State Formation in Sikkim: A Subaltern Perspective

A Thesis Submitted

To

Sikkim University

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Date: 30th, July 2019

DECLARATION

I, **Rajeev Rai**, hereby declare that the research work embodied in the thesis titled **"The State Formation in Sikkim: A Subaltern Perspective"** submitted to Sikkim University for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy,** is my original work. This thesis has not been submitted in part or fully for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **"The State Formation in Sikkim: A Subaltern Perspective"**, submitted to **Sikkim University** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** in the Department of International Relations, embodies the results of *bona fide* research work carried out by **Mr. Rajeev Rai** under my guidance and supervision. No part of the thesis has been submitted for any other degree, diploma, associate-ship, fellowship.

All the assistance and help received during the course of the investigation have duly acknowledged by him.

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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"The State Formation in Sikkim: A Subaltern Perspective"

Submitted by **Mr. Rajeev Rai** under the supervision of **Dr. Sebastian N., Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University, Gangtok, India, 737102.**

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To
the memory of
Smt. Chanda Rai
(A generous woman and a loving Grandma)

Acknowledgements

This work is the fruition of the idea that popped out during the earlier MPhil research. It was just an idea to look upon the British colonial policy on the tiny Himalayan state of Sikkim. Though various studies have been carried out broadly on Tibet and Nepal with exception to Sikkim and Bhutan carried out the least. On the period of the British presence in Sikkim, the least research has been taken place. If it has been carried out, then it is carried out with the Orientalist descriptive mode inherited from the British Raj. However, with no theoretical approaches that have been developed in western theory. My supervisor then in MPhil Dr. Sebastian N. and during PhD helped to provide the conceptual framework for the study. This idea began to sprout with the additional thoughts and initiatives from the faculty of my department; Newton Sir, Dr. Manish, the then Head of the Department who helped to give proper shape to this idea.

Dr. McKay, an excellent scholar on South-Asia particular in Indo-Tibetan history, had mentioned the presence of East India Company Archives in Bangladesh which could cover the period 1750-1850 and contended that not yet looked by any historian. Travel to Bangladesh was an exciting part. First I visited in the summer of 2016 where I could locate the presence of East India Company Archives in National Archives in Dhaka with the help of professors of Dhaka University. Senior Archivist, Mr. Elias Miah in National Archives, told me the documents are being appropriately arranged since it was not long ago transferred from the National Library of Bangladesh, I have to wait for some time to get hold of the documents. My second visit was in the month of Ramadan in 2018, where most of the staffs in the National Archives had taken leave for the celebration. Somehow I was able to get some of the relevant documents pertinent to my work, particularly on the period of Tibetan advance into Sikkim (Lingtu affair), a period of signing of 1890 Convention, 1893 Trade Protocol, the establishment of Council in Sikkim and during the period of British control over the administration in Sikkim.

National Archives in India is an excellent repository of archives, perhaps one of the biggest in South-Asia. Researching in National Archives of India was a great experience, unlike National Archives in Bangladesh, could work more extended period. Though the process is very systematic, it may take some time a little time to

see what we have put in the slip. The staffs were very professional, always ready to extend their help. My visit to the National Library of India in Kolkatta was another essential aspect of this study. It is an excellent repository of the published books, and the archival materials have been relocated to National Archives in New Delhi.

Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in Gangtok has been a great help since my MPhil research. It is an excellent repository of books and archival materials in the region both in Tibetan and English languages and has grown as a collective scholarly institution over time. I must remember late Mr. Tenzin Samphel, who was the librarian in the English language section who willingly agreed to transliterate the Romanised Tibetan words into Standard English, but unfortunately, he could not finish the job. Thankfully Acharya Tsultsem Gyatso was kind enough to finish the job though in a very hectic schedule started by Mr. Samphel. I owe a high debt of thankfulness to him. I have used the documents provided by the Sikkim State Archives in this study, which I procured during my MPhil research.

This research was not possible without the award of National Doctoral Fellowship provided by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi. A vibrant institution since 1969 which offers grants to promote research in social sciences in India. Lastly, I would like to thank Alex McKay again for constant support from the beginning of the study to the end.

Jorethang Rajeev Rai

June 25, 2019

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Chapter I

Introduction

Background of the Study

As it is evident in the field of Sikkimese Studies, much of the narrative relating to Sikkim is enunciated, question drawn from critical studies or the post-colonial discourse has never been raised. Subaltern studies project (1986-87) made its debut by announcing its revisionist aims for studies on colonial India as a critique of colonialist and nationalist historiography[1]. Subaltern studies and other branches of post-colonial scholarship have not been influential for the survey of Sikkim and there is yet to develop fluency in the theoretical frameworks in the Sikkimese Studies (Hansen 2003: 7-9).

This study examines the processes of State formation in Sikkim in different stages with a focus on the subaltern history of Sikkim, from the perspective of subaltern people. This study is not modelled on the 'state-centric' approach instead of on 'people-centric' model. This study focuses on the historiography of Sikkim and puts an effort to look the history of Sikkim from the below, as the most of the historiographies have been predominantly viewed 'from the above' or dealt by the 'elitist' perspective. This study is not a comprehensive survey on the history of Sikkim but intends to bring a review of Sikkim with a close conversation with subaltern studies. According to Said 'political imperialism governs the entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical impossibility' (Said 1977: 14). Gayatri Spivak believes that "To ignore the subaltern today is willy-nilly, to continue the imperialist project" (1994: 94). Therefore, this study tries to turn the historiography of Sikkim upside down, from which some untold stories could emerge which are not highlighted in the elite/mainstream discourses, and this chapter also aims to give the justification for not having theoretical/subaltern studies on the region under examination.

[1] Since early 1980s scholars of Indian history have periodically published essays under the title 'Subaltern Studies' and, have thus become part of the complementary and interdisciplinary repertoire of critical theories available to scholars of colonialism, cultural studies, historical anthropology, and postcolonial studies.

To the Subaltern studies project, colonialist and nationalist histories were problematic because they failed to recognise the agency and actions of subaltern people (Altern 2012: 60). Early work in Subaltern studies was concerned with peasant rebellion, revolution, and 'resistance' in many forms. However, Subaltern studies scholars soon shifted their focus from recovering the agency and self-consciousness of peasants and workers to the study of representations, the creation of knowledge and ideas of subalterns by the colonial state, nationalist movements and elite discourses (Altern 2012: 58; Hansen 2003: 8).

At the boundaries of nationalist discourse that the subaltern studies offers an opportunity to break out the mental prisons established by orientalist or nationalist interpretations (Hansen 2003: 10). Orient was mainly an idea that has a history and tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that has given a form of reality. The belief in the Orient was political to some of the historical accounts (Said 1977: 5, 12). Insularity from theory in the reviews of Sikkim is not the consequence of Sikkim's geographical location. Continuance of Orientalist traditions and the politics of knowledge about modern Sikkim are much more important in explaining the absence of subaltern approaches in Sikkimese studies. As the works carried on Sikkim so far have been looked 'from above'; from the orientalist tradition inherited from the British Raj (Hansen 2003: 7-10).

Wherever appropriate conditions for the state formation existed, the state emerged independently in different places and at different times (Carneiro 1970: 733). This study primarily begins an examination since the establishment of Namgyal dynasty by then we can assume a 'proto-state' was created under a centralised authority. After the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642, an early 'core' state was formed with the unification of various 'state-like' structures into the single authority. The Sikkimese state emerged out of a network of many small multi-ethnic independent or semi-independent proto-states mainly as the result of war and diplomacy (Mullard 2011: 196). The political unit was formed but complex to warrant being called a 'state.' The development of successful states brought within their borders conquered people and territory, which had to be administered. Thus it helped to weld an assorted collection of petty states into a single integrated and centralised political unit and was a creation of a feudal form of state, based on Tibetan hierarchy

and the control over the means of violence and the means of revenue collection in a given territory was gained, another aspect of the state (Rae 2007: 123; Carneiro 1970: 736).

Mullard (2011: 81) argues that before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty there were 'state-like' structures; 'from pages 8-10 of *Lasog Gyalrab (LSG)*[2] we learn that a primary system of social, political and economic organisation was introduced... The early formation of authority existed, through central state organisation and taxation.' There was the division of the population into two groups. According to *LSG*; the two groups were *yog* (servants) and *blon* (ministers), the servants were organised into various groups under higher-ranking officials known as *Go Ching* and *Lepon* (headman and work leader). The Lepchas of Tashi Tenkha and Sengding were given the title of Lepcha officials *(Le Ched Mon Pa)* after their incorporation into the territory of early Sikkim (ibid).

There were 'proto-states' even before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty, what we can say by 1642 is the unification of these 'proto-states' 'by conquest, alliance formation and the subjugation of the population' (ibid: 27) under a single ruler to form a potentially sizeable political entity with a centralised authority, though not without resistance. When we trace the state formation process in Sikkim, it will be bleak to say in the light of the mentioned above fact that the state formation process in Sikkim began with the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642. To understand the state formation process, it is necessary to understand the genesis of the state formation, as genesis is an essential aspect of its present situation (Aloysius 2008: 3). The *beyul* (hidden land), 'Sikkim,' was already populated by the non-Tibetan people even before the establishment of the Namgyal dynasty and there was already 'state-like' structures. Sikkim has been inhabited since pre-historic times, and the Lepchas to have resided in the Sikkimese hills from at least c. 5000 BC. However, the dominant formative narrative of Sikkim is grounded in the developments that took place in historical times. This narrative of Sikkim is not only rooted in the Tibetan

[2] See in Mullard (2011: 64) *LSG* is the first historical source from the seventeenth century, which gives a pivotal understanding of the nature of the religio-political order of seventeenth-century Sikkim.

Buddhist tradition but specifically within the theoretical framework of the *terma*[3] and hidden land tradition (Mullard 2011: 9, 51).

Even though the 'state-like' structures were unified under the single authority, but we cannot term that entity which emerged as 'State' because the definition of a 'State' is 'a centralised political authority that claims legitimate control over the population within a clearly demarcated physical territory through a system of legitimate power or force' (Rae 2007: 123, Mullard 2011: 19). Smith terms 'these as "ethnies" with a common myth of descent, shared history, culture and perhaps language and territory and these ethnies form the basis of modern nations' (1996: 105).

As we discussed in the preceding lines that there was a unification of 'state-like' structures under a single ruler after the establishment of Namgyal dynasty. Since the emergence of a state system is a recent phenomenon, there is much debate on exactly when the processes of early modern state formation started? With some scholars looking back as far as eighth or tenth century, others cite the early fifteenth century with the convening of the Council of Constance of 1414-18, treaties agreed upon at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, or the eighteenth century as the most significant dates in the development of the modern state system (Rae 2007: 124). However, the state formation took place in different spaces at different times though the contemporary state system emerged in Europe and subsequent development in other parts of the world was the extension of these processes.

Even after the unification of these 'state-like' structures into a single authority we cannot term that 'entity' as State, in the modern sense, but a centralised control over the means of violence and the means of revenue was gained, though not in a clearly defined territory and the result was the formation of early 'core' state (ibid: 123). Mullard term this event as 'chiefdoms to a proto-state based on a Tibetan model of hierarchy'[4] (2011: 87). The colonial period had a significant impact on the state formation process in Sikkim. The two main aspects of state development in the British

[3] See in Mullard (2011: 11) the popular idea of *terma* is that they were hidden during the time of Guru Rinpoche either as physical objects *(sater)* or mental seeds placed in the mental continuum; to be revealed at the appropriate time.

[4] See in Mullard (2011: 1-2) the political theories and practices are distinct 'Tibetan.' The concept of divine kingship, the unified system of religion and politics and the writing of legal and administrative documents have Tibetan antecedents than the religious and linguistic similarities.

period were; the creation of structures—the geographical and institutional framework of boundaries, state institution and so on—and the evolution of new processes: national consciousness, community values, and bases for social decorum and unity (Robb 1997: 252-3). This study examines this evolution of new social processes, relations, identities, dialects, values, etc. from the 'people-centric' subaltern approach.

Review of Literature

Various literature have been reviewed to identify the knowledge gap on the said theme; ranging from books, articles, journals, archives, reports, bulletins, treaties, agreements, deeds etc. Literature consulted on the state-making project includes an article by Robert L. Carneiro, *A Theory of the Origin of the State*, 1970, wherein he discusses the first two million years of existence; men lived in bands or villages which were completely autonomous. However, his views are rather state-centred than people-centric. He gives an overview of how states were created and force as a mechanism by which political evolution led step by step, from autonomous villages to the state.

Another was an edited book by Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan *Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory*, 2005. I am discussing how the colonialism played a significant role in the evolution of the modern state, and in this context, this book becomes relevant. Giampaolo Calchi Novati and Peter Lang in their article in this book *National Identities as a By-Product of Italian Colonialism: A Comparison of Eritrea and Somalia* discusses the evolution of the state as not a conscious effort on the part of the ruler to build a nation but to make war and survive led to the creation of states. Charles Tilly in his article *Why and How History Matters*, 2005 has made a similar argument that states are formed through "a process...driven largely by extraction, control and coalition formation as parts or by-products of rulers' efforts not to build states but to make war and survive."

A similar article by Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan in the same book, *Memories, and Legacies of Italian Colonialism*, where they discuss whatever euphoria the colonialism elicited was short-lived, but it percolated to subsequent generations even after their withdrawal from the colony. Another article by Alexander Naty, *Memories of the Kunama of Eritrea Towards Italian Colonialism*, 2001, where he

discusses not all view colonialism negatively. The communities that experienced domination before the advent of colonialism would view colonial rule positively. Such societies would consider colonialists as liberators, in contrast to the groups that have a dominant position would regard colonialism negatively.

Tekeste Negash in *Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1821-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact* (1987) contends there are three salient features of colonialism namely: the subjugation of the economy of the colony to the needs of the colonising power; the implementation of an educational policy with the intention of perpetuating colonialism, and; the definition of relations between the coloniser and the colonised in immutable terms. He states by these features colonialism may be described as a system of domination established by military conquest in the interest of the colonising power. Its objectives are the domination and subjugation of the colony and its inhabitants.

Patrick Pillon and Francis Sodter in their essay *The Impact of Colonial Administration Policies on Indigenous Social Customs in Tahiti and New Caledonia* (1991) attempts to explore some of the ways in which the colonial administrative policies have affected the organisation of the indigenous societies and have given new directions through control of the land and the structure of political authority. Cagni Tugrul Mart, in his essay *British Colonial Education Policy in Africa* (2011) states colonial powers used education as a tool for both political and economic reasons. Western culture, for a long time, became a tool of colonisation.

Aparna Basu in her book *Essays in the History of Indian Education* (1982) argues that the decision to introduce English education in the colonies was the result of a combination of complex administrative, economic, cultural, political, and religious motives. What the British wanted, according to Basu, was a small class of educated English locals to act in Macaulay's words as "interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern...Indian in blood and colour, English in taste, in opinions, in morals and intellect." Concentration on the aristocratic upper and middle classes led to the neglect of mass education. The education system became top-heavy and lop-sided.

Ambe J. Njoh and Fenda Akiwumi in their essay *Colonial Legacies, Land Policies, and the Millennium Development Goals: Lessons from Cameroon and Sierra Leone* (2012) states the colonies inherited the politico-administrative models from their respective erstwhile colonial master nations. British colonial rule is associated with indirect control. This strategy involved the incorporation of traditional or indigenous structures and institutions into the colonial politico-administrative machinery. This model of colonial rule entailed the use of indigenous power structures and institutions, including local kings, chiefs, village elders and lineage heads to discharge imperial government duties. These duties are comprising of the maintenance of law and order and tax collection.

Vincent B. Khapoya, in his book *Colonialism and the African Experience* (2016), contends that the impact of colonisation should be considered an essential factor in understanding the present condition. Therefore, an analysis of the experience of colonialism is necessary to understand the degree to which it influenced the economic and political development of Sikkim as well as people's perception of themselves. Colonial education alienated young people from their own culture and undermined traditional authority.

James C. Scott in *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009) implicitly brings together the histories of all those people extruded by coercive state-making. According to him "The huge literature on state-making, contemporary and historical, pays no attention to its obverse." The physical, coercive presence of the state in the remotest, hilly areas was episodic, often to the vanishing point. Such areas represented a reliable zone of refuge for those who lived there or who chose to go there. This study adopts this model where it is argued that the runaways from the state-making project play a notable role in the formation of the state in rugged, remote, and challenging demographic conditions. James C. Scott adopts a 'people-centric' approach instead of a 'state-centred' model for understanding the histories of people in isolated Himalayan borderlands. Thus, this model is applied in this study to understand the chronicles of the people who played a significant role in establishing Sikkim as a state.

Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (1994) by Thongchai Winichakul suggests making wars means making maps. According to him, the fate of

the tiny tributaries under dispute remains virtually unknown. Their voices have not been heard. It is as if they occupied a dead space with no life, no view, no voice, and thus no history of their own. Review work by Richard A. O' Connor on *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation by Thongchai Winichakul* (1997) argues that the author deconstructs a discourse of nationhood that began when modern geography confronted indigenous concepts of space and sovereignty. He states that we live in nations whose lives require maps. Mapping a nation not only reduces reality to a set of nations, but it incites the State to administer and protect its representation of itself. Maps in short he believes can create a nation. Mapping gives the government a 'geo-body' which shapes minds and threatens diversity.

Charles S. Spencer and Elsa M. Redmond in their article *Primary State Formation in Mesoamerica* (2004) argues that the earliest cases of pre-modern states occurred before detailed written records were kept and can only be studied archaeologically. A quarter-century ago, Wright characterises the state as a society with a centralised and also internally specialised administrative organisation. The expansion of the predatory states played a central role in the formation of states in the first place. Manali Desai's *State Formation and Radical Democracy in India* (2007) begins with the critical question of the impact of British colonial rule on popular insurgency and its legacies for future regimes in the post-colonial state. This is because to some extent state capacities in the direction of popular welfare were also shaped during the colonial era.

David Vumlallian Zou and M. Satish Kumar in their essay *Mapping a Colonial Borderland: Objectifying the Geo-Body of India's Northeast* (2011) states that the sub-Himalayan area is not merely a barrier dividing 'riverine communities,' but in the eyes of mountain dwellers, mountain crests appear rather like bridges, not necessarily obstacles as perceived by lowlanders. Historically, those highlands acted as a 'contact zone' and an 'ethnoscape' between peripheral civilisations of inner Asia. Colonial cartography provided a powerful technology of rule to achieve precisely such a secular end. The British Raj was the most data-intensive 'paper empire.' The colonial cartography introduced a new idiom to naturalise traditional frontiers into imperial borderlands, which in turn forged national boundaries. Peter Robb argues in *The Colonial State and Constructions of Indian Identity* (1997) that national identity

is created out of myths of place and history from rationalisations and shared experiences–social, economic, military and political. He states the most important political process between the eighteenth and at least the 1960s was not imperialism and decolonisation but the growth and evolution of the state.

Another important work is the *History of Sikkim: Unpublished Typescript attributed to Chogyal and Gyalmo (Denzong Gyalrab)* (1908), this piece of work was compiled under the orders of the then Maharajah and Maharani of Sikkim, where they have incorporated the elements of national mythology construction also; stories about how the Namgyal Dynasty in Sikkim was established, the prophecy of Guru Padmasambhava, etc. They have included all the aspects best known to them till their time. This piece of work was in the Tibetan language in its original form; a former British Political Agent had the history translated by the well known Lama and the author, Dawa Kazi Samdup (Rock 1953: 925). Yeshi Choeden in her article *Review of Socio-Political Development in Tibet* (600-1950) (1996) contends it seems they (earlier rulers) could not do so on a long term basis without some justification to make use of force legitimate. So the previous rulers claimed to be divine descendants and the possession of magical powers. According to her, myths provided additional human sanction to consistent their rule.

Another article *The 'Tibetan' formation of Sikkim Religion, Politics and the Construction of a Coronation myth* (2005b) Mullard argues that both Ngadag pa (Phuntshog Rigzin) and Lhatsun pa (Lhatsun Chenpo) texts indicate the level of patronage. It appears according to Mullard competing assertions from the two contenders characterise the issue of new state-led religious patronage: Lhatsun Chenpo and Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin. He contends Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin was perhaps the more influential of the two and asks if the Ngadag lineage dominated early Sikkimese religious life then why it is that in most orthodox historical accounts [like *Denzong Gyalrab/History of Sikkim,* 1908] we find Lhatsun Chenpo in the central role of a royal? He suggests, in short, the development of this historical account was based on the later political and religious events that surrounded the Bhutanese invasion of Sikkim c. 1700.

Saul Mullard in an article *A history from the hidden land: Some preliminary remarks on a Seventeenth-Century Sikkimese chronicle* (2005a) argues how Tibeto-

Sikkimese ascendancy has established the information which is conspicuously absent from the later historical works such as *Denzong Gyalrab/History of Sikkim,* 1908. He states that the myth of origin was used to legitimise the construction of the old state apparatus and the expansion of territory. Tibetan influence is not limited to the spiritual world, however, is also identifiable through the introduction of economic practices such as land ownership, structures of taxation and a form of stratification based on the principles of Tibetan land economy.

Saul Mullard in *Opening the Hidden Land* (2011) argues that Sikkimese history cannot be divided from Tibetan history. Much that made Sikkim was conceived in Tibet. Later, Sikkimese historiography was manufactured based on serious political and religious concerns. The dominant formative narrative of Sikkim is grounded in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition but specifically within the theoretical framework of the *terma* and hidden land traditions. The importance of the *terma* tradition in Sikkim cannot be understated. It is in this tradition that the concept of *beyul* (Sikkim) was conceived which had a religio-political function as a place to escape in degenerate times. According to him 'local Sikkimese history is grounded in a different methodology which places oral accounts on par with documentary evidence.' This narrative tradition acts as a blueprint for Sikkimese society and its historical identity by shaping the past into a model for national identity.

Another is the *Royal Records: A Catalogue of the Sikkimese Palace Archives* (2010) compiled by Saul Mullard and Hissey Wongchuk. This collection covers a stretch of historical periods, from the time of early Sikkimese state formation in the mid-seventeenth century, the Sikkim-Gorkha war of the 1780s and 1790s, the British period (1817-1947), and the merger period of Sikkim with India in 1975. A. C. Sinha's *Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic* (2008), it has been argued in his book that the historical studies of Sikkim that exist deal today mostly with invasions, raids and military exploits and also on the British in Sikkim. Typically, a survey of such evolutionary processes does not require a strictly chronological treatment. However, the history of Sikkim suggests that with specific dates, not only the rulers were changed, but also the process of socio-economic and cultural intercourse was dramatically reoriented.

The photographic record of John Claude White (1883-1908) compiled by Kurt Meyer and Pamela Deuel Meyer, *In the Shadows of the Himalayas: Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim* (2005) where the photos taken by Claude White and other officials have been posted along with the vivid descriptions. The author starts with a beautiful remark that being studied in the classical central European tradition, "we studied the Roman and Greek cultures in-depth but scarcely studied the rich cultures of Central Asia, South Asia, and China." He states the military and political leaders were the key players in determining the fate of the British, all over the world — the practical-minded men whose dogged determination and efficiency made the Empire run smoothly. The strategy in Sikkim was to bring the border areas under the firm control of the British Raj.

Alex McKay's *Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre 1904-47* (2009), explain the developments since Sikkim was the suzerain of Tibet, the British relations with Sikkim affected the Sikkim's relations with Tibet. Alex McKay has analysed the Tibet relations with British India from the perspective of British officials which he terms, the 'Tibetan frontier cadres.' After the opening of the British relations with Tibet in 1904, subsequently, cadres developed cordial relations with Tibetan people. In advice to the Tibetan Government, Charles Bell, a frontier cadre according to McKay stated; 'Britain is giving more power to India, who will hardly show the same friendship…or have the same power to help Tibet.' Tibetan frontier cadres developed sympathy towards the Tibetans, and it was the officers, Richardson, Gould and Ford of the British GoI (Government of India) who were instrumental in the creation of the Tibet Society of UK, in 1959.

A. K. J. Singh's *Himalayan Triangle: A Historical Survey of British India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950* (1988), is based on the records of the India Office Library and Records. The author has given a comprehensive account of British relations with Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The book discusses the British policies towards the Eastern Himalayan states, and she has located these events in the broader context of the Great Game going on between Tsarist Russians and the British; with a focus on the implications of this Game on the Eastern Himalayan states.

P. R. Rao's *India and Sikkim: 1814-1970* (1972), where he discusses the relationship between British India and Sikkim from the beginning of the association

since 1817 till the end of British colonial rule in India. He has also addressed the transformations which Sikkim witnessed till 1970 as an Indian protectorate. He argues Maharajah Tashi Namgyal remained a loyal friend of the British till the end of their rule in India. The Government was so much satisfied with his loyalty that they restored the powers over internal administration of the Kingdom. The personal rule of the Maharajah may be regarded as a success till 1946 when the Kingdom was singularly free from communal disturbances and political agitations. However, after 1947, the Kingdom was rocked with many political anxieties. His sources are mainly the documents from the India Office Records and British Library in London.

B. S. K. Grover's *Sikkim and India: Storm and Consolidation* (1974), analyses the status of Sikkim under British rule and the status of Sikkim vis-à-vis independent India. He states, 'dynamic and ideologically consistent policies have been followed by Smt. Indira Gandhi and these have been firmly executed by the officials of the Ministry of External Affairs.' He contends Sikkim, a religious place, turned into an army base. George Kotturan's *The Himalayan Gateway: History and Culture of Sikkim* (1983), he discusses the initial question of state formation, the relations of Sikkim with British India and independent India. He argues that before the advent of the British in the region, India did not bother about the states in the peripheries.

B. S. Das's *The Sikkim Saga* (1983), gives an account of the series of events that took place after his appointment as the Chief Administrator of Sikkim following the turmoil that led to the collapse of the administration in Sikkim. He suggests the merger of Sikkim took place due to the ambitions of three ladies, namely; Hope Cook who wanted to become the Maharani of independent Sikkim, Elisa Maria[5], who wanted to become the first lady of the state and Mrs. Indira Gandhi whose realpolitik changed the status of Sikkim from protectorate to an Indian state. He states the Chogyal's rule had a feudalistic approach, leaving the vast majority of his people dissatisfied. These people were reaching a stage of revolt against rampant corruption and economic disparities. Decades of suppression by the Sikkimese rulers had made the people docile and subservient. Nepal's invasion in 1775-75 and subsequent occupation of Sikkim's western region led to the substantial settlement of Nepalese on her territory. By 1790, Nepal extended its hold over the entire lower Teesta basin in

[5] Wife of L. D. Kazi, the first Chief Minister of Sikkim.

the East. The discriminatory practices against the Nepali subjects came into full play leading to their complete economic and political domination.

Sunanda K. Datta-Ray in *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim* (1984), argues that the merger of Sikkim was not a merger but an annexation. He states that an article which came out after the death of Chogyal in 1982, proves this point, in *The Voice of Sikkim*, "Palden Thondup Namgyal, Chogyal of Sikkim, died more of a broken heart than of throat cancer." Datta-Ray has reached to the micro details of the events that took place in Sikkim during the time of its merger. He has tried to look from the perspective of Durbar and from the standpoint of sympathisers to the Durbar.

Another literature consulted was L. B. Basnet's *Sikkim: Merger with India*, 1978, an unpublished typescript, throws considerable light to the events that unfolded during the 1970s. He states, 'the Sikkimese youth lacked the patriotic fervour and the willingness to make sacrifices.' The Nepalese had struggled against the Chogyal and the Bhutia ascendancy for so long, and it would be imprudent for the Nepalese youth to make common cause with the Bhutias and fight for a common purpose that was aimed at restoring the Bhutia ascendency.

A book by Kumar Pradhan *The Gorkha Conquests* (1991/2009) gives similar account as James C. Scott, he states the formation of state of Nepal was the consequence of raids on Western India by the Muslims which set in motion the migration of many high-caste Hindus, feudal chiefs and princes to the security afforded by the hills. A similar event occurred during the middle of the seventeenth century; the Lepchas in Sikkim considered being autochthons of the land began to be subjugated by immigrants Tibetans. The Sikkim history compiled by the Lamas of Pemayangtse was destroyed in the Gorkha raids. Whatever was saved, and by other existing documents and oral traditions, the *History of Sikkim* was compiled by Maharajah Thutob Namgyal, and Maharani Yeshey Dolma in 1908 and Risley's *Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894) constitute the principal source of information. Sikkim history refers to the cementing of an inseparable bond between the native Lepchas and the Tibetan newcomers; scrutiny reveals the conflicts between the Tibetans and Lepchas which facilitated both the Gorkha conquest and the British occupation of a part of Sikkim.

In an article *The Brag dkar pa family and g.yang thang rdzong: an example of internal alliances in Sikkim* (2003) Mullard states before the invasion of Sikkim in 1788 by Gorkha army these lands were under Dak Kar Pa family. He states, what is uncertain is the extent of Gorkha control over Sikkimese territory after the 1792 war between Tibet, China, and Nepal. Most of the secondary literature seems divided on the actual geographical distinctions between Nepalese controlled Sikkim and the areas under the authority of the Sikkimese Chogyals. Saul Mullard, in an article *Sikkim and Bhutan: An introduction* (2009/2010) argues with the north-easterly expansion of British India drew Sikkim into the sphere of British influence. Sikkim was structurally changed by the British that set her in the direction of her eventual integration with India.

In the book *History of Sikkim (1817-1904): Analysis of British Policy and Activities* (1985), P. K. Jha argues that, Sikkim became a constituent unit of India in 1975, but her political involvement with India started in early 1817 when the Treaty of Titaliya was signed between Sikkim and the British East India Company. However, he argues 'Sikkim's political entity was decided by the Lhasa convention of 1904 between Great Britain and Tibet which settled the affairs of Sikkim as affairs of India.' Her merger with India was merely a matter of time.

Alex McKay in *A Difficult Country, a Hostile Chief, and a Still More Hostile Minister* (2009/2010) states the 1861 Treaty forced Sikkim to adapt in a way more aptly to modern state models where a single authority has a monopoly over foreign affairs and the legitimate force within its fixed territory. *Documents on Sikkim and Bhutan* edited by S. K. Sharma and Usha Sharma (1998), is a handy source for the study. The original papers on Sikkim in this book are beneficial for the researchers, especially those who work on Sikkim. This book has a collection of various treaties, agreements, covenants, deeds, letters and so on signed/exchanged between the British government and the then Rajahs of Sikkim and Bhutan.

In *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (1948), A. R. Desai has evaluated the changes that took place in the colonial period and has come up with the conclusion that how these changes shaped the state in the post-colonial period. He is comparing the colonial society, with pre-colonial society to come up with a fitting end. He states, the colonial era brought transformation in the feudal economy and laid

the foundation for the modern class system. In the colonial period, a rudimentary administration was established in Sikkim which laid the foundation for the advanced administrative system, and the division of department was done.

To understand the British influence Ashis Nandy's *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (1983) has been reviewed, he states 'Colonialism may not always begin with the establishment of alien rule in society and end with the departure of the alien rulers from the colony.' Even after the departure of the colonialists, the influence remains in the former colonies or in the places they had their control before. That influence plays in shaping the psyche of the people and exerts the colonialist traits in their actions. Bipan Chandra in *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India* (1979), suggests that the colonial period was a period of transition to modernity. However, the transition to modernity remained incomplete due to the hold of tradition. In Sikkim, the old customs and traditions debarred the transition process to modernity. However, in the post-colonial period, he argues that the cultural baggage of colonisers engages in the task of modernisation left incomplete by the colonisers. He further contends colonialism plays a vital role in the social, political and economic evolution in general and in the growth of under development in particular. In Sikkim, it was the common/subaltern people who agitated against the undemocratic rule of the ruler and turned the state into full-fledged democracy under the auspices of Indian Union.

Aloysius in *Nationalism Without a Nation in India* (2008), suggests the past is an explanation of the present, the genesis of social phenomena is an essential aspect of its present situation. Since the inception of British in the Eastern Himalayan region, particularly in Sikkim, the state witnessed the changes in the dynamics of the socio-political structure. Moreover, it is because of these changes that led to the present socio-political situation in Sikkim. The colonial period is the period of great social and political upheaval according to Aloysius, in the colonial period the self-consciousness of people comes to its wake through the education; the inception of new values gives a new dimension to the thinking of the people.

In *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practices in Post-Colonial Literatures* (1989/2002) Bill Ashcroft argues that: 'the idea of post-colonial literary theory emerges from the inability of European theory to deal adequately, with the

complexities and varied cultural provenance of the post-colonial writing.' The inadequacy of the existing scientific theories to explain the dynamics of colonialism entirely led to the emergence of new approaches namely; the post-colonial theory that could explain the dynamics of colonialism, whether it is direct or indirect colonialism.

Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952/2008) was the first book to investigate the psychology of colonialism. It examines how colonial subjects internalise the colonialism, how an inferiority complex is taught, and how colonial subjects end up impersonating the colonisers. The psyche of the people is developed on the colonial influence, as the colonial institutions had already held its firm position and people are habituated in that institutions, and there is no other option other than the continuance of that institution established by the colonisers. Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth* (1963) states, 'they are 98 per cent illiterate, but they are the subject of a huge body of literature.' What colonialism touched became the subject of analysis. British had a relation with Sikkim for 130 years, in this period what colonialism did in Sikkim became the subject for study, and there is a space for coming out with appropriate answers about the British influence in Sikkim.

Ranajit Guha in *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (1998) argues 'the subalterns had acted in history on their own, independent of the elite; their politics constituted an autonomous domain, it neither originated from the elite politics nor their existences depend on the latter.' Guha has asserted that historiography has dealt with the insurgency as a pragmatic phenomenon, but not as an entity whose consciousness constituted the praxis called rebellion. According to him, what has remained unchanged is the endeavour to rethink history from the subaltern perspective.

Ranajit Guha, in an article *The Prose of Counter-Insurgency* (1988) talks about the three types of discourses concerning the peasant rebellion, namely primary, secondary, and tertiary discourse. According to him, the primary discourse was meant for the administrative use–for the information of government for action on its part and the determination of its policy. Another distinctive feature of this type of discourse was its immediacy, written concurrently with or soon after the events which were acknowledged as a rebellion by those who fear from it. The other set of writings to qualify as the secondary discourse was also the work of administrators. The secondary

discourse follows the primary and turns the event into history, not only in the view of those outside it but of the associates as well. The tertiary level of discourse does not rely on these to sustain due to the aura of the neutrality it has about it. Authors, by keeping their narrative beyond the pale of personal involvement, they managed if only by implications, to confer on it a semblance of truth. They are supposed to have found for their discourse a niche in that realm of perfect neutrality–the field of history.

Another book *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (1983) Guha states to acknowledge the peasant as the marker of his rebellion is to attribute consciousness to him. For Guha, the revolt was to recover peasant's self-respect by eliminating or turning against his oppressors the innocuous, because traditionally tolerated, sings of subalternity which had imposed on them. Guha argues nothing can turn the world upside down than the subalterns when feeling bold to delegate power seized in the act of rebellion.

Peter H. Hansen, in his article, *Why there is no Subaltern Studies for Tibet?* (2003) argues the absence of Subaltern studies in Tibetan studies is rooted in a belief in what might be called the 'Tibetan exceptionalism.' He states that insularity from the theory is not the consequence of geographical isolation. He questions the development of subaltern studies in India and why subaltern studies have not been influential in Tibet? The second part of this article deals with a brief case study, how subaltern studies might illuminate a decisive event in Tibetan history.

In the article *Subaltern Studies: from Writing with (Socialist) Passion to Following the (Postmodern) Fashion* (2012) Hannah Altern suggests the drive to create new historiography—one that moved beyond the failings of the existing historiography—was an essential aim of the Subaltern Studies. Colonialist and bourgeois-nationalist histories were problematic to the subaltern studies scholars because they failed to recognise the agency and actions of subaltern people. Gyan Prakash in *Subaltern Studies as* Post-colonial *Criticism* (1994) argues it is essential to note that 'Europe' or 'the West' in Subaltern Studies refers to an imaginary though powerful entity created by a historical process that authorised it as the home of Reason, Progress, and Modernity.

J. Maggio in *"Can the Subaltern Be Heard?": Political Theory, Translation, Representation, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spikav* (2007) argues that the representation of subalterns in the state formation is irreducibly low. The Western approach to the subaltern is to represent them or let them speak for themselves silently. Both strategies incorporate the silencing effect because they ignore the positional relations of the dominant to the subaltern. The subaltern can speak as long as they speak in a language that is recognised by the West. Gyanendra Pandey in *The Subaltern as Subaltern Citizen* (2006) argues the task of subaltern historiography is to recover the little figure of history that the peasant mass was contemporaneous with the modern, part of modernity, and establish the peasant as the maker of his/her destiny. Dipesh Chakrabarty in *Subaltern Studies and* Post-colonial *Historiography* (2000) states that subaltern studies (1982-87) represent a paradigm shift. He argues that post-colonial history was also a post-nationalist form of historiography, and thus subaltern studies began on this very terrain it was to contest historiography that had its roots in the colonial education system.

Spivak in *Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography* (1985) contends that the work of the Subaltern Studies group offers a theory of change. She argues that the most significant outcome of this revision or shift in perspective is that the insurgent or the subalterns are themselves the precursor of change, and it is located within them. According to her, the move itself can only be operated by the force of a crisis. Hegemonic historiography is constituted by cognitive failure. She suggests that the sophisticated vocabulary of much contemporary historiography successfully shields this cognitive failure and that this success-in-failure, this sanctioned ignorance is inseparable from colonial domination.

Documents from National Archives of India have been utilised in this thesis about different periods in the Sikkimese history. One such material is a letter from D. Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling to the Rajah of Sikkim dated 29 August 1849. In the letter, he talks about the vexations which Dr. Hooker had to deal with during his travel to Sikkim for some research purpose. He states either your Highness (the Sikkim Rajah) did not give instructions to your people to follow out the permission granted for Dr. Hooker, and to treat him as would be becoming the professions of friendship Rajah makes to the British Government and the significant obligation he

owed to it, or the Rajah's officers disobeyed their orders. He contends if the latter is the case, then no time should be lost in inflicting appropriate punishment to them and vindicating your claim to the Governor General's confidence.

Another is a letter from D. Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling to Halliday, Secretary to Government of India on 11 September 1849, where he states amongst other things that the Rajah of Sikkim has appointed Aden Cheebo Lama, his agent at Darjeeling, who was there on business connected with the Morung some months past. He states this person is the most capable and eligible officer in Rajah's service for this post. Another letter again from D. Campbell to I. P. Grant, Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 18 September 1849 on the subject of "detention of Hooker" on the Sikkimese border. He states with reference to the call made by me on the Sikkim Rajah for explanation of the obstacles, and annoyances put in the way of Dr. Hooker's travels, the matter has cleared up unexpectedly early and the purpose of taking leave, leaving Captain G. W. Bishop in charge of his current duties, his officiating assistant. A letter from C. H. Sushington, Special Commissioner for the affairs of Sikkim to D. Campbell on 26 February, 1850 states it has been determined to take permanently the possession of the part of the territory of the Sikkim Rajah, which lies in the Morung, and the part of the Hill Country which lies to the Westward of the Teesta, and great Rungeet rivers and to the South of the River Rummo [Rambang]. Moreover, he further states that you will take such preliminary steps as may appear necessary for the present settlements of that portion of the Morung which is to be placed under your jurisdiction and he shall at once issue proclamations announcing that the Government has taken permanent possession of the country.

A letter from D. Campbell to J. P. Grant, Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 26 February 1850 states regarding the annexation of the Darjeeling territory of the Hill tract, and the portion of the Morung situated above and to the East of the road heading from Punkabari to Siliguri. He states immediate steps have taken to fulfil the intentions of Government for the Police and General administration, of the said territory by calling upon the inhabitants generally to conform to the terms of the Proclamation issued by Mr. Sushington, and by summoning the head men of villages to attend without delay to his office.

This is a letter from D. Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling, to A. R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 4 March 1859 where he states that the old Dewan accused Chebu Lama on his arrival at the Durbar of having appropriated to his use and to that of the Superintendent of Darjeeling a gratuity of Rupees 12,000 per annum which the British Government had allowed for the Rajah since 1850. Therefore, the Rajah had ordered the Lama into confinement and these Deputies to proceed to Darjeeling to get the said gratuity for the Rajah. D. Campbell suggests not to allow these Deputies to visit Darjeeling in his absence, but if they sent any letter to him, forward it to him. In a translation of a letter from D. Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling, to the Sikkim Rajah's Officers at Namchi, dated 4 March 1859 where he states that he has no authority from Government to receive them or and their overtures on the subject alluded to so that they had better return to the Durbar. If there any orders from Government on this subject he shall communicate afterwards to the Durbar.

Another is a letter from H. J. S. Cotton on 1 July 1892 to the Secretary, Government of India, where he states that the Maharajah has offered to write and direct his son, Tchoda Namgyel, to come back to Sikkim from Singatsee (Shigatse) who was in Chumbi valley following the war with Tibet. He suggests that the letter should be read and approved by Mr. White, the Assistant Political Officer before it is dispatched. Another letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on 25 June 1892 states the Maharajah of Sikkim has requested to see him represent his circumstances, regarding his flight to Nepal. Another letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on 27 June 1892, states that Rajah said he had suffered much trouble because of the conflict between England and Tibet. His mother and wife are natives if Tibet. At the time of the conflict, the former with other relatives lived in Tibet, and therefore he could not avoid intercourse with that country including correspondence with persons residing in it. For this, he was reduced almost to the state of a prisoner at Guntok (Gangtok). He gives the justification for leaving the country to relieve him from distress, not to relinquish his duties.

Another letter from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary, Bengal Government on 19 July 1892 he states that the Maharajah declined to take any part in the administration which the British Government had established in Sikkim. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner of Rajshahi recommends that the Maharajah should, for a time, be formally deposed and kept under surveillance. The Governor-General in Council thinks, therefore, that it will be sufficient to inform the Maharajah that, as he will not comply with the conditions prescribed by the Government of India, he must remain out of power and under surveillance.

It's a copy of a Demi-official letter dated 30 July 1935, from the Political Officer Sikkim (Camp Gyantse, Tibet), to the Additional Political Secretary, Simla where he states the Maharajah of Sikkim has no intention of entering the Federation and states we may be less affected here than elsewhere by the forthcoming constitutional changes [Act of 1935]. He recommends that the political relations of the Government of India with Sikkim should continue to be dealt with through the officer who is in charge of relations with Tibet and Bhutan. Sikkim is both geographically and racially akin to the latter.

The documents in Sikkim Archives tell us how the relationship was in the reign of Tashi Namgyal with British — as per the document No.777/E, dated, 27 March 1916[6], the Government of India has directed Political Officer to give the control of the departments, namely; Excise, Income tax, Police, Jail and Judicial and Revenue Stamps to the King. Another exchange of letters between Sikkim and the British Government is, on the occasion of the hostility of Amir of Afghanistan towards India in 1919. From this account, it is clear that Maharajah's submission to the British Government led to a stable relation between Sikkim and British India. It lasted till the end of British rule in India.

When Triple Entente was victorious over the Triple Alliance in the First World War, Government of India referred a letter to His Highness Maharajah, to share the happiness of the victory on 9 July 1919. In response to this, Maharajah orders in a document No.919/G.B. that special prayers in all monasteries in Sikkim

[6] This is a letter from C. A. Bell to His Highness the Maharajah of Sikkim.

should be repeated for three days and that the coming years may be of peace, happiness, and prosperity. This shows the stable relation between Sikkim and British India after British moulded Sikkim according to their interest.

Another letter to the Maharajah from the Viceroy of India invites Maharajah to take part in the Chamber of Princes and other ceremonies, dated 22 November 1920. It shows the cordial ties between the British Government and Sikkim after 1914. In reply to this, Maharajah Tashi Namgyal states, dated 9 October 1920; "My friend, I send you, for your information, a post copy of my telegram of today's date respecting my going to Delhi to attend the inaugural ceremony of the Chamber of Princes." The documents procured from National Archives of Bangladesh namely: correspondences, letters, and reports during the British period have been reviewed to come out with proper understanding about the relations which the Eastern Himalayan States had had with the British and vice-versa which may fill the significant lacunae hitherto unknown.

Such a document which is a letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal in 29 July 1886 on a subject "Tibetan Aggression on Sikkim" states the Maharajah of Sikkim is yielding to a most objectionable extent to demands made on him by the Tibetan Officials without references to his obligation towards the British Government. The Maharajah is issuing an order to be obeyed by the Sikkimese Officials regarding the building of a fort by the Tibetan Officials which they allegedly claim as their territory, which other papers show is for the occupation of Tibetan (and perhaps Chinese) soldiers.

Another letter in this connection is a translation of a *perwanah*[7] issued by the Maharajah of Sikkim towards his ministers (Tenduk Pulger and Lasso Kazi) on 18 July 1886 stating "The territory from Rishi belongs to the Thibet Government, and that, as a matter of favour, the Sikkim Rajah has been allowed to enjoy it...Besides this, the whole of Sikkim is under China and Thibet." Under such circumstances, the Tibet Government could resume their land, and they now intend to build a house

[7] A sort of royal decree.

above Lingtu, and they, therefore, state that they see no objection to building houses in their jurisdiction.

A telegram from Lieutenant Governor to Foreign Secretary on 3 August 1886 states the incursion of Tibetans into Sikkim is correct probably, but the deputation of Macaulay with an escort to settle the affair would be unnecessary. As the Macaulay Mission[8] had been stopped and Macaulay's party better be dispersed as quickly as possible. His presence at Darjeeling only tends to keep up the alarm which agitates the frontier. Another letter from Ulick Browne to the Chief Secretary states on 4 August 1886 that the Tibet Mission, which had been assembled at Darjeeling for two months, has been finally countermanded. Armed parties of Tibetans, reported as 300, strong under officers, have occupied the upper part of the Edgar Road for a length of 12 miles in Sikkim to oppose the Mission. They are building a fort at Langtu (Lingtu) and a habitation for soldiers at Choambok, both on the road.

