming the Soft Target Factor

Generally soft target can be understood as a person/community, thing, location which are easily accessible to the general public, relatively vulnerable and easy targets of military as well as terrorist/militant groups. The *Bhutanisation* process was mainly conducted in the *Lhotshampas* dominated areas of Bhutan where the representatives of southern districts were already agreed to adopt the *Drukpa* culture. But due to harsh and humiliating nature of the process implemented by some unpopular bureaucrats of southern Bhutan administration actually caused discontent among the *Lhotshampas*, which later turned into a mass protest joined by the section of the population who had considered as illegal immigrants, and also some organisations from outside the border having political interests (Pradhan, 2012; 134). During the ongoing phase of protest, *Lhotshampas* became the easy/soft target of protesters as well as the Bhutanese officials.

The name *Lhotshampas* was given by the Third King of Bhutan to designate the Nepalese people of Bhutan to differentiate them from the Nepalese of other region. The term itself claims its authenticity as being a Bhutanese citizen and they have been granted Bhutanese citizenship according to the Citizenship Act of 1958. Later, in 1985, in their version of the Citizenship Act of 1958, those who were able to produce the required documents again considered as Bhutanese citizen.

The literature particularly on this issue has described the integration of Sikkim with India and the ongoing *Gorkhaland* movement in Darjeeling district of West Bengal of India as core factors behind the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies. It has been claimed that the

Royal Government of Bhutan has realised that the Nepalese people and their culture and language has been expanding unabatedly in the entire Himalayan foothills by marginalising the other cultural groups (Rustomji, 1978; 7). Significantly, in the case of Sikkim, Bhutan has seen that her Buddhist sister state has also lost its sovereignty due to uncontrolled Nepali immigration (Ahmad, 2013; 148). Therefore, the Bhutan regime decided to restrict/limit Nepali population in the country.

However, it was not only the fate of Sikkim that lead the Bhutan to become serious about their sovereign status, rather Bhutan was always very much concerned about their independent status. The national consciousness among the Bhutanese was always there from the first Dharma Raja of Bhutan. Later, under the visionary leadership of the King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk and his Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji, Bhutan was growing positively towards the development *vis-a-vis* claiming their independent status internationally. But the untimely death of Prime Minister and the controversy behind his assassination has reversed the sequence of events. Certainly, this incident has its connection behind growing national consciousness among the Bhutanese which lead to the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies²⁴.

Nari Rustomji, a close friend of royal family and political advisor to the King of Bhutan during 1960s, in his book *Bhutan: The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (1978), gives a detailed account of the internal turmoil had taken place after the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji. According to him, the tension was due to the faction between the dominant conservative-traditionalist members of the royal court and the modernist pro-Indian Dorji's family. By rejecting Rustomji's point of view, Leo Rose argues that the internal marital intrigue lead to troubles. He put the blame of assassination of PM on the family and supporters of the Tibetan mistress of the King Ms. Yangki and her Tibetan supporters

²⁴After the assassination of Prime Minister, the conspirators also tried to kill the third and fourth Kings of Bhutan, but when the motives behind the plots to kill the fourth King had uncovered has created the national consciousness among the Bhutanese.

(Rose, 1977; 120-22). But both of them haven't related the issues of internal turmoil with the subsequent adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies.

The case of Sikkim's integration into Indian Union has been considered as a core factor in *Bhutanisation* process (Pradhan, 2012; 161). In the case of Sikkim, India inherited Sikkim's defence, foreign affairs and communications from the British, and thus it became a protectorate of India. In the year 1947, the Sikkim State Congress was set up with the prime purpose of the abolition of the monarchy, creation of a democratic regime and merger with India. The common people who benefitted largely from these developments were the Nepalese community, the undisputable majority in Sikkim by then. The Nepalese of Sikkim provided much of the leadership and most of the support base for the movement for democracy in Sikkim. Again, it was the Sikkimese Nepali who sought Indian support for the introduction of a new political system, and pressed for close political relationship with the Indian Union (Rose, 1977; 103).

However, the *Bhutia* Aristocrat Kazi Lhendup Dorjee (in Sikkim he is known as L.D Kazi) was instrumental in changing the fate of Sikkim from an Independent Himalayan Kingdom to a province under Indian Union (Pradhan, 2012; 161). L.D. Kazi was the head lama of most prestigious *Rumtek* monastery²⁵ in Sikkim for eight years, until dismissed by the Palace on charges of misappropriation and corruption. He then moved to Darjeeling and developed political connections.

By 1944, he had founded the Sikkim *Praja Mandal* a political outfit. A decade later, in 1954, he led the Sikkim State Congress delegation and met the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for requesting his support for political change in Sikkim. Later, he formed Sikkim National Congress in 1963 and the party won eight out of eighteen seats

²⁵*Rumtek* monastery also called the *Dharmachakra* Centre is the largest monastery in Sikkim. The monastery is one of the important seats of the Kagyu lineage outside Tibet originally built under the direction of 12th Karmapa ChangchupDorjee in mid-1700 AD and the 16th Karmapa Rangjung Rigpe Dorjee has established his seat-in-exile. The importance of this monastery is the golden stupa which contains the relics of the 16th *Karmapa* and a black hat made by the hair of 10,000 faries.

in Sikkim's third election. L.D. Kazi became the leader of the opposition and eyeing for the post of Prime Minister.

Meantime, *Chogyal* of Sikkim married 24 years old American woman named Hope Cook. The Queen was trying to involve herself into the political affairs of the state and in a forthright comment, she wrote a very controversial note that the grant of Darjeeling to the British was conditional, and the territory was still the property of Sikkim²⁶. She demanded it back from India and the Indian government has become quite nervous in such developments in Sikkim (Ahmad, 2013; 142).

These developments further strengthened the position of L.D. Kazi, who gained support from pro-democratic elements in the state, mostly the Nepali community. Besides, he was seen as trust worthy by the Indian leadership. As a result of all these developments, *Kazi's* Sikkim National Congress party won thirty one out of thirty two seats in the 1974 elections²⁷, and he became the Prime Minister and undisputable leader of the people of Sikkim. During this time, on 10 March 1975, King *Chogyal* made a trip to Nepal, to attend the coronation function of King Birendra. On his return from Nepal, he found that his own cabinet was in full rebellion²⁸ by joining with the pro-democrats. Subsequently, on March 27, 1975, the Cabinet passed a resolution to abolish the monarchy which is fully backed by the Parliament (Ahmad, 1977; 144).

On 9 April 1975, the *Chogyal* found his palace surrounded by Indian forces (Ahmad, 2013; 144). It is unclear whether the government led by L.D. Kazi had proactively asked for help, or merely acquiesced. It took a mere half an hour for Indian troops to subdue the *Sikkimese* guards who were guarding the palace. On 14 April 1975, Sikkim held a

²⁶In fact, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspected that Hope Cook have been a CIA agent because the impression she gave that she was not fully appreciate the pattern of political relationship between India and Sikkim and she did not hesitate to involve some influential Americans (Pradhan, 2012; 162).

²⁷Remaining one seat won by another Tibetan ancestry, Kalzang Gyatso from the National Party (Pradhan, 2012; 161).

²⁸Mysteriously instigated against his rule-possibly by Indian intelligence agencies (Ahmad, 2013; 144).

referendum on the abolition of its age old monarchy and join the Indian Union. More than 97% of the voters supported to abolish monarchy and merge the state into the Indian Union (Ahmad, 2013; 146). L.D. Kazi, once Prime Minister of the country of Sikkim now became the first Chief Minister of the twenty second state of India. Though Kazi was the leader of democratic movement, it was the Nepalese who really brought change in Sikkim as their votes ultimately decided the destiny of monarchy and ratified the merger of Sikkim with India.

If we compare the circumstances of Nepalese people of Bhutan and Sikkim, we will find the huge contradictions. Especially after 1958, there is growing cooperation between the King or state and the Nepalese people of Bhutan (Phuntsho, 2013; 568-9). However, in Sikkim, the situation was different, as the King tried to restore the *Bhutia-Lepcha* character of his kingdom which irritated the majority of his own citizen, who were Nepali origin. Due to extreme exploitation by the aristocratic class of Sikkim the Nepalese people already started agitations against the monarchical system, and demanded abolition of *Chogyal* dynasty (Ahmad, 2013; 142).

Meanwhile, in 1952, G. P. Koirala (the former Prime Minister of Nepal), have founded the Bhutan State Congress (BSC) and tried to mobilise millions of Nepali origin people living on the borders of Bhutan (Assam and West Bengal) for a non-cooperation movement against Bhutan's monarchy (Ahmad, 2013; 154) Moreover, the Nepalese people living inside the territory of Bhutan did not participate in this move as they don't want to risk their status in a country where they have been living happily enough for many years. Even during the time of inter instability after the assassination of Prime Minister, *Lhotshampas* were consistently working for the country. Besides, the Bhutanese Nepali or *Lhotshampas* at that time represented minority population as they were minority and very small in number as compared to the Nepali in Sikkim. Besides, as they were restricted for the most part of a fringe area of the country, there was less possibility

for Bhutanese Nepali to become dominant. As Rose (1977) claims, the Bhutanese Nepali may prove to be a disruptive element in the Bhutanese polity in the future, but they can never be the dominant force in the country, unlike that is in Sikkim.

It has been discussed by many authors that, after the Sikkim's experience, Bhutan felt challenges to its survival, independence and sovereignty. But there seem less possibilities of Bhutan's annexation. Even though both Sikkim and Bhutan shared special relations with the British and later with India, unlike Sikkim, Bhutan always managed to assert its self-determination - which lacked in case of Sikkim. Under the two prominent and efficient leaders i.e. King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk and Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji, whose selfless contribution and dedication toward the country, they managed to affirm country's self-determination, even in its external affairs. In this regard, Rose has written that, 'the Sikkim and Bhutan situations are qualitatively different, both in legal terms and in objective political terms. Bhutan was never a part of British Raj in India as was Sikkim prior to 1947, and thus there was no basis for Indian claims to a special relationship with the former state. Nor is Bhutan a protectorate of India which Sikkim was. Indeed, the relationship between *Thimphu* and New Delhi is based upon a treaty in which the former's independence is specifically recognised' (Rose, 1977; 103).

Since China put an end to the autonomy that the Tibetans enjoyed till 1958-59, Bhutan became very keen to gain international recognition of its status as a sovereign and independent state. The first step for Bhutan to come out of Indian fold in international arena as an independent state emerged when Bhutan became a member of Colombo Plan in 1962 (Labh, 1974; 223). India sponsored Bhutan's membership of the Colombo Plan and a Bhutanese delegation participated as an observer at the meeting of the Colombo

Plan Consultative Committee in November 1962. After a year Bhutan was admitted as a full member of the Council at its 17th session held in Colombo on 7th March 1963²⁹.

Similarly, on 5 June 1967, in the *Lok Sabha*, M.C. Chagla, the then Minister of External Affairs of India, stated: “The Government of India would be happy to sponsor Bhutan for the membership of the United Nations and other international bodies when Bhutan expresses their readiness to assume the responsibilities and obligations of such membership” (*Lok Sabha* debate, 1967). This was followed by the entry of Bhutan to International Postal Union in April 1969, where India sponsored Bhutan’s application for the admission into the union. The most important achievement in this respect was Bhutan’s entry into the United Nations in 1971, a position the *Chogyal* desired for Sikkim but never achieved (Labh, 1974; 225). India sponsored Bhutan’s application for membership of the United Nations in December 1970 (Kharat, 2005; 71). On February 1971, the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly Bhutan’s application for admission in U.N. and on September 21, 1971, Bhutan became a full-fledged member of the U.N.³⁰ During the same period, Sikkim was going through a civil war kind of situation where the majority Nepali population pushed for the abolition of monarchy, democracy, and a merger with Indian Union.

Unlike Sikkim Bhutan was more successful in securing her independent status. After 1971, the introduction of direct flight from Bhutan to third-world countries is allowed and Bhutan could physically bypass India. Today, Delhi has no political control over

²⁹According to 18th annual report of Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation for 1969-70, Bhutan had 26 trainee and student places and one expert up to 1969. Technical assistance received by 1969 amounted to \$68,600 including Australia \$500, Japan \$47,000, New Zealand \$21,000 and Thailand \$100. Japan supplied scientific equipment worth \$28,000 in 1969. Two Australian team members visited livestock farms in western and eastern Bhutan in 1970. They discussed with the Bhutanese Government about Australian assistance to Bhutan in various fields. Australian Government made a gift of 14 trucks to Bhutan under the Colombo Plan aid programmed in 1970. After India Australia is the largest donor of aid to Bhutan (Labh, 1974, 224).

³⁰Although Bhutan desired to become a member of the United Nations even before, but it was not in a position to assume the responsibilities and obligations till 1966.

Thimphu, and Bhutan takes all its decision independently. Although India continues to provide military protection, a lion's share of Bhutan's development budget, and provide guidance for Bhutan's external affairs, two countries stood on an equal footing in the international forums.

It was true that Bhutan was irritated by the influx of illegal immigrants in the country. Since, Bhutan shares a porous border in south; it faced the severe problem of growing illegal immigrants. After the crisis of Tibetan refugees in late 1950s and early 1960s, the Nepali issue raised similar situation once again in Bhutan. The periods of late 1970s in Bhutan realised the emerging trends of national consciousness among the people and the county's administration started identifying the legal immigrant and expelling the illegal one. Later, the situation has gone beyond control when the Royal Government of Bhutan passed the new sets of radical *Bhutanisation* rules.

The situation happened to out of control, when the King approved the policy which forces the people to change their language and culture through *Driglam namzha*. When the matter reached to the level of questioning their survival and identity, the Nepalese people of Bhutan started to react. Then they raised their voice against the *Bhutanisation* policies, but their demand was brutally put down by the Royal Bhutanese Army. Though, the Nepalese people within the Bhutan had never shares the ideology of Bhutan State Congress, many of them who protested against the new set of rules were branded as anti-national and the member of BSC.

In the meantime, the BSC, taking the advantage of the chaos, has erupted more ferociously under the Bhutan People's Party (BPP). In 1990, the BPP was made a plan for a programme of political action across southern Bhutan demanding civil rights and democratic reform, which further worsened the condition of *Lhotshampas* in the country. They had adopted violent tactics, similar to those adopted by GNLFF extremist in India during *Gorkhaland* Movement. As discussed above, the Nepali population or

Lhotshampas were trapped in the emerging conflict between BPP and the Royal Government of Bhutan³¹.

In an incident of 2 June 1990, the severed heads of two southern Bhutanese government officials found in a bag in the *Gomtu* River in *Samchi* district. The Bhutanese government associated this murder with BPP's inception and reported that the attached warning letter threatens that "all those who supported the Royal government would meet the same fate" (Hutt, 2003). According to the refugees in Nepal, this incident gave authority to BPP's threat that non supporters would 'lose six inches' (*chha* inch *ghataune*) - that is their head- or (*tauko jhola maa juiu khola maa*) that they find their 'head in a bag, body in the river' (Evans, 2010).

During the ongoing conflict between the southern rebellion and RGB, the Bhutanese government accused the rebels of terroristic activities of arson, robbery, extortion of money, kidnapping and murder. On the other side the protesters accused the government of a reign of terror, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Consequently, most of the innocent *Lhotshampas* were trapped in between the clash, being suspected of treason by both, against their country by the government and against their own people by the rebels. Karma Phuntsho (2014) defined the situation of Nepali population as caught between the devil and the deep sea, many of them emigrated in the hope of finding a safe place in Nepal, where the UNHRC and Red Cross opened refugee camps, most stayed back in Bhutan to fight for their rights and rebuild their lives(Phuntsho, 2013, 580).

The *Lhotshampas* were going through lose-lose situation and they left with no option but to escape by leaving the country. These difficulties caused many southern Bhutanese to leave Bhutan voluntary. It indicates that all the Bhutanese refugees living in the camps in Nepal are not illegal immigrants expelled from the country. They had become the soft

³¹Some of the people from refugee camps said BPP threatened to shoot them if not ready to give donations or take part in the movement.

target of both the protesters and the Bhutanese officials whom later, after the joint verification, had been categorised as bonafied citizens of Bhutan. Even then, they could not go back to country as the extreme Nepali organisations objected the same.

In November 1991, Amnesty International estimated that there were 5000 people in refugee camps in Nepal. By October 1992, the number increased to 70000 (Amnesty International 1992) (Ahmad, 2013; 174). This would mean that a tenth of the population of Bhutan fled the country in less than a year. According to the people in the camp, many of them fled the country voluntarily by fearing murder, rape and torture.

The refugee problem begins with the growing number of refugees in the camps of Nepal. It was 6000 only in 1991, increased to 70,000 by 1992 (Ahmad, 2013; 177) and crossed 1, 00,000 by the end of 1993 (Phuntsho, 2013: 581). The growth of population in the refugee camps lead number of theories even doubting that the refugees were from Bhutan at all. Some of them suggested that the people in the refugee camps might be from Nepal itself. Hence, it was impossible to say that how many people have moved from Bhutan and how many people have Bhutanese citizenship. It is feasible that the numbers have been greatly augmented by Nepalese from India too. By claiming themselves as Bhutanese, they are able to enjoy limited but useful contribution of food, medicines and clothing distributed by aid organisations in the refugee camps.

Regarding the question on the manipulation of data of Bhutanese refugees, Alexander Casella, the Director of Asia in the UN High Commission for Refugees, laid the blame on Sadako Ogata, the then head of the UNHCR. When Nepal asked the UNHCR for help, Ogata give the go-ahead to her newly created Emergency Response Unit. In his article titled 'Nepal finally waves away refugees', Casella writes that, 'normally, UNHCR, before intervening, would have undertaken a survey....to determine exactly the nationality and reason for departure. Due to the lack of such a survey at the initial stage, the majority

in the refugee camps in Nepal came from other places and not *Lhotshampas* (Ahmad, 2013; 179).

However, presumption that the Nepali citizenship is of such little value that the local Nepalese would be willing to throw their lives in the refugee camps, just for the paltry amount of foods and clothing is little hard to accept. In the meantime, Nepal and some international organisations claimed that all of the refugees are Bhutanese and demanded Bhutan to have them repatriated. Bhutan contested on the demand, and argued that, with a generous daily allowance in the refugee camps and the poor process of verification, many stateless and landless people from the adjoining areas of Duars and Darjeeling also joined the refugee bandwagon (Phuntsho, 2013; 581) Again the Royal government claimed that the *Lhotshampas* formed the overwhelming majority in the southern districts and they are accounted for the least a quarter of Bhutan's total population.

The truth behind the exodus of Bhutanese refugee is simple to understand but very difficult to deal with. The *Lhotshampas* were addressing the question of their political affiliation and religious or cultural identity. The *Lhotshampas* may have belonged to the culture of Nepal and identified themselves as Nepali but at the same time, they lived in Bhutan and paid taxes to the Bhutanese authority. For them idea of the citizenship was limited to the place where they lived, 'the village' rather than the country.

When the rigorous check on citizenship has begun and the strict differentiation between the Bhutanese and other existing ethnic cultures took place, the *Lhotshampas* found themselves in a vulnerable position. They were caught in between the rebel movement, where many people of their community has been murdered in the name of their movement and the local authority of the country who regarded them as disloyal at best and treasonous at worst. In such a climate of fear, those who were unable to deal with the situation and have doubt about their ability to fulfil the criteria of the new Citizenship

Act, fled from the country. Those who stayed back were confident of their paperwork and identify with the state.

Later, the government of Nepal and Bhutan has been engaged in extensive discussions after the initial meeting between the Fourth King of Bhutan and the Prime Minister of Nepal Koirala. In July 1993, the two countries signed a joint statement announcing the formation of a six-member joint Ministerial Level Committee³². In October 1993, the Home Ministers from both the countries led their delegations to Kathmandu where it was decided that, all the people in the refugee camps in Nepal would be grouped into one of four categories (Ahmad, 2013; 180):

1. Bonafide Bhutanese, if they have been forcefully evicted.
2. Bhutanese who emigrated voluntarily from Bhutan.
3. Non-Bhutanese.
4. Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts.

In order to resolve the problem, the governments of Nepal and Bhutan held some fifteen rounds of bilateral talks by 2003 and, the most significant achievement of the talks was the formation of the Joint Verification Team (JVT). The first process of verification began on 26 March 2001 and the team undertook the verification of 12,173 refugees of the *Khudunabari* refugee camp. The result of the verification was announced in May 2003. According to this only 293 were there in the first category (those who were forcefully evicted from Bhutan), 8595 were emigrated voluntarily and 347 fled after committing criminal acts (Phuntsho, 2013; 581). Which means majority of refugees were fell into category 2 and 3 means voluntarily emigrated or had never held Bhutanese citizenship.

³²The committees' role was to verify the different categories of people in the refugee camps who are claiming to have come from Bhutan and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on each category, which will provide a basis for the resolution of the problem.

After the announcement of the result, Bhutanese government agreed to take full responsibility for the people fell into first category and also expressed its willingness to allow those in the other two categories to query this categorisation on the basis of any new documentation they could present. But the Bhutanese delegation to JVT has been alleged for using undiplomatic language and provoking the violence in the camp. The announcement led a riot like situation in the camp and the delegates had to be evacuated under the cover of Nepal's security forces. However, the real problem was not the language rather it was the fact that more than 90% of the refugees whose documents verified had been considered as non-Bhutanese on the basis of the report. The incident delayed the process of negotiations and later Nepal was overwhelmed by internal political turmoil and the negotiations for resolving the issue bilaterally are abandoned forever.

It has been believed that the major political parties of Nepal and BPP were creating faction among the refugees and using the Bhutanese refugees to achieve their political goals. Their major aim was to use the refugee issue as a pressure tactics to overthrow the monarchy in Bhutan and remould the state. They were never in favour of resolving the problem, rather they used every opportunity to complicate the process of repatriation (Phuntsho, 2013; 580) The Nepal government had agreed with the classification criteria of Bhutanese team in their private negotiation but at the same time condemned it publicly. As a result of this, the entire process or attempt to resolve the issue of refugee was failed (Phuntsho, 2013; 581).

Meanwhile, many Western countries including US, Canada and Australia have offered option of third-country settlements of the refugees. *Cesella* writes on how Nepal and other political faction among the refugees reacted to the scheme:

The announcement of the resettlement scheme provoked a major outcry throughout the camps. Fearful of losing their captive constituencies, the various political factions active in the camps, such as the Bhutan Communist Party, the Bhutan

Peoples' Party and Democratic Socialist, supported by the exile movements, launched a massive campaign against resettlement. Riots erupted and in May 2007 three camps inhabitants who had volunteered for resettlement were killed. As for the Nepal government, for whom the camp represented a source of income, it was only after the pressure from the 'Core Group' it was agreed to deliver exit permits to those who had been accepted for resettlement. (Ahmad, 2013; 179)

By the end of 2011, over half of the refugees left their respective camps to begin a new life in the third country where they were offered citizenship and the rest waited for their turn. By 2012, over 65,000 has been resettled in the third countries in which the US alone took about 60,000 refugees, followed by Canada about 4,673, Australia 3,492, Denmark 621, New Zealand 653, Norway 509, Netherland509 and UK224 (Kunsel, 2012). In the beginning of the third country resettlement process, there were 108,000 refugees living in seven camps, and in 2015, there remained only 18,000 refugees left in two camps (UNHCR, 2015). According to a press release by the Kathmandu post on 4th February2019, after the last batch of refugees left for the third country resettlement, only 6,500 remain in two camps in *Jhapa* (The Kathmandu Post, 2019)

5.8 Conclusion

The *Lhotshampa* community of Bhutan belongs to Nepali stock, speak Nepali language and follow Hindu religion. They came to Bhutan from the adjacent areas of Sikkim, Darjeeling and Nepal and there are contradictory claims on the timing of their arrival in Bhutan. However, it has been popularly accepted that they came to Bhutan after the signing of the *Sinchula* Treaty in 1865. Later, the Ugen Dorji (the Political Advisor) and J.B Pradhan (Commissioner of southern Bhutan) encouraged the huge influx of Nepali people to the country in order to generate the revenue.