In a letter from F. B. Peacock the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Foreign Department states as regards the actual and hitherto recognised frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, the evidence since 1849 is abundant and clear. The Lieutenant-Governor has called upon the Commissioner to submit a statement of this evidence, for it seems to him that without it a correct understanding of the question cannot be arrived at. In a letter from Browne to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department states the Maharajah of Sikkim making an annual payment in kind as evidence that he considers himself to be tributary to Tibet, he would like to be sure that the amount is not made merely as a kind of rent for lands occupied by the Maharajah at and about Chumbi in Tibet. Whether Sikkim pays tribute, rightly, to Tibet or not it seems that unless there is something in the Foreign Office, showing the contrary, the Tibetans have no case at all for claiming the exercise of nothing less than sovereign rights over the plateau of Sikkim. He further states the claim should be resisted, and the Tibetans should be called on through the Chinese Government to put forward their applications for the decision of the British and Chinese Governments, retiring to the Jeylep in the meantime.

[8] Macaulay Mission was to go to Tibet to open up Tibet for the trade.

A translation of the letter from the two aristocrats of Sikkim Tenduk Pulger and Lasso Kazi addressed to Sarat Chandra Das, Deputy Inspector of School on 28 July 1886 states that a few months ago when the Maharajah was about to return to his winter residence (Tumlong in Sikkim) from his summer residence (Chumbi in Tibet) under the agreement of October 1884 made with the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling and Secretary Macaulay, the Maharajah received a letter from the English Government requiring him to stay at Chumbi until the arrival of the English Mission there. Accordingly, the Maharajah remained at his summer residence. Subsequently, when the news of Tibetan Mission reached to Lhasa, the Tibetans became apprehensive and fearing the British are coming to invade Tibet made military preparations to oppose the Mission. Suspecting Maharajah's complicity with the English kept Maharajah under surveillance, and now he cannot return to Sikkim.

Browne on 30 August 1886 in a letter to Macaulay the Chief Secretary of the Government of Bengal states the next instalment of the Maharajah's allowance will not be paid. Macaulay on 11 December 1886 writes to Browne, the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division that if the Tibetans do not abandon their position in Lingtu, Government of India will doubtlessly insist at the proper time, and that will be the fittest occasion to come to a settlement with the Maharajah for evading the terms of the treaty. In a letter from W. J. Cunningham, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal on 20 January 1887 states in the opinion of the Government of India and to prove that the terms of Burma-Chinese Convention have been respected, than to get rid of some troublesome men at Langthu [Lingtu]. Governor-General in Council decided not to take any steps which could be misrepresented by China as an intention to force a way to into Tibet. Henceforth, no troops should be moved nor should any assistance either in arms or money be given to Phodang Lama.

In a note written by J. Ware Edgar on April 1889 where he talks about the connections of Rajah's mother with an illegitimate son of her husband and a son, in turn, Kuzoo Lhase made a relation with Rajah's second wife and bore a child and continues the relationship and the Rani have gained complete influence over the Rajah. He further states if the Rajah should return to Chumbi before the affair [Lingtu affair] has been settled, he believes that the administration of the country should be

entrusted to a council of its chief men, including Phodung Lama, the Phurboo and Khanza Dewans, and the principals Kazies.

A. W. Paul, Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force on 2 May 1888 in a letter to J. W. Edgar, Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal states his visit to Gangtok was so far successful, and on the 21st of April Lingtu was taken without opposition. The Rajah is still at Gangtok and on 27th April he sent his three children to his mother at Chumbi. He states Rajah is afraid of breaking with Tibet, and will not openly declare himself on our side. Another letter from A. W. Paul on 9 July 1888 to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal was the continuation of his previous letter where he states on the progress of events since their occupation of Gnatong. As regards Tibet, it is impossible to form an idea of what effect the defeat of the 22nd May will have on them. The Tibetan laity, including the soldiery, was anxious for peace, but the Kham reinforcements are equally concerned for war. The position at Gnatong has been immensely strengthened since the 22nd May, and full provisions to the end of October have been stored there.

A letter from Colman Macaulay, Chief Secretary, Bengal Government on 21 July 1888 to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, informs that the Viceroy has approved the message sent by Lieutenant-Governor of Darjeeling that the British Government now considers itself utterly free from the obligation it assumed in promising not to cross the Tibetan frontier and is entitled to occupy any part of Tibet or take any other measure which may be considered advisable. A letter from J. C. White, Assistant Political Officer to A. W. Paul on 25 October 1888 states the Government intended to form a Council consisting of Lama members of Phodong Lama and Dorji Lopen; Khansa Dewan, Guntok Kazi, Sating Kazi, and Purboo Dewan of lay members; and Kergong Dingpen as a writer. The Government intended Maharajah to work through the Council and not directly. Moreover, he further states that he hopes to bring Maharajah out of his immediate surroundings and to show him that he is his friend in any way, although he was obliged to tell him very difficult truths occasionally.

A letter from A. W. Paul to Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 2 November 1888 which was in continuation of his report of 27th October where he states he met Taloyi Sevu Chum Sean, whom the Tibetans referred to as Chinese

Captain at Rinchagong on the 26th September. He arrived at Rinchagong on the morning of the 25th September, too late to stop the fight. He felt that the Tibetans had disobeyed the Amban's order and had fought the British unsuccessfully. The Sen-de-geh-sum, or council of the united monasteries of Sera, Depung, and Gehden, had tried to prevent the Amban from coming to the frontier to make peace. The Amban could not trust the Tibetan now as they had already broken their promise not to fight. He ends by stating a delegation has gone to Phari in anticipation of the Amban's coming.

In a translation of a letter from Amban dated 20 September 1888 it is stated that in obedience to His Imperial Majesty's mandate that he had been deputed to proceed immediately to the boundary of Tibet to deal with matters in dispute: firstly to forbid the Tibetans to fight and then to settle affairs. I have therefore arrived and accordingly issued orders to the Tibetan officials not to fight, but to obey my decision. In a letter from A. W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 31 January 1889 states Mr. Elias received news that the Amban had left Lhasa and was expected to reach Rinchagong on the 13 December 1888 and shortly afterwards the Amban wrote to inquire what would be a suitable time to meet him at Gnatong and was told the 16th December. On the 18th with the information that was owing to the press of work, fatigue from the journey and the like the Chinese would not be able to reach Gnatong until the 21st. About 2 p. m. on that day the Amban Shen Tai arrived at Gnatong. Paul stated we wished for free interchange of letters with Tibet in accordance with the usage of civilised nations, and also facilities of commerce, already promised us by the Pekin Government, and pointed out that as he had admitted Tibet would now listen to the mandates of China, there could be no difficulty in his now redeeming her pledges.

P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, writes to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political department on 2 December 1892 about the frontier question which has been settled on paper, the line of the watershed, which was well defined, having been adopted as the boundary in the treaty with China. He further states the whole northern border is in dispute, and the Tibetans are so far in occupation, and their officers send back theirs. He was of the view that the boundary pillars should be erected in the summer of 1894, and it was the only way to transplant the Chinese treaty into a form intelligible on the frontier.

In a letter dated 8 June 1894 from John C. White to P. Nolan, White asserts that the soldiers, who have been stationed along the passes between Sikkim and Tibet, have been sent there by the Tibetan Government and not by the Chinese. In a reply of the telegram dated the 7 July 1894 from Simla, Foreign to Calcutta, Bengal about "If Sikkim-Tibet boundary is to be demarcated, please state strength and constitution of the escort which His Honour would propose to send with White. What would be the best time for beginning work?", the following had been stated in the telegram dated the 10 July 1894 from Gnatong, Political, Yatung to Calcutta, Bengal, "small escort of ten men would be enough. They should be Gurkhas and demarcation should be commenced as soon as possible."

A letter from H. J. S. Cotton, Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India on 20 May 1895 states the Chinese representative; Major Tu Hsi-hsan has not yet been able to join White, owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary transport. It was recommended that in the event of the inability of the Chinese and Tibetan delegates to join White, and then he should be authorised to proceed with his men alone to lay down the boundary and set up pillars on the passes along the eastern frontier (Chola, Doka-La [Doklam], Nathu-La, Pembaringo, etc.), where no dispute is known to exist.

In a letter from John C. White, Political Officer to P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division on 6 June 1895 states on the evening of the 3rd, the news was brought that the pillar on the Jeylep had been broken and the brick with the letters had been removed. This is undoubtedly the work of the Tibetans, who have been encouraged by the refusal of their Officials to meet me. Moreover, a telegram from Political Officer to Darjeeling on 11 June 1895 states that the pillar on Donchuk-la has also been damaged. Top of the post broken off and this is an unfrequented pass, and outrage must be deliberate.

A letter from John C. White, Political Officer to P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 9 June 1895 where White states that no further definite news has been received as to who were the perpetrators of the outrage in Jeylep. It was rumoured that search was being done in the Chumbi Valley for the missing brick and it was also reported that the Chinese were in great fear of Tibetans and that the Lamas at Lhasa have refused absolutely to obey the Amban.

On 17 June 1895 a telegram from Darjeeling to Political Officer, Sikkim, states direct communications should not be held with the Tibetans. 'If the Tibetans wish to communicate with you, they should come to you through Major Tu (Chinese representative) and not you should to them.' In a letter from W. J. Cuningham, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department to the Chief Secretary, Bengal Government on 17 August 1895 it was informed that the party assembled for the demarcation of the Sikkim-Tibet border should break up and that Mr. White should return to Gangtok. The Governor-General in Council believes that it should be possible to make more satisfactory arrangements for demarcation next season. Accordingly, White on 25 August 1895 informs to Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division that he arrived in Gangtok on the 20th and all the camp arrived on the 22nd.

In a letter dated 24 November 1895 from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary of Bengal Government he states the Chinese and Tibetan delegates will be invited to meet those from India on the frontier. Should they fail to attend, delimitation shall proceed in their absence. They will be informed of the result, and any objections they may make will be duly considered. They justify their position by stating that the treaty does not bind them, as they were no party to it. The dispute, therefore, involves the crucial question of whether the Convention is to be enforced.

A note from India Office to Bradford Chamber of Commerce on 5 December 1895 states in November 1893, specific regulations were agreed to by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of China regarding trade in connection with the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890. Under these regulations, which will be liable to revision at the end of five years, a trade mart was opened, on the 1 May 1894, at Yatung in Tibetan territory. A note on "Demarcation of the Boundary between Sikkim and Tibet" by Cotton on 4 December 1895 states the Chinese authorities are quite willing to act up to the Convention but are unable to coerce the Tibetans. 'It will be an easy thing to rout the Tibetan guard, break down the boundary wall, and blast rocks at the boundary points we claim. However, a boundary so asserted in such a locality, will be valueless.' The Tibetans would resume possession on the first opportunity, and we could not eject them, except by the committee of another force. He states a little doubt that some concession on the Burmese frontier could be demanded and would be

granted, which would be much more valuable to British interests than the possession of this disputed and barren territory in Sikkim.

The Rationale and Scope of the Study

The rationale and scope of the study are to re-look the historiography of Sikkim/State formation of Sikkim 'from below'; from the perspective of subaltern (runaways from state-making project), as the works carried on Sikkim so far have been looked 'from above'; from the orientalist tradition[9] inherited from the British Raj. Orientalist knowledge was used in the colonial administration (Said 1977: 345). The history writing in Sikkim so far has been done 'from the above,' and is dominated by the elitism, and there is a scope in writing 'history from below' from the perspectives of subordinate people. Scott has recently begun an exciting project in his book of highlighting history not from state-centric models but from the position of those who were marginalised in the elite discourses (2009: 4-5), this model will be used in this study. There is a scope in looking history 'from below' since no one has done this before; to understand the historiography of Sikkim from the 'Subaltern perspectives' and the continuance of the orientalist descriptive mode in the line of enquiry in Sikkim studies could be the reason for not having subaltern/theoretical study so far.

The critical gap this study fills is, on the period of British influence in the region. There are many areas on Sikkim on which researchers are yet to take up, and is still virgin territory to some extent particularly on the period of British influence in the region (McKay and Balikci-Denjongpa 2011: 22). The little work done is mostly based on secondary sources. Such works remain to be addressed on the period of British power in the region, and no one has looked 'history from below.' It might be tempting to say such work could be done on Sikkim since Sikkim does not share the experience of colonialism as in India and abroad. India and Latin America shared the experiences of colonialism, revolutionary peasant movements, and Marxist intellectual traditions and that is the reason why Subaltern studies have been institutionalised in these regions (Hansen 2003: 8). Sikkim does not share the experiences of colonialism as in India and Latin America, but, Sikkim did experience

[9] See in Said (1977) Orientalist tradition is political imperialism which governs the entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions. The connection between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination and varying degrees of complex hegemony. It is hegemony or the result of cultural hegemony that gives birth to Orientalism. Orientalism is an explanation in need ofexplanation.

the peasant movements after the 1940s, which was the profound expression of subaltern agency.

The proposed study intends to fill this knowledge gap and has used different sources and methods which includes East India Company archives in Bangladesh; sources held at National Archives of India, National Library at Kolkata and sources on local languages—oral histories, in-depth interviews—in and around Sikkim. In my course of the research, I visited Bangladesh twice. First in 2016 thinking even if I couldn't find anything besides insect-eaten documents then at least I could inform other researchers of the situation there. In the National Archives of Bangladesh, I found there files dating back to the 1770s-1880s period. The records indicated that they included the Rangpur District records for the period from July 1777 to March 1889 and that they were part of a collection comprising 516 bound volumes of documents, amounts that would undoubtedly shed considerable light on many historical processes in the region.

Photo by Author: East India Company Archives in National Archives of Bangladesh, dated: 05/05/16.

Senior Archivist Mr. Elias Miah then told me, 'the documents are not properly arranged yet it may take time to provide all the relevant documents you need and are

in the process of arranging systematically.'[10] In the record room, what I saw confirmed that without additional workforce and funding, there is little prospect of that process being completed shortly. Scholars will probably have some years to wait before the material is available. In the meantime, their condition was worrying; the records were not well maintained and were scattered around the record room. In my second visit to Bangladesh in 2018, I was able to get some relevant documents about my research. Mainly from the period 1886-1914 from Secretariat Records Room which included correspondences, boundary demarcation reports, administrative reports, land records, census reports, military records, report on Sikkim budget, records on allowances of British officials, enquiry into the system of rents in Sikkim, Reports on Public Works Department, report on State revenues, allowances of Maharajah of Sikkim etc.

The records I was able to get hold of are printed documents, easy to read, but there is a massive bundle of files which are handwritten records containing a tremendous amount of information on the region. The papers dating back from the second half of the eighteenth century to the third half of the nineteenth century are mostly handwritten records. To retrieve that information, one has to do an extensive survey and has to be a handwriting expert at extracting that information from there. Due to the archaic nature of the records and on top of that due to the ill-maintenance of the files, we might lose those records forever if not done something soon. While a selection of these records was published between 1914 and 1927, in Walter K. Firminger (ed.), Bengal District Records, Rangpur, 5 vols., but the actual collection never attracted scholars. The political turmoil which followed after the passing of the control from British colonial India to independent (East) Pakistan, and becoming the sovereign State of Bangladesh in 1971, could be the reason. It is now only after several decades a part of this collection has been used in this study.

I visited the National Library of India in Kolkata, but having a vast collection of published books there very much relevant to my work and they have transferred the historical archives to National Archives in New Delhi, decided to visit there. National Archives of India contains a large number of records and is a massive repository of

[10] See in Rajiv Rai, "East India Company Archives in Bangladesh," The IIAS Newsletter, no. 76 (Spring 2017): 11.

papers covering the colonial and the post-colonial period. The system is very systematic and takes a long time to get hold of the required documents. The time management is proper and can work for the late hours in the archives. The only thing is that it takes a longer time to go through every record relevant to the research work. The British documents from the mid to late eighteenth century have been used in this study.

One of the critical problems while conducting historical research in Sikkim in the past was the lack of accurate and authentic records. However, with the transfer of Sikkimese Royal Palace Archives in 2008 to the custodianship of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology (NIT) (Mullard and Wongchuk 2010: 1), and the availability of the East India Company archives in Bangladesh which was hitherto unexplored and the very recent The Sikkim Palace Archive Digitisation Project (2016-2017)[11] has significantly eased this problem. Mullard states 'this collection of documents is, perhaps, one of the greatest discoveries of recent years as the scope and content of the material is extremely diverse' (2010: 12).

Theoretical Framework

This study attempts to 'look from below' by employing diverse approaches from the Subaltern studies to understand the history of Sikkim through the subaltern perspective. In this regard, it becomes essential to ask what or who constitutes subaltern in Sikkim context? The migrants or the runaways from the state-making project constituted subaltern in Sikkim at the beginning and later, apart from royals and Kazis; the section of people who do not fall into these categories constituted subalterns in Sikkim. The agitation of 1949 and 1973 was the profound expression of subaltern agency. There have been no significant studies hitherto on subaltern people in Sikkim. In the period of migration of Nepalese origin people into Sikkim, which suggests that the Nepalese subalterns found opportunities in Sikkim that were not available to them in Nepal or India. However, of the Lepcha-Bhutia cultivators, we have very little evidence on their perspective. The studies carried on Sikkim so far have been dominated by Orientalist traditions (Hansen 2003: 16), and the histories of Sikkim written after the advent of British in the Eastern Himalayan region represents

[11] However, the British Library has to bring this collection in the public domain, and perhaps soon we will be able to get access to it.

elite discourses/interests and is from the perspectives of elite class both in Sikkim and the British.

The earliest history written in the British period was in 1860 by a Sikkimese monk (Mullard 2011: 35) who represents the elite's interests. Moreover, *The Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894) written by a British Officer H. H. Risley represents British interest in Sikkim, and *History of Sikkim* (1908) attributed to King and Queen of Sikkim represents elite interests. For almost 20 years "subaltern studies" scholars have pursued innovative approaches to the condition and consciousness of subaltern groups in India, and subaltern studies have become very influential in many fields outside South Asian Studies (Hansen 2003: 7). According to Guha, 'the historiography had dealt with the peasant rebel merely as an empirical person or a member of the class, but not as an entity whose will and reason constituted the praxis called rebellion.' The Subalterns have acted in history on their own, independent of the elite, their politics constituted autonomous domain (Prakash 1994: 1478). However, there is no significant work on Tibet or Sikkim in this regard; Tibet and Sikkim have a commonality in several aspects as these states constituted a part of Eastern Himalayan states, both were/are frontier states, both were under the indirect colonial domination and had peasants movements after 1940s-50s.

Subaltern scholars investigate/develops propositions about the cultural and political impact of European conquest upon colonised societies and the nature of responses of those societies' (Ashcroft 1999/2001: 15) by mainly following the post-colonial traditions in theory. Subaltern studies have become part of the complementary and interdisciplinary stock of critical approaches available to scholars of colonialism, cultural studies, historical anthropology, and post-colonial studies. Indian Scholars since early 1980s periodically published essays under the title "Subaltern Studies," and now it circulates widely in many fields of Post-colonial scholarship. The interdisciplinary study of colonialism has embraced the Subaltern studies. It is in India and Latin America that Subaltern studies have been most extensively institutionalised with scholarly collectives, academic journals, and course readers (Hansen 2003: 8). This study raises questions; what are the forces responsible for the State formation in Sikkim? By looking at the history of Sikkim 'from below,' what untold stories could emerge that is not highlighted in the elite discourses? How

did British policy impact upon the State formation in Sikkim? Moreover, what are the implications of British policy in the post-colonial period?

Methodology

This study adopts Historical-Analytical method but at the same time comparative, because combining historical and comparative methods may yield more clues to exactly how the modern state developed and adopts archival studies method for the refinement and extension of the existing knowledge. This research prescribes in-depth interviews with the resource persons; experts in the region, academicians, policymakers, and scholars. The oral histories of the area would be analysed to come up with the proper understanding of the region. Through these methods, the questions raised in this study can be answered, and a new addition to knowledge can be achieved. Chapter two historicizes the State formation process in Sikkim through a Subaltern perspective. The State formation process began in Sikkim much before the intervention of the British in the region, an early 'core' state was created under a single ruler in 1642, and this chapter begins the examination even before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty because some 'state-like' structures were already there before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642.

Chapter three seeks to re-examine the State formation process in Sikkim 'from the below,' and it also examines the effects of Colonialism in shaping the State of Sikkim in the modern parlance. Chapter IV deals with the agitations of 1949 and 1973, which were the profound expression of subaltern agency. There have been no significant subaltern studies in Sikkim so far. This chapter tries to re-look the popular agitations of 1949 and 1973 in terms of Ranajit Guha's "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency." Guha has identified three types of discourse about the peasant agitation; primary discourse is written by the officials reacting to the news of the event and is identified with the interests of the state. The secondary discourse which was published shortly after the incident which contains new interpretations that are later elaborated and developed into longer histories. Moreover, a tertiary discourse where the historians keep their narratives far beyond personal involvement and are said to have a semblance of truth. Chapter V deals with the aftermath of colonial rule in Sikkim, how the State was created as the Colonialism begins with the insertion of Colonialists in a particular society and does not end with the departure of Colonialists from that

society, because the cultural struggle between Colonialists and Colonised continues till present, and its later developments with the Union of India followed by conclusion.

Chapter II

Historicising State Formation in Sikkim

Introduction

Sikkim had been inhabited since pre-historic times, but there is no recorded history available of the people who lived in Sikkim. The accounts of the people in the ungoverned margins where there was no dynasty in control were slightly at odds because most of the official stories of the civilisations are the assertions and hymns of praises of the regime. If there is no history of certain people, that means there was no dynasty in control. The official accounts of the dynasty are centred on the court and the capital cities and are neglected or ignored both the incorporation of 'non-elites' and 'non-state spaces' beyond their reach. As referred in the first chapter 'state-like' structures existed even before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty. They were 'chiefdoms' or 'fiefdoms,' with each tribal chief having no fixed borders—culturally blurred boundaries—with divided jurisdictions. They were 'non-state' spaces without a central authority. It was only after the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642 that the history of the people was written, or the history of the dynasty was written (Scott 2009: 8, 34).

According to Scott 'it is difficult to reconstruct the life-world of the "non-elites" because they typically appear in the record...as labourers, taxpayers, padi cultivators, bearers of tribute...They rarely appear as historical actors and when they do...merely as a suppressed revolt and peasants are out of the archives' (2009: 34). The hegemonic histories of the Classical (premodern) states have been mined and distorted in the interest of identifying a 'proto-nation' and a 'proto-nationalism,' that we shall see in the subsequent section, that would be used against contemporary enemies—both foreign and domestic. The court documents that survive today are mostly tax and land records. The nature of the official histories exaggerates the power, coherence, and power claiming a legitimacy which are meant to persuade and to amplify authority not to report facts (ibid: 34).

'If we take the cosmological bluster emanating from the court centres as indicative of facts on the ground' (ibid) according to Scott it might be 'imposing the imperial imaginings of a few great courts on the rest of the region' states Richard O'

Connor (1997: 280). This chapter tries to deconstruct the history of Sikkim in the light of ongoing discourses as it has been already mentioned that this study is not a comprehensive survey on the history of Sikkim, but intends to bring the study of Sikkim with a close conversation with subaltern studies. To understand the historiography of Sikkim, it is necessary to understand the context in which the modern history of Sikkim was constructed.

Sectarian Rivalry in Central Tibet and the Establishment of Gelug pa Supremacy

The political and religious environment of Tibet was undergoing a radical change with different religious traditions vying with each other for political authority and support in central Tibet, Lhasa region. During sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, the two religious factions, namely Gelugpa and Nyingmapa, were involved in the religious politics to ascertain dominance over central Tibet. This period was marked by the religious rivalry and hostility in Tibetan history for the struggle of political supremacy in central Tibet (Mullard 2003: 14-5; 2011: 106). According to Akester (2001a: 4) "The available sources on this period of Tibetan history may not provide adequate detail, but they do make it abundantly clear that the country was plagued by chronic factional rivalries, verging at times on civil war." It was during the third quarter of the sixteenth century that the various central Tibetan factions began to vie for Mongol patronage and military alliances as a means to supremacy over their domestic rivals (ibid).

Zhigpo Lingpa and the Third Dalai Lama Sonam Gyatso represented the rival factions for the pursuit of a hegemonic power in Central Tibet in the sixteenth century. The flood prevention schemes in the Lhasa region became intertwined with the sectarian rivalry. The struggle for political supremacy conducted by Zhigpo Lingpa and the Third Dalai Lama, the flood prevention rituals in Lhasa were used as a means of displaying political dominance as such rituals, and counter rituals had become synonymous with the political climate of the period. The development of flood control politics in the Lhasa region became the means for extending religio-politico hegemony in central Tibet (Mullard 2011: 106-07). The rival camps were represented as prophesied saviours of Lhasa and to the city's Buddhist heritage (Akester 2001a: 5). After the advent of the Gelug pa which is well known that the

development of Gelug pa aided by the Mongolian military support which led to the increase in their significance in the political and spiritual affairs of the Lhasa region (Mullard 2011: 106; 2003: 14).

Zhigpo Lingpa by using the advantageous position of his supporters tried to increase specifically politically motivated flood prevention rituals in Lhasa to increase the dominance of his lineage. During this period his activities in Lhasa were marked by the ebb and flow of his patrons' fortunes in Central Tibet who was involved in the central Tibetan politics. He was born in the noble family of Nangtse, who was dominant in the Lhasa region. He also received religious and political support from the Drikungpa and the Dukpa[12] and was also closely allied to the Desi of Tsang. He was one of the greatest Nyingma pa masters of his time (Mullard 2011: 105-7; Akester 2001b: 28). According to Yeshe Choedon (1996: 23) 'Gelug pa sect was harassed by the King of Tsang' with which Zhigpo Lingpa was closely allied to and the large communities of Bon pos in eastern Tibet and Khams were severely weakened as a result of the war between different political groups (Mullard 2003: 14-5).

Gelug pa sect gained popularity not only within Tibet but also within a short period commanded the spiritual allegiance of almost all the rival tribes of Mongolia. Gelug pa turned to the Mongol help and in 1642, a Mongol prince Gushi Khan[13] proceeded to Tibet and defeated the King of Tsang (Choedon 1996: 23). The Fifth Dalai Lama was able to refute the teachings of Zhigpo Lingpa as fraudulent with the help of Mongol allies. The Nyingma pa lineage was suppressed and went as far as to ban the propagation of this lineage because of its overtly anti-Gelug pa politics in the central Tibet (Mullard 2011: 107-9; Rai 2015: 6). The Dalai Lama after the third Dalai Lama was the son of the Mongol nobility and perhaps the reason for their support to Gelug pa sect (Sorensen 2003: 127). The Fifth Dalai Lama, Nawang Lobsang Gyatsho after the suppression of Zhigpo Lingpa lineage was conferred as the head of the Gelug pa sect and the supreme authority of Tibet in 1642 (Choedon 1996: 23; Temple 1977: 22; Mullard 2011: 107).

[12] These are both sub-sects of the Karma Kargyu.
[13] See in Sadhukhan (1992: 9) in the political history of Tibet of the seventeenth century, Gushi Khan, an intrepid Mongol King is remembered as his military dominance over Tibet. He is better known as Tenzin Chogyal by Tibetans.

Zhigpo Lingpa and Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin in the Formation of Sikkim State

The religious lineage of Phuntshog Rigzin was heavily influenced by *Jangter* teachings and practices and was inextricably linked to the groups hostile to the rise of the Gelug pa (Mullard 2011: 100-01). In the translation of *Ngadag Gyalrab (NGR)*[14], it is said that in 1614 Phuntshog Rigzin's father lost his Kingdom and following this fall in status, his early life as a religious figure. He received his earliest teachings from his father, Tashi Khrican. *NGR* mentions numerous threats to his life. As a result, he contemplates visiting his grandfather Tagsam Can, who was residing in the palace of the Tsang princes: Samdruptse. He received his full transmission from his grandfather and subsequently, he succeeded his grandfather's position in the Tsang court and became a famous and influential Lama (Mullard 2011: 94, 101-2). Mullard states 'it is not mentioned directly, but we can assume that he was brought up in the traditions of his grandfather Tagsam Can...that he requested to have his funeral rites in the traditions established by his grandfather' (2011: 102). In the sixteenth century, Zhigpo Lingpa, who is said to be the avatar of Prince Murub Tsenpo, who had attended the consecration ceremony of *Bumchu* by Guru Rinpoche, unearthed the *Bumchu* (holy vase) from the monastery in Lhasa. Latterly he offered it to Terton Tagsam Can (1556-?) of Ngari. Terton Tagsam Can entrust the *Bumchu* to his grandson Phuntshog Rigzin, and that is how the *Bumchu* was placed in Tashiding monastery (present Tashiding monastery in West Sikkim) by Phuntshog Rigzin (Dokhampa 2003: 28-9). It throws light to the fact of how the teachings of Zhigpo Lingpa was introduced into Sikkim.

Mullard states 'the presentation of *NGR* as a continuous work helps to reinforce the historical lineage of Phuntshog Rigzin as a descendant of the lineage of Trisong Detsen' (2011: 100) who had connections with Zhigpo Lingpa lineage and the Tsang princes and 'he was not immune from the wider political context of late sixteenth and early to mid-seventeenth century Tibetan politics' (ibid: 104). After the suppression of Nyingma lineage, a lineage hostile to Gelug pa fled from Tibet and to continue the Nyingma lineage, they chose Sikkim as a suitable place. Several *Beyul*

[14] See in Mullard (2011: 90) *NGR* is primarily an account of the Ngadag family history taken from the Namchi monastery edition of *Gyalrab Salbi Melong* (*Glr*) which was written in the fourteenth century by the Sakya hierarch Sonam Gyaltsen (1312-75). *NGR* is an appendage to this document and is a historical account of the early Tibetan emperors and their lines of descent, and it was written in the mid-seventeenth century by Champa Tenzin, son of Phuntshog Rigzin.

(hidden land) had been conceived, and each had their guide books (*Terma*) (Namgyal 1908: 6). Hidden lands (*Beyul*) were foreseen to serve as a refuge in degenerate times in establishing and upholding monastic establishments for those teachings. Throughout the harsh, distant or isolated Himalayan borderlands, which contributed to ensuring the survival and diversification of otherwise lost religious traditions nurtured outside the traditional sectarian institutions (Sorensen 2003: 109). The idea that *Beyul* must be opened by suitably qualified spiritual practitioners. This theological idea of the "opening of the *Beyul*" became synonymous with the process of the formation of the state in Sikkim, as the 'opening' narrative became attached to the 'formation' narrative (Mullard 2011: 192). Sikkim was one of those, and in degenerate times, people would take refuge and ensure the continuance of their tradition.

Phuntshog Rigzin and his Flight to *Beyul* (Sikkim)

The historical sources from the second half of the seventeenth century, which gives insight to the early state formation; the arrival of Tibetan Lamas and the context in which they have been forced to leave Tibet. *NGR* is such an account which helps in contextualising the religious and political background of Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin and his religious activities in Sikkim (ibid: 99). According to Mullard '*NGR* is incomplete and has suffered considerable damage...Indeed the text is missing a portion of the colophon and throughout the text lacunae and errata are commonplace, and a complete translation of *NGR* has yet to be done by the scholars' (2011: 91).

This section accounts Phuntshog Rigzin's flight to Sikkim as the context for his flight has already been laid in the previous section. *NGR* gives the impression that Phuntshog Rigzin was alone in his discovery of the *Beyul* (Sikkim) (ibid: 110). It is mentioned in the *NGR* that when Phuntshog Rigzin appealed to allow him to go to Sikkim to Tsang prince, it was denied in the first instance, which indicates the subordinate position of Phuntshog Rigzin. Moreover, it was only after the fate of the Tsang princes was sealed in 1642, Phuntshog Rigzin was able to make his journey to Sikkim (ibid: 108-9). A translation of the passage from *NGR* about Phuntshog Rigzin's travels and his activities in Sikkim is given in the annexure.

NGR is an account of Ngadag family and Phuntshog Rigzin's activities in Sikkim, Phuntshog Rigzin's son Champa Tenzin is the author of this document, which

may lead to believe that this work is open to biases according to Mullard (2011: 109-2). The content of *NGR* differs from the more traditional accounts of the formation of the Sikkimese state and later Sikkimese histories. There is the absence of two other characters of the coronation myth in *NGR* and the fact that in the later historical tradition such importance is placed on the meeting of the three Tibetan Lamas in Yuksam (present-day West Sikkim) and their role in the formation of the Sikkimese kingdom (ibid: 109). According to *NGR*, Lhatsun Chenpo was not present at the coronation of the first king, or if he was, it is not mentioned in the source.

In accordance to the traditional and orthodox narratives of the formation of the Sikkimese state (*Denzong Gyalrab*/*History of Sikkim*, 1908), Phuntshog Rigzin played a sideline role in the coronation of the first king (ibid: 89). This narrates the departure of Tibetan lamas as the fulfilment of the revelation, as some predestined plan, the fruition of Guru Rinpoche's prophesies. Ngadag pa Phuntshog Rigzin received instructions from the Terton Ratna Lingpa about his sojourn to the hidden land: "One of the four of my Avatars will be a devotee of the Yogi type. He will propagate the faith by cultivation on his path" (Namgyal 1908: 16-7). Moreover, this event is also mentioned in the Ratna Lingpa's oracular work: "One sprung from the line of Trisong Detsen will be born there. The sign of Sikkim being populated will be when circumstances drive a descendant of the lines of Trisong Detsen as a bird pursued by a hawk to seek refuge in Sikkim" (ibid: 17).

Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin started his journey from Shigatse on the 25th day of the 3rd month of the Chu ta year (Water Horse, 1642) and he arrived in Sikkim by way of Darjeeling and Namchi through the southern gate. The Lamas met at Yuksam Norbu Gang, and for the Lepchas, Yuksam means where the three superior ones or noblemen met (Namgyal 1908: 15-7, Risley 1894/1989: 248-9, Mullard 2011: 44-5, 2005: 38). We discussed how the *NGR* and the traditional-orthodox accounts of the formation of the Sikkimese state detail the arrival of Phuntshog Rigzin in Sikkim. There are documents from the seventeenth century, which is a *Namthar* (religious biography) accredited to the collected works of Lhatsun Chenpo which give insights about his journey to Sikkim.

Lhatsun Chenpo and his Arrival in *Beyul* (Sikkim)

There are three principal texts accredited to Lhatsun Chenpo, namely; *Khachod Trulpai Phodrang Demozong su Har Sangs Gyumai Roltsi Kyi Lam Yig (LTLY)*, *Lhatsun Chenpoi Namthar Soldeb (LTNT)* and *Kunzang Nampar Gyalwa (KZNG)* 'written in the poetic style interposed by lengthy poetical songs which sheds light on his early life, his teachers, flight to Sikkim and his activities in Sikkim' states Mullard (2011: 115-6). This section will mainly try to unravel in what context Lhatsun Chenpo left Tibet and how historical narratives have described his visit to Sikkim and his activities in Sikkim. Later in this chapter will try to find out the reason that traditional and orthodox accounts place him as the chief protagonist in the formation of the Sikkimese state.

When we look at the life of Lhatsun Chenpo, he remained under the tutelage of many masters. He fled his home at the age of eleven to dedicate his life in the religious study. At the age of twenty-four (c.1621), he travelled to eastern Kong po where he met Sonam Wangpo (one of his principal teachers) and from whom he received the transmission and instructions in the profound new and old traditions. He remained there for a year and following his stay with this Lama he received some directions from Urgen Palzor (presumably his earlier teacher). He also received essential teachings from Zhanphen Dorje (1534-1654), a student of Sogdogpa Lodro Gyaltsen who had close connections with the lineage of Zhigpo Lingpa and passed on these teachings to Lhatsun Chenpo (ibid: 118).

Lhatsun Chenpo continued to receive teachings and instructions from several Lamas. He had five principal teachers, of which two can be considered his primary teachers: Sonam Wangpo and Jatshon Nyingpo whom he met c.1619. It was from these two Lamas that he received initiations into important Nyingma *terma* traditions. It is clear from the literature authored by him that he is primarily Nyingma practitioner (Mullard 2003: 15; 2011: 119). Lhatsun Chenpo as well as being the student of several essential Lamas but he being a *Terton* in his respect. He is most commonly associated with several *terma* he revealed having received them as pure vision. He received a vision in Tashiding in which he was transported to Lhari Nyingphug in northern Sikkim; this *terma* is revered in Sikkim to this day (Mullard 2011: 119-21).

It appears when we read the historical sources such as Ngadag history since it is the history of Ngadag family we hardly see any mention to Lhatsun Chenpo and any references to his involvement in the seventeenth century Tibetan politics. In the works accredited to him as we mentioned namely *LTLY, LTNT,* and *KZNG* we see he has received teachings from Zhanphen Dorje who was a student of Sogdogpa Lodro Gyaltsen and who had close connections with the lineage of Zhigpo Lingpa. However, this is not sufficient to prove that he was involved in the anti-Gelug pa politics in Central Tibet. Despite his non-reference to anti-Gelug pa politics in central Tibet he still fled Tibet and we will try to deduce a reason for his flight to Sikkim.

Lhatsun Chenpo's Flight to Sikkim

When we analyse the available sources we find that due to the political turmoil in Tibet, due to the period of violence and religious rivalry in Central Tibet, his principal teacher Jatshon Nyingpo warns him about the approaching of powerful army from Mongolia and urges him to open the *Beyul* (Sikkim), and he also alludes to a period of suffering and possibly hostility and the fear of religious suppression (ibid: 116, 124). The political climate in Tibet during the late 1630s and early 1640s was a period of extreme upheaval, both in terms of political organisations and religious participation, and it is probably this broader socio-political climate that Lhatsun Chenpo is referring in the text accredited to him, *LTLY*[15] (Mullard 2011: 123-4).

> (426) Furthermore, during the time of travelling from the eastern region of Kong yul, and being saddened, generally, by what is equal to the degeneration period resulting from the general impermanent and changing nature of all time. And particularly (427) there arose misunderstanding between Dbyings pa chen mo [an old term meaning ministers and regents] and those such as the Sne gdong gong ma, Bkra shis rtse and the brothers of the Lord of the northern Rba clan. Furthermore, to whomsoever I spoke, hearing only words of suffering and pain and so I have realised and understood the prophesies, by other eminent masters, that it is necessary for sentient beings of the *dus mtha* to flee to the hidden lands.
>
> In *The sutra of the royal prophesies,* which comes from the very mouth of our teacher the son of king Suddhodana, it states "Listen Shariputra! After my parinirvana a royal lineage, which is like a lamp, shall arise seven times. After that the end will come after a period of 5000 years and (428) my four disciples must go to four places which are the forests, the island of the external ocean, the source of the essence of meaning rivers and the place of the mountain called Dan tig. They must go to the island of the south-western places and also all the places of the doctrine of the Buddha...At the end of 500 years all the people of Tibet must go to the border regions. They should flee to the forest." Thus it is prophesied! Thus it is explained!

[15] See in Mullard (2011: 115) 'despite being defined as *Lam Yig* (guide book) details vital historical information.'

> "....Now the great powerful army from Mongolia is coming...those sons, (429) disciples, benefactors and persons affectionately connected must abandon attachment and must go towards the direction of the peaceful hidden land " (LTLY: 426 line 1-429 line 1).

To escape the politico-religious contempt of central Tibet, he and those who were facing difficulties in Tibet fled to seek a haven for the practice of Buddhism (Mullard 2003: 15). The *Namthar* in the *LTLY* states because of degenerate times due to the conflict between the ministers and regents that the time has come to move to the hidden lands (Mullard 2011: 122). It can be said that after the consolidation of Central Tibet by forces loyal to the Dalai Lama and after the ascendancy of Gelug pa lineage in Lhasa in 1642, Lhatsun Chenpo fled Tibet and at the same time Phuntshog Rigzin left Tibet. In the *Terma* tradition[16], the opening of hidden land follows a pattern of identifying each prophesied lama who comes to *Beyul* through the four directions; north, south, east and west and meets at the same place to organise the administration of Sikkim in accordance with the religio-politico order: *Chosi Lugnyi*[17](ibid: 4).

Lhatsun Chenpo[18], who as per the traditional and orthodox narratives of the Sikkimese state formation, played a significant role in the coronation of the first king Phuntshog Namgyal (ibid: 89). The third Lama Kahthog Kuntu Zangpo; however, there is not much reference to this Lama, there exists very little evidence regarding this figure's life and activities in Sikkim[19] (ibid: 125). According to *Denzong Gyalrab/History of Sikkim* (1908); Lhatsun Chenpo received a revelation from the hidden texts of *Tersar* and *Danang Gongter,* and *Thanglha* oracle foretold his departure. Kahthog Kuntu Zangpo received instruction from the Terton Ratna Lingpa's oracular works: "One of my four saintly Avatars, who will come hereafter, will be one who will not be so clearly known to others, but who will discover one of the paths leading into this sacred hidden land" (Namgyal 1908: 16-7).

[16] See in Mullard (2011: 28) *Jorche Zhi'i Lungten* the *terma* tradition, 'which predicts the arrival of three Tibetan Lamas to Sikkim.'
[17] However, 'historical narratives' mentions about three Lamas and one layman from each direction.
[18] See in Risley (1894/1989: 248) he is also known as Lhatsun Namkha Jigme (The Reverend God who fears not the sky) and Kushog Sogchen Chenmo [sic], the technical name for the system of mystical insight of the Nyingma pa tradition.
[19] Perhaps this Lama had little role to play in the formation of Sikkimese state, or it is also possible that sources containing his references were lost or destroyed!

The traditional and orthodox accounts narrate the arrival of Tibetan Lamas as follows:

> Lha tsun chen po, a native of Kong bu in the lower valley of the Tsangpo started his journey with thirty five followers after receiving a vision in the Shing-Tel (Wood-Monkey) year (1644), that the time has come to move towards *Beyul*. Next year (Wood Bird, 1645) he meets with one of his principal teachers 'Ja' tshon snying who enlightens him about several prophecies in *Terma* tradition which predicts his appearance and advent in Sikkim. He sets his final journey on the 13th of the 5th month of the Me-kyi (Fire Horse, 1646) year (Mullard 2005: 37), and on his way, he meets with Kathog Kuntu-bzangpo, a lama of Kathog sect, who had come through Kang-la Nang ma pass searching for a path to Sikkim, and tried through sPreu-gyab-lag, Dsong-ri and the western shoulder of sKam -pa Khab-raga ridge of "Kabl'u", and not finding any road towards Sikkim had retreated back. Lhatsun Chenpo after finding him tells that he was destined to open the western gate and continues his journey towards the northern pass. While going through the Kang-La Nangma pass he was not been able to see any pass further. He miraculously flew over the top of the Tugyab lag (the dais of the monkey) beyond the sight of his followers and narratives say that he did not return for seven days, the followers believed that he had perished in the precipices. When they were about to return, they heard *kangling* (thigh bone trumpet), sounding and they were confirmed that he is alive. So on the 3rd day of the 10th month, he came back miraculously and showed them a path through Dsong-ri to Norbugang in Sikkim. Kathog Kuntu-bzang po entered through the western pass through the Singili-La pass into the interior of Sikkim with great difficulties and hardships (Namgyal 1908: 15-7, Risley 1894/1989: 248-9, Mullard 2011: 44-5).

Evidence extracted by the Archaeological Survey of India (Kolkatta circle), which includes the stone carvings of Jatshon Nyingpo and the iconography of Lhatsun Chenpo, where he is shown in a blue figure holding a skull and *kangling* (thigh-bone trumpet). This depiction of Lhatsun Chenpo is based on the story concerning his flight over the top of the Tugyab la, and when he did not return in seven days had suffered frostbite which turned his body into blue-black colour, his disciples began to construct a stupa to honour him. However, when they heard his *kangling*, they abandoned their work and reached there for rescue and hence the blue colour and thigh bone trumpet in the iconography (Mullard 2011: 171-2).

There is a discrepancy in the dates of departure of Lhatsun Chenpo from Tibet in the traditional-orthodox historiography and the texts accredited to him. It is evident that Gelug pa ascendancy in Tibet was established in 1642, and as a result of this, lineage opposed to Gelug pa fled Tibet. Moreover, it is also mentioned that

meanwhile in Tibet, the position of selected Nyingma pa traditions improved both in terms of political and religious ways after the Fifth Dalai Lama gained greater control over the Tibetan government's organisation. The Dalai Lama revered Lhatsun Chenpo as a lineage holder of the *Jangter* and an important Terton. The Nyingma practitioners were enjoying a sort of renaissance, supported by the Nyingma friendly Dalai Lama who much to the disapproval of the Gelug pa authorities began practising and revealing texts associated with the Nyingma teachings. 'The Great Fifth quietly accepted their integrity as distinguished Nyingma pa lamas, while vigorously opposing their political ambitions' according to Akester (2001b: 30). Indeed the respect the Dalai Lama had for Lhatsun Chenpo lineage is reflected by the endowments made to the incarnation of Lhatsun Chenpo, which included the lands of the Zar region on the Tibet/Sikkim/Nepal borderlands. The privileged position of Lhatsun Chenpo's *terma* cycles and the political patronage was given to his lineage was later development, occurring after the defeat of Tsang, the consolidation of the Gelug pa state (post 1642), the coming of age of the Dalai Lama and his liberal attitude towards the Nyingma traditions (Mullard 2011: 121-4; 2005b: 45). Is it after he rose to prominence he left Tibet or before that? Let us see the discrepancy in the dates and try to understand the context in which he left Tibet.