Until 1950s, they were considered as alien and it was under the rule of the Third King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk, they have been granted the citizenship of Bhutan through the Citizenship Act of 1958. The *Lhotshampas* were also appointed for the administrative works, and in the police force and army of Bhutan. They have contributed significantly to all round development of Bhutan ever since the early 20th century, especially in the second half of the 20th century. As discussed in the previous chapter, Bhutan has undergone through a severe internal crisis in 1960s and 70s, which persuaded the state to amend the Citizenship Act of 1958 and to implement the *Bhutanisation* process.

Lhotshampas who constitute a quarter of the population of the country became the major victims of the *Bhutanisation* process. The century old settlers of Bhutan, who has supported and contributed to the developments of the country, became the most vulnerable in this homogenisation process. It has been claimed that, as being a prominent community and practicing distinct culture, the *Lhotshampas* were considered as the major problem for the survival of *Drukpa* identity in Bhutan. However, it seems that, initially, the *Lhotshampas* did not have any problem with the policy, and they were agreed to wear *Drukpa* dress and learn the *Dzongkha* language. Similarly, the Nepalese in Bhutan didn't have any reason to oppose the King or overthrow the monarchy. Such claims is also rejected by Rose (1977) and Pradhan (2012) who proposed that such fears are misdirected and created mainly by those who did not understand the situation in Bhutan.

While discussing about the *Lhotshampas* becoming the soft target factor during the implementation of homogenisation policies in Bhutan, it has revealed that many *Lhotshampas* were vulnerable and became the easy targets of the crisis. They were trapped between the BPP, militant - resistant group within the Nepali community, and the officials of Royal Government of Bhutan, despite the fact that they neither supported BPP nor opposed the government wholeheartedly. However, it was difficult for them to survive in the country as they were suspected by both, and therefore they left the country

‘voluntarily’ and opted to live the refugee camps in Nepal. To conclude, though the *Lhotshampas* were the most vulnerable of Bhutan’s homogenisation process, but after examining the prominent issues relating to *Bhutanisation* process, it has been substantiated that the Bhutan’s government did not have any intention to divert the attention from Tibet/Chinese factor by targeting the *Lhotshampas*.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

At base, this study aimed to understand and analyse/examine the Tibet factor in the cultural homogenisation process in Bhutan. It has discussed in detail, the role/impact of ‘Tibet factor’ on political developments in Bhutan, such as the controversial involvement of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan’s internal upheavals during 1960s and the Chinese suzerainty claim based on the religious and cultural link between Bhutan and Tibet. It examined the issues of Tibetan refugees’ on *Bhutanisation* policies adopted by the Royal Government of Bhutan. The study has focused on multiple cases and developments such as the Chinese incursion on Tibet and its impact on Bhutan, the modernisation policies adopted by the King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk, the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Dorji, alleged attempts to kill the third and fourth Kings of Bhutan, merger of Sikkim and the issues related to *Lhotshampas*. The period of the study ranges from 1960s to 1980s, the period witnessed major transformations in Bhutan. Against this backdrop, the study addressed the research questions such as; what comprises the cultural homogenisation in Bhutan? What kind of impact that the Tibetan factor on Bhutan such as the political developments in Tibet and the presence of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan, their role in the Royal/domestic politics in Bhutan? And what impact that cultural homogenisation has on different communities in Bhutan, especially the *Lhotshampas*?

The cultural homogenisation in Bhutan comprises the amendment of Citizenship Act in 1977 and 1985 and adoption of the code of *Driglam namzha* in 1989 which has been discussed in detail in the chapter three of this thesis. Through this, the Royal Government of Bhutan amended the Citizenship Act of 1958 in order to promote the Bhutan’s national identity based on *Drukpa* culture. The amendments made it compulsory for all to wear *gho* and *kira*, (*Drukpa* dress) and speak *Dzongkha* language in addition to various other

homogenisation policies. The chapter three has also discussed the popular notion of concept homogenisation and contextualised into Bhutan.

Generally, the concept of cultural homogenisation defines as the character associated with cultural globalisation in the contemporary era. While breaking down the cultural barriers among different communities, the process globalisation has credited for eliminating cultural distinctiveness and creating a uniform homogeneous culture. The concept of global culture is also used as a synonym to cultural homogenisation. As far as the process globalisation is praising for uniting the countries, there is growing criticism for replacing the local and indigenous culture. Homogenisation is considered as the prominent element of nationalism; the homogeneous character of nationalism indicates the nation-state, national identity, sovereignty, self-determination, and independence. While discussing the concept of nationalism, the chapter has examined the theory of nationalism of Gellner in detail and contextualised it in the case of Bhutan.

As discussed in the chapters, Bhutan has adopted a series of policies towards cultural homogenisation, popularly known as *Bhutanisation* policies, to protect their national identity by eliminating cultural differences and paving the way for a single and unified culture-based society. However, like in most of the experiences in the developing countries, it became more problematic and ended into severe ethnic crisis in Bhutan. The thesis looked into the question how the process homogenisation, along with nationalism, is becoming the tool in rulers and bureaucrats' hands to serve their interests, from the experience of Bhutan.

Practicing homogenisation based on ethnic nationalism has created a sense of self vs. other, us vs. them, legal vs. illegal etc. This led to the process of assimilation, exclusion, population transfer, and sometimes even ethnic cleansing. While practising homogenisation, the ruler and the bureaucrats have targeted basically those who are either culturally different from them or are the primary threat to their survival. In the case

of Bhutan, by analysing and understanding the Tibet factor in *Bhutanisation* process during the 1960s-80s, the study shows how the Royal Government of Bhutan tried to assimilate its Tibetan refugees into the *Drukpa* culture and when there was a resistance, how they have been excluded from the country.

The process of cultural homogenisation in Bhutan can fit under the principles of ethnic nationalism. Bhutan's *Ngalong* elite has adopted the homogenisation policies based on *Ngalong* ethnicity, which includes the traditional dressed *gho* and *kira* and the language of the dominant 'Dzongkha'. The *Bhutanisation* process has been characterised as ethnic nationalism because it is exclusionary. While establishing *Ngalong* dominance under Bhutan's national identity banner, they had completely excluded other minor ethnic cultures. *Ngalong* had a significant impact on other ethnic cultures like *Lhotshampas*.

What are the major forces behind Bhutan's transformation process? While addressing this question, this study mainly discussed the transformation process adopted by the King Jigmi Dorji in the late 1960s. Chapter four of this study discussed that the forces behind Bhutan's transformation process was the Chinese incursion on Tibet and its activities on the border of Bhutan. It has been discussed particularly in chapter four that it was the aggressively moving Chinese force after absorbing power over Tibet toward the other Himalayan states has led the transformation in the country. The Chinese activities in the Himalayas have forced Bhutan to close its northern border permanently, which has hampered country's economy too. It was the constant violation of Bhutan territory by the Chinese forces in fact forced Bhutan to give up its isolationist policy and open her borders for modernisation and development with India's help. China has never accepted the Friendship treaty between Bhutan and British India (by Treaty of *Punakha* of 1910) or/independent India (by 1949 Friendship Treaty). Instead, the Chinese consistently made claims over Bhutan as it is the case of Sikkim, NEFA, Nepal, and *Ladakh*, which, according to them, was part of the Middle Kingdom. The Chinese also closed the only

routes which connect Bhutan with outside world. All such developments have led to major transformation in Bhutan.

How the Tibetan refugees connected to *Bhutanisation* process is an important issue discussed in this thesis. There are established connections between the Tibetan refugees and the *Bhutanisation* process. Bhutan government has expelled around 5000 Tibetan refugees from the country as part of implementation of the process. The officials of the Tibetan government in Exile and the officials of Bhutan have been involved in a controversial debate on the issue to Bhutan's new citizenship acts. The Tibetan officials alleged the Bhutanese officials for mass detention, arrest, torture, and harassment of Tibetan refugees in the name of citizenship. To connect the Tibetan refugees with the process of *Bhutanisation*, chapter four of the study has analysed the role of Tibetans in the internal upheavals in Bhutan after the assassination of Prime Minister and the controversial Chinese suzerainty claims over Bhutan. The chapter discussed in detail, the impacts of the involvement of Ms. Yangki, the Tibetan mistress of then King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk in the Political affairs of Bhutan. The entire scenario of conspiracies, mistrust, and factionalism between the King's and the Dorji's family due to King's inability to punish the real culprit behind the murder of Prime Minister have all been discussed here. The enquiry of this, along with the two other failed attempts to kill the third King and the new young King Jigmi Singye Wangchuk, revealed the role of Ms. Yangki and her aides. The root of conspiracy is moved to Gyalo Thondup, the brother of Dalai Lama, and few Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling and Bhutan.

The chapter has discussed the reasons behind the plot such as to eliminate the royal heir and place one of her sons in her illegitimate relationship with the King on the throne of Bhutan. Such developments created a sense of national consciousness among the Bhutanese which ultimately led to aggressive measures towards cultural homogenisation. It has also discussed in the chapter that Bhutan has seriously treated the emerging Chinese influence in the world. Bhutan wanted to keep itself outside the Chinese radar

and therefore put stringent measures over those Tibetans who lived in that country. It has banned the organisation of any protest of Tibetan refugees inside the country, mainly due to China factor. To avoid any future threat from the side Tibetan refugees, the RGB has brought policies to assimilate them under the *Drukpa/Ngalong* dominancy by offering them citizenship based on the Citizenship Act of 1977. Those Tibetan refugees who rejected that offer had to leave the country.

The question, how does the Tibetan factor influence the policies of modern Bhutan, was also discussed in the thesis. The second chapter of the study has discussed the historical background of the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet in detail. Bhutan's society is overwhelmed by Tibetan influence. The monasteries (*Kyerchu Lhakhang* and *Jampa Lhakhang*) built by the Tibetan King Songsten Gampo, which still remain in Bhutan, reveals the impact of Tibet on Bhutan. Apart from such territorial links, Bhutan has been represented culturally and religiously at the Tibetan vassalage. Both the centrality of Tibetan *lamaistic* Buddhist system and the political system based on religion (theocratic) in Bhutan indicate that Tibet has played a crucial role in shaping all political and social institutions in Bhutan. Further, Tibet and Bhutan have shared a priest and pupil type of relationship where Bhutanese people used to send their children to *Ralung* (Tibet) to learn Buddhism. It has also claimed that most of the traditional elites or prominent leaders and monks were of Tibetan in their origin and the elites from both the countries had shared close ties at least till the 12th century AD.

While bearing the same name for institutions and involving Bhutanese vassalage to a Tibetan ruler, Bhutan and Tibet's relation has also seen in hierarchical order where Tibet remained as hegemon. Even the architecture of Bhutan's important building like *dzong*, royal palace, government offices, monasteries, and the residential houses are similar to Tibetan architecture. The Tibetan cultural dominance is many another factors compelled the Bhutanese government to adopt *Bhutanisation* policies.

The political establishment of Tibet is rooted in the sect system in Buddhism. The *Gelugpa* or the red hat sect established their superiority over other sects after series of conflicts with *Tsangpa* rulers of *Karmapa* School during 1642. As a result of this, all the sects or schools belonging to yellow hat sects, including *Drukpa*, have been subordinated and to pay loyalty to *Gelugpa* sect headed by his holiness Dalai Lama. Thus, the King of Bhutan or Shabdrung was forced to send gifts to Dalai Lama to express his loyalty and receive the same in return. The Chinese suzerainty claim over Bhutan is also depended on the basis of such practices. In terms of practices like sending gifts to Dalai Lama, Bhutan argue that it was just the gifts, not tribute, and the gifts they presented to him are on religious capacity, not political capacity. On becoming subordinate to the Gelugpa sect, as belongs to an inferior sect, they positioned that, Bhutan never accepted the Gelugpa rule. For that matter neither Dalai Lama nor any monastic institution of the Gelugpa sect was ever allowed to function in Bhutan.

Bhutan's history wrapped up in mystery. Due to the outbreak of fire in *Punakha dzong* in 1832 and the destruction of building due to fire in 1897, the recorded documents on Bhutan's history have been completely destroyed. Later, the country's history was written mostly by the foreign authors, and there emerges the ambiguity about the Tibetan suzerainty over Bhutan. Most local writers, authors, or historians, especially, Karma Phuntsho (2013) of Bhutan, have denied such a parochial Tibetan version of Bhutan's history. They argue that, Bhutan shares a close relation with Tibet, in its religious and cultural sphere, it is wrong to conclude that Bhutan is the extension of Tibet.

There were intermittent hostilities between Tibet and Bhutan ever since the 17th and 18th centuries, with the establishment of Shabdrung Namgyal. Though there were series of Tibetan invasions in Bhutan with an aim to establish Tibetan authority and influence, all such moves ultimately failed and Bhutan remained outside the hierarchy of Tibetan political establishment. They further argued that, though Bhutan's traditional elites have been mostly of Tibetan in their origin, but they came to Bhutan as political refugees, not

as the supporters of Tibetan rulers. There are no documents or events indicates that these elite Tibetan refugees in Bhutan have ever recognised or accepted any political obligation to Tibetan authorities.

During the ongoing process of cultural homogenisation by targeting the *Lhotshampa* people, does, Bhutan's ruling elites have the intention to divert the Chinese attention? The answer to this question is no. There was no intention to divert the Chinese attention. Though the Chinese threat was there but Bhutan's ruling elites were more concerned about their internal crisis and they only wanted to remove all possible internal threats, whether it is from the Tibetan refugees' or the illegal immigrants. As discussed in chapter five of this thesis, they not even specifically targeted the *Lhotshampas*, rather the *Lhotshampas*, has become the easy target of both BPP protesters as well as the Bhutanese officials.

While dealing with the *Lhotshampas* as the easy or soft target, the chapter five has discussed that *Lhotshampas* are purely the Bhutanese Nepali, and the name *Lhotshampas* is given by the Third Druk Gyalpo Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk to identify them as people from the southern part of the country. As the chapter discussed, though they were not illegal immigrants during the implementing phase of homogenisation policies, when the crisis emerged, they were trapped between the protesters (predominantly from outside the country), and the Bhutanese officials. In the midst of chaos, despite having Bhutanese citizenship card/Bhutanese identity card, many *Lhotshampas* were forced to leave the country as they were targeted from both the side.

The chapter has also discussed the issue of merger of Sikkim into Indian Union as a factor behind the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies. Bhutan is the only Buddhist Kingdom in the Himalayan region that retains its independence. The other two, Tibet and Sikkim, were incorporated to China and India respectively in the third quarter of 20th century. Like Sikkim's *Chogyal* dynasty, the Bhutanese elites were also felt a sense of

insecurity, becoming minority in their own state. Bhutan has become more suspicious on developments in the neighbouring areas and became very conscious on their survival and independence. It is viable to feel insecure, and the insecurity had boosted out when Tibet was annexed by China in 1959, and the New Delhi absorbed Sikkim in 1975. Hence, the *Bhutanisation* policy can be understood in the context of these developments. Bhutan's reaction to their insecurities is understandable. But the study makes it clear that, there is no comparability between the case of Bhutan and Sikkim. The situations were completely different in Bhutan as compared to Sikkim. The fear emerged in Bhutan did not have sufficient link with the situations in Sikkim.

Bhutan's challenges are not much different from other developing countries in the world. It also addresses several political and economic issues, issues of balancing country's tradition with modernity, maintaining stability while adopting the new policies, etc. Apart from all these problems, the geographical location is another concern for Bhutan. It is a tiny landlocked state caught between the two rival Asian giants, India and China. Its cultural inclination to Tibet on the one hand, and the porous border with India on the other made the question of preserving its sovereignty, independence, and national identity made very crucial. Therefore, this study argues that the homogenisation process as a strategy to protect the national identity by the Royal Government of Bhutan with the emphasis on the Tibet factor become more relevant.

The Buddhist Himalayan states, especially Sikkim and Bhutan, due to their theocratic political system, constituted dependency with Tibet in the past, which was not just political and diplomatic. Bhutan could not isolate itself from the Tibetan influence due to its deep religious and cultural connections. Tibet was more civilised and developed intellectually than Bhutan and Sikkim. Tibet used to guide them in their internal and external matters. Though Bhutan is an independent state based on its religion, the country has been presented as an extension of Tibet in most of the academic works available on Bhutan. At the same time, Bhutan, dealt with a plethora of controversies like the Chinese

threat from the northern border, threats from the political developments in Darjeeling and Nepal, and Sikkim's controversial merger with Indian Union, was forced to think about its national identity seriously.

However, it is very clear that, the Chinese claim that Bhutan is the part of the Great Chinese motherland was entirely dependent upon the Tibetan linkages. Due to their close cultural affinity and casual works on Bhutan, the country was mistakenly projected as part of Tibet. That is a major reason behind the adoption of *driglam namzha* (one nation, one culture) to identify their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness from Tibet to dissociate it from the cultural horizon of Tibet. While dealing with those insecurities or preserving national identity, Bhutan forgot to take lessons from the incidents from other parts of the sub-continent like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and resultantly adopted policies that brought larger tensions and conflict. In the name of national integration, the Royal Government of Bhutan has implemented various racial and discriminatory policies leading to forceful homogenisation. Consequently, a devastating ethnic conflict arose, and the peaceful image of Shangri-La as Bhutan known for shattered. In short, the Royal Government of Bhutan has aggressively pushed its *Bhutanisation* policy to assert its distinct identity from Tibet. While discussing the Tibetan factor on the *Bhutanisation* process, the study concludes that, the homogenisation policies in Bhutan aimed the protection of Bhutan's national identity. The Royal Government of Bhutan has tried to drive out every possible threat to its survival, whether it could be the Tibetan refugees or the illegal immigrants of Nepali origin. As the crisis has busted out, the Bhutanese government had expelled approximately 100,000 Nepali ethnic people and around 5000 Tibetan refugees.

This study has some limitations due to non-availability of enough source materials. Similarly, the unwillingness of many crucial respondents to give open answers to questions due to sensitivity of the issue has also remained as a hurdle. Surveys and interviews were not very successful as many Tibetan refugees were afraid of giving

answers to sensitive, but crucial questions. However, the comprehensive works done on Bhutan, mostly authentic and first-hand accounts by scholars on specific issues related to the internal political developments in Bhutan were useful to put things together to develop a fresh understanding and make some coherent arguments in this regard. The many available books dealing with the controversial issues between the Bhutan government and Tibetan refugees are however, not directly dealing with *Bhutanisation* policies.

Though the target group of this study includes Tibetan refugees, Bhutanese refugees, and Bhutanese citizens, it has become more refugee centred as there was enough respondents from Bhutanese citizens, and therefore, could not bring a balance. Surveys conducted in Bhutan, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, *Kalimpong*, and Darjeeling was more productive. But the survey conducted at Bhutan was not very productive in terms of developing an understanding from the point of view of citizens of Bhutan. Therefore, that was substituted largely by secondary source materials. Similarly, the linguistic problems also created some hurdles to this study. Almost all the Tibetan refugees responded in their ethnic language only, and it was challenging to have a smooth conversation with them despite having an interpreter.

What we see today in Bhutan is the result of the developments in the last few decades. The country has gone through a series of transformations, politically, socially, and economically. Researching in Bhutan's internal issues remained quite exciting and tricky. The process *Bhutanisation* has many strands and Tibetan factor in the process need to be explored more in the future. This research is one of the pioneering in this regard. The untold stories are yet to hear from Tibetan refugees. The controversial theory about Ms. Yangki and the fight for heir of the throne is just the only upper layer of the information; the remaining stories are still beneath the victims' hearts, which also needs to be uncovered. Although the study addresses the Tibetan factor in *Bhutanisation* process in some details, the discussion on this issue is relevant in other instances like the impact of

Bhutanisation policies on Tibetan refugees who have been granted Bhutanese citizenship and still living in the country.

To conclude, the study has outlined the socio-political background of the conflict between Tibetan refugees and Bhutanese elite. It has described how the Tibetan refugees has become a factor behind the adaptation of *Bhutanisation* policies and evaluated refugees' claims by examining documentary evidences and conducting field studies. After observing the pro-Chinese, anti-Tibetan trend in the neighbouring states like Nepal and Sikkim, Bhutan might have followed the trend indirectly by targeting the minorities, especially the Tibetan refugees. Like the *Lhotshampas*, the Tibetan refugees also opposed homogenisation policies of Royal Government of Bhutan as they are also equally affected by the *Bhutanisation* policies. However, almost all important literature on the subject *Bhutanisation* has focused on Nepalese - *Lhotshampas*. The Tibetan refugees were more or less ignored from the mainstream academic discussions on *Bhutanisation* process. However, as this study reveals, the Tibet factor has also played a crucial role in Bhutan's homogenisation process. The political developments related to Tibetan refugees both internally and externally, have been incidental in the implementation of cultural homogenisation polices in Bhutan during 1960s-80s.

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APPENDIX I

Treaty of Sinchula-1865

On the 11th day of November, 1865

Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B., K.S.I., Viceroy and Governor-General of Her Britannic Majesty's possessions in the East Indies, and the one part by Lieutenant Colonel Herbart Bruce, CB, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Viceroy and Governor – General, and on the other part by Samdojey Deb Jimpey and Themseyrensey Donai according to full powers conferred on them by the Dhum and Deb Rajahs, 1865.

ARTICLE I

There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and the Government of Bhootan.

ARTICLE II

Whereas in consequence of repeated aggressions of the Bhootan Government and of the refusal of that Government to afford satisfaction for those aggressions, and for their insulting treatment of the officers sent by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council for the purpose of procuring an amicable adjustment of differences existing between the two states, the British Government has been compelled to seize by an armed force the whole of the Doars and certain Hill Posts protecting the passes into Bhootan, and whereas the Bhootan Government has now expressed its regret for past misconduct and a desire for the establishment of friendly relations with the British Government, it is hereby agreed that the whole of the tract known as the Eighteen Doars, bordering on the districts of Rungpoor, Cooch Behar, and Assam, together with the Taloo of Ambaree Fallcottah and the Hill territory on the left bank of the Teesta up to such points as may be laid down by the British Commissioner appointed for the purpose is ceded by the Bhootan Government to the British Government forever.

ARTICLE III

The Bhootan Government hereby agree to surrender all British subjects, as well as subjects of the Chief of Sikkim and Cooch Behar who are now detained in Bhootan against their will, and to place no impediment in the way of the return of all or any of such persons into British territory.

ARTICLE IV

In consideration of the session by the Bhootan Government of the territories specified in Article II of this Treaty, and of the said Government having expressed its regret for past misconduct, and having hereby engaged for the future to restrain all evil disposed persons from committing crimes with in British territory or the territories of the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar and to give prompt and full redress for all such crimes which may be committed in defiance of their commands, the British Government agree to make an annual allowance to the Government of Bhootan of a sum not exceeding fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000) to be paid to officers not below the rank of Jungpen, who shall be deputed by the Government of Bhootan to receive the same. And it is further hereby agreed that the payments shall be made as specified below:

On the fulfillment by the Bhootan Government of the conditions of this Treaty
Twenty Five Thousand Rupees (Rupees 25,000).