Examining the Discrepancy on Dates Based on the Context

It was after the consolidation of Central Tibet by Dalai Lama and after the establishment of Gelug pa dominance in Lhasa in 1642 that Lhatsun Chenpo left for Sikkim. According to the traditional narratives, Lhatsun Chenpo arrived in Sikkim in 1642 and was involved in the enthronement of the first Sikkimese Chogyal (Monarch). It was noted in the earlier section that there is a chronological discrepancy in the dates on the arrival of Phuntshog Rigzin (1642) and Lhatsun Chenpo (1646) in Sikkim. The only date given in the writings of Lhatsun Chenpo *(LTLY)* is the tenth day of the fifth month of the Fire Rat year (1636), 'as the date for a tantric feast, which accompanied the consecration and purification rituals' according to Mullard (2011: 124). Moreover, it is mentioned in the text that he sets forth his journey to Sikkim on the fifteenth day of the seventh month (ibid). Since there is no year given, it is possible to assume that he is still referring to the same year. The next date is the tenth day of the ninth month, and it is shortly after this date that Lhatsun Chenpo

meets with Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin at the middle door to the *Beyul* (ibid: 124-5). The passage from *LTLY,* where he narrates his arrival in Sikkim is as follows:

> (556) Then on the first day of dkar phyog dga' ba of the tenth month having arrived at Nor bus gang...[I] stayed in the house of the highest Mantra holder Thutob Wangpo..., vast offering feast were arranged for a number of days to all the assembled Yogin brothers....Chogyal Phuntshog Namgyal, the master of this extensive country Thus the good external and internal Omens were arranged. Then again, being endowed with the heroic consecration of the seven ritual objects of political power, as well as the eight auspicious objects and signs and so forth; was enthroned as the great benefactor of the Buddhist teachings. Then I met with Bkra shis Namgyal dpal bzang po, who is the descendant of the lineage of the *Dharmarāja* Khri srong lde'u btsan, and The Lord of Dharma Kahthog Kuntu Zangpo, who, from a long time, has stepped foot in the outer and inner parts of this great sacred land. And with great kindness *bzhas len* was made abundant (LTLY: 556-7).

In his narration in *LTLY,* he states when he arrived at Norbu Gang (Yuk-sam, present West Sikkim) he stayed in the house of the highest Mantra holder Thutob Wangpo, and it was a sort of feast for the assembled Yogin brothers. Then the Phuntshog Namgyal was enthroned as the benefactor of the Buddhist teachings having said "Chogyal Phuntshog Namgyal, the master of this extensive country." Is it before the arrival of the three lamas that Phuntshog Namgyal was the king of Sikkim? It is a question to delve upon. It is evident that after the consolidation of Central Tibet by Dalai Lama and after the arrival of Mongol Army, Lhatsun Chenpo left Tibet because of political turmoil and period of violence in Tibet and at the same time Phuntshog Rigzin left Tibet after the fate of Tsang's princes was sealed in 1642. If we try to deduce the date of the departure examining the context the appropriate time hinting towards the year the Mongol army arrived in Tibet and the year the fate of Tsang prince was sealed in Tibet was 1642, and there is another part about Lhatsun Chenpo meeting Kathog Kuntu Zangpo on his way to *Beyul*. The creation of new Gelug pa State forced threatened people to choose between absorption and resistance (Scott 2009: 130). The formation of Gelug pa State in Tibet led to the creation of a shatter zone or flight zone to those wishing to evade or to escape bondage fled (ibid: 2009: 24). So, we can conclude that the Lamas belonging to Nyingma sect fled Tibet owing to the arrival of Mongol army in Tibet and after the ascendancy of Gelug pa lineage due to the fear of the suppression of Nyingma lineage in Tibet.

The Arrival of Tibetan Lamas and the Enthronement of Phuntshog Namgyal in Sikkim

Sikkim's geopolitical location is as such that it was a meeting place for the different people of the Tibetan and Himalayan regions and this place is believed to have had the religio-political function as a place to escape to in times of persecution (Mullard 2011: 2, 10). There are 'historical texts' available which includes; *Neyig* or *Lam Yig* (guide books), *Lungten* (prophecies), *Terma* (treasure text), G*yalrab* (royal genealogies), *Namthar* (biography), *Chojung* (histories of religion), *Logyu* (chronicles) (ibid: 27) which sheds light on the arrival episode of the three Tibetan Lamas in Sikkim and the enthronement[20].

It is through *Terma* tradition Sikkim is identified as *Beyul*; *terma* is considered as received treasures and is regarded as direct and truthful renditions of prophecy (ibid: 28). To understand the arrival episode of Tibetan Lamas in Sikkim, it is necessary to understand the *Terma* tradition as the early narratives of Sikkim is based in this tradition. The arrival of Tibetan Lamas to *Beyul* (Sikkim), a hidden land according to Rigdzin Godem 'blessed by Guru Rinpoche' a place of refuge for the practice of Buddhism in degenerate times (ibid: 9). Sikkim as *Beyul* (hidden land) and much of the concept of the *Beyul* was conceived in Tibet (ibid: 1).

According to the traditional-orthodox account, after the arrival of Tibetan Lamas in Sikkim, the three lamas held a council at which Lhatsun Chenpo uttered; 'here are we three Lamas in a new and irreligious country, we must have a—dispenser of gifts—(a king) to rule the country on our behalf' (Risley 1894/1989: 249). *History of Sikkim* (1908) states after the arrival of Lamas in Sikkim Lhatsun Chenpo uttered, "We are all Lamas, we want a layman to rule the kingdom righteously, and he quoted the oracular guide book of Rinchen Lingpa (One of the eight great Tertons)" (1908: 18). *Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894/1989) states, the Ngadag pa Lama Phuntshog Rigzin said, 'I am descended from the celebrated Terton Ngadag Namgyal', who was latterly a Governor; 'I should, therefore, be the king.' While the Kathog lama declared, as 'I am of royal lineage I have the right to rule.' Then Lhatsun Chenpo said, 'in the prophecy of Guru Rinpoche it is written that four noble brothers shall meet in Sikkim

[20] These are the relevant sources which are more prophetical-religious sources, and it is difficult to find other sources which shed light on the arrival and enthronement conundrum.

and arrange for its government. We are three of these came from the north, west, and south. Towards the east, there is at this epoch a man named Phuntshog, a descendant of brave ancestors of Kham in Eastern Tibet and therefore, to the prophecy of the Guru we should invite him'(1894/1989: 249).

Accordingly retinue of messengers was dispatched to search for the Phuntshog. *Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894/1989) and *History of Sikkim* (1908) gives a similar account of the search expedition as already mentioned that these narratives see the arrival of Tibetan Lamas and subsequent event (enthronement) as the fruition of divine prophecy. The account goes on when the entourage was sent for the search of a man named Phuntshog, after several adventures they met a man churning milk, without being aware of the whereabouts of the place, at the extreme east near Gangtok. On their inquisitiveness, he took them inside without replying invited them to sit down and rendered the meeting auspicious by giving a drink of fresh milk as the very first gesture, and he revealed his name was Phuntshog (Namgyal 1908: 18, Risley 1894/1989: 249, Mullard 2011: 44-5).

Phuntshog Namgyal was a descendant of the lineage of the kings of Khams Minyak in Eastern Tibet (Gyatso 2005: 51) and would speak the language which the procession of messengers would understand. Thus, it is possible that they presented him the invitation because he spoke the language they understood. Understanding the word does not mean understanding the language per se, but there could be much more similarities between them. On presenting him the invitation he took graciously and started with entire followers, officers and household establishment forthwith and was conducted to the lamas, who consecrated him as a King to rule the country in a religious order (Namgyal 1908: 18, Risley 1894/1989: 249, Mullard 2011: 44-5). He was offered the eight auspicious symbols, the eight auspicious substances and the possessions of a *cakravātin*, by definition is a universal monarch (Mullard 2011: 134-5), and gave him Lhatsun Chenpo's surname of Namgyal[21] [sic] (Risley 1894/1989: 249) and Phuntshog Rigzin's name Phuntshog and the title of Chogyal or 'religious king.' According to Mullard 'Phuntshog Namgyal was the name given at the event of

[21] See in Dokham (1994: 57) Lhatsun Chenpo took his ordination as a celibate monk at the monastery of gsung-snyak Ri-khred by which he was given the name Kunzang Namgyal.

coronation, and after that, he was no longer referred by his earlier name, Apa Dorje' (2011: 110).

This raises a serious question about the legitimacy of the historical narratives, which claims the 'name' was already conceived in the *terma*. Phuntshog Namgyal at that time was aged 38 years and became a lama in the same year (Risley 1894/1989: 249). Another seventeenth-century document *Tenchog Lha Ne Bab Te Nangtsen Gyakar Sharchog Gyune Wongte Khamchog Mi Nyag Awo Dongdrug Punsum Gyi Jungkhong Logyu Zhugs (PSLG)* indicates that the early formation of centralised authority existed prior to 1642 which leads us to believe that either Phuntshog Namgyal was not necessarily the first ruler in Sikkim, 'he may have inherited this position form an earlier figure, about whom we know almost nothing or his rule predates 1642' (Mullard 2011: 81, 2005a: 75).

The site of the 'coronation' was of significance for extending political control and enhancing the legitimacy of the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal (Mullard 2011: 136) in which the Lamas played a crucial role, and it may be, for this reason, the Lamas chose Yuksam, not Tashiding (Tashiding-which has high-status value according to the *Neyig[s]* of Sikkim) as the site of the coronation. Today numerous standing stones are surrounding a central tree, and this site is similar to some other Lepcha ritual sites such as Kabi in north Sikkim, and La chu in Rong Dzong Gu (North Sikkim) (ibid: 136).



Photo by Author: Coronation Site Yuk-sam Norbu Gang, West Sikkim, dated: 18/03/2019.

Considering that many of the inhabitants of Yuksam were and still Lepcha, it may be possible to assume that Norbu Gang was a site of ritual importance. The practice, then, of holding the enthronement rituals, there becomes a way of showing Phuntshog Namgyal's political and spiritual control of the region and hence enhances the legitimacy of his rule. The assumption of the ritual sites by invaders, new powers or new religious groups is a common theme in human history. It seems likely that the use of this site in Yuksam, on several occasions, for enthronement rituals served the similar purpose of dominating the minds and the spiritual or ritual, as well as the physical territory of the Lepchas in the region. The fact that this ritual was repeated seems to suggest the need for Phuntshog Namgyal to assert his power and seek legitimacy (ibid) always and with the religious patronage of Lamas, it became possible to establish the dynasty. Moreover, after the enthronement of Phuntshog Namgyal how the positions of Lamas changed in early Sikkim, we shall see in the following section.

Transformation in the Positions of Lamas after the Enthronement of Phuntshog Namgyal

After the suppression of Nyingma lineage by the fifth Dalai Lama with the help of Mongol allies in Tibet and the ban on the propagation on the teachings related to this lineage, this reduced the Nyingma practitioners into minor position in Tibet. The fear of complete suppression of Nyingma lineage in Tibet led to the flight of Nyingma practitioners from Tibet. The three Lamas we discussed in the earlier sections belonged to this tradition, and to protect and propagate their lineage, they took refuge in Sikkim under the patronage of Phuntshog Namgyal. This section will try to explore how the religious masters reduced to the 'subaltern' position in Tibet, with the support of Phuntshog Namgyal in Sikkim transformed their positions and try to explain the subaltern position does not remain constant always; it can be changed by the examples drawing from the activities of Tibetan Lamas in Sikkim.

We can assess their positions by examining the monasteries they built with the political patronage of Phuntshog Namgyal during their lifetime with its significance and the role they played in the formation of Sikkimese state. According to Ngadag history, Phuntshog Rigzin and his son held the position of being the chief religious instructor of the first Sikkimese king. Both Ngadag pa (documents concerning

Phuntshog Rigzin) and Lhatsun pa (documents relating to Lhatsun Chenpo) versions indicate the level of patronage. To answer this question, we should see the emergence of early monasteries in Sikkim. Phuntshog Rigzin and his son began the construction of Marpo Lhakhang which was the first monastic complex, the first monastery of Sikkim in Yuksam during the 11th month of the 3rd day of the Water Sheep year (1643). Eight years after his first advent, Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin and his son also constructed the monastery of Zilnon near Tashiding, which they began in 1649 and completed in 1650 and gave the name Zilnon Gonpa. Later the Champa Lakhang was erected within the portals of Tashiding in 1651 (Mullard 2005b: 39-41; 2011: 111; Dokham 1996: 57-8). In between these two events, we are also told that Phuntshog Rigzin held a meeting which was attended by his son and the Sikkimese King Phuntshog Namgyal (Mullard 2011: 111). The subject of this conversation was religious patronage, and it has been argued by Ehrhard (2005: 20) that the 'topic of this meeting was to allow Phuntshog Rigzin's son to succeed him as a royal preceptor.'

According to the Ngadag history, during the lifetime of Phuntshog Rigzin, three principal monasteries were built in the name of the Ngadag lineage: Tashiding, in the centre of the *Beyul* (Sikkim) and thus the most sacred site in Sikkim. Tashiding considered the centre of the valley of rice, the supreme of all hidden lands in Tibet; Zilnon the former ancestral home of Phuntshog Namgyal; and the Marpo Lhakhang which was built close to the site of Phuntshog Namgyal's coronation. Lhatsun Chenpo, on the other hand, was responsible for the construction of Dupdhi and Tashi Zhom, to the west of Zilnon and in the region of his principal patron Lhawang Tashi. Lhatsun Chenpo also chose the site of Pemayangtse, but Pemayangtse monastery was only built as a durable institution in 1705 under the third Chogyal's rule. However, as already mentioned that there is not much reference to Kahthog Kuntu Zangpo in Sikkim, but he is credited to the building of Dagtozhon. The location of Ngadag monasteries seems to indicate that this tradition may have had a more prominent position in the early religious politics of Sikkim (Mullard 2005b: 41-2; Dokhampa 2003b: 84; Vandenhelsken 2003: 58; Acharya 2005: 50).

It appears that competing assertions from the two contenders characterise the issue of early state-led religious patronage: Lhatsun Namkha Jigme and Ngadag

Phuntshog Rigzin. It seems that Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin was perhaps the more influential of the two, Lhatsun Chenpo also had several vital patrons amongst the leading families of seventeenth-century Sikkim (Mullard 2005b: 42). The Lamas who sought refuge in Sikkim went on becoming the royal preceptors of King and thus transformed their positions from being refuge seekers to royal patrons of powerful monasteries in Sikkim. After the enthronement, the early reign of Phuntshog Namgyal was defined by the expansion of the borders of the territory through the subjugation of small regions through military strength and subservient alliances (Mullard 2011: 82-3). Now we shall see the unification of proto-states under the single ruler.

Unification of 'Proto-states' Under a Single Ruler

After the enthronement of Phuntshog Namgyal and after consolidating the power with the help of Lamas through religious consecration went on to the expansion and unification of petty chiefdoms under his single unified authority. Sinha states 'it appears that in the beginning, the Bhutia rulers extended their regime to the north and north-eastern Sikkim' (2008: 48). The Limbus and Magars were said to be among the earliest settlers of the land along with with the Lepchas (Sinha 2008: 66). In this course of unification and expansion, Phuntshog Namgyal was met with the massive resistance/rebellion. The newly formed dynasty was extended from Dibdala and Tang la (near Phari, Tibet) in the north, to Naxalbari and Titaliya (border between Bihar and West Bengal near Bangladesh) in the south, while the western boundary was stretched up to Wa lung, Timar chorten, and then followed the course of the Arun and Dudh Kosi River in Nepal to the eastern border extended up to Tagong La (near Paro, Bhutan) in the east (Mullard 2011: 46; Sinha 2008: 48-9).

The birth of a state or the emergence of the state does not take place smoothly or peacefully; it is a rather complicated and violent process. States are not formed by the intention of a ruler to create a state (Mullard 2011: 21) but, as Charles Tilly argues, are formed through "a process...driven largely by extraction, control and coalition formation as parts or by-products of rulers' efforts not to build states but to make war and survive" (2005: 3). The next phase of Sikkim statehood was characterised by the administrative and organisational structures which would secure a constant flow of revenue and provide a political structure that could be used not only to govern but to raise armies to protect the power of the Chogyal Phuntshog

Namgyal (Mullard 2011: 152). Many Kiranti communities and political entities of eastern Nepal became tied to Sikkim through annual tribute (ibid: 3). By 1657, areas under Phuntshog Namgyal's control were already subject to a system of political organisation, which included ranks of *blon* or ministers responsible for tax collection, trade and presumably the administration of regions (ibid: 153).

During the early reigns of the Sikkimese royal dynasty, a system of ethnic stratification was introduced based on Tibetan land economy. Phuntshog Namgyal adopted 'a magnificent device for courting the Lepcha loyalty by recognising the twelve important Lepcha chiefs as the Dzongpens (governor or administrator) by dividing the country into twelve Dzongs (districts)' (Mullard 2011: 86; Sinha 2008: 47) and twelve Tibeto-Sikkimese (Bhutias) were appointed as ministers; the two-tiered bi-ethnic political class was encouraged (Mullard 2011: 46), probably Dzongpens were under Ministers.

Despite establishing himself as the supreme ruler and Lamas helping him to establish a centralised authority, some point after the establishment of Rabdentse Palace (now in West Sikkim) in 1649, there was an internal rebellion instigated by the *Mon pa* of Yuksam. *Lasog Gyalrab* (*LSG*)[22] describes *Mon pa* of Yuksam as Chongkyel Monpa, which refers to a group within the economic stratification of early Sikkim. However, this internal rebellion was subdued by dispatching 'royal messengers' to the *mon pa* strongholds throughout the kingdom, and after the pacification, a 'royal council' was created to mediate and enact some form of agreement to ease the conflict (Mullard 2011: 84; Sinha 2008: 50). The reason of instigating this rebellion would be the dissatisfaction, on the part of Lepchas since a new system of ethnic stratification had been introduced after the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642, based on Tibetan land economy which might have brought some changes in the pre-existing system of administration.

The council resulted in the introduction of a new law which defined the relationship between *Pon* and *Yog*, the two classes of lords and servants, it was agreed:

[22] See in Mullard (2011: 56) *Lasog Gyalrab* a seventeenth-century historical source written by Karma Tsang Bang Kalzang Loden which gives a short overview of how Sikkim was settled by a Tibetan descendant of the Kham Miyag royalty in alliance with a *mon pa* (Lepcha) chief of Monyul (south of Himalayas).

> If your *Mon pa* (i.e. a *Mon pa* under your administrative authority) is male, his sons will belong to you (i.e. they will belong to you as servants). If the male *Mon pa* has only one son he will be retained by his family. Your wife will obtain whatever female *Mon pa* descendants that may exist but if there is only one, she will be retained by the *Mon pa* family. Whatever daughters your Mnags mo has, you will obtain [them]. But if there is only one daughter she must remain as the replacement mother. If the *Mon pa* and the *mnags mo* have only one daughter they can obtain another [son] (Mullard 2011: 84).

After the pacification of this internal rebellion within the economic stratification of early Sikkim and in the course of unification and expansion, Sinha (2008: 47)/Mullard (2011: 31) contends a massive resistance/rebellion or war was launched by Tsongs (Sikkimese Limbu), *Mons* (Sikkimese Lepcha), and Magars, against the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal. This event would have taken place after the pacification of the internal rebellion[23]. There were several competing assertions of power during the early reign of Phuntshog Namgyal by Tsongs*, Mons* (ibid: 5) and Magars. The different ethnic groups intentionally rebelled against the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal (Lho Mon Tsong Sum Agreement: Annexure I). We came across the internal conflict within the economic stratification of early Sikkim, now let us turn our attention to the rebellion or a war questioning the legitimacy of the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal. Mullard argues 'the sources from the 1650s and 1660s tell the historian a story that is not only different from the later narratives but also they tell us of a different political climate of hostility, opposition, rebellion and the re-assertion of authority' (2011: 139).

One such source is *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* (*LMT*) agreement 'which is written in the stylistic legal cursive script, used for official documents throughout the Tibetan world signed in Water Hare year (1663)' (ibid: 140). In this particular case, the leaders of Tashi Jong probably attempted to invade Lasog Jong, then the home of Phuntshog Namgyal, but were defeated (Mullard and Wongchuk 2010: 6). This document in all likelihood was written after the end of hostilities and Phuntshog Namgyal consolidating his control over the area (2011: 145). *LMT* a hypothetical model with several significant individuals—local leaders in their own right—pledging their allegiance and accepting the supremacy of Phuntshog Namgyal (ibid: 140-52). Mullard argues 'it is highly likely that the signatories were allowed to retain the

[23] After the pacification of this conflict a legal document (treaty) was signed by the contending parties and according to Mullard (2011: 140) this document was signed in the Water Hare year i.e. 1663 and internal rebellion was launched at some point after the establishment of Rab brtan rtse Palace in 1649. There is a gap between these two events and the rebellion/war would have been launched in between these two events in the course of unification and expansion process.

control of their areas in exchange for their submission to Phuntshog Namgyal and the supply of taxes and labour/soldiers to the Sikkikese throne (Mullard and Wongchuk 2010: 7). Sinha (2008: 47) states; "He (Phuntshog Namgyal) invited all the tribal chiefs to a meeting where he proclaimed the Sikkim Bhutias (the victorious *Lhopas*), the *Membas* or the *Monpas* (Lepchas) and the *Tsongs* (*Yakthungbas* or Limbus) were one family. The King (a *Lhopa*) should be considered as a father, Lepchas as the mother, and Limbus (*Tsongs*) as the sons of the same family, forming a council called *Lho Mon Tsong Sum*." He further argues, 'Magars did not come to terms and continued their fight and when defeated, migrated to the south and the west of Sikkim' (ibid).

Sinha referring to 'victorious *Lhopas*' which means there would be a massive rebellion or a war where *Lhopas* or the Bhutias became victorious and further states Magars did not come to terms. It means the Magars were also the party to the resistance, and even after the pacification of the conflict did not come to terms like Lepchas and Limbus. This agreement is a legal document signed by the representatives of three communities namely; *Lho pa* (Tibeto-Sikkimese), *Mon* (Lepcha or *Rong kup*) and the *Tsong* (Limbu) acknowledging the supremacy of Phuntshog Namgyal (Mullard 2011: 140). The following is some excerpts from *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* agreement:

> ....Henceforth conforming to the command of his majesty, the humble (12) ministers and leaders of Lho, Mon and Gtsong have met here with the desire for unification and solidarity and hereby make the statement that there shall not be separate governments of Lho, Mon or Gtsong.
> During the previous *Mon pa* war (13) [people] from all the different ethnic groups intentionally rebelled and this has been remembered...
> ....The eight clans of the Tibeto-Sikkimese (14) and the [people] of the Lho Mon and Gtsong will have come to those people who are united...
> The representatives have signed and affixed their seals in accordance with this agreement.

At the pacification of the rebellion, *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* agreement was signed in 1663 and new legal structures were established[24] (Mullard 2011: 87). It was said in the agreement that the ministers and leaders of *Lho*, *Mon* and *Tsong* with their desire for the unification and solidarity among themselves decided not to form separate governments. If in the case of external disturbance and threat to Dharma of the land, it was decided to act from a single government. In case of the violation of

[24] See in annexure full *Lho Mon Gtsong Gsum* agreement.

the rules sanctioned by the government, and in case of illegal acts committed; it was decided if they have the ability to pay three measures of gold to the legal official, be released from the violation, otherwise the punishment for breaking the law would be death or in the case of small violations physical torture. Sinha argues 'Limbus and Magars were pushed to the hot, humid and forested and malarial southern frontiers. Lepchas accepted the Bhutia overlordship, and it can be said that the entire areas associated with Lepchas came under Phuntshog Namgyal's rule' (2008: 48). Hamilton in *The East-India Gazetteer* states "...but instead of having chosen a Rajpoot chief, they (Lepchas) appear to have selected for their leader a native of Tibet" (1828: 547), they might have been forced to chose Phuntshog Namgyal as their ruler, after being defeated in the war. From the subaltern point of view rebellion against the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal would suggest that elite strategies were not accepted by the non-elites. The state formation narratives are historical accounts designed to legitimate and justify Tibetan [Buddhist] colonisation, although competing narratives enable us to read these strategies of domination.

Guha asserts 'the documents (official) do not get the content from the elitist will alone, it is predicated on another will also, that of rebels. Therefore, it is possible to read the presence of a rebel consciousness as a necessary and pervasive element within that body of evidence' (1983: 15). Like in *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* agreement there is a presence of rebels' will to defy the authority of Chogyal, though defeated they left their marks in the records. However, most, not all of the official records are elitist in origin. This has come down in the form of official records of one kind or another (Guha 1983: 14). Scott argues 'the thicker the paper trail they leave behind, the larger their place in the historical records' (Scott 2009: 34)

The validity of the power of the state comes from the people not through the innate legitimacy of the ruler by means of power, control and his status above the subjects or his royal bloodline (Mullard 2011: 20-1). From the day of signing of *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* agreement/treaty, different groups in Sikkim accepted the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal (ibid: 31) and, since then, we can mark the actual beginning of the Namgyal dynasty when the subjects accepted the legitimacy of the authority of Phuntshog Namgyal, not through religious sanctimony but through coercion, conquest, alliance formation and the subjugation of the native population (ibid: 27). We came across in the earlier section mentioning that the sources from the 1650s and

1660s tell a different story than those of the nineteenth and twentieth-century sources. The traditional and orthodox account places Lhatsun Chenpo as the chief protagonist in the formation of Sikkimese state, unlike in the 1650s and 1660s sources, which suggests the formation of state narratives. Now, we shall see the development of orthodox history and its acceptance in Sikkim in the later period.

Orthodox History of Sikkim and its Acceptance

There was large-scale production of Sikkimese histories during the British period, which conflicts with the early Tibetan sources from the 1650s and 1660s (ibid: 139, 185). Now, the question is why these narratives became the accepted history of Sikkim? *Gazetteer of Sikhim* (1894) and *BGR/History of Sikkim* (1908) are those written in the British period, which narrates the arrival of Tibetan Lamas in Sikkim as the fruition of divine prophecy. Questions arise regarding the development of orthodox history in Sikkim in the later British period and to understand this development; we have to look at the two distinct periods in Sikkimese history. First, the War of Succession c.1699-1708 and its aftermath and the British influence in the Himalayan region and the ultimate establishment of British rule in Sikkim (Mullard 2011: 161; 2005b: 43).

In the reign of second Chogyal Tensung Namgyal, there emerged a severe conflict on succession issue; he had three wives of whom his Bhutanese wife Nambi Ongmo gave birth to a daughter, Pande Wangmo. His Limbu wife gave birth to a son and a daughter, son being called Guru on account of his enrolment as a monk and the name of his daughter is unknown. He had an illegitimate son from the affair with Nambong, Yukthing Arup, the wife of Tasa Aphong and his Tibetan wife Lhacam Padma Phuti who gave birth to a son Chador Namgyal (1686-1717). His eldest son of being illegitimate could not inherit the throne, Pande Wangmo being eldest of the legitimate children rallied for the throne, Chador Namgyal was only ten years of age when his father died (Mullard 2011: 162).

These three marriages assumed to serve balance between the competing powers in the region. The marriage to the Tibetan wife secured connections with Tibet, marriage with Limbu woman achieved states of Limbuwan and the Bhutanese relationship was particularly important given that Bhutanese influence had extended to today's eastern Sikkim. With these marriages, different influences from Bhutan,

Tibet, Limbuwan and the Lepchas would have been present in the Sikkimese court. The war of succession started between the groups allied to crown prince Chador Namgyal and his half-sister Pande Wangmo (ibid: 162-3). The Ngadag school sided with Pande Wangmo to her claim to the Sikkimese throne (Mullard 2011: 173; 2005b: 43).

According to *History of Sikkim* (1908), Tensung Namgyal died in 1700 and in the same year Chador Namgyal was consecrated as the third Chogyal of Sikkim (Namgyal 1908: 25). Following the consecration, the Bhutanese force invaded Sikkim at the request of Pande Wangmo (ibid: 64), and Chador Namgyal fled Sikkim through the Ilam road, via Wa lung (the country of the Tsongs) in Tibet. The exile of Chador Namgyal appears to have been the turning point in the Sikkimese history and historiography (Mullard 2011: 161-63; Namgyal 1908: 25). His time in Tibet for the twelve years was significant for the development of Sikkimese history, in particular with reference to the development of the religious dominance of Pemayangtse monastery and the traditions of Lhatsun Chenpo. At Lhasa in his formative years, he attended the secular schools and distinguished himself in literature and astrology. He was kindly treated by both the Tibetan and Chinese governments and conferred on him a respectful rank called *Thaijee* along with with many estates as *Jagirs* (Mullard 2011: 164; Namgyal 1908: 25). What is more critical is Jigme Pabo's persona, who was the third incarnation of Lhatsun Chenpo in shaping the course of later historical narratives regarding the formation of the Sikkimese state (Mullard 2011: 171).

Two significant events affected the development of Lhatsun Chenpo's tradition in Sikkim. In the preceding sections, we saw Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin was more influential lama during the period of the first king. Ngadag family held the position of royal preceptors, following the death of Phuntshog Rigzin his position was passed to his son Champa Tenzin and from him to his son, Ngadag Rinchengon. Ngadag Rinchengon is remembered for his alleged affair with Pande Wangmo, which discredited his lineage, half-sister of Chador Namgyal, who was considered responsible for the Bhutanese invasion of Sikkim following the death of the second Chogyal, Tensung Namgyal (Mullard 2011: 164; 2005b: 43).

Ngadag Rinchengon unwittingly perhaps was embroiled in this event through his affair with Pande Wangmo and it appears that he was not an active opponent of

Chador Namgyal, his relationship with Pande Wangmo made his position as royal preceptor untenable. Though he remained in Sikkim, conducting prayers in Rabdentse palace at the request of Chador Namgyal, his main work was performed in the northern town of Lachung, where he stayed for some time, and areas of eastern Sikkim, away from the Royal court in West Sikkim. However, after the return of Chador Namgyal from Tibet his position became irrelevant, as far as his status as a royal preceptor is concerned, Jigme Pabo the disciple of Terdag Lingpa[25] arrived in Sikkim. Chador Namgyal and Jigme Pabo jointly administered Sikkim and set about the reorganisation of the landholding system. Moreover, it is from the activities of Jigme Pabo, supported by the third Chogyal that the position of Lhatsun Chenpo in early Sikkimese history became emphasised. This was in part due to the resurgence of Lhatsun Chenpo's religious tradition and the introduction of practices of Mindrol Ling[26] in Sikkim by the presence of Jigme Pabo and it resulted in the decline of the Ngadag tradition (Mullard 2011: 164-65; 2005b: 44).

The arrival of Jigme Pabo in Sikkim c.1709 transformed Pemayangtse and the traditions of Lhatsun Chenpo from a minor monastery and religious tradition into Sikkim's most famous monastery and the dominant religious culture in Sikkim, the position of Mindrol Ling lineage was firmly established in Sikkim. The rising importance of Jigme Pabo in the region resulted in the declining fortunes of the Ngadag tradition in Sikkim. He later cemented this position through the system which extended the control of Pemayangtse monastery in Sikkim: this involved dispatching representatives from Pemayangtse to principal Ngadag monasteries, a move which indicated the suppression of Ngadag and the ascendancy of Pemayangtse. The tension is further evidenced by the role of Pemayangtse in the funeral rites of Chador Namgyal in 1717 (Mullard 2011: 165-7; 2003b: 44).

One month after the death of Chador Namgyal, his son Gurmed Namgyal was enthroned as the Chogyal by Jigme Pabo. This was the first time in Sikkimese history that Pemayangtse monks had led the enthronement of the Chogyal marking the dominance of this monastery in Sikkim. Pemayangtse's position was also guaranteed by the establishment of a monastic estate free from tax obligations to the Sikkimese

[25] See in Mullard (2005b: 43) the fifth Dalai Lama's Nyingma pa student and the founder of Mindrol Ling monastery in Tibet.
[26] See in Mullard (2011: 121) the Lhatsun treasure tradition was taught in Tibet in Mindrol Ling under Terdag Lingpa.

state. In addition to these estates a later document PD/1.1/032b (from the palace collection) indicates that various families traditionally under Tashiding (monastery built by Ngadag Phuntshog Rigzin) were required to pay taxes (though described as offerings) to Pemayangtse, indicating the political as well as religious supremacy of Pemayangtse over Ngadag monastery of Tashiding (Mullard 2011: 168-70).

The elevation of Lhatsun Chenpo as Sikkim's premier saint may provide some reasons for the construction of Lhatsun Chenpo's position in Sikkimese state formation. With the decline in the fortunes of Ngadag tradition in Sikkim and the rise of Lhatsun Chenpo in the Sikkimese imagination had a significant impact on the understanding of the Sikkimese state formation process in the seventeenth century. These fundamental changes impacted on the knowledge of early Sikkimese state formation and these were to be reproduced in a later period when the very foundations of Sikkimese society and political life were challenged by the involvement of the British in Himalayan affairs (ibid: 172-3).

According to Mullard (2011: 185), 'the fact that numerous historical accounts were written during the British period is due to two considerations. First is the impact of the British on Sikkimese life and interpretations of their culture, religion and history. The second is that several earlier histories, including history from Pemayangtse, were either lost or destroyed...What is clear is that there was large-scale production of Sikkimese histories during the British period.' However, this did not necessarily mean the adoption of western historical methods as described by Lincoln (1989: 24), with many of these works based on oral accounts, religious, historical accounts and myths which places them on par of the documentary evidence (Mullard 2011: 17).

With the solidification of Pemayangtse's position as the primary religious tradition came the promotion of a conventional historical narrative, which over the period became accepted and repeated in the histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the royal history *Denzong Gyalrab* (*BGR,* 1908). The later works saw proselytising activities of Tibetan lamas—who had fled to Sikkim to escape political persecution—as the fulfilment of the divine prophesies of Guru Rinpoche. These ideas were later incorporated into the historical works of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as a response to the British presence, and as part of the process of

creating the first national histories for Sikkim. The position of Sikkim as an independent state was in doubt after the takeover of administration by the British and *BGR,* and the subsequent narratives were created to counter claims to British suzerainty over Sikkim by portraying an independent history of Sikkim spanning 650 years from the time of Gye Bumsa until 1908 (ibid: 185-88). Sikkim and the Sikkimese throne remained relatively weak until the early decades of the nineteenth century. The weakness of the state and of the royal family caused by the domestic politics and the expansionist policy of Nepal in the late eighteenth century which had a considerable impact on the political fortunes of Sikkim and her later relations with the British (ibid: 175). Now let us turn our attention to Nepal invasion of Sikkim and its implications on the region.

Impact of Gorkha Invasion on State Formation in Sikkim

Gorkhas desired to establish political hegemony over Eastern Nepal and Sikkim so that all the doors to Tibet would be closed and have full control over the transit road. Tibetan trade was the primary consideration of Gorkha and the principal reason for its conquest of Nepal[27]. Due to the requirements of the expanding army, the total control over the Tibetan trade was felt necessary. An agreement was signed as a result of this in 1775 in Walung between Tibet and the Gorkha kingdom (Pradhan 1991: 136-39). Sikkimese sources note that the year Vijaypur fell, a border settlement was signed between the representatives of Tibet, Nepal and Sikkim settling the Nepal-Sikkimese border at the Kankai River on 15 July 1775 (Mullard 2009/2010a: 13). The Nepal-Tibet Treaty was purely a commercial one concerned mostly with the problems arising out of debased metal coins and the rise of the price of silver and gold in Nepal. There was also an agreement that no trader should be allowed to bring silver and gold except through the passes of Kathmandu valley. Both promised to respect each other's borders, the Nepali text of the Nepal-Tibet Treaty (1775) names the Sikkimese signatories also (Pradhan 1991: 139-40).

However, by 1784, the Tibetans opened a trade route with Sikkim through the Chumbi valley in order to get around the high taxes levied against Tibetan traders through the Nepalese routes (Mullard 2003b: 59). The Nepal-Tibet Treaty (1775) had

[27] See in Pradhan (1991: 95-114) Gorkha was the small kingdom West to Nepal, Prithivinarayan Shah became the king of Gorkha in 1743 and drove off Eastward expansion, and it took Prithivinarayan Shah three decades to capture the valley of Nepal.

stipulated that Tibet would trade through Nepal routes only. However, in 1784 Tibet and Sikkim signed an agreement which ostensibly diverted trade from Nepalese routes to the Chumbi valley through Sikkim thus avoiding Nepalese tariffs and taxes and debilitated Nepal's efforts to monopolise Himalayan trade (Mullard 2009/2010a: 15; Pradhan 1991: 148-49). This heightened the possibility of a war between Sikkim and Nepal as Nepal had quite clear designs to run a monopoly on Himalayan trade. Furthermore, taking Sikkim out of the equation would stop attacks from Sikkim on Nepal's eastern border should the Gorkhas choose to invade Tibet in order to force the issue of Himalayan trade (Mullard 2003b: 59). Kumar Pradhan (1991: 142) states 'the promise given to Sikkim in 1775 remained operative for thirteen years.' There is no evidence of the invasion of the Gorkha kingdom on Sikkim prior to 1788. The Gorkha invasion of Sikkim in 1788 was not an isolated event but closely related to Nepal's Tibetan policy (Mullard 2009/2010a: 15; Pradhan 1991: 148-49).

The pre-emptive attack on Sikkim in 1788 was to protect an eastern front so that the main force could invade Tibet without having to fight on two sides (Mullard 2009/2010a: 15). Nepal's ambition to monopolise the Tibetan trade by controlling all the passes led to the conquest of the upper hill region of Eastern Nepal and Western Sikkim (Pradhan 1991: 142-43). In 1788 A.D. Gorkhas invaded Sikkim with an army of about 6,000 men, of whom 2,000 were regulars. The whole commanded by Tierar Singh, the Soubah[28] of the Morung. He faced no opposition until he reached the capital. The Rajah ventured a battle in defence of the capital, but he was utterly defeated owing to the fire of the Gorkha musketeers, who also sustained a considerable loss, yet were successful in besieging the town. All these events took place at some period before the 28 October 1788. After experiencing this disaster, the Rajah retreated towards the frontiers of Tibet in order to re-assemble an army and to solicit assistance from the Deb Rajah of Bhutan and the pontiff Lama of Lhasa. Gorkhas captured most of the Sikkim territories up to the Teesta river including all of the modern districts of South and West Sikkim as well as Darjeeling and it coincided with the Sino-Gorkha war (1788-1792) (Mullard 2003b: 58; 2011: 177; Hamilton 1828: 548).

[28] See in Hamilton (1828: 309) the Soubah is an officer of justice, revenue and police and the total revenue of the district were collected by him.

On 2 June 1789, Nepal again imposed a treaty on Tibet stipulating she would require paying an indemnity of Rs. 50,001. However, Tibet disregarded the payment, and in 1791, Nepal again renewed its war with Tibet. As a result, the Gorkhas advanced till Shigatse and plundered the rich monastery of Tashilumpo. On the account of the promises made by the British emissaries, Bogle and Turner, Tibet turned to the British for help but fearing their relation would be jeopardised with Nepal did not yield anything. Thus Tibet turned to China and Chien Lung, the Manchu Emperor, sent the vast army to drive the Gorkhalese out. The Gorkhali hold over the eastern region was shaken in 1791 (Pradhan 1991: 148-49).

Eastern Nepal and Western Sikkim were in great turmoil since 1788 till Nepal made peace with China in 1792 (Pradhan 1991: 149-51). The document held at Sikkimese Palace Archives gives the idea that Sikkimese Generals had a significant role in the Sino-Gorkha war. In the document PD/9.5/006, the Chinese Amban writes to the commander of the Sikkimese Army, Chogthup, "to invade Nepal if the Gorkhas invade Tibet," thus opening a second front which the Gorkha army would need to defend, forcing the Gorkha army to fight on two fronts (Mullard 2010: 139). The sources say that the real fighting was done by the Sikkimese under Chogthup[29] (Pradhan 1991: 149-51). Chogthup was the son of the famous Chancellor Chagzod Garwang, he is also referred to as Satrajit in Nepali for his seventeen victories over the Gorkha army (Mullard 2009/2010a: 12). Chogthup was sent to the most vulnerable places on the frontiers, the Chinese Amban in Tibet required the active cooperation of Sikkim and promised Chogthup that in exchange of his satisfactory services he would be accorded proper recognition from the Government. The Chinese circulated an order which said, 'As we intend to proceed to the Gorkha Raj and lay it in ruins, so you the Sikkimites and Tsongs must also render every possible assistance to the best of your abilities. You will have to come to the Gorkha country to join the troops under Tunthangs. The vast tracts of territories will be conquered...You will retain possession of as much land as you have conquered…' The main force was of Sikkim itself, and the Tibetan indifference to Sikkim become apparent after the treaty was made the aftermath of the war (Pradhan 1991: 149-51).

[29] The document PD/6.1/004, gives the idea that not only to Chogthup but the letter was written to the Limbu Ashideba, Jasha Mu Hang, Bama Hang and Yoya Hang also to bring their armies to coordinate the final invasion of Nepal in 1792 which gives the idea that Limbu Generals also played a vital role in the Sino-Gorkha war.

Tibet received assurance that the Tashilumpo property would be restored and an agreement was signed for demarcating the Nepal-Tibet boundary. Sikkim was not represented at the negotiations and Tibet refused to listen to its pleas on the ground that 'Bhutan had rendered assistance, but Sikkim had not.'[30] The Nepal-Sikkim boundary was drawn further back to the left bank of the River Teesta, which was not the original boundary. This, according to Sikkim history, was due to the absence of Sikkimese representatives, the indifference of Tibet and misrepresentations made by Nepal. Sikkim was reduced to the position of subaltern due to the misrepresentations. The Chinese general merely assured Sikkim that it had been arranged and settled that his original territories would be restored to him but that the details had not been entered. Sikkim made two representations to Tibet that despite the assurances of the restoration of the original boundaries of Sikkim, the Gorkhas again sent raiding parties and the boundary was not fixed anew as ordered. Sikkim not only lost most of its territories to Nepal, but Tibet also pushed down its limit to the Chola-Jeylep range (Pradhan 1991: 151-52; Risley 1894: 19).

Sikkim was not accorded with the rewards it had hoped for and in fact, made considerable losses as a result of the final peace treaty between China and Nepal. The result of this was Sikkim's growing resentment towards China/Tibet and Nepal and desire to reclaim its possessions. The Chinese tried to appease the Sikkimese after the peace treaty, which went in favour of Nepal, Sikkim suffering losses to its territories. The documents held at Palace Archives such as PD/6.1/006 states that the Sikkim-Nepal border have been delimited but if Sikkim and Nepal dispute the border the boundaries established during the time of the sixth Dalai Lama would be reinstated; and PD/6.1/007 from the Chinese Amban to the Sikkimese government, which attempted to buy-off the Sikkimese with expensive gifts to settle the matter.

The reason for China agreeing on Nepal take possession of the Sikkimese territories would be to appease Nepal at the cost of resentment which Sikkim felt towards China/Tibet. How China gained by this, what upper hand China would have in the region is a matter of examining the context but it proves the considerable power of Nepal in the region. The Chinese had no intention of re-opening treaty negotiations which may have had the result of increasing conflict between Nepal and China/Tibet. The affairs of Sikkim continued in this unsatisfactory note till the British's rupture

[30] See in *The Gazetteer of Sikhim*, Risley (1894: 19)

with the Gorkhas in 1814. The opportunity to exact revenge on Nepal and China/Tibet came with the Anglo-Gorkha war (1814-1816), where Sikkim could reclaim its possessions and ignored Chinese requests to avoid contact with the British (Mullard 2011: 178-79; Hamilton 1828: 549).

However, what is uncertain is the extent of Gorkha control over Sikkimese territory after the 1792 war between Tibet, China and Nepal. Most of the secondary literature seems divided on the actual geographical distinctions between Nepalese controlled Sikkim and the areas under the authority of the Sikkimese Chogyals. F.I.S. Tucker (1957), states that the six thousand troops that were dispatched to Sikkim in 1788 which overran most of the Sikkimese territory in the Terai and the hills but were unable to penetrate the area surrounding modern Gangtok (Mullard 2003b: 60-1). B.J. Hasrat (1971), however, seems to be confused in regard to the limits of Nepalese conquest as he states that the Gorkhas possessed most of Sikkim, but the area of Nag po ri (presumably this refers to Nag ri which equates roughly with the modern Indian administrative district of Darjeeling) was held jointly by Sikkim and Nepal. This seems to be mistaken as this particular region remained under direct Nepalese control until the end of the Anglo-Gorkha war and the signing of the treaty of Sugauli in 1815. L. F. Stiller (1973) on the other hand shows the eastern border of Nepal as following the Rambang River until its confluence with the Teesta (the territory to the east of the Teesta was under the administration of Bhutan) (Mullard 2003b: 61).

The map in Bajracharya's book entitled *Bahadur Shah: the Regent of Nepal* (1992), shows that Nepal had possession of all of Sikkim's territory in the Terai south of the Rambang River, west of the Teesta and east of the Mechi River. While it has been established that the Nepalese had control of the Sikkimese capital of Rabdentse in 1788, what is not known is for how long they occupied this territory to the west of the Teesta and in the hills. The *Denzong Gyalrab* (1908) sheds no light on this issue, being mainly concerned lamenting the injustice of the Nepalese invasion. There is one clue to be found in the Dak Kar Pa family history (document YA8) and that is the place where the document was written and some of the contents. This was virtuously written in the time of the middle of the second month of the fire dragon year (1796) from the high place of the dual system [of religion and politics] the palace of Rabdentse. While it could be the case that this reference to Rabdentse is nothing more than the wish of the government to maintain continuity with territory lost during the

Nepalese invasion, it appears not to be so. A more detailed examination of the Tibetan documents, primarily document YA8 clarifies the extent of Nepalese control in the western Sikkimese hills (Mullard 2003b: 61).

It happened that the region beyond the south of Singla (an area close to the modern boundary of South Sikkim and West Bengal) slipped into the hands of the Nepalese. The territory referred here includes the district of modern Darjeeling and the land of the Sikkimese Terai extending eastwards to the Teesta and south beyond Siliguri. From lines 22-4 of YA8, the areas of land which remained in the ownership of the Dak Kar Pa family are listed and included in this list is the area of Yang Gang which relates to the modern estate of Yang Thang Dzong, the residential lands of the Dak Kar Pa family in West Sikkim. This seems to suggest that the region permanently acquired by the Nepalese after the invasion of Sikkim was the Terai up to where the Rambang River meets the Teesta and then following the Teesta southwards to the plains. What is still ambiguous, however, is the duration that the areas of West Sikkim, including the palace of Rabdentse, were held by the Nepalese after the invasion of 1788 (ibid: 61-2). The boundary of Nepal in the East remained extended up to river Teesta (Pradhan 1991: 152) till 1815, as Risley states 'for some years, Pemayangtse and south to the Teesta tract paid rent to Nepal…The infant Sikkim ruler (Tshugphud Namgyal), after his return from Tibet, remained ruler only of a small tract to the east of Teesta with his capital at Gangtok' (1894: 19).