On the 10th January following the 1st payment, thirty five thousand rupees (Rupees 35,000)

On the 10th January following, forty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 45,000)

On every succeeding 10th January, fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000)

APPENDIX II

The Treaty of Punakha, 1910

Whereas it is desirable to amend Article IV and VIII of the Treaty concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November, 1865, corresponding with the Bhpptea year Shing Lang, 24th day of the 9th month, between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan, the under mentioned amendments are agreed to on the one part of Mr. C.A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, in virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elloit-Murray, Kynynmound, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., Earl of Minto Viceroy and Governor-General of India-in-Council and the other part by His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, K.C.I.E., Maharaja of Bhutan.

The following addition has been made to Article IV of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865:

“The British Government has increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from fifty thousand rupees (Rs.50, 000) to one hundred thousand rupees (Rs.1, 00,000) with effect from the 10th January 1910”.

Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 has been revised and the revised article runs as follows:

“The British Government undertaken to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regards to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharaja of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require and insist upon the observance of its decision by the Maharajas named”.

Done in quadruplicate at Punakha, Bhutan, this eighth day of January in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ten, corresponding with the Bhutia date, the 27th day of the 11th month of the Earth Bird (Sa-ja) year”.

C.A.Bell

Seal of Political Officer

Seal of Dharma Raja

Political Officer in
Sikkim 8th January,
1910

Seal of His Highness the
Maharaja of Bhutan

Seal of tatsang Lamas

Seal of Tongsa Penlop

Seal of Paro Penlop

Seal of Zhung Dronyer

Seal of Timbu Jongpen

Seal of Punakha Jongpen

Seal of wangdu Potang Jongpen

Seal of Taka Penlop

Seal of Deb Zimpon

Minto

Viceroy and Governor-General of India

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and governor-General of India-in-Council at Fort William on the twenty fourth day of March, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and ten.

S.H. Butler

Secretary to the Government of India

Foreign Department

APPENDIX III

Treaty of Friendship Between India and Bhutan, 1949

The Government of India on the one part, and His Highness the Druk Gyalpo Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their lives of people, have resolved to conclude the following Treaty, and have for this purpose, named their representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar dayal representing the Government of India, who has full powers to agree to the said Treaty on behalf of the Government of India, and Deb Zimpson Sinam Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zim Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie, Palden Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan.

Article 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and Government of Bhutan.

Article 2

The Government of India undertake to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regards of its external relations.

Article 3

In the place of compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and enhanced by the Treaty of the eighth day of January, 1910, and the temporary subsidy of Rupees One Lakh per annum granted in 1942, the

Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rupees Five Lakh to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that said annual payment shall be on the tenth day of January of every year, the first payment being made on the tenth day of January, 1950. This payment shall continue so long as this Treaty remains in force and its terms are duly observed.

Article 4

Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of the signature of this Treaty return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.

Article 5

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of Government of India and Government of Bhutan every facility to the carriage by land and water, of its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.

Article 6

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all times as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other hand, agreed that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, *etc.*, across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by the private individuals.

Article 7

The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agreed that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with India subjects and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of Government of Bhutan.

Article 8

1. The Government of India shall, on demand being duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provision of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said act who may take refuge in India Territory.
2. The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition being duly made by the Government of India, or by any officer authorised by the government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a Foreign Power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by the Government of India with the said power accused any of the crimes, specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903, who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee into Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

Article 9

Any difference and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall in first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three month of the start of negotiation no settlement is arrived at, than the matter shall be referred to the

Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either of India and Bhutan, chosen in the following manners:

1. One person nominated by the Government of India.
2. One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan
3. A judge of the Federal Court, or of a High Court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be chairman.

The judgment of this Tribunal shall be final and executed without any delay by either party.

Article 10

This Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent

Done in Duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, corresponding with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the Eight-Bull year.

Harishwar Dayal

Political Officer in Sikkim

Deb Zimpon Sonam

Tobgye Dorji

Yang-Lop Sonam

Chho-Zim Thomdup

Rin-Zim Tandim

Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji

APPENDIX IV

The National Law of Bhutan, 1958

Having found it necessary to amend this law relating to the acquisition and deprivation of citizenship which has been in force till date, His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo, in accordance with the suggestions put up by the Royal Advisors, People and the Monastic Body, is pleased to incorporate the following changes:

1. This law may be called the Nationality Law of Bhutan, 1958 and shall be effective throughout the Kingdom of Bhutan.
2. This law shall be in force throughout the Kingdom of Bhutan from the day of its enactment.
3. Any person can become a Bhutanese National
 - a. If his/her father is a Bhutanese National and is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan; or
 - b. If any person is born within or outside Bhutan after the commencement of this law provided the previous father is a Bhutanese National at the time of his/her birth.
5. (1) If any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, presents a petition to an official appointed by His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo and takes an oath of loyalty according to the rules laid down by the official, he may be enrolled as a Bhutanese National, provided that:—
 - a. The person is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan for more than ten years; and
 - b. Owns agricultural land within the Kingdom of Bhutan.
- (2) If a woman, married to a Bhutanese National, submits a petition and takes the oath of loyalty as stated above to the satisfaction of the official, and provided that she has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, her name may be enrolled as a Bhutanese National.

(3) If any person has been deprived of his Bhutanese Nationality or has renounced his Bhutanese Nationality or forfeited his Bhutanese Nationality, the person cannot become a Bhutanese National again unless His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo grants approval to do so.

5. (1) If any foreigner submits a petition to His Majesty the Druk Gayalpo according to the rules described in the above sections, and provided the person has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, and has served satisfactorily in government service for at least five years and has been residing in the Kingdom of Bhutan for at least 10 years, he may receive a Bhutanese Nationality Certificate. Once the Certificate is received, such a person has to take the oath of loyalty according to rules laid down by the Government and from that day onwards, his name will be enrolled as a Bhutanese National

(2) Any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, can receive a Nationality Certificate provided that in the opinion of His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo his conduct and his service as a Government servant is satisfactory.

6. Any person who:—

- a. becomes a national of a foreign country and resides in the country; or
- b. has renounced Bhutanese Nationality and settled in a foreign country; or
- c. claims to be a citizen of a foreign country or pledges an oath of loyalty to that country; or
- d. is registered as a Bhutanese National but has left his agricultural land or has stopped residing in the Kingdom; or
- e. being a bonafide national has stopped residing in the country or fails to observe the laws of the Kingdom:

Shall forfeit his Bhutanese Nationality.

8. (1) If a Nationality Certificate has been obtained on presentation of false information or wrong facts or omission of facts, the Government may order the Certificate to be cancelled.

(2) (a) If any citizen or national, engages in activities against His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo or speaks against His Majesty, or the people of Bhutan; or

(b) When Bhutan and India is engaged in a war with some other country if any citizen or national of Bhutan is found indulging in business, correspondence or helping the enemies; or

(c) If any person within a period of five years from the day when he was enlisted as a Bhutanese National, if imprisoned in any country for more than one year, the person is liable to be deprived of his Bhutanese Nationality without prior notice.

To implement this law, His majesty the Druk Gyalpo may incorporate additional rules if necessary.

APPENDIX V

The Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1977

Conditions Required for the Grant of Citizenship:

- KA 1. In the case of government servants an applicant should have completed 15 years of service without any adverse record.
2. In the case of those not employed in the Royal Government, an applicant should have resided in Bhutan for a minimum period of 20 years.
 3. In addition, an applicant should have some knowledge of the Bhutanese language both spoken and written and the history of Bhutan. Only those applicants who fulfill the above requirements may apply for grant of citizenship to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which will ascertain the relevant factors and submit the application to the Royal Government for further action.

Eligibility and Power to Grant Citizenship:

- KHA 1. The power to grant or reject an application for citizenship rests solely with the Royal Government. Hence, all applicants who fulfill the above conditions are not necessarily eligible for grant of citizenship.
2. Any applicant holding the citizenship of another country or with criminal records in other countries or those who are related to any person involved in activities against the people, the country and the King shall not be granted citizenship even if all the other conditions are fulfilled.
 3. A person granted citizenship by the Royal Government is required to register his/her name in the record of the Royal Government from the date of the grant of the citizenship.
 4. All those granted citizenship are required to take the following oath to be administered by the Home Minister.

- Henceforth, I owe allegiance only to His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo of Bhutan.
- I shall abide by observe and the laws and regulations of the Royal Government with unswerving reverence.
- I shall observe all the customs and traditions of the people of Bhutan.
- I shall not commit any act against the TSA-WAS-SUM of Bhutan (the country, the people and the King).
- As a citizen of Bhutan, I hereby take this oath in the name of Yeshey Goempo and undertake to serve the country to the best of my ability.

GA 1. A foreigner in possession of special or extraordinary qualifications will be granted citizenship without consideration of the required conditions except for the administration of the oath of allegiance.

Renouncement & Re-application of Citizenship:

NGA 1. In the case of a Bhutanese citizen, who having left the country returns and applies for citizenship, the Royal Government shall keep the applicant on probation for a period of at least two years. On successful completion of the probation period, the applicant will be granted citizenship provided the person in question is not responsible for any activities against the Royal Government.

2. A foreigner who has been granted Bhutanese citizenship may apply to the Royal Government for permission to emigrate with his/her family. Permission will be granted after an investigation of the circumstances relating to such a request. After grant of permission to emigrate, the same person may not re-apply for Bhutanese citizenship. In the event of adult

family members of any person permitted to leave the country, who do not wish to leave and makes an application to that effect, the Home Minister will investigate the matter and will permit such persons to remain in the country after ascertaining that the country's interest is not harmed.

3. If anyone, whether a real Bhutanese or a foreigner granted citizenship, applies for permission to emigrate during times of crises such as war, the application shall be kept pending until normalcy returns.

Procedure for Acquisition of Citizenship:

- CHA
1. When a Bhutanese woman is married to a foreigner, only she is a citizen, her husband and their children will not be considered as Bhutanese citizens. If they desire Bhutanese citizenship, such cases will be considered in conformity with the procedure laid down in this Act applicable to foreigners applying for citizenship.
 2. When a Bhutanese man is married to foreign woman their children will be considered Bhutanese. The wife will have to fulfil the requirements of this Citizenship Act as applicable to foreigners applying for citizenship.
 3. In the case of Bhutanese citizens residing in other countries, the Citizenship Law subhead KA-12 No. 2 which is reproduced below, shall be applicable.

Reproduction of Thrimyic KA 12-2:

- KA-12(2)
1. With the exception of a genuine Bhutanese whose family is domiciled in Bhutan but he himself has to stay away in another country in connection with the works of the Royal Government, private business or religious practices, all others who live in foreign countries and serve the government and people of such countries or have settled in a foreign country or are holding official posts in a foreign government are considered non-nationals.

Registration Procedure:

- CHHA 1. All children born of a father who is a Bhutanese citizen should be registered in the official record within one year of their birth whether the children are born inside or outside the country.
2. All children born within the country are required to be listed with the Dzongkhag or the Dungkhag of their birth. Children of Bhutanese parentage born in other countries should be recorded with the Royal Bhutanese Embassies. Where they are no Embassies nearby the information should be conveyed to the Home Ministry through correspondence.
3. If a child is more than one year old and still not registered in the official record, registration is not permitted but may be applied for to the Home Ministry by the concerned local authority. The Home Ministry will then investigate the matter before granting permission for the registration.

Validity of Census Record:

- JA 1. All census records must bear the seal of Royal Government and the signature of an officer not lower in rank than a Dzongdag. Other records will not be acceptable.

Enquiry of Kashos:

- NYA 1. All Kashos with the people which were not granted by His Majesty the King will be investigated by the Home Minister and reported to the Royal Government.

Penalty of Violation of Rules:

- TA 1. Any one having acquired Bhutanese citizenship if involved in acts against the King or speaks against the Royal Government or associates with people

involved in activities against the Royal Government shall be deprived of his/her Bhutanese citizenship.