Conclusion

The most of the histories written on Sikkim that we have today are the histories centred on state, and it began after the only dynasty came into control after unifying all the petty chiefdoms into a single authority. Before we do not see any history of the people because it is difficult to reconstruct a life-world of the 'non-elites' who were beyond the reach of the state and are mostly neglected or ignored. The court documents that exist today are mostly land and tax records which are mined or moulded in such a way to construct the official histories of the state, which neglect the incorporation of the 'non-elites' in the official accounts. The court documents which exist today amplify the power, coherence, and the claims to legitimacy of the certain elite class and are tilted towards their interest.

As we saw in this chapter that Ngadag history (*NGR*) written in the seventeenth century by the son of Phuntshog Rigzin, Champa Tenzin that it praises the protagonist of the text and it centres around Phuntshog Rigzin. There is hardly any mention of any other lamas who are said to play a vital role in the coronation of first Sikkimese King Phuntsog Namgyal. It can be contended that merely an exaggeration of the history to highlight their position in the formation of the Sikkimese State. Another source from the seventeenth century accredited to Lhatsun Chenpo *LTLY* is no exception as we come across the third lama in the enthronement conundrum Kahthog Kuntu Zangpo where there is very less amount of information regarding his activities in Sikkim. To leave behind a mark in history, it is essential to leave behind specific records/texts. Though the versions available are bent towards particular interests, the more texts left behind the more place in history, we can see the clear exaggeration of the past towards certain interests. Moreover, the questions arise on the legitimacy of these 'narratives'. To question the existing history and the accepted historiography is essential to unravel the tales beneath it.

Chapter III

Colonialism and the State Formation in Sikkim: A (re)examination

Introduction

The most important political process between the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century was not imperialism and decolonisation, but the growth and evolution of the states (Robb 1997: 248). Colonialism played a significant role in formulating the structure of the state in modern society. Colonial rule made a fatal blow to the indigenous forms of feudalism and brought about the transformation of the feudal economy into a capitalist economy (Desai 1948: xi). Colonialism played a vital role in the creation of the nation and national identities. The more powerful and pervasive the colonial rule, the stronger the evolution of nationalism and thus a nation could, therefore, be considered as the product of colonialism. In the African states, colonialism played a significant role in the effective transformation of traditional African societies into modern society. It is said before the advent of the colonialism, the interaction among various ethnolinguistic groups had been insufficient to give rise to a political entity with common institutions and shared values (Novati 2005: 54-6).

The communities that experienced domination before the advent of the European colonialism would view colonial rule positively in contrast to the groups that had dominant political status; they would view colonialism negatively (Naty 2001: 574). The post-colonial societies that reflect a positive attitude towards colonialists are viewed as collaborators, and the communities that hold negative views towards colonialists are conceived as nationalists. Wherever appropriate conditions for the state formation existed, the state emerged independently in different places and at different times (Carneiro 1970: 733; Naty 2001: 574). History of the hill people is best understood as a history not of archaic remnants but of 'runaways' from state-making processes. The formation of Gelug pa State in Tibet led to the creation of shatter zone to those wishing to evade or to escape bondage fled. These regions of refuge constituted a direct 'State effect'. Sikkim is the inevitable by-product of the coercive state-making project in Tibet (Scott 2009: 24).

After the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642, an early 'core' state was formed with the unification of various 'state-like' structures under a single authority.

The political unit was formed but complex to warrant being called a nation. The expansion of states brought within their borders conquered people and territory which had to be administered. Thus the Namgyal dynasty helped to weld an assorted collection of petty states into a single integrated and centralised political unit and was a creation of a feudal form of state, based on Tibetan hierarchy and the control over the means of violence and the means of revenue collection in a given territory was gained, another aspect of the state (Rae 2007: 123; Carneiro 1970: 736).

This chapter examines the impact of the colonialism on Sikkim—on the feudal character of Sikkim—a qualitative structural transformation that led to the effective change from the feudal society into the modern society and argues the creation of the contemporary nations as the by-product of colonialism to subserve their interest. This chapter contextualises the scenario in which the British became involved in the Sikkimese affairs and examines the politics of the East India Company to secure the constant flow of their capitalist interests by opening up the trans-Himalayan trade. This chapter gives insights about how the intrusion of the British into the Sikkimese affairs reduced Sikkim to the position of subalternity and at the same time provided it with the structures to being called a state.

Contextualising the Sikkim-British East India Company Interactions

The scenario in which the advent of Sikkim-British relation is contextualised is the British were not happy with the emergence of Nepal as a powerful kingdom between their Indian dominions and prospects of the Central Asian trade marts (Pradhan 1991: 115). In the Anglo-Gorkha rupture (1814-16) Sikkim acted as a faithful and according to the extent of her resources, a useful ally to the British (Hamilton 1828: 549). Sikkim suffered considerable losses in the final peace treaty (1792) between China and Nepal and the opportunity to exact revenge on Nepal, and China/Tibet came with the Anglo-Gorkha war (1814-16), where Sikkim was able to reclaim its possessions ignoring Chinese requests to avoid contact with the British (Mullard 2011: 178-79). In the Treaty of Titaliya (1817)[31] between the Rajah of Sikkim and British, Rajah was rewarded by the recovery of a considerable portion of his territory lost during the Sino-Gorkha War (1788-92) (Hamilton 1828: 549).

[31] See in the Annexure II

The stipulations on which the tract within the hills were restored to the Sikkim were a cessation of all aggression on his part against the Gorkhas; the employment of his military power and resources in aid of the British troops when engaged among the hills; the exclusion of other Europeans; the surrender of criminals, and the protection of legal commerce. The Sikkim Rajah has since been the channel through which various despatches have been transmitted from the Bengal government to the Chinese functionaries at Lhasa. The Sikkim ruler even sent the Chinese Amban's letters to the 'official Head Sahib of the Ferangis'[32]. The restoration of this state under the British protection and guarantee constituted a barrier against Gorkha ambitions, and eventually it was hoped, would lead to the enlargement of British commercial relations with Tibet (Hamilton 1828: 550). Despite giving assurances in Article VI of the Treaty of Sugauli[33], 1815 that 'Rajah of Nepal would not molest the Rajah of Sikkim in possession of his territories…', Pradhan (1991: 157) states 'Nepal did not give up scheming for further conquest towards the east. Nepal still hoped to drive towards the east.' Nepal was presented with an opportunity to exploit the internal feuds in Sikkim and serve its designs once again immediately after the treaty of Titaliya (ibid).

Internal Feuds in Sikkim and the British Intrusion in the Affairs of Sikkim

Despite the effort being made to ensure that no border dispute would arise between Nepal and Sikkim in the Treaty of Titaliya (1817), Sikkim Rajah was worried about it[34]. *History of Sikkim* (1908) contends soon after the Treaty of Titaliya (1817), Chagzod Garwang (Chancellor) the maternal uncle of the then Rajah Tsugphud Namgyal, "misappropriated every income to satisfy his selfish wants by illegally using the state seal. By 1819 things began to assume a serious note...and in 1826, Rajah ordered his men to execute Chagzod Garwang" (Namgyal 1908: 58). In view of Pradhan, 'the Bhutia camp being jealous of the achievements and the rising power of the Lepcha Garwang family, procured the murder of Bolod (Chagzod Garwang)' (1991: 157).

[32] See in Pradhan (1991: 154) Shakabpa, *Tibet*, p. 174 quotes from the biography of the Dalai Lama X.
[33] See in the Annexure III
[34] See in Dhanvajra Vajracharya and Tek Bahadur Shrestha, an unpublished typescript "Political Asylum of Kazi Yukla Thup of Sikkim in Nepal," p. 2.

The Garwang family had risen in the politics of Sikkim during the enthronement of Namgyal Phuntshog, the fifth King of Sikkim. Following the death of Gurmed Namgyal (the fourth King), the Sikkimese Chagzod, Tamding took temporary control of the government and was supported by a member of Tibeto-Sikkimese ministers. Chagzod Tamding and his supporters believed the Namgyal Phuntshog was not the true heir to the throne and proposed that the throne should be passed to the leading Tibeto-Sikkimese aristocratic family. Meanwhile, the Lepcha faction led by Garwang supported the legitimacy of Namgyal Phuntshog and began a rebellion against Tamding's rule in Sikkim. Garwang's resistance proved successful, and Tamding faction was deposed and was fled to exile in Tibet. Tamding faction tried to lobby for the Tibetan government's assistance, but ultimately the regent was sent to administer Sikkim during the minority of Namgyal Phuntshog as requested by Garwang. The defeat of Tamding and the establishment of the Tibetan regency was the rise of Garwang's family in the politics of Sikkim. During the regency period, Garwang was promoted to the position of Chagzod, and he further solidified his control in the Sikkimese politics by arranging the marriage of his daughter to the son of Namgyal Phuntshog, Tenzin Namgyal the future king of Sikkim (Mullard and Wongchuk 2010: 6-11; Mullard 2011: 174-75).

Another version is, 'to secure attack from Nepal or Tibet, the Rajah of Sikkim in the year 1826 decided to shift the capital to a more secure place. However, the Chagzod disagreed with the proposal. The issue led to a serious clash of interest between the Chagzod and the Rajah. Eventually, the entire family of the Chagzod was massacred'[35]. Mullard argues 'with the assassination of a Sikkimese aristocrat named Bolod in 1826' (Mullard & Wongchuk 2010: 103) his nephews (the Ilam Kazis/Ko Ta pa family) fearing a similar fate rebelled against the Chogyal and requested Gorkha support for their insurrection. The Gorkhas, longtime rivals to Sikkim accepted by supporting the Ko Ta pa brothers with military and financial backing. The Ko Ta pa-Gorkha force crossed what the border between Sikkim and Nepal was, but at that time was part of Sikkimese territory (ibid).

Document PD/4.2/011 in the Palace Archives states that the British supplied money and weapons to the Sikkimese during the Ko Ta pa rebellion. After the massacre of Chagzod's family, his nephew Kazi Yukla Thup along with his family

[35] ibid

sought asylum in Nepal. With him also came over eight hundred Sikkimese Lepchas and Limboos seeking refuge in Nepal. The Nepali government happily sheltered them, as Nepal was still hoping to extend its influence to the east and was presented by the opportunity, the Nepali government wanted to populate the areas of Illam with these refugees. As per Dhanvajra Vajracharya and Shrestha, 'the Nepal government provided them with many facilities to the families of Kazi Yukla Thup'[36]. Some of the royal decrees were written to the Padam Chandra Lepcha, the progeny of Kazi Yukla Thup by the Nepali government which are still found preserved[37]. After the Nepal government was informed by Officer appointed for eastern Nepal Subba Jayant Khatri about Kazi Yukla Thup and his followers seeking asylum after infiltrating to Nepal, the high officials including General Bhimsen Thapa wrote an approval letter in 1827. In that letter to Kazi Yukla Thup, it was written:

> We have come to learn that you along with your family members and other citizens have come here seeking refuge after the internal conflict broke out in Sikkim, earlier too you were of this place, and presently you have done a wonderful job by coming here along with your family and other showing your loyalty[38].

The Nepal government provided them refuge as they had the further intention of expanding their influence over Sikkim. There is also the point that Nepal benefitted from the arrival of the refugees to settle and became tax-payers in a remote frontier area and as refugees, they were supporters of Nepal, so loyal citizens. Both motives may have co-existed. Though Nepal government tried to create a fuss in Sikkim with the help of these refugees, it did not yield anything. It was the British government who capitalised and could get the beautiful and salubrious hill station of Darjeeling from Sikkim[39].

The Annexation of Darjeeling and its Impact on the Geopolitics of the Region

The British regarded the Lepcha insurrection and their asylum in Nepal as a matter between the two states, and they were clear in their stand that they would intervene if only a dispute arose between Nepal and Sikkim (Pradhan 1991: 159). At some point after, a border dispute occurred between the two regarding the control over a fragment of land called Ontoo, located on the eastern side of the River Mechi and Sikkim referred the matter to the Company in accordance to the Article III of Treaty of

[36] ibid
[37] ibid: 2-3.
[38] ibid: 3.
[39] ibid

Titaliya (1817) (Singh 1988: 177). To investigate the matter, Lord William Bentinck deputed Captain G. W. Lloyd and G. W. Grant I. C. S. in 1828 to settle the issues between Nepal and Sikkim. While resolving the issues between these two parties, both went to inspect the boundary of Sikkim; they came till Rinchenpong (present-day West Sikkim). On their way, they saw Dorjiling [sic] (modern-day Darjeeling), where Lloyd spent six days in February 1829. They were charmed by the site encircled by the forest, and they were struck by the idea of the suitability of the hills for convalescence and recommended to the Governor-General that Darjeeling would make an ideal health resort for the European soldiers (Namgyal 1908: 61; Bhanja 1993: 2-3; Rao 1972: 7). Later that year they were instructed to visit Sikkim once more, accompanied by a surveyor, Captain J.D. Herbert, to examine the full possibilities offered by the place. Their findings suggested that the site would not only make an ideal health resort but that its possession would confer considerable strategic and potential economic benefits to the Company. The British then decided to carry the measure forward (Pradhan 1991: 158; Rao 1972: 7).

Lord William Bentinck then proposed to the Council in 1830, that they should open negotiations with the Rajah Tsugphud Namgyal for the transfer of the Darjeeling to the East India Company (Rao 1972: 7). In 1831 the Englishmen decided to visit Sikkim to talk about the Lepcha rebels, under Yukla Thup whom they considered a traitor. The King agreed as he immediately wanted the restoration of his original boundary (Pradhan 1991: 158; Namgyal 1908: 58). Along with the border investigations between Sikkim and Nepal, the British officers continued to pursue the subject of obtaining Darjeeling to make it a health resort or a sanatorium. Moreover, they had also realised that it would make an ideal place to keep an eye on Sikkim and Nepal with a hope that if a road were built there, it would serve the strategic purpose and the people of Sikkim would open traffic not only with Darjeeling but also between Bengal and Chinese Tartary (Pradhan 1991: 159).

J. W. Grant wrote to Rajah: ‘if we interview the matter, the insurrection will be suppressed very quickly...But it would not be to take any portion of your land...The custom or policy of our government is, when we have once given any land or property, we don’t take it back’ (Namgyal 1908: 58). However, the British were looking Darjeeling as an ideal sanatorium and installing the troops in such a commanding height, from where they could observe the Himalayan states. In 1832,

Smith[40] informed that they would request the Government of Nepal to impose restrictions on the activities of the Lepcha refugees from Sikkim, but at the same time, they advised the Rajah Tshugphud Namgyal to adopt a conciliatory policy towards his refugee subjects (Rao 1972: 6).

Rajah informed the Company that the Magar named Dzin Khatri or Jayanta Khatri had induced the rebel Lepchas to join him in Ilam, as they wanted to populate the Ilam region, and the Lepchas made Nagari their stronghold (Pradhan 1991: 158). At the same time, the Lepchas in Illam, under the Nepal government, was alleged that they were contemplating a raid on the Sikkim Terai (Namgyal 1908: 61). 'A letter of 1833 from Ilam supplements the information about the united fight that the Lepchas gave the Bhutias'[41]. Sikkim lamented that the Ko Ta pa rebels or the Lepcha rebels, who claimed Darjeeling as their patrimonial land, had voluntarily gifted to the British in the hope of gaining their sympathy (Pradhan 1991: 159). The British were granted a land deed by the Ko Ta pa brothers. This caused a minor diplomatic incident as the Sikkimese, aware of the power of the British wished to remain ally with the British as they had done so during the Anglo-Gorkha war. With a pre-existing offer of Darjeeling on the table, the Sikkimese were placed in a critical position, whereby they could either refuse the British request for Darjeeling and risk damaging diplomatic relations or accept that the Ko Ta pa land deed forced the Sikkimese to comply with the British wishes (Mullard & Wongchuk 2010: 103). The rebels also sought help from the Company for the support and protection from the Rajah. The Government of India sent Lloyd to inquire into the matter (Pradhan 1991: 158-59; Rao 1972: 6; Namgyal 1908: 61).

Bentinck wanted to exploit this situation to acquire Darjeeling. He, therefore, proposed the Council that Lloyd should be deputed to negotiate with the Rajah for the cession of Darjeeling in exchange for an equivalent either in land or money (Rao 1972: 8). On 8 February 1835, Lloyd left for Sikkim and on reaching Tumlong, the then capital of Sikkim, he paid a courtesy visit to the Rajah. The next day he again met the Rajah in the court, before he could request the Rajah for the transfer of Darjeeling, the Rajah made three requests, the requests were: the boundary of his

[40] The Magistrate of Rungpur.
[41] See in Pradhan (1991: 158) a letter from Ilam, Bhadrabadi 5 roj 4, Nepal National Archives, Letter No. 273.

Kingdom might be extended up to Konchi; Kummo Pradhan, the embezzler of the Morung revenues, should be arrested and delivered to him; and Debgoan might be added to his Kingdom. Lloyd pleaded his inability to the Rajah's first request, as it was beyond his power. Regarding the second request, Lloyd expressed his wish that he would mediate between the Rajah and the Lepchas and their Kazis to settle their disputes. As to the third request, Lloyd did not say anything and mentioned that the Governor-General desired to have Darjeeling in exchange for the equivalent lands in the plains or a sum of money. On hearing this, the Rajah informed Lloyd that he would give his answer the next day (ibid: 9-10).

The Rajah did not give his answer the next day but sent his officers to discuss with Lloyd the different points connected with his requests. It is not known what had transpired in these discussions. On the sixth day of his stay, Lloyd met the Rajah for the last time and requested him to give a definite answer regarding the cession of Darjeeling to the Company. On hearing that, the Rajah gave Lloyd, a paper with first demand about Konchi having been removed, with two requests regarding the cession of Darjeeling. First, the Kummo Pradhan should be made to account for the embezzlement and restore his plunder and, second, the Debgoan should be ceded to Sikkim. The Rajah further informed Lloyd that if both requests are met, he will give Darjeeling to the Company "out of friendship" (Rao 1972: 10; Singh 1988: 178). 'Debgoan was never ceded to the Sikkim ruler and provides an important point of argument that the Darjeeling transaction was illegal as the British did not fulfil the conditions required by the Sikkimese ruler in making the gift' alleges Hope Namgyal, the former Queen of Sikkim (1966: 49).

Lloyd was perfectly aware that the Company could get Darjeeling only by acceding to the Rajah's requests. Lloyd considered it essential to obtain the possession of Darjeeling for reasons that 'as a military post that must stand pre-eminent.' The British government considered Rajah's conditions for the cession of Darjeeling as illogical since Debgoan was already given to the Jalpaiguri Rajah in 1828, and regarding the other condition, they doubted whether that would be justified in compelling a settlement of accounts between the Rajah and his subjects (Rao 1972: 10-11). The government, after rejecting Rajah's conditions for the transfer of Darjeeling, asked Lloyd to point out any wasteland in the neighbourhood of Sikkim, Lloyd was unable to point out such land and regarding pecuniary compensation he

valued Darjeeling at Rs. 120,000 but doubted Rajah would accept it, since he attached little value to the money (ibid: 12).

Lloyd, while on his way back from Sikkim to Darjeeling, sent the Rajah a new draft of the Darjeeling Deed requesting him to "substitute this or similar paper" for the one he had delivered to his officers. The Rajah on receiving that new draft, which was backdated 1 February 1835[42], thought his demands have been fulfilled and affixed his red seal and returned to Lloyd. It is imperative to note that the new 'deed' was the substitute for the original one which the Rajah gave to his officers with instructions that it should be delivered to Lloyd only if his requests have been considered (ibid: 13). Ultimately a land grant was given to the British in 1835. However, Sikkim retained control of all territory surrounding the upper hills of Darjeeling, including the area in parts of Indo-Sikkimese Morung, down to the southern parts of what is now Naxalbari, i.e., all territory to the west of the Tista River (including modern Siliguri and Kakarivitta) (Mullard & Wongchuk 2010: 103). The British occupied Darjeeling on the strength of the 'deed' (Kotturan 1983: 62), which Lloyd was able to procure from the Rajah leading to the misunderstanding.

The 1835 'grant' of Darjeeling was conditional on the Sikkimese understanding (McKay 2009/2010: 32). The Sikkimese law provides that all land belongs to the King and only usufruct, not outright ownership devolves on the occupants of the property. Therefore, Darjeeling would have given, in the traditional context of a grant for usufruct only; ultimate jurisdiction, authority and the right of the land being implicitly retained by the ruler (Namgyal 1966: 46). The British assumed that the land-grant meant that Darjeeling had become sovereign British territory, whereas the Sikkimese understood the land grant according to their land law[43]. The British failed to understand this and so believed Darjeeling was sovereign British territory, in which British law would prevail and not the rule of the Rajah of Sikkim. When it was apparent that the British had annexed Darjeeling, relations between the two parties worsened. The critical factor in the decline of Anglo-Sikkimese relations was the total misunderstanding of what the Darjeeling land grant meant to both the

[42] See in the Annexure IV

[43] See in Mullard (2011: 182-83) in Sikkimese law, land grants were issued to leading families in exchange for an annual rent based on the tax yield of an estate, which could be changed depending upon the annual income of an estate. A failure to uphold any of these conditions could result in the forfeiture of land.

parties. This cultural misunderstanding led to the cession of Darjeeling and ultimately set the path towards the full-scale conflict between the two parties (McKay 2009/2010: 32; Mullard 2011: 182-83).

Darjeeling was a less revenue producing estate with the only population of hundred, probably the Lepchas and a dense forest. Following the annexation of Darjeeling British enhanced the roads for the trade purpose and the strategic reasons and developed the conditions for cultivation to attract new immigrants. Lloyd visualised the immense potentiality of this place and for the reason that the British wanted to open up the commercial relation with Tibet, for which they saw Darjeeling a suitable trade post (Kotturan 1983: 60; Rai 2015: 93; Novati 2005: 54). According to Kotturan, 'Darjeeling's use as a military base for the defence of the trade route to Tibet through Sikkim was apparent. From its commanding height, the whole of Sikkim and the neighbourhood would be observed and protected' Kotturan (1983: 60). The annexation of Darjeeling in 1835 and the establishment of a robust British station acted as an impediment to Nepal's desire to march towards east after 1816 (Pradhan 1991: 159).

Many scholars, namely P. R. Rao (1972), Saul Mullard (2011) and A. K. J. Singh (1988) are of the view that the annexation of Darjeeling had a significant impact on the subsequent developments in Anglo-Sikkimese relations. The relation till then going on a friendly note turned into the sour after the annexation of Darjeeling (Rai 2015: 94). The good relations between the two parties were short lived. However, the 'grant' of the Darjeeling hills did not only leave a bitter memory for the Sikkimese king, but also the prospect of developing British hill station threatened Sikkimese interests. Such cultural misunderstanding played an essential part in the subsequent conflict and ultimately led to the conflict (Mullard 2009/2010b: 7).

What the Rajah immediately got after the cession of Darjeeling was a gift parcel–one double-barrelled gun, one rifle, one 20 yards of red-broad cloth, two pairs of shawls, one of superior variety and the other of inferior type (Kotturan 1983: 62). The annexation of Darjeeling constituted an essential aspect in their relations with the Himalayan states of Bhutan and Nepal and it also reminded of the possibilities of trade with Tibet (Singh 1988: 180). The payment for the 'grant' of Darjeeling of Rs

3,000 from 1841 was increased to Rs 6,000, after a long British annexation of the territory and it seemed that the conflict had been resolved partly, but Sikkim considered it as rent for the Darjeeling grant. In Darjeeling, the British maintained a representative, a Vakil, who was in closest contact with the Superintendent of Darjeeling, Dr. Campbell (McKay 2009/2010: 32; Kotturan 1983: 62).

Cultural Misunderstanding and its Impact on the Subsequent Relations

During the 1840s and '50s, several problems arose between the two governments due to the different legal systems in use and the cultural misunderstanding between the two. Sikkimese tenants owing rent to the Chogyal including landlords, what the British called them as 'slaves' could take refuge in Darjeeling, similarly in Sikkim those considered criminals by the British where they refused to return them (McKay 2009/2010: 33). After the death of Ilam Singh in 1847, Tokhang Namgyal[44] a Tibetan married to the Chogyal's illegitimate daughter became the Dewan (Chief Minister) of Sikkim. His ascendancy was challenged by Lepchas who were led by Tseepa Adan, known as Chebu Lama to the British supporting the Chogyal's son being a celibate and the Bhutia's supporting the Dewan's relative. Chebu Lama, who wanted the position of Dewan for himself, brought his ambitions into direct conflict with Dewan Namgyal. After the death of the Rajah's elder son Labrang Kyabon, Rajah's surviving legitimate son Sidkeong Namgyal was a celibate Lama. As such he was considered ineligible to succeed his father, the only other candidate was the Rajah's illegitimate son, Changzod Karpo, whose sister was married by Tokhang Namgyal. Naturally, Namgyal supported the candidature of his brother-in-law. The faction led by Chebu Lama was opposed to this. It wanted the succession of the Rajah's Lama son, Sidkeong Namgyal (1819-74). To remove the difficulties in the way of a succession of Sidkeong Namgyal, Chebu Lama in 1848, persuaded Dalai Lama to dispense the vows of celibacy and also arranged his marriage[45]. Chebu Lama favoured with the British accommodation in foreign affairs, whereas Tokhang Dewan Namgyal

[44] See in Rao (1972: 22) Tokhang Namgyal was a Tibetan who had married the Rajah's illegitimate daughter. He used that influence in his rise to power.

[45] See in Namgyal (1908: 65) when Rajah came to know about this, Rajah was very angry with him (Sidkeong Namgyal) for two reasons, namely; he said the ordained priest should think of marrying and secondly that being born an Avtar Lama he should have thought of becoming a layman by assuming the Raj Guddi. The Rajah got his ministers to inquire from the princes as to what he had to say about this. At that time, it was proved that Tseepa Aden, better known as Chebu Lama, was the man who caused the rupture between the father and son. The latter was compelled to give a written apology and sign a bond.

supported Tibetan policies of excluding the external influence (McKay 2009/2010: 33-9; Rao 1972: 22-3).

The succession dispute brought these differences in open; the succession to the throne would shape Sikkim's future with what these two groups were concerned with (McKay 2009/2010: 44). In 1848 Dr. Joseph Hooker, a distinguished English botanist, wanted to explore Sikkim and the Himalayas. Campbell, with the permission of the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, wrote to the Rajah to permit Hooker to travel through Sikkim (Rao 1972: 23). The Sikkim authorities flatly refused the visit and Campbell presumed the refusal was due to the influence of *Pagla* (mad) Dewan[46] who had a monopoly in Sikkim's trade with Tibet. After a prolonged wrangle, Hooker was allowed to visit Sikkim[47] (Jha 1985: 8-9).

In 1849, Sikkim posted a new pro-Dewan agent, Lasso Kazi in Darjeeling an adherent of Dewan Namgyal. However, Campbell refused to receive him and insisted upon the appointment of the pro-British, Aden Chebu Lama in his place (Rao 1972: 26). Consequently, Aden Chebu Lama was appointed and for Campbell '...the most capable and eligible officer in Rajah's service for the post...is to have much more extensive powers for meeting requisitions any other previous agent has had...'[48] Dr. Campbell along with Dr. Joseph Hooker made their infamous visit to Sikkim in the same year. Accompanied by Chebu Lama, Campbell and Dr. Hooker succeeded in reaching Chumbi valley of Tibet where Campbell wanted to investigate as the possible trade route for Indian trade with Tibet, but after being refused entry into Tibet by the Tibetan soldiers escorted them back to the Sikkim frontier. They were seized at the Cho-La pass[49]. British wanted to open up a trade route to Tibet and to secure their interests; they brought changes in Sikkim suitable to their needs.

On reaching the Sikkim territory on 7 November 1849, they were arrested by the Rajah's officials and detained for the six weeks. British protests secured their

[46] Tokhang Dewan Namgyal also used to be known as "*Pagla* Dewan" which means Insane Chief Minister.

[47] See in Rao (1972: 23) the correspondence of the Government of India with Sikkim was carried through the latter's Vakil or Agent at Darjeeling. Campbell suspected that his letters had never reached the Rajah, but handed over to the Dewan Namgyal who was opposed to the free travel of Europeans into Sikkim and whose policy was to enter as little as possible with a powerful alliance with the British.

[48] A letter from David Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling to Halliday, Secretary to Government of India dated 11 September 1849, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[49] A letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 15 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

release. The British government considered Campbell the architect of his own misfortunes, however, some response to his arrest was necessary for the reasons of prestige (Mckay 2009/2010: 34; Rao 1972: 25-8). As a result, it was decided 'to take possession of the part of the Sikkim territory in the Morung, and the part of the Hill Country to the Westward of the Teesta, and great Rungit rivers and to the South of the River Rummo [sic]'[50]. Accordingly, the steps were taken to conform to the terms of the Proclamation of Government. Since the annexed territory was coterminous on all sides with the Darjeeling district situated above and to the East of the road heading from Punkabari to Siligori [sic], an offshoot of the Police establishments was created[51]. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, commented '...since his loss of territory through the misconduct of his officers; he has received an annual allowance from Lhasa of Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000, apparently of the nature of a compassionate allowance in consequence of the losses in Sikkim'[52]. Sikkim and Tibet had marital and religious relation with each other and Sikkim were always considered as a vassal state of Tibet.

The annual payment to Sikkim which she was receiving as a Darjeeling grant was stopped and the Sikkim Rajah was isolated from the plains except through the British territory due to the seizure of 640 square miles of the Sikkim Terai linking Darjeeling with the Bengal plains (McKay 2009/2010: 34; Rao 1972: 25-8). Dewan Namgyal's influence was eclipsed temporarily, however, within a few years, by taking advantage of Rajah's strained relations with the British, he re-established his position in Sikkim. This was followed by raids on the British territory of Darjeeling. British Indian subjects were carried off and sold as slaves or detained in Sikkim. On 19 March 1860, a critical case of kidnapping was reported to the Government of Bengal. Some thirteen Sikkimese raided a British Indian village called Tukdah and kidnapped two women. The raiders turned out to be the relatives of Dewan Namgyal. Those 'kidnapped' from the Sikkimese perspective were Sikkimese subjects, runaways from Sikkimese justice, and their 'kidnapping' was not only legal but was in the case from what they saw as their territory. It was an unstable period in Tibetan

[50] A letter from C. H. Sushington, Special Commissioner for the affairs of Sikkim to David Campbell dated 26 February 1850, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[51] A letter from D. Campbell to J. P. Grant, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 26th February 1850, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[52] A letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 21st August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

history which led Tibet to follow isolationist policy, and Tibet's relations with Sikkim influenced by these isolationist policies at that point of time (McKay, 2009/2010: 35, Rao 1972: 32-3). Sikkim was built upon the Tibetan model of hierarchy, since the British intrusion in the affairs of Sikkim, they meddle with Sikkim independently with Tibet out of equation giving Sikkim shape conforming to the modern state.

British Invasion and the Signing of the Treaty of Tumlong in 1861

Dr. Campbell, as Superintendent of Darjeeling, was in direct charge of the East India Company's relations with Sikkim. It is alleged that he had played a role in worsening Anglo-Sikkimese relations. Being a qualified doctor, he was unequal to the task which needed considerable diplomatic skills (Kotturan 1983: 63). On 1 November 1860, Campbell advanced towards Sikkim to obtain satisfaction for insults and injuries done to the British subjects and for the violation of British territory. Campbell attacked Sikkim accompanied by Chebu Lama, he marched into Sikkim with a force of 100 local troops, Campbell seems to have had another eighty men from that force available, but prudently stationed them on the frontier with Nepal to prevent the Gorkhas taking advantage of the situation. What was described as a mixed force of Tibetans and Sikkim Bhutias under the Dewan's command, forced their hasty retreat. Weapons and supplies were abandoned in the panic. Campbell fled back to Darjeeling which was a massive blow to British prestige in the region. This initiative forced colonial government intervention to protect British influence and interests on the frontier. Within weeks, Lieutenant-Colonel John Cox Gawler was appointed to command a force of nearly 2,000 men (McKay, 2009/2010: 35-7).

Campbell's expedition to Sikkim had not solved any of the British problems with that Kingdom; on the contrary, it had complicated further and forced the Government of India to undertake a new military expedition (Rao 1972: 37-8). The retreat of Campbell from Sikkim was a significant blow to the British prestige. The Government of India, therefore, thought it necessary to take immediate steps not only to demonstrate its power and restore its influence in Sikkim but also to reduce the likely unpleasant political effects upon Tibet and Bhutan (ibid: 38). Campbell's retreat threatened the impact of the British Empire. Ashley Eden of the Bengal Civil Service was appointed Political Officer on the mission which Gawler described as being intended to "counteract the political effect which Campbell's failed attack…will have

upon Thibet and Bhotan"[53]. Chebu Lama had a crucial role in the mission. He recommended the route to be taken (McKay 2009/2010: 38).

Having despatched a letter to the Rajah of Sikkim containing their demands, the British waited five days and then, on 1 February 1861, Gawler's forces marched en route to Tumlong, the then Sikkimese capital. As the British marched on to Teesta, the opposition flew away, fleeing their bases at Namchi and Temi, where on 17 February Eden was able to report the news that Dewan Namgyal had fled to Tibet. There had been no sustained battles, just a few exchanges of fire with a handful of British wounded. Sikkimese casualties also seem to have been very low. Once Dewan Namgyal had fled, the campaign was effectively over (McKay 2009/2010: 40-2). At this time, the Rajah Tsugphud Namgyal was at Chumbi with his son and family[54] (Namgyal 1908: 66).

On 28 March 1861, the treaty was signed at Tumlong[55] on behalf of the Government of India by Ashley Eden, and Sidkeong Namgyal, the son of the Rajah Tsugphud Namgyal, on behalf of Sikkim Durbar. With the conclusion of the treaty, British relations with Sikkim were once again normalised (Rao 1972: 42). Its main features were an extradition agreement, free trade and travel between the two powers, and Sikkim's consent to maintain the road the British planned to build-up to the Tibetan frontier. A fate of single individual (other than a ruler), was also specified; the Treaty's 7th article stated that Dewan Namgyal and his immediate family were barred from Sikkim. Sikkim was also charged Rs 7,000 to compensate for losses suffered in Campbell's initial invasion (McKay 2009/2010: 41-2).

The real cause of the misunderstanding, which led to the expedition from the British side was traced to Tokhang Dewan Namgyal, who was banished from Sikkim (Namgyal 1908: 67). The treaty consisted 23 Articles, and all the previous agreements between the British Government and Sikkim were cancelled, and it was declared that now on Rajah will be referred as "Maharajah" (Rao 1972: 42). After the Treaty,

[53] See in McKay (2009/2010: 38) PP: Secretary, GoI to Eden, 28 December 1860.
[54] See in Namgyal (1908: 67) Political Officer requested either the Rajah himself or his son to meet him in which event a new treaty would be made. The information was conveyed to him by the Lamas and Lay ministers of Sikkim. However, Chebu Lama sent up the Phodang Lama purposely to say that if the Rajah's son, Kyabgon Sridkyong came down then the treaty would be favourable to the Sikkimites. This private information from him made the Rajah Tsugphud Namgyal deter from his purpose of coming down in person and sent down his son Kyabgon Sridkyong instead.
[55] See in the Annexure V

Chebu Lama became the Dewan. Eden stated that "so long as he remains in that post there is no fear of any policy being adopted hostile to British interests"[56] (McKay 2009/2010: 44).

The 1861 Treaty also forced Sikkim to conform more closely to modern state models, in which a single authority has a monopoly over foreign relations and the use of legalised force within its fixed territory (McKay 2009/2010: 46). The British Military Expedition to Sikkim was an unqualified success. The power of the Maharajah was considerably reduced, and he had to accept all the demands put forth by the British. The Government gained many trade privileges under the Articles 8 to 12 of the treaty. Ashley Eden expressed the hope that a great trade would develop between Bengal and Tibet via Sikkim (Rao 1972: 46). Sikkim seemed the ideal route to Lhasa, and in summing up Gawler and Eden's mission, the Government of India observed, "...a satisfactory conclusion and a fair prospect of extended commercial intercourse with Sikhim, and with the hitherto inaccessible country beyond it"[57]. Indeed, the 1861 Treaty increased Sikkim's opening to the world, or at least to the colonial state, bringing fundamental changes to the principles of Sikkim which was unidimensional relation to Tibet with several travellers, surveyors, and road-builders entering the country in the ensuing decades (McKay 2009/2010: 45).

The British, however, could now deal directly with the new Chogyal. Maharajah Tsugphud Namgyal (who remained and died in Chumbi in 1863) abdicated the throne in favour of his legitimate eldest son Sidkeong Namgyal. Eden was satisfied that "…under the advice of Chebu Lama, an entirely new state of things will now be inaugurated in Sikhim"[58]. Moreover, Anglo-Sikkimese relations did improve during the eighth Chogyal's reign. In 1862, the Government of India as a matter of grace restored the annual grant of Rs. 6,000 which was forfeited in 1850 following the crisis in Sikkim. It was increased to Rs. 9,000 in 1868. The Maharajah Sidkeong Namgyal's visit to Darjeeling in 1873 marked the happy period in Sikkim-British relations. This was the first time a Sikkim Maharajah had visited the British territory, although they were invited so many times before. The annual allowance for Darjeeling was increased from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 12,000 with effect from the year 1873

[56] See in McKay (2009/2010: 44) PP: Eden to Secretary, Government of Bengal, 8 April 1861.
[57] See in McKay (2009/2010: 45) PP: Under-Secretary, GoI to Secretary, Government of Bengal, 7 May 1861.
[58] See in McKay (2009/2010: 45) PP: Eden to Secretary, Government of Bengal, 14 March 1861.

and the subsequent visit to Sikkim by the then Deputy Commissioner in Darjeeling, J. W. Edgar, who hoped to gain a formal trading agreement with Tibet. Only after the Chogyal's death in 1874 Anglo-Sikkimese relations again deteriorate (McKay 2009/2010: 45; Rao 1972: 45).

After the death of Sidkeong Namgyal in April 1874, his half-brother Thotub Namgyal was made Chogyal (Kotturan 1983: 68). H. H. Risley, who afterwards became the Secretary of the British Indian Government commented with satisfaction, "Not a whisper was heard on the frontier of the remonstrance against this vigorous piece of king-making, and Tibet acquiesced silently in an act..." (Risley 1894/1989: VI). The increased British influence in Sikkim made the pro-Tibetan party uneasy. Edgar, who had been deputed to investigate the possibility of establishing British trade with Tibet, brought to the notice of Bengal administration; a communication addressed by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to the ruler of Sikkim, calling upon him not to encourage road building in his territory and to prevent British officers from crossing the border into Tibet. They were warned that the purpose of the road building was not only for the trade; it was for the military use also. The road was constructed through Sikkim to the Jeylep La on the Tibetan frontier (Grover 1974: 22).

In the 1860s British built roads and bridges in Sikkim for both strategic reasons and the trade purpose and sent some officials to the Tibet-Sikkim border at Mount Lingtu to explore the paths further. The overseer was stopped when going for the repairs of the road in the north of Lingtu[59]. Meanwhile, the reports came that the Tibetans are not allowing to carry out ordinary annual maintenance to the Edgar road[60]. They were bothered by the locals, most probably Tibetans, and then British sent people to the area north of Mount Lingtu to building roads and small easily defended wooden fort (Gyaincain 1997: 82; Novati 2005: 54). In early 1886, the Macaulay Mission under the leadership of Colman Macaulay, then Finance Secretary to the Government of Bengal, was assembled at Darjeeling to open up Tibet for the trade. All the details of the Mission were published in the British newspapers, and that information soon reached to the Chinese Government. The news of the Mission caused alarm in Tibet. Both the Amban and the Viceroy of the Szechuan province,

[59] Letter from Darjeeling, Commissioner to Bengal, Political Department dated 30th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[60] Memoir by W. B. Oldham, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling dated 28th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

under whose direction Tibet was placed reported to the Chinese Government, the Tibetan opposition of the Mission (Rao 1972: 76). An influential Tibetan Lama on a visit to Peking informed the Viceroy Li Hung Chang that the Tibetans were opposed to the British Mission as they feared that their territory and religion would be interfered with. The Viceroy calmed the fears of the Lama and told him to use his influence to obtain a commercial and trading facility for the British Indian subjects and to find a specific place where they could exchange merchandise. Viceroy Li Hung Chang felt 'a small escort of ten members would be more likely than a larger one to forward the objects of the Macaulay Mission' (Rao 1972: 77).

In fear of the imminent British invasion, the news came that the Tibetan Government had dispatched troops into Sikkim across the Jeylep La[61] to Mount Lingtu, where they built small and quickly defended fort as a defensive mechanism or observation post (Gyaincain 1997: 82; Rao 1972: 82). W. B. Oldham, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, stated "Mr. Macaulay will have reached before"[62], he addresses his concerns about Macaulay would have reached before. According to Macaulay "The Lamas (Tibetan Lamas) have come down to Chawab, a place 13 miles (not 8 as Oldham puts it) on this side of the Jeylep"[63]. The Tibetans showed no signs of withdrawal from their position at Lingtu. Instead, they took steps to consolidate their position by building a fort at that place (Grover 1974: 22). All reports showed that the Tibetans were gaining confidence in the occupation of the plateau[64]. The Viceroy of Szechuan province was alarmed at the British usurpation of Upper Burma, and being ignorant of the British intentions in Tibet thought it was desirable to despatch a certain number of troops into that country to guard against a surprise attack (Rao 1972: 76).

Thotub Namgyal, who had risen to power with the British support, could not stand up to the pressure of the anti-British Bhutias and Tibetans. He soon drifted away from the British influence and succumbed to the pressure of the anti-British Bhutias

[61] Jeylep La was considered as the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, from where the Tibetan jurisdiction commenced. In a letter from W. B. Oldham to Lord H. Ulick Browne on 15 August 1886, it is said 'the last recorded evidence was the confidential map framed by Mr. Robert of the Survey in 1883-84, which showed this boundary,' Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[62] Letter from Darjeeling, Commissioner to Bengal, Political Department dated: 30th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[63] Letter from Colman Macaulay to Sir Rivers dated 28th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[64] ibid

and Tibetans. Early in 1886, he abruptly disavowed his subordination to the Government of India, as enjoined by the treaty of 1861 (Grover 1974: 22). The Maharajah was at Chumbi in Tibet, and he was allowed to remain longer than stipulated in the Treaty of 1961. The point was that he could easily obtain more information about the attitude of the Tibetans for the British towards the contemplated Mission to Tibet. Ulick Browne viewed the situation as '...the Maharajah is yielding to a most objectionable extent to demands made on him by the Tibetan officials without references to his obligation towards the British Government'[65]. The Maharajah was, in fact, in fear of the Tibetan officials and was willing to allow them, what they like to do[66]. Colman Macaulay states "The Maharajah has broken the treaty [1861] Article 20 certainly, if not Article 19, and the matter cannot surely drop"[67].

The Maharajah of Sikkim, supporting the Tibetan action stated; "it (Mount Lingtu) had been given to Sikkim because of the Sikkim people had suffered and been much reduced in number, and if we failed to maintain the independence of the land, Tibet was compelled to assume possession of their property" (Namgyal 1908: 87). The Maharajah in his letter to Tenduk Pulger and Lasso Kazi on 18 July 1886 stated "The territory from Rishi (Eastern part of Sikkim) belongs to the Thibet Government, and that, as a matter of favour, the Sikkim Raja has been allowed to enjoy the land..., and has allowed the British Government to construct roads and come up to Jeylep. Under such circumstances, the Thibet Government can rightly resume its land, but if the Sikkim Government now acts properly, its possession below Gyaneh will not be disturbed. Besides this, the whole of Sikkim is under China and Thibet"[68].

The Maharajah further stated that the orders of the Tibetan Officials at Rhenok should be obeyed. In the *perwanah* (royal decree) to his ryots at Rhenock, the Maharajah urged them "to send within the 20th of the 5th Bhooteah month (19th July) at Chambok[69] 30 coolies consisting of Bhooteahs, Lepchas and Paharias to construct a

[65] Letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 29th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[66] ibid
[67] Letter from Colman Macaulay to Sir Rivers dated 28th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[68] Translation of a letter from the Maharajah of Sikkim to Tenduk Pulger and Lasso Kazee dated 26th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[69] A spot on the road 4 miles from the west of Lingtu and about 8 miles from the Jeylep.

house for the accommodation of the Thibetan and Chinese soldiers"[70]. Most of the official records are elitist in origin, though not all. The presence of the subaltern people has come down to us through the official records of one kind or another (Guha 1983: 14). Tibetan Officials at Rhenok stated 'at this time the Sikkim Rajah and his officials cannot do without obeying the orders of the Tibet Government'[71]. The Tibetans suspecting the complicity of the Maharajah with the English had kept the Maharajah under surveillance in Chumbi, in consequence of which he was not able to return to Tumlong[72]. The Deputy Commissioner sent him a letter requesting, on general grounds, and without referring to his instructions about building the fort and obeying the orders of Tibetan officers, to return to Sikkim (Gyaincain 1997: 82).

Moreover, it was stated that if he fails to obey these orders, his annual allowance will be stopped henceforth, and such further notice of his disloyalty and disregard to the provisions of the treaty will be taken as may seem fitting[73]. The British asserted this constituted a Tibetan invasion of Sikkim and urged the Chinese government that the Government of Tibet must withdraw its troops from Mount Lingtu in a given period or the British would station troops there too (ibid). Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling thought that 'if something not done quickly to check the Tibetans, they may do what will force on us measures to be avoided if possible'[74].