2. In the case of any person knowingly presenting false information at the time of applying for citizenship, the Kasha granting him/her citizenship will be withdrawn after due verification of the false information presented.

Status of the Provision:

- THA 1. In case of conflict between the provisions of this Act and the Provisions of any previous laws, rules and regulations, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.

APPENDIX VI

Bhutan Marriage Act, 1980

Marriage with a Non-Bhutanese

KHA 2-1: If a Bhutanese citizen wants to obtain a marriage certificate from a court of law to enter into matrimony with a non-Bhutanese spouse whether residing in the kingdom or outside, he/she will be required to produce two persons as guarantors before the court. One of them must be a reliable Bhutanese citizen in the knowledge of the court and both of them must possess thorough knowledge about the bride and the groom. Thereafter, the matter shall be processed in accordance with the article KHA 1-5 as mentioned above (Ref-Thrimshung 1957, article KHA 2-2). *A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen must abide by the traditional customs and the citizenship act.*

KHA 2-2: The question whether a non-Bhutanese spouse shall acquire Bhutanese citizenship or not whether he/she shall be allowed to live in the kingdom or not shall depend on the citizenship act, traditional and cultural requirements and the government directives issued from time to time.

Rules and regulations to be followed by a non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen.

KHA 2-3: A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese spouse must abide by the following rules and regulations irrespective of whether he/she acquires citizenship.

Promotions shall not be granted to a Bhutanese citizen married to a non-Bhutanese.

KHA 2-4: Any Bhutanese citizen working under the Government of Bhutan shall not be granted promotion with effect from June 11, 1977, if married to a non-Bhutanese or such a person will never get promotion beyond the post he/she held at the time of marriage with the non-Bhutanese. Such a person shall not be promoted beyond the post of a sub-divisional officer.

Promotions shall not be granted to a Bhutanese citizen married to a non-Bhutanese.

KHA 2-5: Whichever post a Bhutanese citizen held prior to marriage with a non-Bhutanese or prior to June 11, 1977, such a person shall not be granted promotion beyond the post he held from the date of marriage with the non-Bhutanese or after June 11, 1977.

A Bhutanese citizen married to a non-Bhutanese shall not be employed in the national defence department or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

KHA 2-6: Any Bhutanese citizen employed in the national defence department or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be removed from such services if he/she is married to a non-Bhutanese. No Bhutanese shall be employed in these two departments if married to a non-Bhutanese.

A Bhutanese citizen married to a non-Bhutanese shall not get facilities enjoyed by other citizens.

KHA 2-7: A Bhutanese citizen whatever status he/she may enjoy shall be entitled to other facilities and welfare of the government including the following assistance upon marriage with a non-Bhutanese.

- a. Distribution of land
- b. Cash loans
- c. Seeds for cultivation and oxen for ploughing fields
- d. Livestock and income generating livestock schemes of the department of Animal Husbandry
- e. Treatment abroad and
- f. Grant of capital for factory, industry or trade.

A Bhutanese married to a non-Bhutanese shall not be entitled to education and training abroad.

KHA 2-8: A Bhutanese citizen receiving education and training under the government funding shall not be entitled to the following facilities and welfare upon marriage with a non-Bhutanese:

- a. No assistance shall be provided by the government to undertake education or training either inside Bhutan or outside.
- b. Government assistance being rendered for education or training shall be discontinued from the day of marriage.
- c. The expenses incurred by the government on education or training until the day of marriage will be required to be refunded to the government.
- d. A Bhutanese citizen undergoing education or training abroad under a foreign scholarship shall lose it immediately upon marriage with a non-Bhutanese. In such a case the government of Bhutan shall request the concerned foreign government to stop the funding.

Religion of non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen.

KHA 2-9: If a non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen is allowed to live in the kingdom, then, he/she shall not be permitted to preach other religion or start a new religion except the religion of the kingdom of Bhutan.

A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen shall be required to follow the culture of the kingdom and the government orders.

KHA 2-10: A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen, if allowed to live in the kingdom irrespective of whether he/she acquires the Bhutanese citizenship shall be required to follow the traditional customs, government orders and laws in force in the kingdom.

A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen shall be required to comply with the Marriage Act.

KHA 2-11: A non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese citizen irrespective of whether he/she acquires Bhutanese citizenship or not shall be required to abide by the rules included in the provisions of this Marriage Act on all matters of Marriage.

APPENDIX VII

The Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985

1. This Act may be called the Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985. It shall come into force from the twenty third day of the fourth month of the Wood Bull year of the Bhutanese Calendar corresponding to 10th June, 1985. In case of conflict between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any previous laws, rules and regulations relating to citizenship, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.

2. Citizenship by Birth:

A person whose parents are both citizens of Bhutan shall be deemed to be a citizen of Bhutan by birth.

3. Citizenship by Registration:

A person permanently domiciled in Bhutan on or before 31st December, 1958, and, whose name is registered in the census register maintained by the Ministry of Home Affairs shall be deemed to be a citizen of Bhutan by registration.

4. Citizenship by Naturalization:

A person desiring to apply for Bhutanese citizenship to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Form KA- 1 and KA-2 must fulfil and the following conditions to be eligible for naturalization:

- a) The person must have attained the age of 21 years, and 15 years in the case of a person either of whose parents is a citizen of Bhutan;
- b) The person must be mentally sound;
- c) The person must have resided in Bhutan for 15 years in the case of Government employees and also in the case of applicants, either of whose parents are a citizen of Bhutan, and 20 years in all other cases and this period of residence must be registered in the records of the Department of Immigration and Census;

- d) The person must be able to speak, read and write Dzongkha proficiently;
- e) The person must have good knowledge of the culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan;
- f) The person must have good moral character and should not have any record of imprisonment for criminal offences in Bhutan or elsewhere;
- g) The person must have no record of having spoken or acted against the King, Country and People of Bhutan in any manner whatsoever, and
- h) The person must be prepared to take a solemn Oath of Allegiance to the King, Country and People of Bhutan according to the prescribed Form KHA.

On receipt of the application Form KA- 1 for naturalization, the Ministry of Home Affairs will take necessary steps to check all the particulars contained in the application. The Ministry of Home Affairs will also conduct written and oral tests to assess proficiency in Dzongkha and knowledge of the culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan. The decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the question of eligibility for naturalization shall be final and binding. The Royal Government of Bhutan also reserves the right to reject any application for naturalization without assigning any reason.

5. Grant of Citizenship:

- a) A person, whose application for naturalization has been favorable considered by the Ministry of Home Affairs, shall take the Oath of Allegiance according to Form KHA of this Act.
- b) A person shall then be deemed to be a citizen of Bhutan upon receiving a Kasho from His Majesty the King of Bhutan according to Form GA of this Act.

6. Termination of Citizenship:

- a) Any citizen of Bhutan who acquires the citizenship of another country shall cease to be a citizen of Bhutan. The wife/husband and children of that person if they were Bhutanese citizens shall have the right to remain as citizens of Bhutan provided they are permanently domiciled in Bhutan and are registered annually in the Citizenship Register maintained by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
- b) Any citizen of Bhutan who has acquired citizenship by naturalization may be deprived of citizenship at any time if it is found that naturalization had been obtained by means of fraud, false representation or the concealment of any material fact.
- c) Any citizen of Bhutan who has acquired citizenship by naturalization may be deprived of citizenship at any time if that person has shown by act or speech to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, Country and People of Bhutan.
- d) If both the parents are Bhutanese and in case of the children leaving the Country of their own accord, without the knowledge of the Royal government of Bhutan and their names are also not recorded in the Citizenship register maintained in the Ministry of Home Affairs, then they "I not be considered as citizens of Bhutan. (Resolution No. 16 (2) adopted by the National Assembly of Bhutan in its 62nd Session).
- e) Any citizen of Bhutan who has been deprived of Bhutanese citizenship must dispose of all immovable property in Bhutan within one year, failing which, the immovable property shall be confiscated by the Ministry of Home Affairs on payment of fair and reasonable compensation.

APPENDIX VIII

THE LAWS OF BHUTAN

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE LAWS AND RULES LAID DOWN FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN

THE form of government is twofold, viz., spiritual and temporal.

1. The spiritual laws are said to resemble a silken knot—*i.e.*, easy and light at first, but gradually becoming tighter and tighter.
2. The temporal or monarchical laws resemble a golden yoke—*i.e.*, growing heavier and heavier by degrees.

This twofold law was composed by a spirit of perfect disinterested-

This twofold system of government established in Bhutan rendered the country happy and prosperous, taking for example the system of the great Saint-King of Tibet, whose very first prohibition was against the taking of life, a crime punished by the realisation of blood-money in case of homicide, and damages or fine in case of attempted homicide. A penalty of hundredfold repayment was realisable in cases of robbery or theft of church or monastic property, eightyfold repayment in cases of stealing the king's property, eightfold repayment in cases of theft amongst subjects. Adultery was punishable by fines. Falsehood was punishable by the offender being put to oath in a temple, and the invocation of tutelar deities and gods. Over and above the prevention of the ten impious acts, all were required to regard parents with filial respect and affection, and elders with reverence, to receive with gratitude any kind action done by others to themselves, and, lastly, to avoid dishonesty and the use of false measures, which constitute the sixteen acts of social piety.

Although Bhutan had been once effectually brought under the beneficent influence of strict law and justice, it subsequently, on

account of general corruption and laxity on the part of those in authority, became slack in all branches.

If this should be allowed to continue, there would be no discrimination between right and wrongdoing, no justice, and without justice human beings cannot have happiness and peace. If there were no peace or happiness for human beings, the Dukpa Hierarchy would have failed in its errand upon this earth, and it would be useless for it to exist longer. Therefore, bearing the interest of the Hierarchy at heart, every one is exhorted to leave all partiality aside and to act up to a true sense of justice, emulating the great Saint-King Srongtsan Gompo of Tibet.

For it is said that Universal Happiness depends upon the existence of the Jina's Hierarchy, and that, in its turn, depends upon the character of individual Hierarchs. But it is unfortunately the general custom now for those who are in authority to give way to their own selfish and immeasurable greed of gain, to satisfy which they resort to extortion by oppressive means—*e.g.*, binding, beating, and imprisoning—thus rendering the subjects as miserable as tantalised ghosts in this very lifetime. And the elders of the village—*i.e.*, mandals and pipons—in their turn act the part of spies and inform those above them as to who amongst the raiyats have some articles of value or riches. Thus they render the clear fountain of justice muddy and foul. Therefore it is extremely necessary that he who enjoys the privilege of being the Dharma Raja should use the utmost circumspection in finding out the real truth and facts, when it happens that cases are brought before him for trial, so that the innocent be not punished for nothing and the wrongdoer escape unpunished. To enforce temporal laws by punishing sinful and impious acts in perfect accordance with moral and religious laws is the essence of the

Commandments of the Jinas.

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION FOR DEB RAJAS

Buddha says in the Sutras, "A king, if he is fond of Dharma [Righteousness], finds the path to happiness both in this and in the future lives. The subjects will act as the ruler acts, and therefore should the ruler strive to learn Righteousness."

They should encourage religious institutions and the inculcation of knowledge, and religious sentiment therein.

They should see that the priests are properly trained in the ten pious acts; that they gain the necessary accomplishments in (a) dancing, (b) drawing, or making mandalas, and (c) psalm-singing; besides acquiring knowledge in the twofold method of meditation. The above should be for those who expect to spend their lives as priests. Those who are to acquire the other branches of learning, such as rhetoric, poetry, and dialectics, also must be encouraged, and their progress enforced by periodical examinations in each of these several branches.

An annual circular perwana should be issued to those in charge of the State monasteries, requiring that the monastic properties of value, whether they be ornaments for the altar, treasures, coins, plates, utensils, &c., should not be disposed of or misused in any way. To those also amongst the priesthood who are engaged in handicrafts (*e.g.*, painting, sewing, embroidery, carving, modelling, &c.), and those also who are engaged in menial service, should be taught thoroughly writing and rituals, and they should be thoroughly imbued with the ten pious sentiments. In short, the Deb should consider it a daily duty to inquire into the state of the raiyats' condition, whether they are happy or unhappy, contented or discontented, and strain his utmost power to render them happy.

They should prohibit indiscriminate life-taking, by forbidding cruel sport on the hills and fishing in the rivers. This effectually strikes at the cause of several ills in the future.

The collection of taxes, raising of labour contributions, and trial of cases constitute the administrative duties, on the proper discharge of which depends the happiness of a nation.

A constant check and inquiry as to whether, out of those who are sent on these duties, there are any who exempt certain persons, some from partiality, and tax others heavily in consequence of grudges or prejudice, should be exercised and kept up.

The officers posted on the frontiers should be constantly reminded of the fact that the peace of the central nation depends upon the conduct of the borderers. The borderers, if they commit lawless raids into others' territories in their vicinity, will give occasion for reprisals and involve the nation in the horrors of foreign warfare in an unjust cause. Therefore they should be exhorted to live peaceably.

To be brief, these are the three ends to be secured :

1. The contentment of the raiyats.
2. The proper influence of and respect for officials or authorities.
3. The support of the Sangha, or the body of the Trinity.

Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the Deb Raja, as the temporal ruler of the people, should be well versed in the method of securing these ends.

The most effectual and shortest method of securing the first end, the raiyats' happiness, is by administering strict justice. If a ruler would devote himself to administering justice impartially, he would make all his subjects happy in a single day. For it was by this means that the ancient dynasty of Tibetan kings secured happiness for their subjects and popularity for the rulers themselves, and also by which the Dharma Raja of Bhutan (Shabdung Rimpochi) succeeded in subduing the stiff-necked and lawless people of Bhutan, and rendering his reign so very glorious and popular. The main end of establishing law and justice is to give peace and security to both the ruler and his subjects, and in particular to promulgate the Dharma and to perpetuate the Hierarchy of the Buddhist Sangha, which embodies and represents the three chief principles of the Buddhist Trinity.

Of late a dangerous laxity has crept into all branches of justice.

Priests who break their vow of celibacy, and criminals who are guilty of homicide, robbery, and otherwise disturbing public peace, go unpunished. This not only sets a bad example for the future, but endangers present tranquillity, and encourages crime and breach of faith. Thus the country becomes filled with vow-breakers and knaves, and public peace is destroyed. It is said, "The violation of spiritual laws makes the Guardian Deities retreat to the Abode of Passivity, and allows the foul breath of the mischievous Fiends to pervade everywhere. The breach of Social Laws weakens the power of the Gods, and the Demons of Darkness laugh with joy." It is absolutely necessary to compel the priests who have violated their oaths to change their modes of dress and give up other priestly habits.

Moreover, at present the use of a most filthy and noxious herb, called tobacco, is spreading amongst the sepoy and raiyats, who use it incessantly. This is sure to steep the sacred images and books in pollution and filth. It has been prophesied by Ugyen Padma Jungna that it will cause wars and bring epidemics. So unless every one of the provincial Governors, Kazis, Subahs, and Headmen strives to stop the use of this poisonous and evil stuff by fining those who deal in it, and those who use it, they will be sure to feel heavily the consequences of such neglect themselves.

If those who are rulers, having the opportunity to render their subjects happy, neglect their duties, then where is the difference between them and the Prince of the Devils? In worldly matters it is not always mild means which conquer and subdue rude and evil persons, but sometimes stern measures have to be adopted. So when there are law-breakers or evildoers the ruler's duty is to punish them sternly, putting aside all consideration of pity and sympathy. This is the path by which a king on his throne obtains salvation.

Although the rulers are responsible for the general prosperity of a nation, yet it is the local authorities on whom lie the responsibilities of a province or district. The deputies (who are sent to inquire into a case), and the headman who reports, are the chief persons on whom the real burden of a fair trial lies. The establishment of a second-grade Kuchap, as well as that of a Lama and Hyerpa combined, should consist of two orderlies or sepoy and one syce, and ordinary Kuchaps should have only one orderly and one syce. Officers' tours entail too much expense and trouble on the raiyats, so unless it be for transfers or new appointments, officers' tours should be restricted as much as possible, and they should not be allowed to travel about on any trivial pretence. The husking of paddy should not be given in dribbling quantities, but in a large quantity at one time; nor should rice be realised over the actual out-turn of the husking. The raiyats should not be dispossessed of any gold, turquoise, vessels, cattle, or ponies they may possess on frivolous pretences of extortionate rates of interest on trading capital lent by the headmen, nor should any headmen request subscriptions by means of giving charm threads or cheap clothes. All barter or trading should be carried on at fair prevailing rates, and not at extortionate and preferential ones. Forced gifts of salt or butter should not be made. No wearing wool should be given, no sheep's load should be realised. All Jongpens and Head Lamas of monasteries shall not try to realise any gifts by going round visiting raiyats.

The sale and purchase of slaves (plainsmen) must not be permitted. Any one persisting in it should be reported to the Durbar authorities. State officers will not be entitled to any coolies or rations from the State, if they are going to visit a hot spring or mineral-water spring for their own health, but they shall provide themselves with the necessary provisions and coolies on such occasions. When officers are out on their own account they shall not present themselves at the Jongs, and if they do the Jongs shall not provide

them with the usual rations to which they would otherwise be entitled.

The officers in charge of the several Jongs should report to the Durbar what amount of free labour has been enforced, how many coolies supplied, or how many coolie-loads have been conveyed, and for whom, or by whose order, on what date, and so on. Should any officer at the different stages permit any load to be conveyed free of cost to the owner without reporting, he shall be liable to a heavy fine.

A Kuchap can keep one pony, and may perhaps be entrusted with the feed of a pony from the Superior Jongpen. Over and above these he may not maintain any ponies at the cost of the State. Should he do so he will forfeit the same to the Jong. He may, however, by paying a licence fee of over one hundred tankas to his Jong, be allowed to maintain one more pony. But on no account is he to be allowed to maintain more than three ponies at the cost of the State. Should he desire to give a pony in the place of the annual revenue, he may not send any raiyat to purchase it from any market. In case of complaints made to him, he may not receive anything over a measure of pachwai murwa, not so much as a square bit of silk in kind, nor a tanka in cash. A Kuchap should report all cases, be they light or important, to the Jong, and by no means decide any himself. At harvest-time a Kuchap should not take the opportunity of visiting his field border, or turn it to a means of going on a rambling visit to his raiyats. Nor should a Kuchap make slight cattle trespasses upon the border of his fields the pretence for realising heavy damages from his raiyats. The Kuchaps or other responsible officers must not be wine-bibbers, fornicators, nor adulterers. Should they be guilty of any of the above faults, they render themselves enemies to public peace, and thereby liable to dismissal from their office in disgrace.

The collection of the taxes in kind, such as meat and butter, must be considered and settled at the Kuchang's own place, with the assistance of the elders, and karbaris or mandals under him, after which he will submit the proposed demand rent-roll to the Jongpen, his immediate and chief superior, for sanction and order. Only upon obtaining such sanction can he realise the rents in kind.

Should any guests have to be provided for, it will not do for him to realise the provisions or their equivalent from the raiyats, but he should quarter them on the houses in turn. The guests should on no account expect luxuries, but bare necessities.

The Kuchap must not grant any remission of rents of either kind, on consideration of any private gift to himself.

The Kuchap may not accept the first portion of any ceremonial feast, be it for the dead or the living. He should not accept or demand any present for marriages or separations.

When sending out for collections, he should send a pipon, who will represent an orderly, a mandal, and a karbari in one. This man shall not realise anything on his own account. He shall not accept any present from cattle-keepers. Any mandal, or lamas or shalugos who have been appointed to any posts, requiring to go to the seat of the Durbar, must not take any raiyats to accompany them, nor should they raise any tax on the pretence of nazars for the Durbar. Any officers, village headmen, who have obtained permission to retire from service on account of old age, infirmities, &c., must not linger above three days in the Jong. Any foreigners or strangers arriving in their jurisdiction must be reported and presented to their superior at the Jong. They must not harbour or receive any such. Anybody found harbouring robbers or thieves must be punished as heavily as the criminals themselves.

Any slaves attempting to escape in an unhappy mood must be detained, and should any one after having harboured one fail to detain him the same shall make good the slave. But, on the other hand, if any one succeed in handing back to the owner the escaped slave the same must be compensated, due consideration being taken regarding the distance, the time, the cost and expenses incurred in the performance of the enterprise.

Two different raiyats cannot combine into one. A holding may be enjoyed both by a son or, if there is no son, by a daughter. A raiyat who is aged, and has neither daughter nor son, may be asked only to render such labour and service for revenue as he is able to perform alone as long as he lives; upon his or her decease the same holding shall pass to the nearest kith or kin, who will thenceforth be expected to render both labour and cash and kind revenues. No marriages or permanent connections should be allowed where the parents do not approve. And whereas, where there are two or three holdings and houses which used to pay taxes separately now combined in one, with a view of lightening the labour contribution, it must be ruled that this be not permitted or tolerated, as it is a bad precedent. If there be any, either a male or a female, heir to the property, the same should be compelled to make good the State revenue. If there are no heirs in the

line, then it should be made over to the nearest kin, or to such person whom the owner wills as his assignee, who will thenceforth make good the State revenue. Those who own properties in land and houses, and yet live untaxed in towns, should be made to render proportionate labour contribution and rents in cash and kind with the value and area of their properties.

Whereas the slaughter of many animals on account of funeral ceremonies is bad, both on account of the deceased as well as the living, henceforth it is expedient to offer simple gifts on these occasions, which shall be regulated as follows :

1. For the Durbar, in lieu of a head and limb the value of half a tanka.

2. For the Lama, the price of a piece of cotton cloth.

But if the party be poor and cannot afford the gifts, but simply some offerings for the deceased, then he shall be liable to the above costs only in case of Durbar and Lama, and for the assistant priests he can give rice in lieu of meat, about four manas. But if one animal has to be slaughtered, on no account shall he exceed one life, out of which he must defray the necessary meat expenses.

A monastery Head Lama shall perform the cremation within one day in summer and two in winter ; he must not exceed this time, on his own responsibility. The number of priests to attend a funeral, and the fees to be received by them, are the same as at the capital or Durbar. But if the Head Lama is delayed in coming or prevented from coming, the layman must have the obsequies partially performed at home, and must take such stores with him with which he can have the same performed at a monastery. No freehold grants to lamas for their support shall be sold. The laymen shall not stop supporting the lamas. Should any wealthy or propertied lama die, his chief supporting layman or disciple shall utilise his property in meritorious charity. When any State-supported and retired lamas die, their effects, if they are books, images, or altar appurtenance, shall be offered to the State or Deb as obsequies offerings, and the rest shall be devoted to funeral ceremonies to the best account. When it becomes necessary to build a cell to serve as a retreat for any lama of the monastery, it shall be within the compound or in the vicinity of a monastery or other religious institution, and not in the vicinity of a village or any hill spur. Should any child be born to a couple, as the result of a connection within monastery precincts, the same couple shall be considered to have reverted to the world, and their life

must be passed amongst the villages, and they shall accordingly be made to fill up any vacancy amongst the raiyats, and shall be liable to the same taxes and labour contributions as any other raiyat.

Should any member or Tape of the monastery loiter more than fifteen days amongst the villages, otherwise than on some special business of the Head Lamas, or their own, and on the usual charity begging purpose, the same shall be liable to be forced to render the usual labour contribution by the village headmen. The Head Lamas of the several monasteries, too, must, except on the occasions of the annual congregation for observing the Buddhist holidays, always pass their time in retreats. They shall use their utmost efforts to effectually put an end to any sham or charlatanism, necromancy, quackery, and false witchcraft. The licensed as well as private Manewas (those who go about singing "Om mani padmi hum") shall only enjoy such offerings as are made voluntarily; there shall be no tax for them. No one shall harbour any mischievous person who has been banished from a Jong for some roguery.