The Chinese Government demanded the Government of Tibet to withdraw its troops from Mount Lingtu. The Government and the three major monasteries of Tibet Sera, Depung, and Gheden refused to do so by pointing out that Mount Lingtu was Tibetan territory. Chinese High Commissioner Wen Shu supported the Tibetan Government (Gyaincain 1997: 83). Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was of the view that "As the Tibet Mission is stopped, Macaulay's party had better be dispersed as quickly as possible. Its presence at Darjeeling now only tends to keep up the alarm

[70] Letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to F. B. Peacock, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 29th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[71] Letter from the Tibetan Officials at Rhenok to Lasso Kazee and Tenduk Pulger dated 24th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[72] Letter from Baboo Sarat Chandra Das, Deputy Inspector of Schools of British Sikkim (Darjeeling) on special duty to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 23rd August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[73] Letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to F. B. Peacock, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 29th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[74] Letter from Darjeeling, Commissioner to Bengal, Political Department dated: 30th July 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

which agitates the frontier"[75]. The Tibet Mission which had been assembled at Darjeeling for two months was officially rescinded. The tract so claimed by the Tibetans was called Sartinkai[76], its general position was from the Jeylep to Rhenock (where the British jurisdiction commenced), and the places occupied by Tibetan soldiers at Chambok and Lingtu. F. B. Peacock, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, stated: "...as regards the actual and hitherto recognised frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, the evidence since 1849 is abundant and clear"[77]. The Lieutenant-Governor called on the Commissioner of the Rajshahi to submit a statement to this evidence, for it seemed that without a correct understanding of the question cannot be arrived at[78].

The Phodang Lama informs the British officials that "he had addressed a remonstrance to the Thibetan officers, protesting against their occupation of a part of Sikkim...in consequence the Thibetans had relieved the Sikkim labourers and were only employing Thibetans labourers on their works"[79]. Despite the clear directives from the Rajah that the orders of the Tibetan officials should be obeyed, Phodang Lama issuing remonstrance on the occupation of part of Sikkim, and Tibetans relieving the labourers shows the relative power of Lama in the administration of Sikkim.

Mullard contends that "these two leading men (Phodang Lama and Khangsa Dewan) of the state are considered by traditional Sikkimese histories as the 'bad men' of Sikkimese history" (Mullard and Wongchuk 2010: 59), and talks about the "silent rebellion" of these two men. On the account contained in the Palace Archives, document PD/1.7/004; a letter from Thutob Namgyal to the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, states "Their (Phodang Lama and Khangsa Dewan) intention was that they

[75] Telegram from the Lieutenant-Governor, Calcutta to Foreign Secretary, Simla dated 3rd August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[76] A tract in the up-lands of Sikkim, called Sartinkai, was granted by Tibet as a rent-free *Zemindari* or *jagir* to the Lamas of Padma yang rtse as long as they were incarnations. When the line of incarnate Lamas ceased, and the secular power of Sikkim correspondingly rose, the Rajah was allowed by Tibet to succeed to this grant, and his successors have held it since. This tract was quite undefined, and that was the basis of the Tibetan claim (Letter from W. B. Oldham to Lord H. Ulick Browne, 15 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh).

[77] Letter from F. B. Peacock, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, dated 11 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[78] ibid

[79] Memo. by W. Oldham, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling. Copy forwarded to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division for information dated 16 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

wanted to replace the Chogyal of Sikkim, as they ordered taxpayers to stop paying taxes to the Chogyal [presumably to pay the taxes to themselves instead].” On account of all these things, the Chogyal requests the British to reduce the power of the Phodang Lama and his brother.

Ulick Browne states that “the Tibetans have no case at all for claiming the exercise of nothing less than sovereign rights over the plateau or tract of Sikkim”[80]. According to him “the claim should be resisted, and the Tibetans should be called on, through the Chinese Government, to put forward their claims for the decision of the British and Chinese Governments, and in the meantime, they should retire to Jeylep”[81]. The Deputy Commissioner Oldham reports that “the Tibetan troops are in occupation of and are completing and extending the fort at Lingtu, and that the Tibetans say that they intend to construct another similar one at Rhenock, on the frontier of Sikkim and the Darjeeling district, after the rains”[82]. The British were infuriated when the Tibetans constructed a fort at Lingtu, some 12 miles inside the Sikkimese border (Rao 1972: 82).

F. B. Peacock notes that the British Government had been at the trouble and expense of making a road up to the summit of the Jeylep pass, to establish communications between Tibet and Darjeeling. Moreover, until then, no objection had been raised that the British Government was not entirely within their rights to do so. If this conclusion was correct, the Tibetans had invaded by their acts the territory of a Chief who was in a treaty alliance with the British Government, and whom in an unusual manner the Government was bound to protect[83]. Sir Rivers Thompson had hoped that with the knowledge that the British Government has revoked the Tibet Mission, things would revert to their former position. However, this was not the case. The Tibetans still did not go back. For the Lieutenant-Governor the most desirable thing was to resort to force for the evacuation of Sikkimese territory from the Tibetans. Peacock states that ‘setting aside for a moment the Maharajah of Sikkim,

[80] Letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 21st August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[81] ibid
[82] Letter from Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 30 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[83] Letter from F. B. Peacock, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India dated 13 September 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

the people of that country are entirely opposed to the Tibetan inroads, and intensely dislike the subordination of their ruler to Tibetan control. They have long wished that the Maharajah should abandon Chumbi and take up his permanent residence at Tumlong'[84].

Given the preceding considerations, the Governor-General in Council presumed the more prudent plan was to leave the Tibetans alone and to see whether a delay of a few weeks or months, would end in their quiet retirement[85]. The Tibetan aggression had already lasted for months. It was reported that Tibetan official Karcho Dyepen [Generalissimo] was coming to take command with a relief of fresh 100 regular troops and Nyechang Lama[86] or his representative. The coming of this Lama hinted the occupation of the spot was permanent, and the Tibetans showed their intention to annex Lingtu permanently by consecrating the spot (Rao 1972: 89). The spot at Lingtu had been fixed from the utterance of the Nyechang oracle[87]. Colman Macaulay, Chief Secretary of the Bengal Government states "...If the Tibetans do not abandon their present position, the Government of India will doubtless insist, at the proper time, upon the retirement of the Tibetan force, and that will be the fittest occasion to come to a settlement with the Maharajah for evading the terms of the treaty..."[88]

The Provincial Administration of Bengal was very much worried about the continued Tibetan presence in Sikkim as it resulted in severe damage to the British prestige in the Himalayan states. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal wanted the Government of India to take steps to ensure the immediate withdrawal of the Tibetans from Lingtu. The Bengal Government asked the Government of India to use the force to expel the Tibetans, either by the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling or by the Sikkim Dewan supported by the British arms (Rao 1972: 89).

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[84] ibid

[85] Letter from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 9th October 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[86] Nyechang was a monastery near Lhasa, the seat of the oracle of Tibet.

[87] Letter from W. B. Oldham, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 29th October 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[88] Letter from Colman Macaulay, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 11th December 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

Given the far greater importance of the terms of the Burma-Chinese Convention, the Governor-General in Council aversely decided to take any actions which could be misrepresented to China as an intention of forcing a way into Tibet. Therefore, it was agreed no troops should be moved, nor should any assistance, either in arms or money, be given with the object of operating against Lingtu garrison[89]. J. Ware Edgar, informs that he just received a letter from Chumbi from the Maharajah, and was astounded to read that 'he (Maharajah) and his country have become subject to China and Tibet, and that he has signed a treaty undertaking to obey their behests in all things, and that, in consequence of the receipt of their orders forbidding him to leave his dominions, he is unable to accept friendly invitation to visit Darjeeling'[90]. Edgar states that "the country of Sikkim is not, and never has been, subject to China and Tibet, but is in close alliance with, and under the protection of, the British Government"[91].

Government of Bengal made several invitations to Maharajah to visit Darjeeling, but the Maharajah declined the invitations and informed the Government of Bengal, that he was bound to China and Tibet by the Treaty signed in 1886, the Treaty of Galing, and he is not allowed to enter into British territories (Rao 1972: 86). Risley in *The Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894) puts it that the Treaty of Galing is peculiar in the history of Sikkim. In 1880, one of the Tibetan Secretaries of State accompanied by a Chinese military officer went to Paro in Bhutan for settling some local disturbances. On their return to Phari, in Tibet, an unsuccessful attempt was made to extract a similar agreement from Sikkim. Six years later, the subject was reopened, and a formal treaty was signed at Galing, in Tibet, by the Rajah, on behalf of the "people of Sikhim, priests, and laymen", the agreement read as:

> From the time of Chogel Penchoo Namguay (first Rajah of Sikhim) all our Rajahs and other subjects have obeyed the orders of China. You have ordered us by strategy or force to stop the passage of the Rishi river between Sikhim and British territory, but we are small and the sarkar (British Government) is great, and we may not succeed, and may then fall into the mouth of the tiger-lion. In such a crisis, if you, as our old friends, can make some arrangements, even then in good and evil we will not leave 'the shelter of the feet of China

[89] Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal dated 20th January 1887, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[90] Letter from J. W. Edgar, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Khanza Dewan of Sikkim and the Phodong Lama and Officers of Sikkim dated 28th September 1887, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[91] ibid

> and Tibet...We all, king and subjects, priests and laymen honestly promise to prevent persons from crossing the boundary (Risley 1894/1989: VIII).

The British Government in India waited for the right time for the intervention, Dufferin, the then Governor-General finally decided to expel Tibetans from Lingtu by force (Rao 1972: 90). Viceroy finally recognises the importance to put an end the state of affairs which had assumed utmost necessity[92]. On the 16 December 1887, the Lieutenant-Governor addresses a letter to the Officer Commanding at Lingtu as follows:

> His Excellency the Governor-General of India commands me to warn you that, unless the Tibetan troops, who have advanced beyond their frontier and have wrongfully occupied Lingtu in the territory of Sikkim, retire within the Tibetan boundary, a detachment of Her Majesty's troops will be sent to expel them, but in order that you may have ample time to forward this communication to your Government, you are accorded until the 15th of March next to effect the required evacuation[93].

In the meantime, the news came that the Maharajah of Sikkim had arrived in Gangtok. The Maharajah requested A. W. Paul, the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to visit Gangtok and hear his explanation for his long absence at Chumbi. The Lieutenant-Governor permitted him and asked to explain him the circumstances which made it necessary for the Government to commence preparations to enforce the evacuation of Lingtu and to maintain its long-standing treaty relations and friendship with the Sikkim Government[94]. A. W. Paul leaves Siliguri [northern part of present North Bengal] with Mr. Bernard[95] on the 7th February and reached Gangtok on the afternoon of the 13th; he found Rajah and his family wretchedly accommodated in tents and huts near the new palace[96]. He obtained a copy of the so-called treaty of Galing, by giving reference to which Rajah was abstaining himself from returning to Sikkim, which was already laid down before the Government of India[97]. Rajah explains that he had gone to Chumbi in 1885 with the permission of the British

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[92] Telegram dated 9th October 1887, from Simla, Foreign Department to Darjeeling, Political, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[93] Letter from J. W. Edgar, Chief Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 17 January 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[94] Letter from J. W. Edgar, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling dated 6 February 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[95] Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector of 24-Pergunnahs.

[96] Letter from A. W. Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 25 February 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[97] Letter from J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 10 February 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

government and circumstances compelled him to remain there. When he was directed to return in August 1886, he could not return because of fear of both Tibet and the British government. He further stated 'he was but a youth and had been deserted by his old advisers (Phodang Lama and Khangsa Dewan) who have refused to assemble at Chumbi, and so did not know how to act.'[98]

However, despite being warned of probable expulsion from the Mount Lingtu if they chose to remain there. The Tibetans justified their actions as on their border. To protect the British interests, the British military forces entered Sikkim in March 1888. Under the command of General Graham, an army of about 2,000 men took the field. A. W. Paul and J. C. White were attached to it as Political and Assistant Political Officers (Rao 1972: 93). Two Duiboin generals, on the Tibetan side, were sent to lead 900 Tibetans troops, and the militias were also mobilised. They were deployed on Mount Lingtu and to its north. Galoon Lhalu Yexei Norbu Wangqu was appointed as the Chief Commander. On 20 March 1888, the British troops attacked the Tibetan troops at Mount Lingtu (Gyaincain 1997: 83). The force encountered little opposition destroyed the Lingtu fort and occupied the capital city of Gangtok on 21 March 1888, the Tibetans suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat to Yadong and Phari, leaving Mount Lingtu under the control of the British. The Chinese government dismissed Wen Shu, the High commissioner stationed in Tibet, who had supported the Tibetan struggle against the British mission and appointed obedient Shen Tai to take his place as the High commissioner. The British took Lingtu after a brief clash with the Tibetans. This was the first time when the Tibetans had clashed directly with an army of Western power (Rao 1972: 93; Meyer 2005: 20; Gyaincain 1997: 83).

Paul reports Lingtu was taken without opposition; the thirty or forty Tibetans fled when they saw pioneers before the gate. The Sikkim Rajah remained in Gangtok, and fearing the breaking with Tibet, he did not openly declare himself on the British side. He sent his three children to his mother at Chumbi[99]. Paul reported 'they (Tibetans) never abandoned their hold on this side of the Jeylep valley, but have

[98] Letter from A. W. Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 25 February 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

[99] Letter from A. W. Paul, Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 2nd May 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

added fortifications nearly down to Kophu, and on the 5th July sent a force as far as the Tukola.'[100] As regards Tibet, the Tibetan laity, including the soldiery, were anxious for peace, but the Kham reinforcements were equally concerned about war. The accounts received from both Sikkim and Bhutan were that 8,000 more troops from Kham Daya were on their way[101]. Despite the disapproval from the Chinese Government, Tibetan Government led by the 13th Dalai Lama mobilised 10,000 Tibetan troops including militiamen and battled against the British from June through October, in an attempt to recover Mount Lingtu (Gyaincain 1997: 83).

Lieutenant-Governor of Darjeeling referred a letter to Viceroy on the account that 'the British Government should be relieved from the obligation it had assumed in promising not to cross the Tibetan frontier..., and to take any other measure which may be considered feasible,'[102] it was approved and was dispatched to the Chief of the Tibetan troops early in June. Following the instructions from the Chinese government, the new High commissioner did not support the Tibetan actions, and the inadequate equipment of the Tibetan troops and militiamen led to failure. The British troops crossed the Zhelilha mountain pass and penetrated Rinchagong and Chumbi in Yadong (Gyaincain 1997: 83-4). A justification of the British position was later laid out in the *Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894), "that the obligation of driving the Tibetans out of Sikkim was imposed on us by the essential conditions of our policy towards the East Himalayan states, and that this policy is just and reasonable" (Risley 1894/1989: XVI-XVII).

The Se-de-geh-sum, or Council of the united monasteries of Tibet Sera, Depung, and Gheden, had tried hard to prevent Amban from coming to the frontier to make peace. It was reported that the Amban had intended to leave Lhasa on the 3rd of October. It was rumoured the Se-de-geh-sum were preparing to send their Lama army. The Amban protested and threatened to call in the Chinese troops (4,000 men) collected at Ta-tsien-lo. The Tibetans, however, were doing their utmost to prevent

[100] Letter from A. W. Paul, Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 9th July 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[101] ibid
[102] Letter from Colman Macaulay, Cheif Secretary, Foreign Department, Government Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 21st July 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

the Amban coming in person, suggesting the Popen would be sufficient[103]. All the messengers agree that the Amban is having significant trouble in bringing the Tibetans to terms, his great opponents being the Se-de-geh-sum. Thus his departure was initially for the 3rd October: he put it off until the 8th; then the 17th, next to the 19th. Another rumour was the date of departure was the 28th October, another as the 2nd and 3rd November, while the latest was the 9th November. It was heard that a deputation has gone to Phari in anticipation of the Amban's coming[104].

Amban had tried to forbid the Tibetans from fighting; he had issued orders to the Tibetan officials not to fight. The Government had been already obeyed the Imperial mandate[105]. The Amban had left Lhasa and was expected to reach Rinchagong on the 13th December, and shortly afterwards Amban had written to inquire what would be a suitable time to meet at Gnatong and was told the 16th. On the 18th with the information that is owing to pressure of work and fatigue from the journey would not be able to reach Gnatong until the 21st. On 21st December 1888, the Amban Shen Tai arrived. On 22nd December it was decided to meet at Goorkha mess-house. The Amban stated he had letters of authority from the Chinese Government giving him full power to come to the frontier, stop hostilities and settle matters, and also several written petitions from the Tibetan officials agreeing to abide by his decisions. British wished for the free interchange of letters with Tibet and even facilities of commerce, already promised by the Pekin Government and full recognition by the Tibetans of sole supremacy in Sikkim and boundaries laid down by the British. The Amban, however, insisted on having no authority to yield up Sikkim and suggested what he claimed as the *status quo ante* should be agreed to without further enquiry and detail. He refused most emphatically and insisted on his claim being accepted without alteration. On this, Paul stated it was impossible and expressed his fear that the negotiations would break up and asked him to think over

[103] Letter from A. W. Paul, Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 2nd November 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[104] ibid
[105] Translation of Letters from the Amban dated 8th Month of 15th day (20th September 1888) , Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

again. However, he reiterated his claims and stated it was no use of offering any further concessions, and therefore the negotiations broke down[106].

However, in 1890 under British pressure, Sheng Tai joined the British Indian Viceroy P. C. Lansdowne in Calcutta to sign the Anglo-Chinese Convention[107] relating to Sikkim and Tibet, which obligated the Chinese government to recognise the British government's protectorate over Sikkim (Gyaincain 1997: 84). Sikkim was deemed essential to establishing a substantial British presence, as it was a key strategic outpost in the region guarding the Russian and Tibet/Chinese influence. The occupation of the Lingtu fort by the Tibetan force gave the British a chance to revise the Treaty of 1861 with the Maharajah. The defeat of the Tibetans convinced the Chinese that if they failed to come into terms with the British, they might lose their influence in Tibet. As a result, the Convention of 1890 was signed between Great Britain and China (Rao 1972: 96). The British-Indian takeover of Sikkim culminated in the war of 1888-89, the British took around 70 years in occupying the relationship between British India and Sikkim, they reiterated restoring prestige demanded victory (McKay 2009/2010: 46). Moreover, on the broader sphere of strategic necessity, it was necessary to establish friendly relations with China, in the face of the Russian advance in Central Asia (Singh 1988: 210).

However, it is to be noted that every policies British were adopting and every tactic they were using was to get a step ahead in their goal to open up Tibet for the trade. In doing so, the administrative structure Sikkim was attaining was mainly the by-product of the British policies to reach their ultimate goal. Under the terms of the 1890 Convention, the Indian government obtained the right to make administrative decisions regarding Sikkim's internal affairs, frontiers and foreign relations, essentially absorbing Sikkim into British India conforming to the modern state model. The Raj obtained effective control over the gateway from India into Tibet with this agreement (Meyer 2005: 52).

[106] Letter from A. W. Paul, Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 31st January 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[107] See in the Annexure VI

The Establishment of the Council in Sikkim

After the conflict, it was decided to appoint a Council to assist Maharajah in his administration. A. W. Paul states 'as long as 1880 at Tumlong, I had personally, under the orders of the late Hon'ble Sir Ashley Eden, advised him (Rajah) to appoint a council of the older and more experienced officers and Kazis to help him in his administration to which he was adamant about acting. The government now again pressed the matter on him...'[108] Claude White, Assistant Political Officer explained to the Maharajah that Government intended to recognise him, but also intended to work through the Council and not directly through him, which mostly made him subaltern in his own country. Claude White in consultation with Tendook Pulger decided to appoint a council to the Rajah consisting of Phodong Lama and Dorji Lopen (Lama brothers); Khansa Dewan, Guntok [sic] Kazi, Sating [sic] Kazi, and Purboo Dewan as lay members; and Kergong Dingpen as a writer[109].

On 22 October 1888 Rajah was presented to his Council[110]. The Rajah, acting under advice convened a meeting of the Council. Paul stated 'it would be too early to judge how the Rajah and his Council will get on together'[111]. According to Paul 'there are no Kazis of sufficient standing who could be trusted with the administration...I would, therefore, advocate that for the next four or five years a European officer of standing be left at Gangtok as Assistant Political Officer..., who should be Political Officer for Sikkim under the Government of Bengal...'[112] He further stated 'if the above proposal is approved, I would venture to suggest that Mr. J. C. White would make an excellent officer for the work'[113]. The Lieutenant-Governor heartily accepted Paul's recommendation that a Political Officer should remain to advise the Rajah and his Council and to aid them in restoring the orderly administration which was

[108] Letter from A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 2nd November 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[109] Letter from John C. White, Assistant Political Officer to A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force dated 25th October 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[110] ibid
[111] Letter from A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 2nd November 1888, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[112] Letter from A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 31 January 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[113] ibid

impaired by the events during last few years[114]. Paul reiterates 'I have carefully impressed upon that officer that his motto should be *"Festina Lente"*, and pointed out that all reforms to be permanent should be of slow growth'[115].

The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 was followed by a protocol between the two countries regarding trade, communication, and pasture, which was signed at Darjeeling in December 1893. This gave the right to the British for establishing a trade mart at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier. The Convention and the subsequent Trade Protocol had been negotiated over the head of Tibet and Sikkim, reducing to the state of the subaltern. Since Tibet was not a party to either of them, she tried to sabotage them by throwing in difficulties, their implementations. China then was in no position to compel the Tibetans to honour her commitments to the British. She was herself weak and withering (Kotturan 1983: 76-7).

In Jeylep pass boundary pillars were erected. It was decided to erect pillar at Donchuk-la and other passes also demarcating the Sikkim-Tibet border[116]. The Lamas of the three great monasteries were opposed to it, and 'the opposition of the Lamas was not connected with any difference of opinion as to where the treaty boundary lies, but on reluctance to accept the treaty itself'[117]. Claude White informs the Bengal Government that the pillar on Jeylep site of which was fixed in the presence of Chinese, has been demolished by Tibetans, and a number of the pillar on stoneware slab removed[118]. He alleges that 'this is undoubtedly the work of the Tibetans, who have been encouraged by the refusal of their officials to meet me'[119]. The pillar on Donchuk-la had also been damaged[120]. It was reported that the Lamas at Lhasa had

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[114] Letter from J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 2 February 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[115] Letter from A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 31st January 1889.
[116] Telegram from Gnatong, Political Officer, Sikkim to Darjeeling, Lieutenant-Governor dated 19th May 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[117] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 22nd May 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[118] Telegram from Gnatong, Political Officer, Sikkim to Darjeeling, Bengal dated 4th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[119] Letter from John C. White, Political Officer, Sikkim to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 6th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[120] Telegram from Gnatong, Political Officer, Sikkim to Darjeeling, Bengal dated 4th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

refused absolutely to obey the Amban[121]. In the meantime, news came that the Tibetan Commissioners wishes to meet Claude White at Yatung[122]. Bengal Government directs White that he should not hold communications with Tibetans directly, they should come to him and not to them[123]. It was informed that the meeting between White and Tibetan Commissioners was satisfactory[124]. The two Tibetan Commissioners whom White met informed that it was only the Lamas who want to oppose the demarcation. They said villagers and laymen had no wish to fight, and they also reported that there was no likelihood of any active opposition by the Tibetans if the demarcation was continued[125].

It was decided that the Chinese and Tibetan delegates will be invited on the frontier. Should they fail to attend, delimitation shall proceed in their absence. They will be informed of the result, and any objections they make will be duly considered. At the same time, they will be requested to see that no Tibetan official exercises jurisdiction on the Sikkim side of the boundary laid down pending discussion as to its accuracy[126]. Cotton agrees that all charges should be borne by the high contracting parties, and not by the State of Sikkim which had been no party to the agreement[127]. However, the boundaries were never demarcated, and the option was left open for the conflict in future.

Sikkim from Feudal to Modern Form of Administration

The administrative acts that were to be done by the Council in the name of the Sikkim Rajah, the Rajah took no real interest or the part in the administration[128]. In

[121] Letter from John C. White, Political Officer, Sikkim to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division dated 9th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[122] Telegram from Darjeeling, Bengal to Simla, Foreign dated 17th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[123] Telegram from Darjeeling, Bengal to Gnatong, Political Officer, Sikkim dated 17th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[124] Telegram from Simla, Foreign to Darjeeling, Bengal dated 17th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[125] Diary of J. C. White, Political Officer, Camp Yenkongten dated 25th June 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[126] Letter from P. Nolan, Commssioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of India dated 24th November 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[127] Letter from H. J. S. Cotton, Chief Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 17th December 1895, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[128] Letter from A. W. Paul the Political Officer, Sikkim Field Force to J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 31st January 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

connection with Paul's recommendation that a Political Officer should remain for some time to come at Gangtok to advise the Rajah and his Council, he should be subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling[129]. The custom of the Sikkim Durbar had been to support its expenses by sending for *raiyats* (farmers) and calling on them to pay a contribution in kind under the name of presents. Indeed, the more significant part of the average revenue raised was realised in this way. After the creation of Council in Sikkim under the presidency of the Rajah with old Kazis and experienced men as members, which substituted the former form of administration, Rajah still attempted to levy these taxes by his sole authority, for his exclusive benefit. This was discouraged because his allowance was paid in money, at a rate fixed by Government; that as regular taxes were being introduced the *raiyats* could not be called on to give the old benevolences as well; and that all revenue should be under the control of the Council. The affairs were to be conducted by a Council, presided over by the Rajah when present, all decisions to be communicated to him and in his absence, and if he disagrees, the Political Officer to decide orders being executed in the common name of the Rajah and Council. The Rajah never accepted this restriction on his authority, and every instance of its imposition he treated as a grievance. Rajah refused to take part in the administration assigned to him. The arrangement proved unworkable from the first, as the Rajah declined to take part given to him[130]. Under these circumstances, he left for Rabdentse to make a change of place and to Dobta, which was three day's journey from Walung, on the borders of Tibet and Nepal, where he had a *jagir* (estate)[131].

A. W. Paul informs 'Tenduk strongly urges that the Raja of Sikkim should at once be induced to return to Gangtok, and make that place his headquarters'[132]. According to him, 'at Rubdenchi [sic] he is surrounded by the disaffected, does nothing himself, cares nothing about his State, and is wholly subject to the Rani's influence...and so he be induced to take some interest and part in real

[129] J. Ware Edgar, Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India dated 2nd February 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[130] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of Bengal dated 25 June 1892, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of India.
[131] P. Nolan, *Additions made by the Raja of Sikkim* dated 23rd June 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.
[132] A. W. Paul, Grant to Raja Tenduk Pulger of Certain Plots of Land in the district of Darjeeling dated 19th October 1891, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

government...'[133] The change in place according to Rajah was, he was 'so ill-treated at Guntok [sic] that he thought it better to change for a short period the place of his residence than to return to that town"[134]. According to him, "He left the country in order to relieve himself from distress, not with a view to resign his Raj"[135]. When the Rajah received orders to leave his retreat at Rabdentse and go to Gangtok, he declined to comply with the order, instead, pretending that he was going to Gangtok, he fled to Nepal. He had informed Yangtang and Dullon Kazis, that he is starting for the Gangtok, but instead, he tried to escape to Tibet. He had no desire to go to Gangtok, taking part assigned to him by the British Government, and act with the Assistant Political Agent and Council, he said 'he desired a Council that would act with him, not, like that at present existing, against his orders'[136]. Rajah was not happy with the functioning of the Council, and thus, he tried to flee to Tibet to relieve his stress according to him. However, the Rajah and his family was caught in Nepal and escorted back to British territory.

Sir H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India refers a letter to the Chief Secretary of Bengal, H. J. S. Cotton that "The Maharaja has declined to take any part in the administration which the British Government has established in Sikkim; although his acceptance of it was an essential condition of his restoration to power. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner of Rajshahi recommends that the Maharaja should, for a time, be formally deposed and kept under surveillance"[137]. The Lieutenant-Governor pointed out, the formal deposition of the Maharaja would undoubtedly make some stir throughout India and possibly in England. Thus, it was decided to inform him that, as he will not comply with the conditions prescribed by the Government of India, he must remain out of power and under surveillance. In this connection, it was decided that arrangements should be made to find him some suitable and retired place of residence, more distant from Darjeeling than the Lebong spur[138].

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[133] ibid
[134] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 27th June 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.
[135] ibid
[136] ibid
[137] Letter from Sir H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department to The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 19th July 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.
[138] ibid

The Maharajah was put under house arrest and was deposed for the three years, beginning from July 1892. After the temporary deposition of Maharajah, White recommended the government that the Maharajah's second son, Sidkeong Namgyal should succeed his father. The Commissioner in reply informed that time had not come to think about a permanent arrangement since the Maharajah might obey the Government's orders or the eldest son might return to Sikkim from Tibet (Namgyal 1908: 113-14). Maharajah's eldest son Tchoda Namgyal was in Tibet.

By the end of Maharajah's exile in Kurseong, the Council opposed the restoration of Thotub Namgyal and expressed their wish that he should be permanently deposed and his second son Sidkeong Namgyal should be made the Maharajah. The personal relationship between the Maharajah and Claude White was not pleasant, and on November 1895, despite the opposition, the Government of India restored Maharajah to his throne. However with the limited power in the administration and it was affirmed that in the course of two or three years the power on internal administration would be restored to the Maharajah (Namgyal 1908: 114-5; Jha 1985: 25). The question of restoring the allowance of Rs. 12,000 which the Maharajah used to get 'as compensation for the cession of Darjeeling,' was discussed in July 1895. The payment had been stopped since White's appointment as Assistant Political Agent in 1888-89. Sir Charles Elliot stated that the Maharajah had forfeited any claim to such favour by his misbehaviour and the allowance was stopped to Maharajah[139].

Development of Modern Forms of Administration in Sikkim

The British evolved the administrative apparatus in Sikkim even penetrating the remotest village in Sikkim. The whole of Sikkim was divided into about ninety estates owned by Kazis, Thikadars (landlords), and lamas, who were called as *ilakadars*. Each *ilakadars* had several mandals or headmen under him who were responsible for the collection of rents and taxes from the villagers. The number of houses under each mandal varied from five to sixty, but the average number of the houses under each mandal is not known and may be estimated at fifteen to twenty. Each mandal had to keep simple accounts, but many were illiterate, and each illiterate mandal employed a man called a *baidar* or *kamdari*, who could read and write and kept the accounts for

[139] Presidency Office Papers 29-6-1896, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

him. It was not known how many mandals were in Sikkim, but the number was estimated in 1910 at 800. There was a list of the estates in the Judicial Secretary's office; the list showing the number of houses in each *ilakadars*' estate[140].

Each bazaar had a block, the six-state bazaars at Gangtak [sic], Pakyang [sic], Rungpo, Singtam, Rangbi and Naya bazar formed a select circle under the supervision of Bazar Inspector. Other houses under each mandal formed one block, and one enumerator would deal with one or more blocks, for example, the number of houses in each block, their distance from one another, and the number of literate men available such as the mandal, his *baidar*, or some other person. The blocks were grouped into circles; each circle consists of one or more estates. There were no villages outside the few bazaars, but only scattered houses. In preparing the census reports, the supervisors were supposed to be men of understanding English, and they received the manual of instructions in English and a copy for enumerators adopted for British India[141].

Although White's appointment was made for political and military reasons, it also had a substantial effect on Sikkim's socio-economic and internal political situation (Meyer 2005: 52). Sikkim state was impoverished and lacking in most of the structures of modern government. There were no police, courts, or public works and no secular education or public health system (McKay 2007: 87-8). In 1914, after the death of Maharajah Thotub Namgyal, Sidkeong Namgyal became the Maharajah, ignoring the claims of his elder brother Tchoda Namgyal[142] (Rao 1972: 145). Sir Charles Elliott, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal advised the government to make proper arrangements for the education of Sidkeong Namgyal, as a successor to Sikkim's throne. Sidkeong Namgyal was placed under the charge of Sarat Chandra Das at Darjeeling. He was taught in English, Hindi as well as in Tibetan (Rao 1972: 115).

The education of tenth Maharajah Sidkeong Namgyal Tulku, who had been destined to the religious life, but his elder brother Tchoda Namgyal being banished in

[140] Census Administrative Report, Bengal Miscellaneous Schedule no. 17: 98, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[141] Ibid: 98-9
[142] By the refusal of Tchoda Namgyal to return to Sikkim, Government of India decided that, by his own act he surrendered his claim to the succession. Government of British India, therefore, in February 1899 recognised Sidkeong Namgyal as the successor-designate to the Sikkim throne. At the same time Tchoda Namgyal was prohibited from entering into Sikkim.

Tibet allowed him to become Maharajah. The British had sought to educate him in the English language. Bell reported to the India Office that the role of then Kumar's (Prince) tutor was crucial. 'He is, no doubt, the most important of all. While teaching the Kumar, he should endeavour to strengthen the latter's pro-British ideas'[143]. Maharaj Kumar stated on one occasion that, 'It will be necessary to adopt the European style of dress so as not to be conspicuous'. 'This was an important symbolic marker of an individual's acceptance of and identification with modernity'[144]. The British not only sought to make the sons and daughters of aristocratic families pro-British, but they sought to make the ruler pro-British by inculcating the pro-British ideas. However, he was not destined to rule for a long time. He died on 5 December 1914, and he was succeeded by his younger brother, Tashi Namgyal (Rao 1972: 145). Within a decade of the establishment of Political Office in Sikkim, the Government of British India consolidated its authority in Sikkim to such an extent that it was able to meddle with liberty in essential affairs concerning the royal family. The silent consent of the royal family and the people in the decisions of the Government of India indicated the nature and extent of British authority in Sikkim (ibid: 123).

The Administration of Sikkim in the Reign of Tashi Namgyal

With the accession of Tashi Namgyal to the throne of Sikkim, the British relations with Sikkim entered into another happy period. The Maharajah was under the tutelage of Sir Charles Bell with 'less dictatorial and more persuasive as the Political Officer' according to McKay (2007: 99). Maharajah remained a loyal friend of the British till the end of their rule in India. Bell followed a policy of befriending the local elites and encouraged them to gradually transform their state through the development of modern institutions such as schools and hospitals (McKay 2007: 112). Sir Charles Bell encouraged the education of the Sikkimese students, although the primary aim was to employ them in Tibet. Thus, of the first three students sent from Sikkim to the medical college in Patna, two of them were immediately posted to the Political Department dispensary in Tibet and their contemporary Bhowani Das Pradhan, a member of Nepali community, remained in Sikkim and was placed in charge of the Chidam dispensary in 1913 (ibid: 99).

[143] See in McKay (2003: 32) Charles Bell to Ritchie [India Office], 7 May 1907.
[144] Ibid: 31.

The Government of India was so much satisfied with the loyalty of the Maharajah that government decided to restore the powers over the internal administration of the kingdom (Rao 1972: 145). The documents in Sikkim Archives indicate how cordial the relation was in the reign of Tashi Namgyal. As per the document No.777/E, dated, 27 March 1916[145], the Government of India has directed Political Officer to give the control of the departments, namely; Excise, Income tax, Police, Jail and Judicial and Revenue Stamps to the king, which was held by the British-Indian government in the time of Maharajah Thotub Namgyal's exile in Kurseong. It shows the trust of the Government of India on Maharajah that it agreed to transfer the full powers to Maharajah over the internal administration of Sikkim (Rai 2015: 125).

Another instance is when Triple Entente was victorious over the Triple Alliance in the First World War. The Government of India referred a letter to His Highness Maharajah, to share the happiness of the victory over Triple Alliance on 9 July 1919, which read as:

> The Government of India have suggested to Local Government that the 19th July should be notified as a public holiday, this being the date fixed for the Peace Celebrations in England. As the hot weather is unsuitable for celebrations in India the general celebrations will take place in India next cold weather but it is thought that the actual signing of the peace treaty should not pass unnoticed in India... [146]

In response to it, the Maharajah orders in a document No.919/G.B.[147] that special prayers in all monasteries in Sikkim should be repeated for the three days so that the coming years would be of peace, happy and prosperous. In another letter, the Viceroy of India invites Maharajah to take part in the Chamber of Princes[148] and other ceremonies, dated 22 November 1920, in which Field Marshall the Duke of Connaught was coming on behalf of King-Emperor to inaugurate the Chamber of Princes. It shows the cordial ties between the British Government and Sikkim after 1914. In reply to this, Maharajah Tashi Namgyal states, "My friend, I send you, for your information...respecting my going to Delhi to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Chamber of Princes"[149].

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[145] See in the Annexure VII this is a letter from C. A. Bell to His Highness the Maharajah of Sikkim, Sikkim State Archives.
[146] See in the Annexure VIII
[147] See in the Annexure IX
[148] See in the Annexure X
[149] See in the Annexure XI

The exchange of letters between Governor-General and the Maharajah of Sikkim shows there was no such trouble. On the occasion of the hostility of Amir of Afghanistan towards India, the letter sent by Viceroy:

> I greatly regret to inform Your Highness that the Amir Amanullah has, without warning and without provocation, moved troops to the Indian frontier and has committed acts of hostility which render collision between our forces and those of Afghanistan[150].

In reply to this, the *Maharajah* writes to the Viceroy of India:

> ...my surprise at hearing of the audacity shown in the unprovoked act of hostility on the part of the Amir of Afghanistan. I, however, feel quite sure that he will soon be brought to his senses and compelled to see the folly of the step he has presumed to take against the Indian Government. I beg to assure Your Excellency of the firm faith and loyalty of my little State and of my own sincere allegiance to the King-Emperor and my readiness to do my best. The number of Muslim subjects in my little State is so small that I am sure to be able to prevent them from creating any trouble[151].

In the reign of Sir Tashi Namgyal, the British government did not have any trouble as such with the Sikkim state, and it lasted till the end of their rule in India.

Conclusion

The dominant voices of this period became history are elite, and thus, the subaltern perspective is not apparent. There is very little evidence on non-elite or subaltern aspects and actions in this period. The fate of the tiny subalterns virtually remains unknown. Their voices are not heard, as if they occupy dead space with no life, no view, and thus no history of their own. However, most, though not all, the evidence is elitist in origin. The official records do not get the content from elite actions only; it is predicated on subaltern actions and will also. Therefore, it is possible to read to some extent, the presence of non-elites or subalterns within that body of evidence. The contact with the British marked the significant development in the structures of the state. The connection with the British came about in a historical juncture when Sikkim was resentful to the injustice done in a peace treaty between China and Nepal. She was looking for the option to claim her territories lost to Nepal, and she was presented with the opportunity in the Anglo-Gorkha war.

The initial period in the relationship between Sikkim and British had no issues but the subsequent annexation of Darjeeling and the advancement of imperial power towards Sikkim to establish her as a stable trade post, to reach to their ultimate

[150] See in the Annexure XII
[151] See in the Annexure XIII

regional goal, Tibet created a schism. The contact with the British turn the feudal character of the state into a modern state, the state structure was enhanced, the positive changes that came about in the realm of society and polity were mostly by-products of the pursuance of the main objective of the British exploitation of the land and its people.

The colonial period was a period of transition from feudal to the modern state. Colonialism played a vital role in the social, political and economic evolution of the state. However, all these changes were taking place to suit their needs in the state. The posting of a Political Officer in Gangtok marked a significant step in securing this objective. The Political Officer was not directly responsible for administering the state in papers; he worked in consultation with the Council. However, any significant orders it had to go through Political Office and the Council and the Maharajah had little role to play in it. Since the establishment of the Political Office, there was complete consolidation of power by the British and the state was shaped in the parlance of the modern state to suit their interests.

Chapter IV

Contesting the 'Elite' Narrative: Understanding the Popular Agitations in Sikkim of 1949 and 1973 through a Subaltern Perspective

Introduction

The term 'Subaltern' now appears with growing frequency in studies on Africa, Latin America, and Europe, and subalternist analysis has become a recognisable mode of critical scholarship in history, literature, and anthropology. The subaltern discourse was an effect of the dominant discourses of colonialism, nationalism, and modernity. For almost twenty-five years, 'subaltern studies' scholars have pursued innovative approaches to the condition and consciousness of subordinate groups in India, and subaltern studies have become very influential in many fields outside South Asian Studies. Subaltern studies have been instrumental elsewhere but not everywhere (Prakash 1994: 1476; Hansen 2003: 7-9). There is yet to develop fluency in the theoretical frameworks in the Sikkimese Studies. The originality of Subaltern studies came to be its striving to write history outside the state-centred national discourse (Ludden 2002: 12).

Subaltern studies journal was written and developed primarily by Indians studying Indian history and the influences on the project were global (Altern 2012: 58). Subaltern studies now circulate widely in many fields of post-colonial scholarship throughout the global academy (Hansen 2003: 8-9; Guha 1998: ix). 'The historiography of Indian nationalism for a long time had been dominated by elitism both colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism' according to Guha (1988: 37). Subaltern studies began in India as an effort to rewrite history 'from below' by historians on the left, dissatisfied with prevailing Marxist and nationalist interpretations of Indian history. They adopted Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'Subaltern' to signify the subordinate position of peasants and other people subject to various forms of domination (Hansen 2003: 8). In the criticism of existing historiography, Guha was reacting against the historiography of India that had been dominated by the focus on the development of the nation-state, where the actions of peasants and other marginalised groups were not acknowledged (Altern 2012: 60).

Subaltern studies employ diverse approaches to the history of subaltern peoples—these range from examining the workings of religion, gender, science,

medicine, and memory—the fragments of the nation, critiques of Enlightenment practices of history writing. While the Subaltern studies have been used to pose questions for the study of China, Africa, Europe, the US, and the Middle East; it is in India and Latin America that subaltern studies had been most extensively institutionalised with scholarly collectives, academic journals, and course readers. India and Latin America shared experiences of colonialism, revolutionary peasant movements, and Marxist intellectual traditions. By contrast, it might be tempting to say that subaltern studies would be developed in the Sikkimese studies as Sikkim was not subject to the direct European colonisation and the Marxism was not influential in Sikkimese society as in India or abroad (Hansen 2003: 9). However, Sikkim did experience the peasant movements which in most of the narratives have been obscured. The dawn of the Subaltern Studies was the paradigm shift to the nationalist historiography in India (Chakrabarty 2000: 14).

Agitation in the Guha's words has been regarded in the secondary discourses "as external to the peasant's consciousness, and the cause is made to stand in like a phantom surrogate for a reason" (1983: 47). The omission of the subaltern agency was often signified by metaphors assimilating peasant revolts to natural phenomena: "they break out like thunderstorms, heave like earthquakes, spread like wildfires, and infect like epidemics" (Hansen 2003: 12; Guha 1983: 46). It is this misrepresentation this study tries to highlight among other things and contextualises the 1949 and 1973 agitations in the Guha's 'The Prose of Counter-Insurgency.' A concept developed in the subaltern studies and substantiates the agitations that had been inaugurated by a planned and conscious effort on the part of the local peasant masses (Guha 1983: 46).

This chapter gives a chronological overview of the events that took place in Sikkim. The historical writing on the 1949/1973 uprising provides typical examples of each type of discourse which Guha provides in the 'The Prose of Counter-Insurgency.' Subaltern studies scholarship posits a subaltern position that is resistant to domination by the state and is intractable to incorporation in elite discourses of all sorts (Hansen 2003: 11). Hansen argues that 'Subaltern studies scholarship has the potential to destabilise the myths promulgated by both British and indigenous elites' (2003: 2).

Political Awakening in Sikkim

Like in other Indian states of Hyderabad, Mysore the independence movement in British India had given inspiration to similar changes in Sikkim. Political activities in Sikkim started simmering since the end of 1945 before it was confined to isolated pockets with social rather political aims. At the capital, Gangtok there was Praja Sudharak Samaj under the leadership of Tashi Tshering, there was Praja Sammelan under the direction of Gobardhan Pradhan at Temi Tarku (South Sikkim) and Praja Mandal at Chakhung (West Sikkim), under the leadership of Kazi Lhendup Dorji Khangsarpa (Kotturan 1983: 94; Datta-Ray 1984/2004: 52). Indian independence and the establishment of popular governments in some states encouraged these organisations to come together with pronounced political aims. The movements aimed to overthrow Bhutia-Lepcha elites control in general and the authority of Kazis in particular. They also aimed at destroying the power of Thikadars (Datta-Ray 1984/2004: 52); a *kalo bhari* system of forced labour resulted in considerable hardship (ibid: 34), and that is the reason why people voiced for the removal of *Kalo Bhari*. The causes identified by the historians, such as economic and political deprivation, do not relate to the peasant's consciousness or do so, negatively, triggering off the rebellion as a sort of reflex action, almost mindless response. Agitation is regarded as outside the realm of peasant's consciousness, and the cause is attributed to the mindless spontaneous activity for a reason (Hansen 2003: 12; Guha 1983: 46-7).

On 7 December 1947, the leaders of the regional organisations met at Gangtok and called for political awakening in Sikkim. In a largely attended public meeting at Gangtok, a new political party, the Sikkim State Congress[152] was formed with Tashi Tshering as its President. Tashi Tshering had been for many years employed as a clerk in the Residency (Kotturan 1983: 94-5; Datta-Ray 1984: 52). Although the British use of education was to staff the subordinate posts to the Sikkimese, in doing, so it became the blessing for the Sikkimese because all the prominent leaders in the subsequent Sikkimese politics came from the educated classes of the Sikkimese society. The educated Sikkimese—only a section of them though—rebelled against

[152] In an interview with Mr. C. D. Rai on 29th December 2013, he was the General Secretary of Sikkim State Congress. He said the Sikkim State Congress was created in the same line how the Mysore State Congress, Hyderabad State Congress was created.

the idea of serfdom, both physical and mental. The rebellion has a historical tendency to come to the surface among the redical sections; education provided them ground to rebel against any idea of servitude (Desai 1948: 133; Guha 1983: 20). These new educated classes of contemporary Sikkimese society desired a free Sikkim, free from forced labour (*Kalo Bhari*) and practices like *Jharlangi* (Unpaid labour). This consciousness comes to the surface of some radical sections of the people long before being generalised on a national scale in any country (Guha 1983: 20).

It is important to note that in other princely states, similar political parties had been in existence, and some of them were already in power (Kotturan 1983: 94-5; Datta-Ray 1984: 52). The formation of the State Congress was a landmark in the political history of Sikkim (Kotturan 1983: 95). According to C. D. Rai, "The birth of Sikkim State Congress on 7th December 1947 can be considered as the first cockcrow of the political movement in Sikkim, and it was the direct result of the Indian independence" (Rai 2011/2013: 101). With the formation of the party, a resolution was also introduced for political and economic reforms (Kotturan 1983: 95). Tashi Tshering had compiled an elaborate note on Sikkim economic grievances. It justifiably criticised the political relationship of feudal type[153], the civil and criminal magisterial powers conferred on Kazis and the practice of *Kalo Bhari* which had supposedly been abolished two decades earlier, but prevalent in most estates (Datta-Ray 1984: 52).