A thief or robber, killed while in the commission of theft or robbery, dies without any hope of redress. The man who kills a thief in the above manner is not liable to any punishment. But otherwise one who takes out his sword (for threatening or for striking) is liable to sword fine.

One committing homicide must be bound to the corpse of the deceased whom he has killed. If he escapes after committing homicide, he may be killed wherever and whenever he is caught. The offspring of a homicide shall be banished from their home.

Any one killing notorious highway robbers, any wild beasts which are working much havoc in a country, or who has performed heroic service amongst enemies during war should be encouraged by gifts of robes or clothes according to merit.

The headmen should inspect the products of their country industries, and see that they are honest and solid in make and texture.

The merchants who have the responsibility of the import trade at the different marts also must satisfy themselves that they get good things, and all the traders must obey the State merchant in these particulars. Any one acting in defiance of these rules, and any one found forging Government letters, or altering their meaning, or attempting detention or miscarriage of such orders issued from the seat of the Government, shall be dealt with severely,

inasmuch as they shall be deprived of their sight or of life by decapitation.

From the Dharma Raja at the head of all the ruling officers, including Lamas, Jongpens, Penlops, &c., down to the Mandals and responsible village headmen, if they do not act in accordance with the above, if they do not regard public prosperity nor check their subordinates, if they suffer Karmic laws to be subverted, and tolerate the spread of evil without making an effort to remedy it, then how will the Spiritual Guardians help them! Thus, in conformity with the text "Those who offer insults to those who live in Righteousness are worthy of being exterminated," they shall surely be offered up as fitting sacrifice on the altar of the Great and Terrible Mahakal.

But, on the other hand, if all observe the above rules, which they must understand are for their general as well as individual good, they will put their faith in the threefold Rare One (Tri Ratua) as their God and witness, and regard the Chagdzöd (Deb Raja) as the human liege lord who has been entrusted with the weal of the nation and the prosperity of the Hierarchy in general, and serve him unto death most loyally and energetically, just as the great Righteous Prime Minister Garwa did formerly.

This completes the brief code of rules and regulations of the great Dharma Raja, of which this is the chapter regarding the officials and provincial governors, and their subordinate Kazis and Subahs.

APPENDIX IX

(1) PROCEDURE FOR THE TRIAL OF CHABDA AND OTHERS

The trial will be an open hearing at the Dzong before His Majesty the King's Commissioners and the following procedure will be followed:

1. The Royal Commission will be read out by the Chief Secretary.
2. Prayers by a lama.
3. The charges will be put to the accused persons by the Chief Secretary. These will be explained clearly to the accused. They will then be asked whether they plead guilty or not guilty to these charges.
4. The Chief Secretary calls on Colonel Tangbi, the Chief Investigating Officer, for a full report of the offence and the proof of the guilt of the accused.
5. Colonel Tangbi outlines the case against the accused and calls for evidence of the crime, the arrest of the accused persons and the statements and confessions made by them.
6. The accused are asked individually if they have any further statement they wish to make to the Court.
7. The Court is adjourned while the Commissioners consider their verdict.
8. The Judgement of the Commissioners is read out by the Chief Secretary.
9. Sentence is then given.

(2) ROYAL COMMISSION

We, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, King of Bhutan, hereby appoint:

1. Dasho Gyelden Tinley Dorji (President)
2. Commissioner Rinchhen
3. Thimphu Thrimpon Japha Dorji
4. Tongsa Thrimpon Dawa Tshering
5. Deputy Chief Secretary Dasho Sangey
6. Puna Thrimpon Ura Gup

as Our Commissioners to inquire on Our behalf into the circumstances of the death of Our trusted and well-loved Prime Minister, Jigmie Palden Dorji.

And to hear and determine the criminal charges arising from his

death which have been made against Namgye Bahadur and others now awaiting trial.

By command.

(3) CHARGES

Chabda Namgye Bahadur, Jambey and Doley, and Sangye Dorji, you are charged with Treason, contrary to section 3(1) of the Law of Treason, Act No. 17 of the Laws of Bhutan.

(Chief Secretary reads Act No. 17 in full.)

Do you admit instructing Doley and Jambey to go in search of the Prime Minister and then to shoot him? Chabda Namgye Bahadur, do you now admit it?

Jambey, do you admit shooting at Jigmie Dorji, the Prime Minister, and so killing him?

Sangye Dorji, do you admit discussing the assassination of the Prime Minister and taking action against his life, passing on instructions to Jambey and Doley, who committed this crime? Do you now admit it?

Doley, do you admit that you went armed in search of the Prime Minister, having received a payment of rupees 1,000, with intent to kill him? Do you admit it?

(4) REPORT OF CHIEF INVESTIGATING OFFICER

The Court will see from the statements of the four accused that knowing full well that they were breaking the law of the country for their own personal selfish reasons they carried out the murder of Jigmie Dorji. They hoped that they would not be discovered but fortunately they were caught. They must therefore suffer the penalty laid down by the law.

After the death of the late Prime Minister there were widespread reports that the Army had revolted. This was not true; the Army remained loyal to the King and country and the plot was found to be limited to a small group of vain, discontented traitors. It was entirely an internal affair and there has been no evidence at all to show that any foreign power played any part in this crime.

The evidence that the Court will now hear will consist of details of the murder from a witness who was present. The Court will also hear evidence of the arrest of the accused. Their voluntary confessions admitting the crime have already been read to the Court.

(i) Witnesses

1. Subdivisional Officer, Phuntsholing
2. Maksi Penjore
3. Pelpon Nob Getsen

(ii) Read Statements

1. Chabda
2. Bacchu
3. Sangye Dorji
4. Jambey
5. Doley

The trial of these accused arises out of a terrible crime which will be remembered as a black moment in the history of our country.

The four accused are charged with Treason, contrary to Act No.17 which has been read to this Court by the Chief Secretary. This crime involved the murder of Jigmie Dorji, our late Prime Minister who was acting as Regent in the absence of His Majesty abroad. The killing of a senior officer of His Majesty's government changes the crime of murder to one of treason, and the accused have admitted their crime both in their statements and before this honourable Court. You have already heard the statements and confessions of the accused and as Chief Investigating Officer, I would like to tell the Court briefly of the circumstances of this crime.

The late Prime Minister was sitting at the Rest House at Phuntsholing with friends and relatives playing cards on 5 April. Through a window behind the Prime Minister, a shot was fired wounding him fatally. He died from this wound about one hour and a half later. His dying words were a request to tell His Majesty that he had always served his King and country faithfully and loyally and to the best of his ability. (You will hear one of the persons present on that unfortunate evening describe to this Court the events of that evening.)

In the meantime, an extensive search was started to find the killer. A message was sent to Chabda asking him to send all available men to search for the killer. His first reply was that it was late at night and he refused to send any men. He sent a message the following day that due to heavy pressure of work only a small force of men was available but that he would despatch reinforcements later if necessary. The Court may find it hard to think of a more necessary occasion to send forces than the assassination of the Regent, the Prime Minister.

The Indian Government sent dogs to help in the search and showed their concern with offers of assistance in the investigation. The efforts of Sgt. Nob Gyetsen and his men were rewarded with the arrest of Jambey on 8 April 1964. He readily admitted to being the killer but to everyone's surprise, claimed to have been acting on the orders of Chabda and Sangye Dorji. This was at first incredible. This was a man who enjoyed the trust and confidence of both the King and the Prime Minister, and who had always appeared to be a loyal servant. The investigation showed, however, that this information was correct.

As soon as His Majesty returned to this country, he consulted his advisers and thereupon summoned Chabda to the Palace where he was arrested together with his accomplices. (The Court has heard their statements in which they admit their crime.) One of the accused, Bacchu Phugel, after making his statement and realizing with horror the dreadful crime he had committed, took his own life in prison.

While the accused admit their crime, they try in their statements to attempt to justify their action by a series of lies and false evidence. The real motive behind this crime will be shown to you to be the personal ambition and vanity of Chabda, assisted and advised by Bacchu Phugel. Phugel was acting through motives of revenge against the Prime Minister, who had dismissed Phugel from his Government appointment as Q.M.G. of the Army. Chabda's complaints about the Prime Minister have been stated in Phugel's statement. (Read complaints set out as 1 to 4.) Referring to Chabda's statement, it will be remembered that the late Prime Minister had modernized the army by bringing in young officers to replace the old ones, who had been pensioned off. Chabda felt that he too was likely to be pensioned off. He states: The Prime Minister's decision to release the old officers on pension had created suspicion in my mind. He wanted to dispose of all loyal and experienced Officers and put a younger lot in their places in order to strengthen his position. Chabda tells Doley that he had been asked by the Prime Minister to go on pension but had refused. Chabda's motive for killing the Prime Minister is absolutely clear. His own position in the Army had become insecure and he resented the Prime Minister scolding him with insulting words, taking away his vehicles and substituting young officers for the old ones. Bacchu in his statement says that when Chabda saw him and made these complaints, he asked whether it was advisable to send someone to murder the Prime Minister.

Chabda claims that he uncovered a plot by the late Prime Minister to kill His Majesty. This is ridiculous. The late Prime Minister's devotion and loyalty to His Majesty have never been in any doubt and far from seeking power, the late Prime Minister was anxious to retire and let younger men take over his responsibilities. Apart from the obvious absurdity of this story it is an obvious lie for other reasons:

1. The story of the plot being uncovered shows that, according to the statements, the arrangements to kill the Prime Minister took place at least one month before the so-called discovery of the plot.
2. If Chabda had any real evidence of such a plot, he should have informed His Majesty. He did not do so.
3. He could have made arrangements to arrest the Prime Minister.
4. His instructions to the killer were 'to carry out the task with

absolute secrecy. In case of arrest they promised not to mention my name by any chance.' If he had been acting in the interest of the King it would not have been necessary for him to carry out this crime in secret.

5. If he was giving a lawful order to the soldiers, it would not have been necessary to pay them a thousand rupees each to carry out the killing.

(5) JUDGEMENT

You have admitted before this Court that each of you is guilty of the crime of treason. The penalty is laid down by law and this Court has no power to alter the sentence provided in the Act.

Chabda Namgye Bahadur, Sangye Dorji, Jambey and Doley, you must have realized what the consequence would be to you if the crime was discovered. You could not have realized what a terrible calamity the late Prime Minister's death would be to your country, blinded as you were by your own selfish motives. The death of Jigmie Dorji is a sad loss for our country and the King has lost his most loyal and trusted adviser, in whom he reposed the confidence to appoint him as his Regent in his absence abroad. The late Prime Minister guided our country into an age of progress and we and our children will be thankful to him always for the work he did for Bhutan.

In view of certain reports that have appeared in the Press, the Court would like to state that there is no evidence at all that any foreign power was in any way involved. It is entirely an internal affair of our country. It has been clear from the evidence that has been heard by this Court that the full and entire responsibility for this plot belongs to these accused men and only to them.

Chabda Namgye Bahadur, it is a sad duty that we, your former friends and colleagues, have to perform. You have served your King and country well for many years and rose to one of the highest posts in the land. Your devotion and loyalty were never before in any doubt. You enjoyed the trust, confidence and affection of the King, the late Prime Minister and your colleagues. Unfortunately you betrayed that trust.

The sentence of the Court as laid down by section 11 of the Treason Act is that you, Chabda Namgye Bahadur, Sangye Dorji and Jambey, suffer death by being shot by a firing squad of the Army at a time and place to be ordered by His Majesty the King.

The Court has come to the conclusion that while Doley has committed the crime of treason, he played an insignificant part in the plot. For his own personal reasons, he failed to carry out the part in the crime assigned to him. In these circumstances, while this Court does not have jurisdiction under the Act to alter the sentence laid

down by law, we shall humbly advise His Majesty to commute Doley's sentence of death to a sentence of imprisonment for life.

All sentences pronounced by this Court are subject to the confirmation of His Majesty the King.