A five-member delegation went to meet the Maharajah, Sir Tashi Namgyal on 9th December[154] and presented the memorandum incorporating the three demands formulated at the meeting of 8th December. These three demands were; i) Abolition of landlordism, ii) Formation of an interim government as a precursor for a democratic form of government, and iii) the accession of Sikkim to the Union of India (Kotturan 1983: 95; Rai 2011/2013: 102-3). The widespread resentment culminated in the formation of Sikkim State Congress. The reason behind putting forth these demands; the first demand, the abolition of landlordism, people in Sikkim was highly oppressed

[153] See in Guha (1983: 6) a political relationship of feudal type; it was a relationship of dominance and subordination.

[154] In an interview with Mr. C. D. Rai on December 29, 2013, while narrating the event, he said; when they went to present the memorandum. Tashi Tshering had written a draft about the ill-treatment of Kazis and Thikadars in Sikkim, and that draft became the memorandum of Sikkim State Congress. When they went to present a memorandum to Maharajah, the three demands were not there; it was a plain memorandum without demands. When it was decided that there should be demands, the three demands were incorporated.

by the authority of Kazis and Thikadars. Kazis and Thikadars used to collect revenues at their own will by forcing people to pay high taxes, but a small amount of income used to go to the State exchequer. The State Congress also threatened to withhold rent from landlords and taxes due to the government (Datta-Ray 1984: 54). As per the second demand, they wanted the democratic form of government which ensure basic human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination. Moreover, they believed these goals would be achieved if Sikkim would accede to the Indian Union.

The demands were reportedly discussed by the Maharajkumar Palden Thondup Namgyal[155] with his advisors. After thorough discussions, Maharajkumar raised severe objections to the vital issue of Sikkim's accession to India. However, he was ready to negotiate on the other two demands. Meanwhile, the Sikkim Durbar wanted to evolve a consensus on the accession issue and invited three Congress representatives to serve in the government as secretaries. The offer of the Sikkim Durbar was discussed at an emergency meeting of the Congress. After heated arguments on the desirability of joining the Government, the Congress nominated three representatives Sonam Tshering, Captain Dimik Singh Lepcha, and Raghubir Singh Basnet and they began to serve in the Government as secretaries in charge of some departments as Congress representatives, but Maharajah Tashi Namgyal was averse to sharing the authority (Rai 2011/2013: 103).

Formation of Sikkim National Party: Offshoot of the Popular Agitation

To counter the upcoming democratic agitation, and to emphasise the communal and racial differences in the kingdom's population, the Maharajah sponsored a new party called the Sikkim National Party (SNP) which was composed of mainly of the minority ethnic communities of the Lepchas and Bhutias (Rao 1972: 148). On 30 April 1948, the party passed a resolution stating that "Sikkim shall not under any circumstances accede to the dominion of India." Further, it demanded a revision of "Sikkim's political relations with the Indian Union based on equality" and declared that Sikkim was closer to Tibet and argued historically Sikkim had closer affinities with Bhutan and Tibet, She has only political relations with India which was imposed on her, and being a lamaist state, she is quite distinct from India (Grover 1974: 88).

[155] The younger son of Sir Tashi Namgyal and was a crowned prince. After the death of his elder brother Palzor Namgyal, he was declared crown prince.

The resolution declared that the policy of the party was 'by all means to maintain the unique character of Sikkim and to preserve its integrity and dignity.' The resolution further declared that the party would make all efforts to see that Sikkim remained outside the Indian Union. The resolution pleaded that any attempt to force Sikkim to accede to the Indian Union, either by direct or indirect means, would be unfair because it would be a denial to Sikkim of its fundamental right to national affinities.

To avoid any controversy and ill-feeling with the Sikkim Durbar over the questions whether Sikkim was a princely state and whether the Government of India automatically inherited the paramount rights the British had enjoyed in the border states, 'Standstill Agreement'[156] between the Sikkim Durbar and the Government of India was concluded and signed on February 27th, 1948. This agreement stipulated that all agreements, relations and administrative arrangements were deemed to continue between the Dominion of India and the Sikkim Durbar, previously existed between British India and Durbar, pending the conclusion of a new agreement or treaty. This constituted an implicit recognition by India of Sikkim's special status, as well as providing an early but clear indication that independent India would not insist upon Sikkim's complete merger with the Indian Union like other states. While replying to the question in the Constituent Assembly, B. V. Keskar, Deputy Minister of External Affairs stated, 'in many matters, Sikkim is controlled by the Government of India, but in many matters, it stands independently. It is neither a state in India nor an independent state completely.'[157] Prime Minister also during the debate stated: 'Sikkim has not acceded. All these matters are pending...the future relationship will be a matter for consideration between Sikkim, Bhutan and the Government of India' (Grover 1974: 87-8).

According to Furber "Sikkim and Bhutan may be described as states protected by the Republic of India...New agreements have been negotiated with each of them. The difference from the pre-1947 position is that, whereas under the British regime

[156] See in Grover (1974: 87) the Indian authorities had first submitted 'the Instrument of Accession' form which was used for signing the rulers of the Indian princely states on their merger into the Indian Union. When Sikkim objected to this format, India agreed to use the terminology of "Standstill Agreement", which had been suggested by the Sikkimese.
[157] See in Grover (1974: 87) India, *Constituent Assembly Debates*, Pt I, March 9, 1949. Vol. II No. 13, pp. 1397-98.

only Bhutan was considered as outside the international frontier of India, they are now both outside that frontier" (1951: 369). In the Act of 1935, Sikkim appeared in the list of Indian states, but the British did not accede Sikkim into British Empire given the geopolitical location of Sikkim. Bhutan had also been considered outside the British Empire; it was the responsibility of the Political Officer in Sikkim to look after the affairs of Bhutan. In Sikkim, Political Officer dealt with the dual affairs of Sikkim that is political relations with Sikkim and foreign relations with Tibet and Bhutan[158].

Moreover, another reason could be the Government of India had specific responsibilities to discharge in Bhutan, the offices like the CPWD or the Road Borders Department were operating there resulting in frequent visits of Central Government officials to Bhutan. Thus, the Ministry of Finance (E. A. Division) was of the view that "Bhutan may also be treated on the same footing as Sikkim."[159] The reason stated was to simplify the matters of frequent visits to Bhutan and Sikkim to discharge responsibilities by Central Government officials and to avoid any technical formalities of the regular visits there.

In a meeting of State Congress held on June 1948, the three Congress members serving as Secretaries in the Government pleaded, 'Sikkim is now on a double-edged agreement with India and that within a specific time, if it so desired, could join India. However, they further submitted that after scrutiny of all state papers, they had concluded that Sikkim should remain independent' (Rai 2011/2013: 103). Tashi Tshering agreed to reconsider the accession issue if they could show state papers within ten days. Strangely enough, the three Secretaries failed to produce the promised state papers (ibid). By then, these three Secretaries had fully identified themselves with the administration and that the State Congress had started having second thoughts about their utility and called for their resignation (Kotturan 1983: 95).

By giving representation on a communal basis, the Maharajah and his Durbar cleverly brought about division in the ranks of the State Congress and the political movement it represented. The Lepcha and the Bhutia members of the three secretaries

[158] Letter from Political Officer Sikkim (Camp Gyantse, Tibet) to the Additional Political Secretary, Simla dated 28 August 1935.
[159] Letter from Brij Kumar, Under Secretary to the Government of India to Ministry of External Affairs dated 4 October 1966.

of the Maharajah refused to abide by the State Congress directive to resign (ibid). Consequently, in the general meeting of the State Congress held at Namchi on the 22 October 1948, the three Secretaries were expelled from the party (Rai 2011/2013: 103). The Bhutia member Sonam Tshering was mostly instrumental in forming the rival pro-Durbar political party, National Party with partisan interests and toed with the official line of the Sikkim Durbar. The declared objective of the National Party was the preservation of the status quo in internal affairs. About the state's relations with India, its policy was ominous (Kotturan 1983: 96).

The Uprising of 1949

The leaders of the State Congress held an annual party meeting at Rangpo (East Sikkim) in the first week of February 1949 and called on the launch of the protest movement in Sikkim for the abolition of landlordism and the formation of a democratic government (Rai 2011/2013: 104). The uprising of 1949 is perhaps the crucial event in the history of Sikkim because it was for the first time the 'voice' was raised against the authority of Chogyal which was profound expression of the subaltern agency, but this agency has been obscured in most of the histories of the event (Hansen 2003: 11). To press for the fulfilment of the twin demands, the State Congress, under the leadership of Tashi Tshering, took a first positive step towards *satyagraha* (true-plea) movement. At the Rangpo Convention, a resolution was unanimously passed calling upon the people to start 'non-rent campaign' whereby, "until the demands of the Congress would be met, the people would refuse to pay land revenue and house tax" (Rai 2011/2013: 104). Ranajit Guha's 'The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,' an excellent essay from 'Subaltern studies,' examined historical writing about peasant insurrections in colonial India. He wanted to portray peasant insurgency as 'a motivated and conscious undertaking,' and not as historians usually depicted them as 'purely spontaneous and unpremeditated affairs' (Hansen 2003: 12). In the words of Guha, 'there is nothing in the primary sources of historical evidence suggest anything other than this. This gives sloppy and impressionistic writing on the peasant revolts as purely spontaneous and unpremeditated affairs' (1983: 45).

The historians have treated the agitation as spontaneous natural phenomena, but the launch of the protest movement in Sikkim was pre-planned and executed through the protracted consultation among the local masses (Guha 1983: 46). The role

of the literati in the history of modern Sikkim was decisive. They integrated to a great extent the wishes of Sikkimese people and organised various progressive socio-religious reform movements in Sikkim. The intelligentsia became the first leaders. Tashi Tshering, Chandra Das Rai, Dimick Singh Lepcha, Raghubir Basnet were the product of modern education, or it would not be wrong to say by-product of modern education. The introduction of modern education in Sikkim was primarily motivated by the politico-administrative and economic needs of the British (Desai 1948: 129). Therefore, the education Sikkimese attained was mainly a by-product of the British colonial policies. The educated Sikkimese who had assimilated modern ideas of democracy and freedom and who knew about the social, cultural, and scientific achievements of the people in the West came out with profound socio-politico reform movements (Desai 1948: 183-5).

As a result of the protest movement, the prominent rebel leaders, namely Namgyal Tshering, Chandra Das Rai, Ram Prasad, Jam. Ratna Bahadur Khatri, Jam. Budhiman Rai, Ongdi Bhutia, Chanchula, Abi Chandra Kharel, Brihaspati Prasai, Chukchum Sangdarpa, and Katuk Lama were arrested by the Sikkim Government. A warrant had been issued to detain its President Tashi Tshering. However, on the written advice of the Political Officer, Harishwar Dayal, the execution of the warrant was kept in abeyance (Rai 2011/2013: 104). The first type of discourse was usually written by the officials reacting to the news of the agitation and is identified with the interests of the state. The Political Officer's letter call for the calming things down, but its official character, and contemporary context all suggest Guha's category of primary discourse on the insurgency (Hansen 2003: 12-3). As a repercussion, about 5,000 people poured into Gangtok bazaar and held a demonstration against the arbitrary arrest of the rebel leaders (Rai 2011/2013: 104). In secondary discourse, the events are narrated to demonstrate a sequence of causality. None of this instantaneous percolates to the next level that is secondary discourse. The uprising is, for example, the responsibility of the upper social strata, who spread rumours; and then using this rumour as a pretext, they staged rebellion; a discourse in which the causality of events excludes any space for the consciousness of subaltern insurgents (Guha 1988: 50).

Ascribing it to the secret design of a small number of outlaws rather than the initiative of individual offenders against the law; thus, the insurgency is mistaken for

that more important type of crime which is produced by the conspiracy (Guha 1983: 80). The administration in the four districts of the state had been collapsed. In Gangtok, the police had been disarmed and confined to their barracks for fear of retaliation by the thousands of people who had joined the agitation from all over Sikkim (Das 1983: 2, 13). The initiative of such activity as purely spontaneous, an idea that is elitist as well as erroneous. It is elitist because it makes the mobilisation of the peasantry altogether dependent on the involvement of appealing leaders, sophisticated political organisations or upper classes (Guha 1983: 4). For Antonio Gramsci, 'there is no room for pure spontaneity in history' (ibid: 5).

The thousands of people turned up and were expressing their anger against the highhandedness of the Government. The demonstration displayed the gulf between the people and the ruling class in Sikkim. It marked the irreparable breakdown of the relationship between the masses and the ruling class (Hansen 2003: 16). The resistance comes, at last, it comes after all the other elements of dominance and subordination because there can be no operation of dominance and subordination beyond this (Hansen 2003: 14; Guha 1998: 55).

When the peaceful agitation of Congress gained momentum with more and more *satyagrahis* joining the movement, the government had to give in before the united movement of the people of Sikkim. After negotiation between the President and the Sikkim Durbar on the mediation by the Political Officer, the Durbar agreed to release the political prisoners unconditionally. Meanwhile, the Political Officer, Harishwar Dayal accompanied by Mrs. Dayal, visited Gangtok jail and assured the political prisoners that they would be released soon. The goodwill gestures showed by the Political Officer, first to keep in abeyance the warrant of arrest of Tashi Tshering and secondly visited Gangtok jail to inquire about the condition of the prisoners, unnerved the Sikkim Durbar (Rai 2011/2013: 104). The reform movements represented the strife of the conscious and progressive sections of the Sikkimese people to democratise social institutions and remodel old religious outlooks to suit the new social needs. The determination of the first group of leaders of the movements to secure the power to enforce socio-political reforms in Sikkim (Desai 1948: 224-25).

To bring about an agreeable settlement, talks were held followed by frequent exchange of letters between the Congress President and the Sikkim Durbar. However,

as there was no sign of amicable settlement, Congress decided to launch a second *satyagraha* movement. Incidentally, the *satyagraha* movement started on 1st May, and a massive procession of the *satyagrahis* went to the Palace and sat on the ground. They began to shout slogans like "Down with the oppression of landlords", "Gandhiji Zindabad", "Our demands must be met" etc. (Rai 2011/2013: 104-06). The ruler, for his safety, had to seek protection at the residence of the Political Officer (Kotturan 1983: 97). A detachment of the Indian Army was posted at Gangtok, intervened and rescued the ruler to its protection in the Indian Residency (Grover 1974: 90).

Due to these developments and after a lengthy negotiation in the Palace between the Congress President, Maharajah Tashi Namgyal and the Political Officer, the Maharajah acceded to the popular demand (Grover 1974: 90) and agreed to install a five-member interim Government that would include two Durbar nominees. Thus the first popular ministry was formed on 9th May 1949 with the Congress President Tashi Tshering as the Chief Minister and included Captain Dimik Singh Lepcha and Chandra Das Rai from State Congress and Dorji Dahdul and Reshmi Prasad Alley as Durbar nominees (Rai 2011/2013: 106).

The Aftermath of the Formation of the First Popular Ministry

Soon after, there emerged troubles over the functioning of the Ministry (Kotturan 1983: 97). Even this experiment failed to contain political unrest and tension in the Kingdom (Grover 1974: 90). The Government of India was in a delicate position. Even though its sympathies were with the State Congress, which represented the majority of the population, it was unable to advise the Maharajah to accept the popular demands otherwise it might be accused of having sinister designs on kingdom situated on a sensitive international border. The Maharajah exploited the Indian Government's dilemma and dismissed the popular ministry on 6 June 1949. The Ministry remained in office for less than a month (Rao 1972: 150). The Maharajah was unwilling to part with any real power, whereas the ministry wanted to function as a full-scale government with the Maharajah remaining as a Constitutional Head (Kotturan 1983: 97). In the absence of any specific delineation and demarcation of the powers of the Maharajah and the Ministry, both sides started blaming each other. With such chaotic conditions, the whole administration seemed to be heading towards a total collapse (Grover 1974: 90).

The Maharajah of Sikkim wrote to the Political Officer expressing his inability to carry on the administration without the assistance of the Government of India. He requested the Political Officer to take over the administration. The Political Officer had already reported to the Government of India that the State was threatened with a disorder which neither the Maharajah nor the ministry would be able to control. Balakrishna V. Keskar visited Gangtok towards the end of May 1949 and reported to the Government of India that there was tension between the Ministry and the Maharajkumar and there was the likelihood of bloodshed (Grover 1974: 91), he suggested for an impartial, capable administration to restore normalcy (Kotturan 1983: 97).

The Government of India accepted the Deputy Minister's recommendations. A company of troops was sent to Gangtok on 2 June 1949. As mentioned earlier, the Maharajah had already sent a letter requesting the Political Officer to take over the administration pending the appointment of a Dewan to whom the Maharajah would delegate all powers necessary for carrying on the administration until normal conditions were restored. The same day, the Political Officer sent for the ministers and informed them that the Government of India is assuming responsibility for the administration of Sikkim in the interests of law and order. Thus the administration of 'twenty-nine days ministry' had ended (Grover 1974: 91). Accordingly, a senior civil servant, Mr. J. S. Lall, took over the administration of the state on the 11th of August 1949 as Dewan (Kotturan 1983: 97).

The Indian press denounced India's 'fascist policy' in taking over the administration of Sikkim which they characterised as on a par with her policy towards Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Chandernagar (Singh 1988: 263). However, the fact was that Patel and Menon had assured Maharajah that India's External Affairs Ministry would continue to handle relations with Sikkim and not the new Ministry of States (Datta-Ray 1984: 49). In a conversation with Mr. Shattock at the British High Commission in Delhi, Harishwar Dayal justified his decision to bring Indian administration into Sikkim. In his view, the state was very much of a pyramidal hierarchy ranging from the feudal landlords to the Maharajah. During the last few years, the State Congress had carried on agitations against the landlords and brought them to their knees. Seeing that the feudal machine was being rapidly undermined, the

Maharajkumar, who in Dayal's opinion, was the real ruler of Sikkim, took up the cudgels on behalf of the landlords against the State Congress. From then on, the struggle began to be one between the State Congress and the Maharajkumar. This led to frequent demonstrations in Gangtok against the Maharajkumar and went so far as to take place in the Palace grounds itself. In these circumstances, the Indian Government had no alternative but to intervene, which they had done. Dayal was insistent that the agitation itself was almost entirely amongst the Sikkimese themselves, the Nepalese and Indian Marwaris having generally stayed aloof. It was not the Indian Government's intention to merge Sikkim into the neighbouring districts of Darjeeling. He envisaged that, in due course, the Dewan would be assisted by a Council of Ministers and the State would come to be ruled on the pattern of those other states which are retaining their separate entity, with the Maharajah as a constitutional figurehead (Singh 1988: 263).

Shattock appears to have believed that it was only when the ruling house was on the point of being overthrown that the Indian Government had come to its rescue. The British High Commission saw no reason to protest to the Indian Government that the 1948 Standstill Agreement had been violated, and it was not that they could not justify their action solely on the statement that they could not allow the disorder to prevail. On the other hand, India's sympathy to State Congress movements may lead her to have to condone the Sikkim Congress agitation, but they had not directly encouraged the development of a situation which made it necessary for them to intervene. In Shattock's view, the primary factor which had influenced Delhi to intervene in the internal administration of the state was communist infiltration from Tibet (ibid: 263-4). Had there been no interference by the Government of India, a civil war between the masses and the Durbar was quite likely in 1949. This unsettled political climate provided an excellent ground to the Government of India to have merged and acceded Sikkim to the Indian Union. Despite historical precedents from the British period and unstable internal political conditions, the Government of India was prepared to grant complete autonomy to Sikkim in exchange for recognition of her 'special interests.' However, India did not want to take the benefit of the unstable political climate of the Kingdom or to completely integrate Sikkim with the Indian Union (Grover 1974: 91-2).

The Government of India consequently started negotiations regarding the status of Sikkim and her future relationship with India and Sikkim Durbar in the late 1940s[160]. By then, China had emerged as a unified, centralised and militant regime under the control of Communists in October 1949. Notwithstanding the physical features of India's Northern frontier, Sikkim had assumed great importance after coming into power of the Communists in China and their subsequent occupation of Tibet. This event changed the very basis of the direction of the politics of the Himalayan States. The Government of India, during negotiations, had held consultations with the Maharajkumar of Sikkim and the representatives of the various political parties in Sikkim. They were invited for discussions at New Delhi on March 1950[161]. All the eyes were turned to Delhi (Grover 1974: 91-2; Kotturan 1983: 97). The discussion covered the entire field of future relations between Sikkim and India and necessary administrative arrangements within the State, including the association of popular representatives in the Government of the State. A provisional agreement was reached as regards the future relationship of Sikkim with India between the representatives of the two countries (Grover 1974: 91).

Treaty of 1950: Sikkim as an Indian Protectorate

The Maharajkumar of Sikkim, who was authorised by the Maharajah Tashi Namgyal to participate in the discussions on his behalf, took to Gangtok the terms agreed upon. During talks, it was agreed that as regards the status of Sikkim, it will remain a Protectorate of India with; external relations, defence, and communications controlled by India. As regards internal government, the State would continue to enjoy autonomy subject to the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India, if necessary, for the maintenance of proper administration and law and order (ibid: 91-2). This treaty bound Sikkim hand to foot and India became sole arbiter in the case of Sikkim. The leaders of the State Congress got no hearing while the negotiations for the new treaty was in progress. The Maharajkumar was successful in keeping them away from the sources of power in Delhi. After the negotiations for the leaders of the people there was only the ambiguous press note of 20 March 1950, which at best, was an exercise in political piety:

[160] See in Kotturan (1983: 97) at the time of signing the "Standstill Agreement" the understanding was that a new treaty would be signed later to settle once and for all the relations between Sikkim and India.
[161] See in the Annexure XIV

> For the present, an officer of the Government of India will continue to be the Dewan of the state. However, the Government of India's policy is one of progressive association of the people of the state with its government, a policy with which happily His Highness the Maharajah is in full agreement. It is proposed, as a first step, that an Advisory Council, representative of all the interests should be associated with the Dewan. Steps will also be taken immediately to institute a village Panchayat system on an elective basis within the state. This is an essential and effective process of education in the art of popular government and it is the intention that these Panchayats should, in due course, elect a council for the state, whose functions and area of responsibility will be progressively enlarged (Kotturan 1983: 98).

Inder Malhotra, famous journalist of that time reported on this that: "I remember going to a ramshackle old Delhi hotel, not far away from the Delhi Railway Station, to hear the veteran and venerable Tashi Tshering, then leader of Sikkim Congress, lament that the Government of India was being both pusillanimous and unfair. Why must it deny the people of Sikkim the fruits of independence which other Indians were going to enjoy? He asked" (ibid). The treaty was signed on 5 December 1950, at Gangtok. Accordingly, Sikkim was recognised as a "protectorate" of the Indian Union. It was allowed complete internal autonomy while external affairs with defence and communications remained in the hands of the Central Government at Delhi. There was a great disappointment in the State Congress circles when the terms of the new treaty became known. The State Congress was hoping for a fully responsible government in the state as a part of the Indian Union. Their representation to the Central Government did not produce any result since Delhi was reluctant at the moment to interfere in what could have been construed as internal affairs of the state. Now the state political parties had left with no choice but to fight it out themselves with the Sikkim Durbar (ibid: 98-9). Moreover, with the recognition of the 'special status' of Sikkim[162], the Durbar began to move forward to consolidate its position.

The Consolidation of Power by Durbar

In the early fifties, the active power in the state still rested with the Dewan J. S. Lall appointed by the Government of India (Kotturan 1983: 100). With the recognition of the 'special status,' to Sikkim, the Durbar began to move forward to consolidate its position in Sikkim. However, the State Congress remained insistent on demanding the establishment of an interim government in the state and intensified the pace of agitation. Ultimately after a prolonged period of discussion, accusation and recrimination among the political parties in the state as well as the Advisory

[162] See in Kotturan (1983: 98-9) Treaty of 1950 recognised the special status of Sikkim with complete internal autonomy while external affairs with defence and communications remained in the hands of the Central Government at Delhi.

Committee. On the 23rd March 1953, a "Constitutional Proclamation" was issued by the Maharajah to set up a State Council and Executive Council and given the power to enact with the assent of the ruler laws for the peace, order, and good governance in the state. However, it cannot discuss or deal with matters relating to external relations and the appointment of the Principal Administrative Officer, who is also the ex-officio president of the State Council. The State Congress, however, in a memorandum denounced the Proclamation as "contravening all principles of democracy" and saw no prospect of democratic rule in it (Kotturan 1983: 100; Grover 1974: 43; Roa 1972: 150).

The proclamation provided the constitution for the "State Council" consisting of seventeen members based on equal ethnic division irrespective of the size of the population: six seats for the Bhutia-Lepcha community, six for the Nepali community, and five seats for the nominees of the Durbar. At one stroke, the Maharajah introduced the curse of communalism into the very constitutional framework. There was no equitable distribution of seats; the majority Nepali community was reduced to the position of subalterns. The Sikkim Durbar could easily manoeuvre to get the upper hand in the State Council, ostensibly the highest constitutional body in the state. It was admittedly a passing phase. It was the Maharajkumar who was the prime mover in this regard and remained until the crisis of the 1970s (Kotturan 1983: 100).

Under the new constitution, Sikkim went to the polls for the first time in 1953. About forty per cent of the electorate of 60,607 went to the polls (Grover 1974: 43; Kotturan 1983: 101). The result of the 1953 elections was a triumph for the forces of communalism. The National Party captured all the six Bhutia-Lepcha seats, and all the Nepali seats were won by the Sikkim State Congress. The first election held in Sikkim both the parties returned an equal number of candidates. Since no party enjoyed a majority in the Sikkim Council, the question of forming a government by the people's representatives did not arise. Although the Maharajah of Sikkim retained absolute powers, as announced by the Proclamation of 1953; a diarchic system of administration was set up as a step towards the progressive association of the people with the administration of the kingdom. Consequently, the two elected leaders of the State Congress and National Party, Kashiraj Pradhan and Sonam Tshering were respectively taken into the Executive Council, with Dewan as its Chairman (Grover 1974: 44).

The administration of Education, Public Health, Excise, Press and Publicity, Transport, Bazaars, Forests and Public Works were transferred to the Executive Councillors elected by the people and the Durbar retained the administration of Ecclesiastical Department, External Affairs, State Enterprise, Home and Police, Finance, Land Revenue, Rationing, and Establishment. The Executive Councillors were made responsible to the Durbar for the executive and administrative functions of the government. The State Congress voiced strong opposition against the system and composition of such a complicated setup, mentioning that it fell short of popular aspirations. The critics said that the first general elections held in Sikkim instead of ushering in a democratic government proved a farce. The Sikkim Durbar had no intention to part with its powers and prerogative which a democratic government would necessarily entail. However, despite these limitations, there is no denying of the fact that political activity was accelerated in the kingdom (ibid: 44-5).

Sikkim remained comparatively free from political troubles for some years after the first general elections, though the next elections were due in three years (Kotturan 1983: 104), and should have been held in 1956. According to the Section 7(c) of the State Council and Executive Council Proclamation, 1953: "The Sikkim Council, unless sooner dissolved by the Maharajah, shall continue for three years from the date appointed for its first meeting." However, pending decision regarding future administrative arrangements, the Durbar extended the term of the Sikkim Council by a proclamation (Grover 1974: 45). By the "Proclamation of 1958," the number of the seats in the Sikkim Council was increased to twenty as against seventeen in 1953. The six seats were reserved for the Bhutia-Lepcha, six seats for the Sikkimese Nepali, six seats for the Durbar's nominees, one for a member of the Sangha to be elected by an electoral college, consisting of Lamas of the Sikkimese monasteries recognised by the Sikkim Durbar, and one general seat with the whole of Sikkim serving as one single constituency (Grover 1974: 46; Kotturan 1983: 104; Roa 1972: 150).

The Introduction of Parity Formula

The Durbar used various moves and tactics to weaken the popular agitation and introduced a 'parity' system. Most famous for Sikkimese political development, the divisive politics of Chogyal reinforced the ethno-religious divisions among Sikkimese

people (Kotturan 1983: 100; Killion 1989: 129). The earlier system of election was abolished. Instead, a new system in which all the communities had to cast their votes together in a single ballot was introduced (Grover 1974: 46). The Proclamation of 1958 contained a very complicated system of communal voting, said to have been a brainchild of Dewan Nari Rustomji (Grover 1974: 46; Kotturan 1983: 104).

The communalism was deliberately placed as a stumbling block in the path of the candidates who enjoyed the popular support. According to the formula laid down in the Proclamation of the Durbar regarding the parity system, a candidate representing a particular community would not be declared elected even if he had polled the highest number of votes unless he could secure fifteen per cent of the votes of the other communities in that particular constituency (Grover 1974: 47). Apa B. Pant (1955-1961), the then Political Officer of Sikkim mentions that Chogyal (Sir Tashi Namgyal) never considered the Nepalese people as his people. He states in a letter to Kaul, "He indeed knows that he is the ruler and historically as well as dynastically these people belong to Sikkim, but he does not feel that the Nepalese are his people. It was amusing as well as pathetic to hear him speak of the Lepchas, the Bhutias, the Limbus as my people"[163]. In this connection, he further states "if the Maharaj Kumar (Palden Thondup Namgyal) also feels really a love for the Nepalese and takes them more and more into his confidence and also seeks confidence from them I think there is a good chance of his becoming, as I have said elsewhere, a leader par excellence for Sikkim. Nari Rustomji thinks that may be difficult"[164]. The divisive politics of Chogyal never allowed to develop a nationalist feeling among the Sikkimese people and resulted in a fragmented society (Basnet 1978: 15).

National Party was the only party which did not protest against the parity system. All other parties demanded a "one man one vote" system on the pattern of India. The distribution of seats was not fair and equitable is evident from the fact that the Nepalis were allowed only six seats of the fourteen elective seats, even though they constitute about seventy per cent of the total population of Sikkim. At the same time the Bhutias and Lepchas, who number about 14,847 and 14,000 respectively are also given the same number of seats as Nepalis. Under the new electoral law, the

[163] Apa B. Pant, Political Officer Sikkim, Letter to T. N. Kaul, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, 22 March 1955.
[164] ibid

general election was to be held on November 1958; it was boycotted by the large section of the population. The State Congress was not satisfied with the reforms introduced by the ruler. On 22 September 1958, they once again passed a resolution demanding Sikkim's accession to India. The State Congress leaders C. D. Rai and Nahakul Pradhan suggested that Sikkim should be allowed to have the same constitutional relationship with India as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. They felt that a gradual integration of the people with the larger Indian family was inevitable and that it became urgent given the developing Chinese threat to India. They further felt that accession of Sikkim to India would put a stop to all the fissiparous tendencies fostered and exploited by exciting elements to their advantage (Rao 1972: 150-52).

New Developments in the Politics of Sikkim

On the eve of the November 1958 election, a significant new development occurred in Sikkim with a new political party, Sikkim Swatandra Dal (SSD), a splinter group of the State Congress, came into picture under the leadership of Kazi Lhendup Dorji who had been the President of State Congress since 1953 after the death of Tashi Tshering. Unfortunately with elections coming up and the prospect of various government offices in sight, frictions had developed within the two major parties of Sikkim. The Sikkim National Party also ousted its President Sonam Tshering and elected Martam Topden in his place (Grover 1974: 47).

However, despite this complicated communal voting procedure, Sikkim State Congress (SSC) secured eight out of fourteen elected seats in the Sikkim Council which included one Bhutia-Lepcha seat and as well as the general seat. The Swatandra Dal could secure only one Bhutia-Lepcha seat in the elections. Rival parties made allegations of malpractices by some of the leaders. Swatandra Dal and some defeated candidates of National Party filed petitions against some of the elected candidates with Durbar. An Election Tribunal was appointed by the Durbar, and as a result of its findings, six of the elected candidates were nullified on the ground that they had used fraudulent propaganda during their election campaigning (Grover 1974: 47-8; Roa 1972: 152). The leaders included Kashiraj Pradhan, Nahakual Pradhan, and Sonam Tshering was deprived of their seats and removed from the Office in 1959. The Durbar upheld the decision of the Tribunal and ordered a fresh election. The State Congress and the National Party were mainly affected by the verdict of the Tribunal,

the former losing three seats and the latter two in the Sikkim Council (Grover 1974: 48; Kotturan 1983: 105).

A significant development in the political history of Sikkim took place when a joint convention of the political parties of Sikkim–the Sikkim Nationa Party, Sikkim State Congress, Sikkim Swatantra Dal, and the Sikkim Scheduled Caste League was convened by the Sikkim Swatantra Dal at Melli, South Sikkim on 23-4 September 1959. The immediate necessity for the written constitution was demanded by all the political parties. It was unanimously decided that an interim government should be formed until the framing of the constitution. A second joint meeting was convened at Singtam in eastern Sikkim on October 22, 1959; the meeting resolved: "Past experience has been clearly shown that the system of the communal electorate is the stumbling block towards the realisation of a fully responsible and democratic government in Sikkim." The joint meeting was of the firm opinion that a fully responsible and democratic government could only be realised with the introduction of joint electorate system based on the universal adult franchise as in India (Grover 1974: 49-50).

Another most significant event in the history of Sikkim after the election of 1958 was the formation of Sikkim National Congress (SNC), which made its debut in the politics of Sikkim on 20 May 1960, as a powerful force in the Sikkim's political landscape. A severe split took place in the ranks of both the State Congress and the National Party. The dissidents of both the parties together with some independents decided to form a new party, Sikkim National Congress. Kazi Lhendup Dorji was elected the president. The party's demand included a written constitution including fundamental rights, the codification of laws and the High Court. Since the emergence of the National Congress, it demanded a written constitution incorporating fundamental rights, for codified laws and representative government. In the interim election of 1960 Sikkim National Party secured five seats, Sikkim National Congress secured four seats, and Sikkim State Congress secured three seats. The Chogyal by a Proclamation appointed on June 1, 1960, Martam Topden as Senior Executive Councillor and one of his party colleagues as Deputy Executive Councillor. No one was taken from the National Congress. This ommission was resented by the National Congress. There was sharp criticism of the composition of the Executive Council and

the leaders of the National Congress even threatened to embark on a programme of the *satyagraha* (Roa 1972: 152; Grover 1974: 51-2).

In the by-elections held in Namchi on December 1960, on account of complicated voting procedure, Nidup Bhutia of Sikkim National Party was declared elected even though Kazi Lhendup had secured an overwhelming majority of the popular votes. Kazi Lhendup had secured 2,277 votes in contrast to the candidate of the National Party who had secured only 851 votes. The defeat of the Kazi provided a glaring example of the unfair communal voting system prevailing in Sikkim. Kazi Lhendup Dorji decided to contest no more elections and resort to direct action and alleged the Council was under Maharajkumar, and there is no possibility of free and fair elections. Early in 1962, the Sikkim Durbar again announced its intention to hold new elections to the Sikkim Council. The Sikkim Council was dissolved on May 1, 1962. Political activities reached new heights when the two political parties, the State Congress and the National Congress joined hands for a showdown with the Government to compel sweeping political reforms. The State Congress even though it was weakened by a split in its ranks, did not give up its agitation for the democratisation of Sikkim's administration (Grover 1974: 52-3; Roa 1972: 152-3).

Sino-India War: Implications on the Politics of Sikkim

While brisk preparations were being made to hold the third election in Sikkim, the Chinese in October 1962, launched a massive attack on India and the election was postponed sine die. The Sino-Indian conflict made the area very sensitive. The Sikkim People's Consultation Committee consisting of 31 members with Maharajkumar as President and Dewan as Chairman was constituted with the sole objective of advising the Government of Sikkim on defence measures necessary for the territorial integrity of Sikkim on November 26, 1962. The number of members were chosen from different political parties to serve on the Committee. The fourteen members were selected from the Sikkim National Party; five were selected from the Sikkim State Congress, two were chosen from Sikkim National Congress, five members from Independent party, two servicemen, and one from Sikkim Scheduled Caste League. On account of negligible representation given to the National Congress, it objected and submitted memorandum to the Maharajah and Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to revive the Sikkim Council of 1958 or to dissolve the

Executive Council so that the administration of the state could run directly by the Dewan during the period of emergency (Grover 1974: 53-4; Kotturan 1983: 103-4).

The demands for early elections and political reforms were continued, and it was said that there is nothing during the state of emergency to prevent the authorities from introducing political reforms to the satisfaction of the people at large. It was contended that on account of the proximity of the border, where heavy concentrations were reported, it is all the more necessary that the state and the parties are unified and that they make a united effort wholeheartedly for the defence of the state. The political parties charged that the Durbar took advantage of the Sino-Indian border dispute to dismantle people's demand for a democratic pattern of administration. The fresh election could not be held for nine years due to the state of emergency declared in Sikkim on account of the Chinese aggression in 1962. Apart from intrusion China began its propaganda to drive a wedge between India and Sikkim. It accused India of intruding into Tibet across Sikkim-Tibet border and alleged it to be an Indian scheme to create tensions along the Sikkim-China border. India refuted all the allegations as 'preposterous and baseless' and pointed out that the motive of China in making such allegation was obviously to fabricate a fictitious justification for the continuing aggressive concentration of Chinese forces on the Indian border. It was in this background that the Chogyal's Proclamation of December 21, 1966, paved the ground for the third election (Grover 1974: 54-5; Roa 1972: 165-6).

The Third General Election in Sikkim and its Implications

Sikkim went to the polls for the third time in March 1967. The Council was enlarged to twenty-four members, and the elected seats were raised to eighteen. The Bhutia-Lepcha and Nepalese seats were increased to seven. Three members were to be elected by the general constituency of which one was to be a general seat, one from the Scheduled Castes and another from Tsongs. One member was to be elected by the Electoral College of the Sangha belonging to the monasteries recognised by the Chogyal (Grover 1974: 55-6). The National Congress as the most influential political party of Sikkim secured 55% of the total votes polled and won eight seats in the Council; five Nepali seats, two Bhutia-Lepcha seats, and one general seat. The National Party had no following in the Nepali stronghold; it failed to secure even one Nepali seat. However, it captured five out of the seven seats reserved for the Bhutia-

Lepchas. The two seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Tsongs went uncontested to the supporters of the National Party. The Sangha seat went to a Lama supported by the National Party. The State Congress won two Nepali seats (Roa 1972: 154).

Sikkim National Congress and the National Party captured the maximum number of seats. The State Congress, the oldest political party in the state, managed to get only two seats. Soon after the elections, the National Congress was split into two factions, when the Chogyal nominated B. B. Gurung, one of the eight successful candidates of the party to his Executive Council. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, president of the National Congress, saw this as an attempt to undermine his position. He, therefore, expelled Gurung from the party (Roa 1972: 155; Grover 1974: 56-9).

The Fourth General Election and its Implications

The National Congress led by Kazi Lhendup Dorji contested on seventeen seats in the fourth general elections of April 1970. For the first time in the election campaign since 1953, demand for the revision of treaty was raised at the public meetings. A new political party, Sikkim Janata Party (SJP) under the presidentship of Lal Bahadur Basnet was formed, but it could not capture any seat. The dissidents of the party led by Gurung set up candidates for eight seats, but none of them came out triumphant. Out of the eighteen elective seats, National Party led by Netuk Tshering captured four, Sikkim National Congress led by Kazi Lhendup Dorji captured five seats including one general seat, State Congress captured four seats, a faction of National Party, Namgyal National Party secured three seats, Independents two, and nominated six members. Dorji's National Congress went to the elections demanding the responsible government and a written constitution. The State Congress took a similar stand, but the two factions of the National Party made the revision of the India-Sikkim Treaty as the central theme of their political campaign. These two factions had won seven seats as compared to five in 1967 (Roa 1972: 155; Grover 1974: 58-9).

Sikkim's Fifth General Election of 1973

Sikkim's fifth General Elections of 1973 proved to be a turning point in the political and constitutional development in Sikkim. On the eve of the election, a new political party came into the picture by merging the Sikkim State Congress and the Janata Party, the Sikkim Janata Congress led by K. C. Pradhan. It happened at Bikmat, a

two-hour pony ride from Namchi, during the election the presiding officer gave five ballot papers instead of six for each candidate to about 150 voters. Kazi at once accused him of saving an extra slip for the National Party candidates. The aftermaths of the election saw a wave of unrest in the state. There was a widespread allegation in the state that Durbar having rigged the 1973 polls to the advantage of the National Party[165] (Datta-Ray 1984: 167; Kotturan 1983: 107; Grover 1974: 59-60).

The crisis built up since the National Congress leaders and the Janata Congress were rallying against the elections (Datta-Ray 1984: 173). Later developments which completely eclipsed the National Party makes one believe that there must have been some truth in the allegation. It was discovered during the counting of the votes in the White Hall (in Gangtok) that some ballot papers from Rawang not been separated along the perforation and it was found in the National Party candidate's box. The National Party came out as the largest single party capturing as many as eleven seats out of the eighteen elected positions to the State Council. Seven Bhutia-Lepcha seats, two Nepali seats, one Sangha, and one Scheduled Caste seat. Janata Congress won two seats and the National Congress five seats: three Nepali, one Tshong, and Kazi's general constituency. The National Congress Chief, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, was utterly disillusioned and decided that the only alternative left under these circumstances was intense popular agitation. The leader of another mass-based party K. C. Pradhan of the Janata Congress also seconded the Kazi. Kazi Lhendup Dorji and K. C. Pradhan charging the presiding officer with 'aiding and abetting the Sikkim National Party in rigging the elections' walked out of the counting hall alleging the polls have not been conducted in a free and fair manner (Kotturan 1983: 107; Grover 1974: 59-60; Datta-Ray 1984: 166-67).

However, it seemed there would not be any repercussion to this since all the eighteen elected and six nominated candidates were set to take an oath of allegiance. The Lamas proposed 20th March as an auspicious day for swearing in the new executive council (Datta-Ray 1984: 167). K. C. Pradhan decided to join forces with the Kazi, and together they formed the Joint Action Committee (JAC). The agitation rocked the state again since 1949 and the state was engulfed in the political turmoil. The Sikkim Durbar tried to contain the crisis by arresting K. C. Pradhan on the charge

[165] See in Rao (1972: 148) party sponsored by the Maharajah which was composed of mainly of the minority ethnic communities of the Lepchas and Bhutias.

of treason; the Government invoked the Security Act against him for inciting communal strife. The JAC condemned the arrest and submitted to the Chogyal a memorandum containing the resolutions passed by the Committee seeking changes in the electoral system, Pradhan's immediate release, administrative and political reforms, and the introduction of the universal adult franchise on the principle of "one man one vote". Pradhan was later released on parole (Grover 1974: 60; Kotturan 1983: 107; Datta-Ray 1984: 173-4, 180).

The Chogyal promised the progressive reforms in the state on 27th March, but it could not suffice the growing resentment of the people. All the eleven National Party leaders along with the nominated members took an oath of allegiance on the same day. Tension crackled in the air as Gangtok observed the Chogyal's 50th official Birthday on 4th April, defying the Section 144[166] early in the morning the crowd began to pour into the town. The offensive had been carefully planned, a fact ignored by many subsequent historians who have depicted as spontaneous. There were rumours that many groups of young agitators were on their way to Gangtok. The youthful volunteers of the two political parties who had formed the joint front took over the police posts in many places, established a parallel administration and continued their demonstration against the Chogyal. The general upsurge affected the countryside more than the capital. While in Gangtok itself, the situation became severe, in the countryside, there was a complete collapse of the administration (Datta-Ray 1984: 171-74, 180; Kotturan 1983: 108).

Primary Discourse on Insurgency

A letter sent by Kazi Lhendup Dorji, to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on the first day of the uprising constitutes Guha's primary discourse on the insurgency.

> *Letter from Kazi Lhendup Dorji to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, April 4, 1973*
>
> The Joint Action Committee of the Sikkim National Congress and the Sikkim Janata Congress, on behalf of the people of Sikkim, beg to bring the following matters of indiscriminate use of tear gas and shooting with live bullets on the peaceful procession of the people today at 7 A.M. at Gangtok...The black flag demonstration by more than fifteen to twenty thousand people at Gangtok, on the day of Chogyal's birthday and total boycotting of

[166] See in Datta-Ray (1984: 177) section 144 had been imposed operative from 3rd April, and later it was extended for a week.

such celebrations throughout with black flag demonstration go to show growing unpopularity of the Chogyal amongst his own people…

The first type of discourse is usually written, reacting to the news of the event, and it is later on elaborated and developed into longer histories. Kazi reports the indiscriminate shooting on the peaceful protestors in the morning of Chogyal's birthday which is a clear indication of the collapse of law and order situation in the tiny Himalayan state and growing unpopularity of the Chogyal amongst his people.

Another article shortly published after the launch of the movement in 1973, which constitutes Guha's primary discourse on insurgency:

"Terror in Sikkim", Current Weekly, November 24, 1973, p. 7.

While the victims till now are mainly people who have been the active supporters of the Sikkim National Party, the Sikkim Congress's lone rivals in Sikkim politics, anybody who dares to raise voice against the mounting excesses of the hooligans wearing political masks runs the risk of public humiliation… the Sikkim police have been shorn of its powers to take any action against the Sikkim Congress leaders and workers following the April revolt, and the uniform of the Sikkim police neither inspires confidence in the populace nor respect for the law in the elements who break the law with total impunity.

This article depicts the people's movement as the movement of hooligans, and it does not justify in any way the sanctity of the movement which was triggered for the demand of the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination. This kind of articles and letters reacting or reporting to the launch of the event are later on elaborated into much longer histories. However, the official records do not get the content from the elitist will alone; it is predicated on another will, that of the insurgent. It is, therefore, possible to read the presence of a rebel consciousness as a necessary and pervasive element within that body of evidence (Guha 1983: 15). When an official document speaks of badmashes (mischief), this does not mean any ordinary collection of rascals but peasants involved in a struggle (Guha 1983: 16). As such, in the article, people are accorded with the noun of hooligans who breaks the law and does not have any respect for the law. Most, though not all, of the records, is elitist in origin, this has come down in the form of official archives (Guha 1983: 14).

Secondary Discourse on Insurgency

In the secondary discourse, the events of the insurgency are rendered as 'history', in documents written for public readership with pretensions to neutrality as well as official histories shortly published after the uprising for overtly political purposes, and they contain new interpretations of the insurgency typical of secondary discourse that is later elaborated and developed in longer histories (Hansen 2003: 13). The following is an example of such history:

> *Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim,1984 p. 56*
>
> There were strikes and satyagrahas, rowdy meetings in Gangtok's Paljor stadium, and threats of invading the Palace...Mobs were collected in Singtam, Namche (sic), and Gyalzing, brought to Gangtok and allowed to free run of the capital's liquor shops. Drunken brawling, street-corner orgies, and a constant repertoire of offensive songs blaring out of wayside loudspeakers marked the campaign for civil liberties.

The pressures exercised by rebellion on elite discourse force it to reduce the phraseological range of many words and expressions and assign specific meanings to them to identify peasants as rebels and their attempt to turn the system upside down as crime. When the letters written by the officials reacting to the launch of the event and the articles published shortly after the launch of the event which, identifies itself with the interests of the state are turned into elaborated, and much longer histories, this kind of narrative would emerge; which assign the peasant rebels a metaphor of rowdy mob who ran over the liquor shops, drunken brawling, street-corner orgies etc.

The indigenous government constructed the official nationalist narratives to justify their position (Hansen 2003: 11). Combined with a fair amount of force, the indigenous elite kept the antagonism of the subject population well under control despite the rebellion (Guha 1998: 34). The 'methods' and 'forms' of peasant agitation is for a historian to be represented as nothing but chaos, confusion and disorder; a sort of 'blindness and madness' as a modern scholar has written of the Sikkim uprising echoing the sentiments of the ruling class who endeavoured to contain it. What this view misses is that there is much order in this seemingly 'madness' a great deal of discipline in what looks like pure spontaneity. Myths of peasant savagery and rebel heroism estimated in both cases in terms of magnitude, the incidence of the latter appear to have been so low indeed as to be negligible (Guha 1983: 136, 161).

The secondary discourse follows the primary at a distance and opens up a perspective to turn an occasion into history in the perception not only of those outside it but of the participants as well. The secondary discourse draws from primary discourse as material but transforms it at the same time. The other class of writings to be qualified as secondary discourse is also the work of officials. They too addressed themselves to be a predominantly non-official readership but on the themes not directly related to their own experience (Hansen 2003: 14; Guha 1988: 51-2). On 9 April 1973 the Government of India's nominee B. S. Das took over as the Chief Administrator, his appointment had hit the headlines in the press as the 'takeover' of Sikkim. The members of the political parties were kept outside the administration and the Chogyal as well (Das 1983: 4; Basnet 1978: 24-5).

The Chogyal's dynasty was assured of continuity and so of his privileges. However, he was to exercise his residuary powers only through the Chief Executive who would refer every dispute to the Political Officer for Delhi's arbitration in case of disagreement. The Dewan being replaced by a powerful Chief Executive keeping an effective check on both the Chogyal and the elected Government, it only meant a revised agreement of 1949, the Chogyal was to sign this agreement, and on April 23rd Chogyal put his seal on the agreement. It was a bilateral understanding to enable the tripartite arrangements between the Chogyal, Delhi and the political parties, that would be the final agreement (Das 1983: 25). The following is an example of such discourse written by B. S. Das, who was appointed as the Chief Administrator following the breakdown in 1973:

> *B. S. Das, The Sikkim Saga, 1983 pp. 3-4*
>
> Its (Indian Government) intervention was obligatory in circumstances where law and order had broken down...India wedded to democratic ideals and consequent obligation devolving on her to lend support to forces fighting against tyranny in spheres of her responsibility, had a moral obligation towards the people of Sikkim. Decades of suppression by the Sikkimese ruler had made the people docile and subservient. People joined the movement in the hope of a quick response to their demands.

Here, the people are depicted as docile, and the reason has given due to the decades of suppression by the Sikkimese ruler who joined hands with the Indian Government in the hope of a quick resolution to their demands. The rebels are denied the position of being conscious and rebellion triggering off merely as a sort of reflex

action, that is, as a mechanical and almost mindless response or as a passive reaction (Guha 1988: 47). All the force of the ruling ideologies is pandered to the peasant by eulogising the virtues of loyalty and devotion so that he could be persuaded to look upon his deference not only as tolerable but almost preferable. Strangely enough, his revolt against that authority when the hour struck derived much of its strength from the same awareness. However, this did not constitute a mature and fully evolved class consciousness. It would not be wrong to regard this as the very beginning of consciousness (Guha 1983: 18-9).

Tertiary Discourse on Insurgency

None of this would percolate to the next level that is the secondary discourse if the rebellion had triggered passively, affected or produced by something external. In the secondary and tertiary discourse written at an even greater remove in time and space from the agitation, Guha notes that some historians attempt to break away from the code of counter-insurgency and adopt the insurgent's point of view. These historians want the insurgents, not their enemies to win (Hansen 2003: 14-5; Guha 1988: 47, 52-3). The tertiary level of discourse does not rely on these to sustain due to the aura of the neutrality it has about it, according to Guha (1988: 52). Authors, by keeping their narrative firmly beyond the pale of personal involvement, they managed if only by implications, to confer on it a semblance of truth. They are supposed to have forced for their discourse a niche in that realm of perfect neutrality—the realm of history—over which the aorist and the third person preside (ibid: 52-3).

When historians of insurgency attempted to explain in more human terms, Guha (1988: 46) suggested, they either assumed "the identity of nature and culture, a hallmark of the deficient state of civilisation or specified the enumeration of causes" (Guha 1998: 34). Guha (1988), examined historical writing about peasant insurrections in colonial India. He wanted to portray peasant insurgency as 'a motivated and conscious undertaking,' and not as historians usually depicted them as 'purely spontaneous and unpremeditated affairs' (Hansen 2003: 11-12). In the words of Guha, 'there is nothing in the primary sources of historical evidence suggest anything other than this. This gives careless and impressionistic writing on the subject of peasant insurrections being purely spontaneous and unpremeditated affairs' (1988: 45). It is as if they occupied a dead space with no life, no view, no voice, and thus, no

history of their own (Winichakul 1994: 96). In the words of Said "To reconstruct a dead meant ultimately to reconstruct a dead or neglected orient; it also meant that reconstructive precision, science, even imagination" (1977: 123).

The May 8th Tripartite Agreement

The famous May 8 Agreement[167] was signed at 9 P. M. in the Palace. On Kewal Singh's[168] assurance, the tripartite agreement was the same as of April 23rd agreement with minor variations, it only had given the part of the reserved subjects to the elected government and should be treated as a 'Public Relations Document.' However, the Chogyal sought an explicit assurance that the Treaty of 1950 will continue to govern Indo-Sikkimese relations and all arrangements would flow out of its provisions. This was accepted, but later Foreign Office confirmed that it left many loopholes to interpret and the agreement gave all the powers to Delhi. The power of administration had been shifted from the Chogyal to the Chief Executive. "I was greeted by the Chogyal the next day with the words welcome Mr. Das, our new Chogyal, it summed up the agreement" states Das (1983: 26-7).

As per the provision of elections based on 'one man one vote' principle in the May 8 tripartite agreement. On the 1st December the Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh arrived in Gangtok and gave the political leaders an understanding that the Election Commissioner of India would soon visit Sikkim and device a scheme under which elections based on "one man one vote" system would be held. Two days later the Election Commissioner arrived, and as a result of the talks with different political party leaders, the election date was fixed on the 15th, 17th, and 19th of April 1974 (Basnet 1978: 35-5).

April 1974 Elections

Voters turned up in unprecedented numbers. There were ninety-nine polling booths all over Sikkim for the twenty-eight territorial constituencies. Out of the total electorate of 90,791, this number excludes the voters in the three constituencies where the three Sikkim Congress candidates had been declared elected uncontested. The valid votes cast were 35,019, the number of invalid votes being 1,498. Though the victory of the Sikkim Congress was a foregone conclusion, few people were prepared for the

[167] See in the Annexure XV
[168] Foreign Secretary of India

astounding result which gave the Sikkim Congress twenty-nine seats out of thirty-one territorial constituencies, one seat to the National Party, and one to the independent. For the first time astoundingly since the inception of the Sangha seat, the National Party whose preserve it was failed to win this seat, here too Sikkim Congress candidate emerged victorious (ibid: 45).

The Sikkim Congress held a victory rally at Singtam on the 23rd and 24th of April 1974. It took a pledge to bring about the "rule of law, communal harmony, and administrative and other sorely needed reforms in Sikkim." The Sikkim Assembly held its inaugural session on the 10th May 1974. On the first day, the Chogyal said, among other things:

> "We are passing through a very critical period in our history, but, nevertheless, I am sure the Hon'ble Members present, who have sworn to uphold our Constitution, will live up to the high expectations and will contribute their utmost in our earnest endeavours for the promotion of the welfare and prosperity of the Sikkimese people through selfless devotion and service. I would, in all sincerity, urge the Hon'ble Members and the civil service in the administration to take note of the fact that these are crucial testing times for us. Constructive criticism is an essential ingredient of the healthy democratic system, and it is far easier to criticise than to shoulder responsibility. Thus, those of us placed in a position of responsibility must try to work in harmony and produce tangible results for the ultimate benefit and satisfaction of our people" (ibid: 47-50).

It was the first time that "one man one vote" election was held in Sikkim. As usual, there would be an official luncheon after the inaugural address, but most of the Assembly members boycotted the luncheon (ibid: 51).

May 11 Resolution

On 11th May the Assembly adopted a resolution recalling the inherent responsibilities of the Government of India (GoI) for the security and defence of Sikkim, for its external relations, and proper administration in Sikkim. It was decided that the constitutional framework established for Sikkim by the Agreement of May 8, 1973, must be speedily developed to give full effect to the objectives and fundamental tenets of the preambular paragraphs of that Agreement, including in particular more significant legislative and executive powers for the elected representatives of the people. The resolution thanked the GoI for providing a head of the administration (Chief Executive) in Sikkim to achieve and safeguard the needs and objectives set out

in the Agreement of May 8, 1973. Reiterating its determination to further strengthening the relations between India and Sikkim, the resolution demanded immediate steps to be taken for 'Sikkim's participation in the political and economic institutions of India.' Moreover, asked to depute a Constitutional Adviser immediately for giving a legal and constitutional framework for the objectives of the resolution, and defining the powers of the Chogyal, the Chief Executive, the Executive Council, and of the Assembly (ibid: 52-6).

All the members unanimously passed the resolution. Under the May 8 agreement, which was to remain a guiding spirit under which the Sikkim administration was to function, the people's representative in the Assembly and the Executive organ were given limited powers. The Section of the resolution in seeking 'Sikkim's participation in the economic and political institutions of India' attracted contention from the Chogyal. The only National Party sole representative in the Assembly without realising what he was doing, joined the others in the House in supporting the resolution of May 11 1974 (ibid, 57-1).

The Government of Sikkim Bill 1974

As per Section A (1) of the May 11, 1974, resolution demanding the constitutional framework for Sikkim. The GoI deputed Raja Gopal, Secretary in the Law Ministry, to draw up a constitution for Sikkim. He held talks with different groups and sections of the people, the handiwork of constitutional expert reached Sikkim towards the middle of June 1974, it was called the Government of Sikkim Bill, 1974. The Bill was a short document, containing six chapters, thirty-four clauses, and a schedule. Chapter I included the title, definitions and the date of the commencement of the Act (ibid: 62-3). Chapter II briefly gave the Chogyal the "honour, position, and privileges hitherto enjoyed by him." Chapter III dealt with the Sikkim Assembly, which was to be elected based on the adult franchise; the Chief Executive was to be the ex-officio president of the Assembly. The Assembly was to have the power to make laws on all the subjects enumerated under clause 3 (i) of the May 8 Agreement except Home, Establishment, and Finance. Any other matter could be included in the list of subjects on the recommendation of the Government of India. If the Chogyal withheld his assent from any bill, the Assembly could reconsider the bill within three months, and

if it is passed again by the Assembly, the Chogyal could not withhold his assent (ibid: 64).

Chapter IV dealt with an Executive Council; the Executive Council shall be referred to the Council of Ministers. Chapter V dealt with the Chief Executive; "At the head of the administration in Sikkim, there shall be a Chief Executive, who shall be a person nominated by the Government of India and appointed by the Chogyal. The powers of the Chief Executive was to enjoy were the same as envisaged in the May 8 Agreement." Chapter VI began thus for the speedy development of Sikkim in the social, economic, and political fields the Government of Sikkim may request Government of India to; associate officials from Sikkim in the planned development of Sikkim; request Government of India to provide facilities to Sikkimese students including all India services at par with those citizens of India; and to seek participation and representation for the people of Sikkim in the political institutions of India" (ibid: 65).

The independence of the judiciary was ensured. All the sections of the people of Sikkim were to enjoy basic human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination. A meeting of the Sikkim Congress Assembly members was held to discuss the merits and demerits of the Bill. Those who objected held that the proposed Council of Ministers would have little powers to fulfil the party's pledges to the people since the Council of Ministers were too subservient to the Chief Executive. The Clause whereby the Government of Sikkim "may seek participation and representation for the people of Sikkim in the political institutions of India" was looked upon with high suspicion that and was vigorously protested against. The Kazi remained adamant, and so did Nar Bahadur Khatiwada, and the meeting ended without resolving the issue (ibid: 66-7). On 20th June 1974, Kazi Lhendup Dorji stood in the Assembly and said that "the members had some amendments to suggest and express their views". A total of eight amendments were moved, seconded and passed without any opposition and the Bill was passed unanimously. It was resolved that immediate steps should be taken by the Government of Sikkim to request the Government of India to take such measures as may be necessary for the shortest possible time (ibid: 70-4).

Demonstration Against the Government of Sikkim Bill

There was the demonstration against the Sikkim Bill; the Political Officer traced the reason for the demonstration on Chogyal. The Chogyal went to Delhi for talks with the Government of India on June 25. The Sikkim Congress demanded an emergency meeting of the Assembly to discuss the situation arising out of the Chogyal's not having given his assent to the Constitutional Bill (ibid: 81-2). The Chogyal in Delhi had been having fruitless talks with the officials of the Foreign Office, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 30th June 1974, the Indian Prime Minister finally agreed to grant an appointment to the Chogyal. The Prime Minister advised the Chogyal to give his assent to the Bill. A special session of the Sikkim Assembly was fixed for July 2, 1974, when the Chogyal wished to address but the Assembly members boycotted the session (ibid: 98-101).

The Chogyal agreed to give his assent. On 4th July 1974 at 1:05 p. m., the Chogyal signed the bill to the proclamation which said: "I hereby approve of the Government of Sikkim Bill, 1974, for proclamation with my formal assent and under my seal and signature." The ministry was formed on July 23, 1974, with Kazi Lhendup Dorji as the Chief Minister with other ministers (ibid: 115). The first step of Kazi Lhendup Dorji on assuming office was to write to the Chief Executive requesting the Government of India 'to confirm their willingness to discharge their rights, responsibilities, and power, and to accept the request to set out in the Act and resolutions, and to take necessary steps on their part both to give effect to the Act and resolutions' (ibid: 124).

Introduction of the 35th Amendment Bill in Lok Sabha

A formal bill was introduced in the lower house of Indian Parliament on September 2, 1974, for granting "Associate Status" to Sikkim by amending the Indian Constitution. Introducing the Constitution Amendment Bill (the 35th Amendment Bill) in the Lok Sabha, Sardar Swaran Singh, the External Affairs Minister traced the developments in Sikkim from the April 1973 upsurge to the enactment of the Sikkim Government Act of 1974 (ibid: 126-7). The Lok Sabha passed the Bill on September 4, 1974, by an overwhelming majority–320 for and nine against. The Bill was sent to Rajya Sabha on September 6. The Rajya Sabha passed the Bill on the 7 September 1974 with 168 votes for and eight against it. The External Affairs Minister on 11th September

informed the Kazi, Chief Minister of Sikkim that "…the Indian Parliament has passed the Bill for the amendment of the Constitution which formally acknowledges the association of Sikkim with India. This amendment will become effective as soon as certain remaining formalities have been completed…" (ibid: 135-6). The Chogyal requested the Prime Minister to grant him an urgent meet to discuss the implications of the Bill before the President give his assent, he stated, 'the best way to determine the people's will is through the referendum' (ibid: 139-41). On October 10, 1974, mainly pro-Palace supporters held a public demonstration at Gangtok town demanding that a referendum under neutral auspices to be held to determine the sincere wishes of the Sikkimese people (ibid: 149).

The Chogyal's Final Bid: His Visit to Kathmandu and the Abolition of Institution of Chogyal in Sikkim

On February 22, 1975, Chogyal left for Kathmandu to attend the coronation of King Birendra, where he was invited in his capacity, and Delhi cleared his visit. During his sojourn in Kathmandu, he met with the Chinese delegation and gave a press conference criticising Delhi and the Sikkim Congress leaders. He questioned Delhi's motives and the legality of Sikkim's new status (Basnet 1978: 167-68; Das 1983: 61). A senior journalist makes apt comments on the Chogyal's press conference at Kathmandu:

> *Indian Daily, The Statesman, March 3, 1975*
>
> ….The Nepalese visit is significant in this context only for what it discloses of New Delhi's inability to identify its objectives and evolve an unambiguous programme for their effective realization. Kathmandu correctly routed its invitation through the External Affairs Ministry, which cleared it, and was duly informed of the Chogyal's acceptance. At some later point in time, however, South Block (where the Ministry of External Affairs is housed) appears to have had second thoughts about the wisdom of the Sikkimese monarch making an official appearance at an international event such as King Birendra's coronation. Whether these belated doubts were prompted by the Sikkim Chief Minister's sudden discovery of objections to the invitation, or whether New Delhi—unwilling to retract a sanction it had already granted—found it more prudent to let Mr. Lhendup Dorji Kazi carry the can is neither here nor there. What does matter is the lack of consistency in a policy that is as unable to anticipate developments as it is apparently incapable of taking into account personal reactions and their likely repercussions, such as Mr. Kazi's refusal to accept the constitutional ban on discussing the royal family or relations with India…

There was an immediate reaction in Delhi and Gangtok. Kazi came out with a counter-attack on the Chogyal stating that the latter had not reconciled himself to the democratic aspirations of his people and been playing a destructive role. As such, he had lost the complete confidence of his people and demanded his removal. For Delhi, the Chogyal's contact with the Chinese posed a threat. When the Chogyal returned, he was confronted with the demonstrations at Rangpo by the leaders of Sikkim Congress. A small detachment of Sikkim Guards made way for the Chogyal's car, while the leaders tried to prevent its progress which led to a brief clash between the Sikkim Guards and the demonstrators. A prominent leader of Sikkim Congress, R. C. Poudyal was injured, and he was brought to the Military Hospital at Libing Cantonment, two miles below Gangtok (Basnet 1978: 170-71; Das 1983: 61).

The Sikkim Congress condemned the incident and called on the state-wide protest. The next day they rallied around the Gangtok town, and the Chief Minister addressed the meeting demanding the immediate removal of Chogyal for his anti-people, anti-democratic stance (Basnet 1978: 172). Meanwhile, with effect from 1 March 1975, Sikkim formally became an Associate State of India. Though Sikkim officially became an Associate State, the news was made public much later in the month. As soon as the news came in the public domain, a case was filed in the Central Court of Sikkim, by Madan Mohan Rasaily[169] against the Sikkim administration and all the Assembly members challenging the validity of the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. However, on March 29, 1975, the Sikkim Assembly passed a resolution stating that the Government of Sikkim Act cannot be challenged in any court of law (ibid: 186-9).

On April 6th Kazi Lhendup Dorji issued a strongly-worded statement demanding the immediate disbandment of the Sikkim Guards and the abolition of the institution of Chogyal. Kazi Lhendup Dorji sent a telegram to the Indian Prime Minister stating: "Events of the past week have proved beyond doubt the Chogyal must quit...The deepest wish of all Sikkimese people is that their links with the Central Government be strengthened as soon as possible." On April 9, 1975, the Indian Army moved in and disarmed the Sikkim Guards. Ever since the Sikkim Congress demonstration at Rangpo where a brief clash had taken place where a

[169] See in Basnet (1978: 172) a senior government official, who had accompanied the Chogyal to Kathmandu.

Sikkim Congress leader was injured, Sikkim Guards had been called a tool in the hands of the Chogyal to suppress the people of Sikkim. After disarming the Sikkim Guards, they were sent out of Sikkim to different units of the Border Security Forces and other paramilitary organisations in India (ibid: 190-4).

On April 10, the Sikkim Assembly held an emergent session and said, among other things: 'being satisfied that the activities of the Chogyal of Sikkim have violated the objectives of the Agreement of May 8, 1973…also impedes their democratic development and participation in the political and economic life of India; solemnly declares and resolves the institution of Chogyal is hereby abolished, and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent part of India.'

After a brief discussion, the resolution was passed unanimously (ibid: 194-7). On April 14, 1975, the referendum was held, as per the wishes of the Chogyal and his supporters. The Sikkim Congress volunteers campaigned to vote against the institution of Chogyal in the forthcoming referendum. There were two boxes at every polling booth, one white and red. The red box was for 'the against of the institution of Chogyal in Sikkim,' and white box for 'the institution of Chogyal in Sikkim.' Nobody bothered whether the voters were literate or illiterate. Out of a total electorate of over 97,000, 61,000 votes went to the red box, and 1,500 went to the white box (ibid: 199-201). Authoritarian conceptions were replaced by libertarian ones, which affirmed that all individuals should have equal rights and freedom irrespective of anything (Desai 1948: 229, 260). The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Y. B. Chavan introduced the Constitution (36th Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha on 21 April 1975, seeking to make Sikkim a full-fledged State of the Republic of India. The President of India affixed his signature on the Bill on May 16, 1975, and Sikkim became the 22nd State of the Republic of India (Basnet 1978: 206). On May 17, 1975, the Chief Executive, B. B. Lal was sworn in as the first Governor of Sikkim at a ceremony held at the Raj Bhawan which was the India House and British Residency in the British period (ibid: 213). The affairs of the new state passed on to the Home Ministry, Government of India (Das 1983: 62) and a new chapter, Sikkim as an Indian state began.

Conclusion

The simmering of political movements in Sikkim after the independence of India and its subsequent merger with India has rendered all kinds of research about Sikkim politically sensitive. At the boundaries of nationalist discourse that the subaltern studies offers an opportunity to break out the intellectual prisons established by orientalist or nationalist interpretations. There is no trace of the new line of enquiry that has developed in western theory. Thus the works so far carried on Sikkim is on the orientalist descriptive mode. There is yet to develop fluency in the theoretical frameworks in Sikkim; this is, just a minor effort in that direction. Insularity from theory in the studies of Sikkim is not the consequence of Sikkim's geographical isolation. Orientalist traditions of colonial scholarship and the politics of knowledge about contemporary Sikkim are much more important in explaining the absence of subaltern approaches in Sikkimese studies.

The works carried on Sikkim so far have been looked 'from above'; from the orientalist tradition inherited from the British Raj. There is less amount of discussion on the 1970s period and has never become a discussion on the public realm; even the period after the Indian independence; the politics of Durbar to consolidate power in their own hands. It has several loopholes and perhaps could be filled only after extensive research on the subject, though it is a politically sensitive issue. Policy makers and the political leaders chose to escape this topic rather confront it.

The movements in varying degrees emphasised and fought for the principles of individual liberty and social equality. The new intelligentsia which imbibed the liberal western cultures recognised these needs and launched movements to reform or revolutionise social institutions, religious outlooks, and ethical conceptions inherited from the past since they felt that these were obstacles to the development. They were convinced that the new society could politically, culturally, and economically develop only based on liberal principles such as the recognition of individual liberty, freedom of unfettered expression of human personality and social equality.

Revolutionary China's control over Tibet met independent India's extension of administration over frontier regions. The Nepalese in Sikkim had struggled against the Chogyal and the Bhutia ascendency, and it would be foolish on the part of the Nepalese youth to make common cause with the Bhutias and fight aimed at restoring

Bhutia ascendency. The fear they had lived with during the long rule of the Chogyal had corroded their will to wage a sustained struggle and divisive politics of Chogyal never allowed to develop a feeling of solidarity among the Sikkimese. The Sikkimese youth lacked the patriotic fervour and the willingness to make sacrifices that go in the making of Sikkim a separate entity.

Chapter V

Revisiting the Colonial Experiences of Sikkim

Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to analyse the British policy in the critical areas of academic concern and is within the framework of subaltern and post-colonial studies. It is also an attempt to measure British policy and practice on 'semi-colony'/state of Sikkim (Ferreira 1974: vi). This chapter assesses the political impact of colonialism on Sikkimese society through an analysis of colonial economic, educational and native policies in Sikkim. The impact of colonisation should be considered an essential factor in understanding the present condition of Sikkim. Therefore, the scrutiny of the phenomenon of colonialism is necessary to understand people's perception of themselves (Negash 1987: 12; Khapoya 2016: 99). The chronology of British colonialism in Sikkim can be divided into three phases. The first phase began positively with the collaboration during the Anglo-Gorkha war; the second phase marked the intense relationship between British and Sikkim: British tried to exploit Sikkim as a base for penetrating Tibet and; the third phase of the British colonialism was closely associated with the so-called system of 'indirect' rule (Negash 1987: 92). Now let us examine the different phases of colonialism in Sikkim.

The First Phase of British Colonialism in Sikkim

Aftermath of Anglo-Gorkha War, the Company, restored the mountainous areas situated eastward of the Mechi River and westward of the Teesta River to Sikkim (through Treaty of Titaliya, 1817). They wanted to strengthen Sikkim as a 'buffer state' between States in the Eastern Himalayas. In return, the British gained influence over its foreign relations and the state was placed under their protection. It would impede the Gorkha desire, and it would lead to a step ahead of opening commercial relations with Tibet. The company added a tract of low land, Morung, ceded by the Gorkhas, to the east of Mechi river (Hamilton 1828: 549-550; Rao 1972: 5). As British developed a stronger awareness of the strategic role of Sikkim as a staging post for colonial expansion into Tibet, it found it to be in its interest to maintain political stability in Sikkim (Negash 1987: 152).

In search of trade routes to Tibet, the Company was thinking about a viable option that Sikkim could offer because of its matrimonial and religious affinities with

Tibet (Pradhan 1991: 154-56). A dispute between Sikkim and Nepal regarding the jurisdiction over a piece of land called Ontoo, situated on the eastern side of the Mechi river, offered British a chance to intervene in the matter (Singh 1988: 177). In 1828 to settle the issues between the two countries, Company deputed British Officers to investigate the issues. While settling the border disputes, they come across a land probably with hundred of the population, and they considered it appropriate for the prospect of developing as a health resort for the British soldiers (Namgyal 1908: 61; Bhanja 1993: 2-3; Rao 1972: 7; Kotturan 1983: 60). Their findings suggested that the place would not only make an ideal health resort but that its possession would confer considerable benefits to the Company (Pradhan 1991: 158; Rao 1972: 7). The Company thought they should open negotiations with Rajah of Sikkim for the transfer of Darjeeling to them, and it would also serve the strategic purpose. British were looking for Darjeeling as an ideal sanatorium and installing the troops in such a commanding height, from where they could observe the Himalayan states. Lepchas, who claimed Darjeeling as their patrimonial land and to gain their (British) sympathy voluntarily gifted to them (Rao 1972: 7; Pradhan 1991: 159).

However, the British occupied Darjeeling on the strength of the 'deed' (Kotturan 1983: 62), which Lloyd was able to procure from the Rajah owing to the misunderstanding[170]. According to Sikkimese law, all the lands belong to the royal family and only usufruct, not outright ownership could be entrusted to the occupants of the land. Therefore, Darjeeling would have been given on this line of the traditional Sikkimese land law, ownership being retained by the ruler (Namgyal 1966: 46). However, the British assumed that Darjeeling had become their sovereign territory, which they called 'British Sikkim' whereas the Sikkimese understood the land grant according to their land law (McKay 2009/2010: 32; Mullard 2011: 182-83).

After annexing the part of Sikkim, the British developed the conditions for trade and cultivation there. The local administrators tried to turn the hills of Darjeeling into a commercial centre and to promote tea cultivation. British envisage the immense potentiality of this place as a suitable trade post and a strategic zone which would serve their interests in the region (Kotturan 1983: 60; Rai 2015: 93; Novati 2005: 54; Sodter 1991: 152). Thoroughly untamed Darjeeling hills became the centre of the colonial project. The suitability of its climate, its richness, and its

[170] See in Chapter III, the misunderstanding about the Darjeeling 'grant' has been discussed in detail.

wholesomeness were all guarantees of success for colonising ventures in Darjeeling hills (Sodter 1991: 152). The British visualised the use of Darjeeling as a strategic base for the defence of the trade route to Tibet through Sikkim (Kotturan 1983: 60). Darjeeling became the observatory post of British which placed themselves so close to the hill states of the Eastern Himalaya and also always reminded them, the possibilities of trade with Tibet (Rao 1972: 14; Singh 1988: 180). Darjeeling was the vital foothold of the British from where they successfully operated their policies and controlled the broader Eastern Himalayan region. Therefore, the status of Darjeeling in the colonial framework had a 'special' significance in the strategic concerns of the British.

British interest in the Eastern Himalayan region was to gain political and commercial privileges from these states and to promote trade in Tibet via Sikkim. The annexation of Darjeeling proved to be very useful because of its commanding height and its strategic location in the Eastern Himalayan region. As Darjeeling hills were close to Nepal, the Rajah of Sikkim paid the least attention to the prospect of developing this place for the fact that Nepal was always hostile to Sikkim. Darjeeling was less revenue producing estate with the only population of hundred and dense forest. The age-old desire of the British to open up commercial relations with Tibet saw materialising by annexing a part of Sikkim and developing as a stable trade post.

The Second Phase of British Colonialism on Sikkim

After the takeover of Darjeeling, the British intended to increase the zone of influence over 'independent' Sikkim. Darjeeling's 'strategic' function as a base for regional expansion resulted in an attempt to introduce social changes in independent Sikkim and minimise conflicts between the colonisers and the colonised to maintain Sikkim as a stable strategic base (Killion 1989: 128-29). Independent Sikkim, as a strategic base, required a radical restructuring of 'traditional' or pre-colonial economic system (Negash 1987: 151). However, in an attempt to maintain Sikkim as a stable base, the British found themselves involved in a cultural misunderstanding. The cultural misunderstanding between the two civilisations led to the instability in Sikkim until Sidkeong Namgyal became King of Sikkim. Soon after annexing the part of Sikkim British lost the goodwill of the ruling family of Sikkim.

The reason for misunderstanding between the two parties was the 1835 'grant' of Darjeeling and was conditional in the Sikkimese understanding when it became clear that the British had annexed Darjeeling, relations between the two parties deteriorated. However, the British payment of an annual subsidy partly resolved the issue, although in Sikkimese understanding this was seen as a rent (McKay 2009/2010: 32). Several disputes between the two occur during the 1840s and '50s due to the different legal systems in use. Sikkimese tax defaulters, debtors (including landlords owing rent to the Chogyal) what the British referred to as 'slaves' and other such persons took refuge in Darjeeling, where the British refused to return them. Similarly, those considered criminals by the British found refuge in Sikkim. Moreover, there were instances of kidnapping Sikkimese subjects, and their 'kidnapping' was not only within traditional Himalayan judicial practices but was what they saw as their territory (ibid: 33-5). This led to a misunderstanding between the two powers.

The arrest of the British officer and the British naturalist Dr. Joseph Hooker, in 1849,[171] added another bitter chapter in the relation. The British felt some response to it was necessary to safeguard the British prestige as they believed 'colonies were created by arms but were maintained by the aura of prestige that surrounded the European coloniser' (Negash 1987: 68). As a result, the annual payment which Sikkim saw as rent for Darjeeling was stopped, and 640 square miles of Sikkim territory was annexed and placed under Darjeeling (McKay: 2009/2010: 34). To avenge the insults inflicted upon the British officers, Campbell obtained an authority to march over Sikkim and make them pay. However, it was ill-managed and ill-equipped with the local troops of 100 from a sappers and miners unit which backfired, and Campbell had to suffer a humiliating rout. This initiative forced the colonial government to intervene in the matter to protect the British prestige and interests on the frontier. This was about prestige, Lieutenant-Colonel John Cox Gawler was given the charge of the force of nearly 2,000 men, and there was no sustained battle, just a few exchanges of gunshots with the least casualty on both sides. Eden prepared a formal Treaty to end the hostilities (McKay 2009/2010: 35-41). The Treaty of

[171] In 1849 Dr. Hooker found the Tibetan outpost at the group of passes near Daukhia, they marked the spots which prohibited him from passing as being the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. A few weeks later he and Dr. Campbell went to the Cho-La, which they found similarly marked and guarded. They were seized by the Sikkim officials and put to arrest. Letter from W. B. Oldham to Lord Ulick Browne, dated 15 August 1886, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

Tumlong was signed on March 1861 and its main features—typical of those made by the British with neighbouring state—an agreement over trans-border legal issues and the opening of trade and access to Sikkim and Tibet. The British recognised that annexing Sikkim would not be of economic or political benefit to them (McKay 2009/2010: 46).

Opening Tibet to British Indian trade was already one of the main objectives of the British. Sikkim seemed an ideal route to Lhasa. Moreover, now, Sikkim became the main strategic base for the expansion into Tibet (McKay 2009/2010: 45). After Tsugphud Namgyal, Sidkeong Namgyal became the ruler, Tsugphud Namgyal remained and died in Chumbi in 1863. Moreover, Anglo-Sikkimese relations did improve in the reign of Sidkeong Namgyal. The Government of India restored the annual grant of Rs. 6,000 which was stopped due to conflict of interests between the two. It was increased to Rs. 9,000 in 1868 and to Rs. 12,000 from 1873. It was only after the death of Sidkeong Namgyal in 1874 Anglo-Sikkimese relations again deteriorate (McKay 2009/2010: 45; Rao 1972: 45).

Edgar, who was deputed to investigate the possibility of conducting trade between India and Tibet, brought to the notice of the Bengal administration that communication was addressed by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to the ruler of Sikkim. Sikkimese Maharajah was intermediary between Tibet and the British Government calling him not to encourage road building and to prevent British officers from crossing the frontier into Tibet. However, the road was built through Sikkim to the Jeylep La on the Tibetan frontier[172] (Grover 1974: 22). Thotub Namgyal, who became the Maharajah after Sidkeong Namgyal, who had risen to power with the British support, could not resist the pressure of the anti-British Bhutias for long and succumbed under their pressure.

Soon the British found itself mingled in a war with Tibet, where Sikkim had the least role to play. Thotub Namgyal supported the Tibetan action and acted disloyally to the British (Namgyal 1908: 87). The offence between British and Tibet in Mount Lingtu marked that if British neglected its relation with Sikkim, then they might lose their influence over Sikkim. After the conflict, the establishment of British Residency in Sikkim one year before Britain and China settled the issues of Sikkim

[172] See in the third chapter for the detailed discussion of the event.

and Tibet in 1890 (Convention of 1890) as their own led to the complete consolidation of Sikkimese affairs by the British. By 1889 the British could not ignore a growing awareness that the trade routes through these mighty mountains offered potential military access to India; from the north through the course from Gyantse in Southern Tibet, crossing across Chumbi Valley to Sikkim and onward to India. An alternative route also existed from Shigatse in Tibet to Sikkim, and from Sikkim to Darjeeling and finally to Calcutta (the official heart of British India at that point of time) (Meyer 2005: 50, 19; Jha 1985: 30). It led to the creation of Political Office in Sikkim. By the establishment of British Residency in Sikkim, now they would take the affairs of Sikkim into their own hands. The Chinese pressed for the agreement and stated that they would 'be able to oblige Tibetans the terms of the treaty' (Younghusband 1910: 50). The Chinese were responsible in the fullest sense that they had sought the agreement and they recognised the British protectorate over Sikkim. However, the Chinese were utterly unable to control the Tibetans. Tibetans never accepted the treaty and the Chinese were unable to impress them. The British Government came to a series of agreements on behalf of Sikkim that gave them considerable autonomy (Younghusband 1910: 50-1; Cajani 2013: 73).

The Third Phase of British Colonialism on Sikkim

After the convention of 1890, in 1893 a Trade Regulation was signed at Darjeeling. This gave the right to the British for establishing a trade mart at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier. Tibetans repudiated the agreement and never considered themselves bound by the Convention, as they were not a party to it. The Chinese were unable to impress them upon the terms of the treaty and not able to manage the Tibetan affairs (Younghusband 1910: 52-4, 62; Kotturan 1983: 76). China then was in no position to compel the Tibetans to honour commitments to the British. She was herself weak and withering (Kotturan 1983: 76-7). The 1890 Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1893 were intended to secure fuller trade facilities, but none had been obtained (Younghusband 1910: 66). Moreover, in the broader sphere of strategic necessity, it was necessary to establish friendly relations with China, in the face of the Russian advance in Central Asia (Singh 1988: 210).

In the era, when the overseas trade with China had not yet developed, Hastings, then Governor-General in the late eighteenth century, saw the great

opportunity in introducing British goods into China via Sikkim and Tibet (English 1985: 70). However, in an eventual Gorkha-Tibet War (1788-91), the British declining to afford effectual assistance to Tibet, all the communications were severed, and the approach of strangers, even of Bengal and India was utterly prohibited (Younghusband 1910: 31). The attempt was protracted over 137 years to accomplish the establishment of ordinary neighbourly intercourse with Tibet (ibid: vii).

One of the main reasons that Britain involved in the political rivalry was due to the access to abundant resources, control of trade routes and the transportation routes that transfer the resources to the world market (Abilov 2013: 34). China wielded suzerainty over Tibet, which was viewed by the British forward group as a strategically critical in guarding the northern frontier against Russian infiltration and control (Meyer 2005: 17). About the demarcation of the boundary line between Sikkim and Tibet, the Tibetan Government was singularly obstructive. They frequently violated the border, and once occupied Giagong, claiming that it fell under their territory (Kotturan 1983: 77). The whole of the boundary between the source of the Lachen and Lachung rivers was in dispute. Possession as far as from Giagong to the Donkia had always been with Tibetans. However, in the Convention of 1890, it was laid down that the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet shall be the summit of the mountain range separated by the waters flowing into Sikkim on the one side, and into Tibet on the other. According to this boundary line, there can be no doubt that the truth of disputed territory should pass from the hands of Tibet to those of Sikkim. Tibet was, however, no party to the Convention, and it was sure that the Tibetans would not willingly agree to any cession of territory. The Chinese authorities were quite willing to act up to the Convention but were unable to coerce the Tibetans[173]. The then Viceroy, Lord Curzon, wanted to bring an end to the continuing uncertainty with Tibet. There was the increasing clamour of the Russian influence, gaining a stronghold in Tibet (Kotturan 1983: 77).

As China had become weak, she was not in a position to withstand the British pressure. As a result, Tibet turned to Russia and sought help from them, in the case of British hostility. Lord Curzon came to know that the Tibetans shared a suspicion that the British had designs on them and absorption of Sikkim in 1889[174] confirmed them

[173] H. J. S. Cotton's Note 4-12-95, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[174] Establishment of Political Residency in Sikkim.

that Tibet was on the next agenda (Singh 1988: 237). This prompted Tibetans to seek help from Russia, and they tried to establish a relation. This alerted Lord Curzon to send an expedition to Tibet, to have negotiations with them that they do not carry any grand design on Tibet and they do not intend to annex any part of Tibet. British also wanted to chalk out Russophobe from Tibet and open up a long-awaited chapter of trade relation with Tibet (Rai 2015: 55). The purpose of the Mission was to secure a trading agreement and to prevent Tibetans from establishing a relationship with the Russians (ibid: 46).

Lord Curzon was insistent that every indication pointed to Russian emissaries having ready access to the Tibetan authorities and Russian merchants freely traded at various trade marts in Tibet (Singh 1988: 237). When Viceroy was making fruitless efforts to enter into direct communication with Dalai Lama, the information came that Dalai Lama had been sending envoys to Czar Nicholas II[175]. The mission was led by the Lama called Dorjieff, and its principal object was reconciliation and enhancing the relations with Russia. It had been said that the team was equipped by Dalai Lama with autograph letters and presented to His Imperial Majesty from him. Moreover, among other things, it was to raise the question of the establishment of a permanent Tibetan Mission in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of good relations with Russia, as she was the only power able to thwart the intrigues of Great Britain (Younghusband 1910: 67-8).

The Indian Government's failure to establish trade marts in Tibet and to establish direct relations with Lhasa was the indication of its failure to safeguard its interests against Russian designs on Tibet. Before Curzon's arrival, the real issues which confronted the Indian Government had been frontier disputes over trading facilities. After Curzon's arrival, they became involved with the much broader question of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. Curzon used the three pillars, the Tibetan encroachments at Giaogong and the obstructions imposed on the trade at Yatung, as well as every insult—real or imagined—which British officers had received from the Chinese or Tibetan functionaries, as weapons in his armoury for the "epic

[175] See in Younghusband (1910/1994/2002: 67) British Ambassador at St. Petersburg forwarded to the Foreign Office an announcement in the official column of the *Journal de Saint Petersburg* of October 2 (15), 1900, announcing the reception by His Majesty the Emperor of a certain Dorjieff, who was described as first Tsanit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

struggle"[176]. Curzon's policy was that nowhere along the Indian glacis should hostile influences be permitted to obtain a foothold, on the contrary, British authority should be 'unmistakeably and indeed ostentatiously asserted'; the policy should be to persuade Tibet to ally herself with Britain rather than with Russia (Singh 1988: 237-38).

Russian Government, on the other hand, disclaimed the visits of Dorjieff having political nature (Younghusband 1910: 68-9). Curzon was alarmed by the rumours of various treaties which Russia was making with Tibet, and the Russians were in the process of establishing a protectorate over Tibet. For Curzon, these rumours were one aspect of the crisis, the other more critical sign being the visits of Dorjieff to Czar bearing with him tokens of esteem and friendship from the Dalai Lama. By 1902, Curzon was convinced that Dorjieff was, after all, a Russian agent of some importance (Singh 1988: 243). At the same time, the Viceroy was inclined to believe the rumours emanating from China regarding a Sino-Russian treaty over Tibet, and which was said to have been signed at Lhasa on 27 February 1903, by the Amban and a Russian Representative. The settlement was said to contain eight Articles, all dealing with Russian mining rights in Tibet and which gave the Chinese the right to be consulted on every venture the Russians proposed to initiate in Tibet. Moreover, the treaty was to remain valid in the face of protests from other foreign powers (ibid).

By the end of 1902, the India Office, the Foreign Office, and the Viceroy were all in agreement that reports of Russo-Chinese treaties could no longer be ignored if British India's interests were to be preserved (Singh 1988: 244). Thus, the Government of India recommended prompt action. The attempts to negotiate for an understanding with the Tibetans through the Chinese had been failed (Younghusband 1910: 76). The British tried to increase the zone of influence through Sikkim and had already consolidated their position in Sikkim as a stable strategic base. Thus, the Maharajah of Sikkim Thutob Namgyal referred a letter to Dalai Lama:

> "…the British Government regarded the articles regarding trade as for why important one if the two governments were to fall out it would cause much misery and woes… I, therefore, beg you who are come to negotiate this affair to assume the peaceful tone and allow the trade mart

[176] See in Younghusband (1920) Mission was termed as "epic battle", British was going to open up Tibet for the first time since the time of Warren Hastings in later half of the 18th century. Every means were failed until now, and they were keen to open up Tibet.

> at Yatung to be pushed at least as far as Rinhengang in Trome. If you yield that much point you reasonable demand a permanent treaty that will not seek to push it any further...and sincerely wishing the peace and prosperity of our own coreligionists I beg to submit this opinion " (Namgyal 1908: 128).

In reply to the Maharajah's letter, the Tibetan officials wrote, 'that the Tibetans were patiently trying to do their best to preserve peace, but it is British government who invade and trespass the Tibetan territories. They said that they had sent the Maharajah's letter to the Government and if Government agrees with it, they will look at once forward it to the Maharajah' (Namgyal 1908: 128; Singh 1988: 248). The Maharajah appealing the Dalai Lama to come into terms with British Government was because Maharajah knew if Tibet did not enter into terms with the British then they would have to face a humiliating defeat and have to agree on the conditions imposed on them by the British, as Tibet did not match the military superiority with the British. Moreover, Maharajah was worried that they would have to actively participate in the tiresome affairs of war if Dalai Lama's reluctance prolonged the war.

Throughout the mission's advance, the Sikkim Durbar was pressed into making roads and laying bridges and was personally supervised by Maharajkumar (Sidkeong Namgyal), who, however unwilling to do but had to do White's bidding. "Everyone in Sikkim, including the Maharajah, Kazis, and Thikadars, had to be up and alert at their work. No one was allowed to be flagged, and all had to suffer the intense cold...until at last, it ended" (Namgyal 1908: 132). Every people in Sikkim were involved in the war, including Maharajkumar and Maharajah himself, they were not allowed to flag. Their work was to transport the shipment to the British. The Maharajah's requests did not yield any productive results, because Dalai Lama considered the Maharajah as an agent of the British government, who brought British to their doorsteps. China was weak and without its military backing, the Maharajah recognised that Tibet would be unable to withstand the British pressure. The reluctant acceptance of the Royal Family and the people of Sikkim in decisions which affected their ancient allegiance demonstrate the degree of colonisation in Sikkim as a protectorate after the 1890 Convention, and also of the extent that the British imperial power in the states on the Himalayan periphery (Singh 1988: 247-8).

The strength of the Sikkim Military Police was increased by twenty temporary men and was accorded to the supply on loan of twenty carbines and bayonets and

necessary accessories with ammunition for the twenty temporary men, on the condition that these would be returned to the Fort William Arsenal, when the services of the temporary force will be dispensed[177]. According to Peter Hopkirk (1997: 10), "Tibetan troops were massacred by the British en route to Lhasa." The massacre at Guru on March 1904, where 700 Tibetans lost their lives after they had agreed to give up their arms, the Maharajah decided to plead once again so that they would not be forced to make a humiliating peace. Maharajah had argued that the "British had not the least intention of depriving Tibet of even an inch of land, upon that they are ready to sign a bond. However, they insist on having free trade and friendly interchange of correspondence" (Namgyal 1908: 130).

The reply, when it came, stated that 'the establishment of trade marts and the opening of new routes into Tibetan territory was something difficult to get...Moreover, since European imports are coming in from India right up to Lhasa, there is no reason why they should insist on establishing trade marts for that purpose' (ibid: 131). In Dalai Lama's opinion, the British were bent on 'over-reaching' the Tibetans by actual acts of lawlessness and unprovoked aggression, and he was left with no alternative but to defend Tibet (Singh 1988: 248; Namgyal 1908: 131).

When Dalai Lama learned that the escort was on its way to Lhasa, he fled the country (Younghusband 1910: 281). Amban said, 'the Ti Rimpoche would act as Regent and would use the seal which the Dalai Lama had left with him...supported by the seals of the National Assembly..., and of the three great monasteries' (ibid: 293). On 7 September 1904, a Convention was signed between the British Government and the Tibetan Government[178] (ibid: 260). The treaty which Younghusband had signed at Lhasa, the British government, made several changes to the Convention. On account of Tibet's inability to pay the war indemnity, the Chinese government agreed to pay the reduced indemnity[179] (Younghusband 1910: 348). On April 27, 1906, a Convention was signed at Peking between Great Britain and China[180] which confirmed the Lhasa Convention of 1904. In addition to that, Great Britain agreed not to annex any Tibetan territory, or to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet,

[177] See in the Annexure XVI
[178] See in the Annexure XVII
[179] See in Younghusband (1910/1994/2002: 338-39) a Telegram to Viceroy, by the British government, said; 'The Viceroy should reduce the indemnity from 75 to 25 lakhs, and it should be paid in three instalments', hereby, the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley will be terminated.
[180] See in the Annexure XVIII

while the Chinese government guaranteed no other foreign State would be permitted to interfere into the internal administration or the territory of Tibet. It was also agreed that the provisions in the old Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should remain in full force (ibid: 342-3).

By this Convention between Great Britain and China, it was clear that the Conventions of 1890 and 1893 would remain in the full force. It is important to note that, in both the Conventions, Tibet and Sikkim were not parties, though matters relating to Tibet and Sikkim were decided in the Conventions (Jha 1985: 1). Tibet and Sikkim were reduced to the position of subalternity. The conventions were signed on behalf of them over their heads. The approach was adopted to act on behalf of them, which ignored the positional relations of the dominant to the subaltern states (Maggio 2007: 442). Tibet agreed to abide by the clauses of both the Conventions which they were reluctant to accept before Younghusband Mission, on the ground that Tibet was not a party to the Conventions. By the Conventions of 1904 and 1906, affairs relating to Sikkim were also solved as affairs of India. Lhasa Convention of 1904 gave every assurance to the British, and with this, the process of establishing British suzerainty over Sikkim was complete in every respect (Jha 1985: 1). In the Convention of 1906 between Great Britain and China, China ultimately confirmed the suzerainty of British over Sikkim and the confusion in this regard was cleared entirely. The weak states were utterly silenced by the powerful nations, and they were represented as if they have no voice. The final subjugation had occurred.

On the following year, an agreement was signed between Great Britain and Russia, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907[181] (Hopkirk 1997: 10). In the Convention, the suzerain right of China over Tibet was recognised, but, considering the geographical position of Great Britain, it was decided that, Great Britain retains a s*tatus quo* vis-à-vis the external relations of Tibet. Both parties agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration. Secondly, it is also recognised, not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government (Younghusband 1910: 378). The powerful states were dividing their share of administration and agreeing to each other the fair share of other states. After the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention, both the Governments agreed, not to interfere in the internal

[181] See in the Annexure XVIV

affairs of Tibet, and the suzerain right of China over Tibet was recognised by both the governments. Tibet to some extent was secured from the interests of Great Britain and Russia and was held secured under the suzerainty of China since any negotiations with Tibet would have to go through China (Rai 2015: 69).

Administration of Sikkim: Post 1889

By 1889 the British colonialism had reached its apogee of consolidated power in Sikkim with the establishment of Political Office. The British Administration of 1889-1947 in Sikkim was at least juridically not a colony (Negash 1987: 147). Between 1889 and 1947, the British colonial policy hinged around the problems of defining and implementing the system of 'indirect rule' with the local elite as an integral part of the machinery of Government in Sikkim (Negash 1987: 92-3). The indirect rule refers to the areas under the administration of indigenous rulers, as in Council but defence and foreign policies were entirely controlled by the British but enjoyed considerable autonomy in matters of internal administration (Iyer 2010: 693). This strategy involved the incorporation of traditional or indigenous structures and institutions into the colonial politico-administrative machinery. This model of colonial rule entailed the use of indigenous power structures and institutions, including local chiefs, village elders and lineage heads to discharge Colonial Government duties which included the maintenance of law and order and tax collection. British ideal of indirect rule was the natives were ruled by their leaders, and the interference of the colonial officer was to be limited to 'persuasion in all possible circumstances' given their interests had been secured. As a colonial politico-administrative strategy, indirect rule was cleverly designed to provide the 'ruled' the false impression that they were meaningfully involved in the colonial governance process, but the real power rested with the Political Officer (Akiwumi 2012: 211; Negash 1987: 107).

Within a decade of the establishment of Political Office in Sikkim, the Government of India (British) consolidated its authority in Sikkim to such an extent that it was able to meddle with liberty in essential affairs concerning the affairs of Sikkim (Rao 1972: 123). The British had created a zone of influence in Sikkim by establishing a protectorate in 1861. By 1889 British influence gradually turned into full control in foreign affairs and internal administration (Cajani 2013: 72). The period from the late 1880s to the late 1940s marked the zenith of colonial rule in

Sikkim (Khapoya 2016: 99). After White, Charles Bell became the Political Officer of Sikkim[182]. In the long array of British Political Officers, Bell was the only officer of the Raj who knew in totality the 'Tibetan mentality', and the HH Dalai Lama's Court had the highest regard for and full trust in him (Pradhan 2011/2013: 220-21).

Sikkim was subdued by the British in instalments and through stages (Desai 1948: 162). By 1889 till the end of their colonial rule in India, the British policies on administration, land economy and education demonstrate the impact of British colonialism on Sikkim (Killion 1989: 128). The subsequent section attempts to explore how the colonial administration affected the organisation and directions of the indigenous society through the control of landholding and the structure of political authority (Sodter 1991: 152). The British policies on administration, land economy and education will be assessed to demonstrate the impact of British colonialism on Sikkim during their 'indirect' rule in Sikkim. British rule initiated some of the fundamental changes in the social physiognomy of Sikkimese society, though to subserve their interest (Desai 1948: xvii). The British relation with other states in the region was structurally different from that of India as the latter was a 'colony' whereas four of the Eastern Himalayan states viz. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet were never a colony, though they were shaped profoundly by the colonialism during the nineteenth and twentieth century.

i) British Policy on Administration

White[183] reorganised the entire system of administration in Sikkim (Grover 1974: 24). After the takeover of Sikkim in 1889 the British Government established a Council, and it was said to assist Maharajah in governing the State. However, the Maharajah was deposed soon after the formation of the Council. The Council's function was to collect revenue, listen to appeals of people and to manage the day to day affairs of the state (Jha 1985: 33; Meyer 2005: 52). White was appointed as the Political Officer of Sikkim to run the administration in consultation with Maharajah and Council, but he exercised the full control over the affairs of the Council (Meyer 2005: 20; Jha 1985: 29). In 1892 the Council was composed of Phodong Lama, Khangsar Dewan, Guntok Kazi, Phurboo Dewan, Giring Dewan, Tassithing Kazi, Rheno Kazi and Shew

[182] He was a diplomat par excellence, and his Tibet Policy was followed throughout by all his successors till the independence of India.
[183] White was an officer in the Public Works Department of British Government.

Dingpen. Of these the Lama and the Phurboo Dewan were the most influential, the one acting always with his brother Kungya Dewan, the other being followed by his son Giring Dewan. It was agreed that until a purely native administration had been firmly established; it will be necessary to keep an eye on the internal administration of Sikkim. It will ensure the internal peace in Sikkim, and also a considerable effect on the frontier[184]. No record had been kept of Council's proceedings of the past two years, and the minutes of the earlier meetings could not be found in Gangtok[185].

White increased the Sikkim revenues from about Rs. 8,000 income annually to nearly a lakh[186] and significantly developed the revenues of Sikkim[187]. This income enabled White to begin instituting the development of state structures on the British model and to encourage the introduction of modernity by financing the education of Sikkimese youths in British India (McKay 2007: 88). The roads made by the State were in excellent condition. Most of them marked on the map and were the product of feet or hoofs rather than of hands. The Council dealt with all severe criminal cases[188]. He established the police department with its first police post at Aritar, Rhenock (present-day East Sikkim) (Pradhan 2011/2013: 220). Indigenous Sikkimese administration lacked in most of the structures of the modern government, and there were no police, courts, or public works and no secular education or public health system and the tax was collected in kind (McKay 2007: 87-8). There were no jails, the people having Buddhist dislike to capital punishment; the penalties were banishment, fine, and flogging. White inflicted his authority only on petty fines. The administration, in this respect, following the tradition of Sikkim, was mild; justice was secured with the least amount of individual suffering possible[189]. The various villages, towns, and districts were brought into a single politico-administrative unit (Grover 1974: 24; Desai 1948: xvii, 119).

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[184] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 2nd December 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.
[185] ibid
[186] Letter from C. R. Marindin, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated 17th December 1900, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[187] Notes and Orders, C. E. Buckland, dated 12-10-1901, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[188] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 2 December 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.
[189] ibid

The internal affairs of Sikkim went quietly well under the administration of White, and the revenue was being paid. White started a bazaar at Gangtok with few shops and tried to induce the local people to bring in supplies for the Sunday *hat* (market). As the people saw that they could sell their things at their price, they brought them more freely. There were numerous applications for land in Sikkim. After consulting with the Rajah and Council, it was agreed to encourage settlers with some fixed agreement, whether they be Lepcha, Paharia, or Bhutia[190]. Phodong Lama had so long been identified with the administration, and particularly with English influence in Sikkim that he represented the powerful clerical element to a limited extent. All initiative came from Claude White, who also controlled the more critical details; but the Council was duly consulted, and had a significant influence on the conduct of affairs, both as a body and through its two chiefs, Phodong Lama and Phurboo Dewan[191].

After Claude White became the Political Officer of Sikkim, Maharani Yeshey Dolma acknowledges in a private interview with Lady Minto, "Mr. White, Political Officer in Sikkim taught us how to collect rents, and taxes, to administer justice, and in every way improved the condition of Sikkim and shed the light of knowledge in the benighted little State" (Namgyal 1908: 140-41). It demonstrates the impact of British policy on Sikkim, the modernisation of Sikkim effectively began with the establishment of the British Political Office in Sikkim.

Through his well-calculated moves and policies, White made Sikkim a well-integrated and peaceful corner of British India (Meyer 2005: 54). The colonial administration had sufficient time to carry out in-depth institutional and social reorganisation. British Raj undertook the delineation of boundaries, introduced the bureaucratic administration and territorial centralisation promoting law and order. However, the work of colonialism as state-maker was not only confined to the demarcation of frontiers. The primary contribution of the British colonial rule was to establish a system based on capitalist principles and to establish a hierarchically

[190] Extracts from Reports by J. C. White dated 11th March 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[191] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 2nd December 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.

structured organisation in the context of a centre-periphery scheme that would engender the creation of shared identity (Novati 2005: 53-4).

British kept this region as an integrated zone of influence because of the fear that Russia would penetrate India from the Eastern Himalayan region. The British kept these states as 'colonial peripheries'. In other words, these states were made to be dependent on British India through various treaties and agreements. The remarks of Charles Bell[192] prove this intention of the British government to make these states dependent on British India. On such account, Bell states that; 'make the Tibetans economically and militarily dependent on us to just that extent that is desirable' (McKay 2009: 66). According to Alex McKay, Bell clearly states on the several occasions that he sought to make the Tibetans dependent upon the British. It was not only with Tibet but true with other peripheral Himalayan states. By 1908, the British Government had consolidated its position over Sikkim to such an extent that Government of India experienced no trouble either from the Maharajah or from the outside powers like Tibet and China (McKay 1997: 413). Claude White laid the path to economic exploitation and development in the first decade after the establishment of a political office in Sikkim (Novati 2005: 53).

ii) British Policy on Land Economy

The settlement of the land revenue was the most important work undertaken by the Council. There were eighty-one collecting units or estates. A sum of Rs. 5,000 was spent on 1892 in loans to new settlers, made through Lutchmi Narain and other respectable persons. Claude White made much better work in the name of the Council[193] and exerted himself most creditably to effect improvements[194]. White issued "*patta*," (land deed) to the ryots, translated into Tibetan and Nepalese, and also licenses for the liquor-shops at Rhenock, Pakyong and Lingtam. White collected over Rs. 3,000 alone from men who required land, and the petitions were coming in large numbers. There was no system of felling trees, and all the forests were gradually disappearing for want of cultivable land and settlements. White brought a new face to

[192] Political Officer of Sikkim after Claude White.
[193] Extracts from Reports by J. C. White 11th March 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.
[194] Letter from P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division to the Cheif Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department dated 2nd December 1892, Foreign Department, National Archives of India.

the administration by modifying the land tenure system, establishing the Forest Department and stopped the reckless destruction of valuable *sàl* forests (Pradhan 2011/2013: 220). The forest areas were scheduled to be protected, and private cultivation tracts were legally described (Meyer 2005: 52). White sent an order that no trees were to be cut without first asking the permission, he took all the *sàl* forests under the direct management of the State, to mark the trees to be felled[195].

White surveyed the lands, divided them into parcels and was instrumental in offering them to the leading families of Sikkim to manage under a well-codified land tenure system. The agriculture was developed on a large scale, primarily rice and cardamom, by using the techniques of terrace farming. The forest areas were scheduled to be protected, and private cultivation tracts were legally described (Meyer 2005: 52). He conducted land and mineral surveys and developed unoccupied wasteland, including the area occupied by the monasteries (Grover 1974: 24). The land-use changes under White were the beginnings of the gradual decline of the absolute power of the Maharajahs and Kazi aristocracy in Sikkim (Meyer 2005: 52). The feudal structure of landholding was partially replaced through the introduction of private ownership (Novati 2005: 54). White initiated a revenue-raising measure to obtain the finance necessary to create structures. A land revenue settlement was made, forestry, excise measures were introduced and, acting through the Durbar (McKay 2007: 88). He also imported apples from England in Lachung and Lachen valley in North Sikkim (Pradhan 2011/2013: 220).

iii) British Education Policy in Sikkim

The education system was widened, and the local people were educated in the English (Novati 2005: 54), schools were established by the missionaries, though their principal aim in starting these institutions was religious, these missionary organisations played an essential role in spreading modern education in Sikkim (Desai 1948: 129). Sikkimese began to receive Western education from the 1870s onwards after Christian Missionaries in Kalimpong actively sought to attract Sikkimese to schools that they had established there (McKay 2007: 219). The number of educated Sikkimese was small, and it was only after the British Government found more and more schools and with the private effort of the missionaries reinforcing this growth

[195] Extracts from Reports by J. C. White 11 March 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

that a significant class of educated Sikkimese developed (Desai 1948: 183). White started a school in Gangtok, with nine pupils who were being taught the alphabets in Tibetan, and later it was extended to other subjects[196]. The expansion of education and political liberalisation led to the effective transformation of a feudal society into modern society (Novati 2005: 55).

The aristocratic family managed to reap the maximum benefit generated by the introduction of English education in Sikkim (Aloysius 2008: 41). However, the British brought up the sons and daughters of the leading aristocratic families of Bhutia/Lepcha into English education. Since Kazis and Lamas were the indigenous aristocrats of Sikkim and by bringing up their sons and daughters into English education, the British wanted to create a section of pro-British aristocrats (Jha 1985: 50). Elites were targeted in the colonial strategy 'to persuade first elites and then citizenry to attach them to the state' (Robb 1997: 251-2). The observation made by Ranajit Guha in *Dominance without Hegemony*, 'it is a political strategy to persuade the indigenous elite to "attach" themselves to a colonial regime' (1998: 33) seems justified in case of Sikkim.

By introducing modern education in Sikkim, the British brought Sikkimese people in contact with the extensive and profound achievements of the modern West in the sphere of scientific and social scientific knowledge (Desai 1948: 126) and with the western democratic ideologies, through that education (ibid: 289). Many families were able to advance their social and economic status as a result of granting modern education (McKay 2007: 237). The introduction of modern education in Sikkim was a progressive act of British rule. It was secular in character, liberal in essence and open to all. It was the key which opened the great treasures of rationalist and democratic thought of the West (Desai 1948: 145). Its anti-authoritarian liberal note, individual liberty, social equality the essential core of modern education, and the collective progress constituted the cornerstone of the western education and its rejection of blind faith and the stress on the modern natural sciences. The first contact with modern western culture through new education was electrifying (ibid: 132-33).

However, the introduction of modern education in Sikkim was primarily motivated by the politico-administrative and economic needs of the British in Sikkim

[196] Extracts from Reports by J. C. White dated 11 March 1889, Secretariat Records Room, National Archives of Bangladesh.

(Desai 1948: 129). Sikkim was strategically important as the gateway to Tibet and beyond, as the imperial stepping-stone with their regional Political Officer resident in Gangtok, and the British inevitably became involved in the internal affairs of Sikkim (McKay 2007: 174). It was, therefore, necessary to establish schools and colleges to produce the least educated people who would assist them in the administrative apparatus of the colonial rule. The British Government entrusted the key posts in the state machinery to the British and filled the subordinate posts with educated Sikkimese (Desai 1948: 129). The Anglo-Indians held the highest position of civil surgeons and the other positions were supplied by the Sikkimese (McKay 2007: 220).

Despite the limitations and distortions of the education imparted, the fact remains that Britain by spreading modern education in Sikkim, liberal and technical, even due to its own needs, objectively played an increasing role (Desai 1948: 129). The new education was increasingly becoming a powerful politico-administrative weapon of dominance (Aloysius 2008: 41). It should be recognised and remembered that all these changes were taking place to suit the needs of various phases of British capitalism and to subserve the primary interests of the British capitalism (Desai 1948: xviii), not only the British capitalist interests but the military-strategic interests also played a significant role in these restructuration (ibid: 119). A group of prominent Englishmen, Mountstuart Elphinstone among them, also held that English education "would make the people gladly accept the British rule." Education in English, according to Mountstuart, was a 'political necessity' (ibid: 130). British colonialism was first and foremost pragmatic, intended to serve the Empire; and to this end, it was eager to go to any extent to accommodate local forces. As time elapsed, the liberal ideas began to percolate through education (Aloysius 2008: 46-8).

The British colonial education policy was intended to 'Anglicise' the native population (Killion 1989: 129). The colonial state was responsible for educational policies, but it shared responsibility for their application with the Catholic mission (Negash 1987: 66). They used Western Education to train Sikkimese as Catechists, messengers, and other positions needed to them. Moreover, merchants and traders also required qualified personnel to handle their business transactions (Mart 2011: 191). Missionaries set up health clinics and schools, they treated the sick and taught people how to stay healthy, and other methods of persuasion were applied (Khapoya 2016: 101). The hereditary aristocracy took the English education and schools were

started for the sons of chiefs and princes. It was traditionally literate class and sons of Kazis and Thikadars who took advantage of the new education (Basu 1982: 61). Concentration on the aristocratic upper and middle classes led to the neglect of mass education. The education system became top-heavy and lop-sided (Basu 1982: 65).

The schools were expected to produce educated workers. It was explained that although education was an obligation of the colonial power as part of its civilising mission, political reasons necessitated clear guidelines (Negash 1987: 69). Various missionary groups were continuing to use education as a tool for expanding religious activities and enlarging their sphere of influence (Mart 2011: 193). The education aimed to produce clerks, interpreters, and skilled workers and to impart knowledge of modern agricultural practices. Colonial education felt the necessity of providing training in recognition of the exigencies of commerce, industry and the colonial administration. Education system produced results which complicated colonial rule (Negash 1987: 80-3). British strictly pursuing the prescriptions of indirect rule, expected and maintained that educated Sikkimese should work in a subordinate position to the British officers. Sikkimese society was undergoing structural changes caused by the emergence of an articulate and educated elite (Negash 1987: 97).

There were Western model schools in Sikkim by 1890s (McKay 2007: 219). Through the close conversation of modern education with the people of Sikkim, Sikkimese people came in contact with the sphere of scientific and social scientific knowledge and with the western liberal-democratic values (Desai 1948: 126, 289). Many families were able to uplift themselves in the social ladder as a result of modern education (McKay 2007: 237). The little education they acquired opened their minds and provided them with the practical and intellectual skills they never had before (Khapoya 2016: 103). As its administrative rule expanded, the need arose for administrators (Basu 1982: 64).

One of the main items of expenditure was the high salary of English Officers, and one way of economising was to employ local subordinates. Employment of locals required being able to read, write and speak English (Basu 1982: 64). Locals were educated to meet the limited need for semi-skilled workers in colonial administration (Khapoya 2016: 102). There was an over-emphasis on the study of languages and humanities. Familiarity with English as a spoken and written language was

indispensable to success in professional life (Basu 1982: 65). However, the case of a young chief or heir to a Gadi (throne), who was being educated in England to his future duties and responsibilities as the head of the State was different. The Government decided where and how he should be brought up, under the obligation of his relatives and to the subjects of his State to see that the religious side of his education was not neglected[197].

What the colonialist said was "we want to teach natives to write, to read and to count, but not make them doctors" (Ferreira 1974: 26). The decision to introduce English education was the result of a combination of complex administrative, economic, cultural, political and religious motives. What the British wanted was a small class of educated English locals to act, in Macaulay's words, 'as interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern…' (Basu 1982: 64-5). In every case, the colonial educational policy reflected the needs of the imperial power (Basu 1982: 72). Sikkimese took Western education with zeal. There emerged political dangers to the ruling elite because of English education. It was felt that familiarity with Western ideas was breeding political discontent. English education was also a means of social mobility. Men from lower castes could raise their social status by acquiring a Western education (Basu 1982: 66).

Conclusion

Since 1850, with the interruption of 1860-61, Sikkim had been treated as substantially a portion of a British district. The single incident which marked Sikkim as an independent State was its power of levying transit duties. Even these were levied at Darjeeling under the eyes of the Deputy Commissioner. Theory and practice in imparting education did not entirely coincide, the development of the small educated stratum that played a crucial role in the political movements in Sikkim men such as Chandra Das Rai, Tashi Tshering, Raghubir Basnet and Captain Dimik Singh Lepcha. Through the slow but steady spread of western education, however, colonialism created an elite which demanded active participation and an eventual transfer of powers. It was clearly understood from the outset that an educated elite was dangerous for the maintenance of political stability, the praxis of colonial education resulted in the production of Sikkimese elites which posed challenges to the local

[197] Deputy Secretary, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, 12 June 1914.

ruling elite. The colonial rule gave lasting empowerment to non-elite indigenous groups within the new structures.

The organised political and social activity in Sikkim came forth after the inception of colonial rule in Sikkim and this outcome was made possible mainly by the accumulated changes and pressures reflecting the transformation process that Sikkimese society underwent under the British colonial rule, whether reality or invention, the state was the colonial 'artefact.' The British rule was the expression of the growing national consciousness and spread of the liberal ideas among the Sikkimese people. Modernisation began because of the penetration of the western ideas in Sikkim. After the end of colonial rule much urban growth occurred, the development of urban working class and salaried people planted the seeds of 'agitation' which sprouted as the political movements in due course. The net result of the Chogyal's rule was the growing strength of corrupt sycophants, who lined their pockets with little or no care for administrative efficiency or the wellbeing of the people.

Conclusion

This study examined the processes of State formation in Sikkim in different stages with a view on the subaltern history of Sikkim and tried to look from the perspective of subaltern people. In this study, it was found that the Orientalist traditions of colonial scholarship and the politics of knowledge about contemporary Sikkim are much more important in explaining the absence of subaltern approaches in the Sikkimese studies. This study tried to look from the below, from the perspective of the subaltern as the works carried on Sikkim have been looked from the above; from the orientalist tradition inherited from the British Raj. Orient was essentially an idea that has a history and tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that has given a form of reality. The idea in the Orient was political to some of the historical accounts. Political imperialism governs the entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions in such a way as to make its avoidance mental and historical impossibility, therefore there is an absence of subaltern studies in the Sikkimese studies largely because most of the studies carried on Sikkim followed this tradition. In the opinion of Spivak to ignore subaltern studies is to carry forward the imperialist project. Orientalist knowledge was used in the colonial administration and the subsequent scholars took up that knowledge as a harbinger to produce narratives, without questioning the validity of the same. The overtly political knowledge cannot be considered as "true" knowledge which has had been the case in the Sikkimese studies, therefore, there is a need to look the history of Sikkim through the theoretical framework which has been developed in the western theory.

And to understand the state formation process in Sikkim, it is necessary to understand the genesis of the state formation, thus this study tried to explain the genesis of state formation in Sikkim, which had started much before the establishment of Namgyal dynasty in 1642; where it was conceived and from where the idea of Sikkim as *beyul* (hidden land) began. The genesis of the formation of the state of Sikkim lies in the political discontent in the sixteenth century between the two major religious sects in Central Tibet, led by Zhigpo Lingpa and the Third Dalai Lama Sonam Gyatsho. Early sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century the rival camps displayed the flood prevention rituals and counter rituals had become the symbolic marker of the dominance in the Lhasa region. The coming up of Dalai Lama as a supreme authority with the Mongol aid in the Lhasa region, hence, the Gurus of the rival

faction had to leave Lhasa to continue their religious tradition in another part of the Himalayas. They had to choose between absorption and resistance. The state of Sikkim is the inevitable by-product of the coercive state-making project in Tibet. The effect of this state-making project created a shatter zone or flight zone to which those wishing to evade or to escape bondage fled. *Beyul* a region of refuge constituted a direct "state effect".

The persecution of a particular religious faction/sect in central Tibet and their eventual refuge in Sikkim; the narrative has created in such a way, as we saw in the sources from the seventeenth namely: *Ngadag Gyalrab (NGR), Khachod Trulpai Phodrang Demozhong su Har Sangs Gyumai Roltsi Kyi Lam Yig (LTLY)*, *Lhatsun Chenpoi Namthar Soldeb (LTNT)* and *Kunzang Nampar Gyalwa (KZNG)* that they eulogise the flight of Tibetan Lamas as some predestined divine prophecy and the idea of Sikkim as *beyul* was created, to give legitimacy to the continuance of their teachings in this part of the Himalaya. Several *beyul* (hidden lands) had been conceived and each had their guide books (*terma*). Hidden lands (*beyul*) were foreseen to serve as a refuge in degenerate times in establishing and upholding monastic establishments for those teachings.

The *beyul* from the outset had a religio-political function as a place to escape in times of persecution. *Beyul* is also grounded in the real need for places of refuge. Narratives play a fundamental role in articulating the past. Much that made Sikkim a state was conceived in Tibet. The idea that *beyul* must be opened by suitably qualified religious practitioners. This religious idea of the "opening of the *beyul*" became synonymous with the process of the formation of the state in Sikkim, as the 'opening' narrative became attached to the 'formation' narrative. Sikkim like much of the Himalaya was a shatter zone for different people fleeing from oppression (be it religious, political or personal) in other regions of Tibet and Bhutan. Perhaps *beyul* was those forest lands, rugged mountains, marshes, and inaccessibly remote zones which serve as a potential refuge for those who had reason to flee the state.

This study is of the view and consonant with the idea that the evolution of the states does not occur as a conscious effort on the part of the rulers to build a nation, but it starts with an effort to make war and survive, as by-products of the rulers' efforts to expand and survive. The warfare may be a necessary condition for the rise

of the state, but it was not the only sufficient reason. There have been wars fought in different parts of the world where states never emerged. After the enthronement of Phuntshog Namgyal, he went on to the expansion and unification of petty chiefdoms under his authority. There emerged a need to acquire more land and the war became predominantly economic, the frequency, intensity, and importance of war increased. The state-making project required a density of population, that is, itself a key resource for state-making. The Sikkimese state emerged out of a network of many small multi-ethnic independent or semi-independent proto-states mainly as the result of war and diplomacy.

A backward, naive and barbaric people are gradually incorporated into an advanced, superior, and more prosperous society and culture. As Charles Tilly says the state was formed in extraction, resistance, and settlement cycle. The Limbus and Magars were said to be among the earliest settlers of the land along with the Lepchas. In this course of unification and expansion, Phuntshog Namgyal was met with the massive resistance/rebellion. Local people resist agents of the authority who arrive to seize the demanded resources. The surplus food extracted from conquered villages through taxation, which in the aggregate attained very significant proportions went largely to support the ruler, his warriors and retainers, officials, priests, and other members of the upper class. The next phase of Sikkim statehood was characterised by the administrative and organisational structures which would secure a constant flow of revenue and provide a political structure that could be used not only to govern but to raise armies to protect the power of the Chogyal.

There were a number of competing assertions of power during the early reign of Phuntshog Namgyal by Tsongs (Limbu)*, Mons* (Lepcha or *Rong kup*) and Magars. The different ethnic groups intentionally rebelled against the rule of Phuntshog Namgyal. A massive rebellion or a war took place where *Lho pas* (Tibeto-Sikkimese) or the Bhutias became victorious and Magars rejected to be part of the agreement. It means the Magars were also the party to the resistance, and even after the pacification of the conflict did not come to terms like Lepchas and Limbus. At the end of the war, a Council was formed known as *Lho Mon Tsong Sum* where it was said a *Lhopa* should be considered as a father, Lepchas as the mother, and Limbus as the sons of the same family. This agreement is basically a legal document signed by the representatives of three communities namely; *Lho pa*, *Mon* and the *Tsong*

acknowledging the supremacy of Phuntshog Namgyal. The struggle ensued, till the settlement ended the struggle.

The course of military conquest itself brought conquerors to state powers. Then administration of conquered territories involved rulers so heavily in extraction, control, and mediation within those territories that they began simultaneously to create civilian staffs, to gather resources for military activity by means of those staffs, and thus to make the military dependent for their own livelihoods on the effectiveness of the staffs. In the process, tax granting legislatures and budget making bureaucrats gained the upper hand. In the second variant, a group of priests or merchants drew riches from their priestly or mercantile activity, staffed the higher levels of their governments with priests, merchants, or other civilians, and hired military specialists to carry out war and policing. In both versions of the subordination process, the crucial mechanisms inhibited direct military control over the supply of resources required for the reproduction of military organisation.

After the consolidation of power by the *Lho pas*, they achieved complete supremacy in terms of administration and became undisputed power in the region. Despite several skirmishes with the Gorkha Kingdom and Bhutan, their rule was never challenged. After the Gorkha-Tibet/China War (1788-92) where Sikkim lost her position and the feeling of antagonism against China/Tibet, it was only after the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-16), where Sikkim could reclaim her possession of territories ignoring the Chinese requests to keep abeyance with the British. After Sikkim coming in contact with the British, they gradually moved to increase the sphere of influence over Sikkim. Their prime motive was to open up Tibet for the trade, where Sikkim could act as a trading post. The eventual annexation of Darjeeling from Sikkim for the sake of building sanatorium for the British soldiers worsened the relationship between the two and hit the rock bottom in the subsequent years of annexation.

However, British were increasing the sphere of their influence in Sikkim and at the same time they were opening up the vistas of opportunities for those people living under the rule of Rajah. The communities that experienced domination before the advent of colonialism would view colonial rule positively. After the annexation of Darjeeling, the British developed the conditions for trade and commerce there. The

British turn the hills of Darjeeling into a commercial centre to promote tea cultivation, thus, opening the vistas of employment to the local population. The tax defaulters and debtors from Sikkim took refuge in Darjeeling hills where they got the opportunity for employment which the British referred to them as slaves. It might be possible that, after fleeing the bondage of the state, they took refuge in Darjeeling where the British refused to return them. And, after the creation of a Council in Sikkim and the appointment of White as Political Resident in Sikkim, the revenue of the State was increased from Rs. 8,000 to nearly a lakh annually. It was used in the development of state structures on the British model and the education of the Sikkimese youths was encouraged in British India. The education enabled many Sikkimese families to uplift themselves in the social ladder of Sikkimese society, which was not the case before.

A small Sunday *hat* (bazaar) was initiated and the local people were induced to bring in supplies, with few shops. Several applications for the land were received and after consulting with the Rajah and Council, it was agreed to encourage settlers with some fixed agreement. White surveyed the lands and divided them into parcels and offered them to the leading families of Sikkim under a well-codified land tenure system irrespective of any discrimination, even the land occupied by the monasteries. This led to the gradual demise in the absolute power of the Maharajah and Kazi aristocracy, and it benefited the local population at large.

After the advent of British in Sikkim, the education system was widened and the local people had an opportunity to get educated in English. A very small section of Sikkimese was getting educated before and it was only after the British Government established more and more schools and with the effort of the missionaries, the number of educated Sikkimese started growing steadily. However, the introduction of modern education in Sikkim was to serve the British interest, it, therefore, became necessary to establish more and more schools to turn out the educated people who would staff the subordinate posts in the British administration. The colonial rule gave lasting empowerment to non-elite indigenous groups and individuals within the new medical structures. Medical service was intended to win indigenous support for the British presence.

The colonial policy deliberately set out to sustain one group over others. The groups that had a dominant position before the advent of colonialism would view

colonialism negatively. They began to lose control in the administration, they were sidelined and were barred to play a direct role in the administration. The Rajah being unhappy with the workings of the Council and his acceptance in taking part in the administration as established by the British was made an essential condition of his return to the power. After three years, on November 1895, he was restored to his throne with limited power and it was assured that in a course of two or three years, the power on internal administration would be restored to the Maharajah.

During the eighteenth to mid-twentieth century, colonialism played a significant role in the growth and evolution of the states. There is no denying that Colonialism played a significant role in formulating state structures into modern society. The phenomenon of colonialism is necessary to analyse the degree to which it influenced not only the economic and political development of Sikkim but also people's perception of themselves. The British evolved the administrative apparatus in Sikkim even penetrating the remotest village in Sikkim. Sikkim was divided into several estates and the persons were appointed for the collection of rents and taxes from the villagers. The British presence in the Eastern colonies had a lasting, cataclysmic effect on the minds and societies of the East.

Modernisation began because of the penetration of the western ideas in Sikkim. The state structure was enhanced, the positive changes that came about in the realm of society and polity were largely by-products of the pursuance of the main objective of the British exploitation of the land and its people. Colonial rule made a fatal blow to the indigenous forms of feudalism and brought about the transformation of the feudal economy into a capitalist economy. The feudal structure of landholding was partially replaced through the introduction of private ownership and capitalist methods. The slow and steady penetration of the proto-capitalist structures/forces did result in the transformation of social relations and the emergence of new social forces. Thus, the feudal state built on the Tibetan hierarchy was transformed and the structure and institutions of a modern state were gradually evolved under colonial administration.

Most important for Sikkimese political development, the divisive politics of Chogyal reinforced the ethno-religious divisions among Sikkimese people. The British colonialism in India developed an Indian national consciousness; there is a

causal relationship between colonisation and the development of national consciousness. However, the divisive politics of Chogyal in the post-colonial period in Sikkim failed to develop Sikkimese national consciousness because of Chogyal's divisive politics the Sikkimese youth lacked the patriotic fervour and willingness to make sacrifices that go in Sikkim a separate state. The Nepalese had struggled against the Chogyal and the Bhutia ascendency, and it would be foolish on the part of the Nepalese youth to make common cause with the Bhutias and fight for a common cause that was aimed at restoring Bhutiya ascendency. Far from shaping a national consciousness, the Chogyal's policies produced a politically fragmented population, and this fragmentation was mirrored in the referendum on Sikkim's future political status which was held in 1975.

While trying to unravel the history of Sikkim this study leaves behind several questions which will help us in understanding the history of Sikkim in future. This study adds knowledge to the study of Sikkim. The archival sources from Rangpur/Dhaka have become relevant in this regard which was hitherto unexplored. Browsing the entire collection of the hitherto-neglected records promised to be of considerable value, as the Rangpur Collector was the main source of political and commercial information about Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet, particularly in the late eighteenth century developments. One of the critical problems with conducting historical research on Sikkim was the lack of availability of accurate and authentic records. However, with the transfer of Sikkimese Royal Palace Archives in 2008 to the custodianship of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology (NIT), Gangtok and the recent breakthrough in the East India Company archives in Bangladesh (2016) and the current The Sikkim Palace Archive Digitisation Project (2016-2017) has dramatically eased this problem.

Narratives depict most inhabitants of the ungoverned margins are not remnants of an earlier social formation left behind. With the primary source in hand, we can create a whole new narrative. The simmering of political movements in Sikkim after the independence of India and its subsequent merger with India has rendered all kinds of research about Sikkim politically sensitive. Policy makers and the political leaders choose to keep this topic in abeyance rather confront it. Decades of colonisation explains the motives of colonialism. The development in the colonial period was sufficient enough to bring about profound changes in society.

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ANNEXURE I

Lho Mon Gtsong Gsum Agreement

(1) Please take heed, Please observe, Please listen! From Dharmakāya Samanthabadra, who, from the beginning, was the protector [to] the root Guru [and] the highest dharma protectors, who have been bound by the vow are requested to form a great assembly (2) and without body, speech or mind distracted elsewhere, arise in your wrathful form and observe [this event]; and with the Male and female dharma protectors and the personal deities of the father and son, the Mchod yon and the Chos rgyal are requested to (3) form a great assembly, without your body speech or mind distracted elsewhere and having [appeared] in your wrathful form please observe [this event].

The glorious protector Māhākala, the supreme Ma ning nag po, (4) the protectors who have been motivated by the dharma and who possess the precious qualities of the Body, speech and mind; Ra hu la, the eight classes of gods and demons of the phenomenal world and without your body distracted elsewhere please [this event].

The Chos rgyal chen po, all his consorts, ministers and subjects to whom Guru Rinpoche gave his commands (5) and his retinue of the three classes of earthly gods [bdud btsan and klu], rdo rje shugs ldan, rdo rje dgra ‘dul, pe har rgyal po, the rgyal po of recent and ancient times and the eight classes of violent deities being assembled together, without body speech or mind (6) distracted elsewhere appear in wrathful form and please observe [this event].

The great treasure holder of this supreme hidden land, Mdzod lnga stag rtse, Thang lha, Ga bur Gang btsan, the twelve local goddesses, the female possessor (7) bdud lcam dral, the *sri* in this [land], the protectoress of the teachings: Ekajati, the female guardians, the guardians of the middle valley [of] Dpa’ bo hūm ri and the hundred thousand armies of Lha, btsan, bdud and klu (8) may also appear in their wrathful form and without their body speech or mind distracted elsewhere, please observe [this event].

The guardian deities of Sgrub sde gsang sngags rdo rje ldan holding the lineage of Rdzogs pa chen po, (9) the armies of bdud, btsan and klu residing in the mountains, valleys, trees, rocks, lands and pastures. The guardian deities and treasure holders of Theg chog yang rtse, Padma yang rtse, Rab ldan rtse [sic], Brag dkar bkar shis sdings and so forth (10) should assemble together, in this hidden land of Guru Rinpoche, in their wrathful forms and observe [this event].

All the deities and guardians worshiped by us the people of four parts of Bkra shis steng kha, and all the districts [of this land such as] 'Bar spungs,
(11) Ling dam, and the protector deities and patrons f the religions of the Gtsong and Mon without their minds distracted elsewhere, please observe [this event].

Henceforth conforming to the command of his majesty, the humble (12) ministers and leaders of Lho, Mon and Gtsong have met here with the desire for unification and solidarity and hereby make the statement that there shall not be separate governments of Lho, Mon or Gtsong.

During the previous Mon pa war (13) [people] from all the different ethnic groups intentionally rebelled and this has been remembered. Henceforth from this year of the Water Hare year take the hold [of this order] and in accordance with the orders of the Lord the Chos rgyal [lit. The lord who is the aggregate of the mchod yon, father and son] laid down the affirmation and grasped the solution [unclear text] and so the humble and dedicated minister Dag shar [affixed his] seal.

The eight clans of the Tibeto-Sikkimese (14) and the [people] of the Lho Mon and Gtsong will have come to those people who are united.

If [the Lho Mon and Gtsong cause] misery from the exterior to come within and the unregistered enemies, (15) who do not abide by this agreement, cause the disturbance of the exterior to come into Sikkim and oppose the dharma etc the Lho Mon Gtsong will act from the point of view of a single government. The actual deities [as mentioned above] will see the truth (16) and appear in their wrathful form and shout Hūm phat and they will see, and they are requested to eat the flesh, blood and heart etc without delaying for a

year, month or day and cause them to be overcome with madness. (17) Kha ram Kha yi!

The Lho Mon Gtsong, who are without separate government, should respect what is contained within this document and respect the deities mentioned in accordance with the command. (18) [If] the humble ministers fulfil this statement and [act] in accordance with the wishes and intent of the Chos rgyal and serve whatever arises (whether peaceful, physical or war) and (19) also fully serve in accordance to the single unity [of this land], whenever need arises; The above mentioned deities will see this and are requested to bestow upon those longevity, wealth and glorious merit [i.e. those who fulfil the obligations of this agreement] like the waxing moon.

(20) In particular if this agreement is broken it will be done like this. Having followed the unofficial rules [i.e. rules which are not sanctioned by the government], if anyone from the Lho Mon or Gtsong follow the illegal laws or act in this way, whoever they are (21) will, if they have the ability to pay three measures of gold to the legal official, be released from the violation, otherwise the punishment [for breaking this law] is death or [in the case of]] small [violations] physical torture. With no doubt at all, each individual must keep this in their mind!

The representatives have signed and affixed their seals in accordance with this agreement.

(22) The seal of the Sikkimese Minister Gra shar [Tibeto-Sikkimese]; The seal of the leader of Bkra shis steng kha, the chamberlain [Gron] Bde chen rnam rgyal [probably Tibeto-Sikkimese though the people of Bkra shis steng kha are in fact Lepcha]; The seal of the leader the representative, Rdo leg. (23) The seal of Bstan chos from Ling dam [Tibeto-Sikkimese], the seal of the representative Chos ‘grug [sic]; The seal of the representative ‘Gu ru [sic], from ‘Grang sdod; The seal of Snag po the representative of Bod ‘grong; The seal of ‘Bang sha hi from the Gtsong shu spu [Limbu clan name]; The seal of the Limbu ‘Yug shugs.

(24) The seal of Mo nang; The seal of Brtsa ltas; The seal of Sig brtse; The seal of Spo ging; The seal of Ma brtse rta; The seal of La ‘thung; The seal of

Tha pha Ku ‘dis [Limbu]; The seal of the Sde she hang [Limbu]; The seal of Mig yam; The seal of A dzam [probably Lepcha]; The seal of Mo ldan pa [Lepcha]; The seal of Pad kha. (25) The seal of ‘Bo lo ‘bir [Limbu]; The seal of Rta sa A rgod of Ra thong chu; The seal of Rta sa Shu phang of Ring ‘bigs chung [sic. Should read chu]; The seal of Rta pa [sic] mgon sba bus, who was summoned from Ga lad chung [sic]; (26) The seal of Pad lo.

Thus on the [x] day of the [x] month of the water hare year, In the marvellous new house of Sikkim [this agreement] was made.

ANNEXURE II

Treaty between the Raja of Sikkim and Government of India, 10 February 1817

TREATY, COVENANT, or AGREEMENT entered into by CAPTAIN BARRE LATTER, AGENT on the part of HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONORABLE the EARL of MOIRA, K.G., GOVERNOR-GENERAL, &c., &c., &c., &c., and by NAZIR CHAINA TENJIN and MACHA TEINBAH and LAMA DUCHIM LONGDOO, Deputies on the part of the RAJAH Of SIKKIMPUTTEE, being severally authorized and duly appointed for the above purposes, 1817.

ARTICLE 1.

The Honorable East India Company cedes, transfers, and makes over in full sovereignty to the Sikkimputtee Rajah, his heirs or successors, all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the eastward of the Mechi River and to the westward of the Teesta River, formerly possessed and occupied by the Rajah of Nepaul, but ceded to the Honorable East India Company by the Treaty of peace signed at Segoulee.

ARTICLE 2.

The Sikkimputtee Rajah engages for himself and successors to abstain from any acts of aggression or hostility against the Goorkhas or any other State.

ARTICLE 3.

That he will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between his subjects and those of Nepaul, or any other neighbouring State, and to abide by the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 4.

He engages for himself and successors to join the British Troops with the whole of his Military Force when employed within the Hills, and in general to afford the British Troops every aid and facility in his power.

ARTICLE 5.

That he will not permit any British subject, nor the subject of any European and American State, to reside within his dominions, without the permission of the English Government.

ARTICLE 6.

'That he will immediately seize and deliver up any dacoits or notorious offenders that may take refuge within his territories.

ARTICLE 7.

That he will not afford protection to any defaulters of revenue or other delinquents when demanded by the British Government through their accredited Agents.

ARTICLE 8.

That he will afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company's Provinces, and he engages that no duties shall be levied on the transit of merchandise beyond the established custom at the several golahs or marts.

ARTICLE 9.

The Honorable East India Company guarantees to the Sikkimputtee Rajah and his successors the full and peaceable possession of the tract of hill country specified in the first Article of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 10.

This Treaty shall be ratified and exchanged by the Sikkimputtee Rajah within one month
from the present date, and the counterpart, when confirmed by His Excellency the Right
Honorable the Governor-General, shall be transmitted to the Rajah.

Done at Titalya, this 10th day of February 1817, answering to the 9th of Phagoon 1873 Sumbut, and to the 30th of Maugh 1223 Bengallie.

BARRE LATTER.

NAZIR CHAINA TINJIN.

MACHA TIMBAH.

LAMA DUCHIM LONGADOC.

MOIRA.

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

ARCHD. SETON.

GEO. DOWDESWELL.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, at Fort William, this fifteenth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen.

J. ADAM,

Acting Chief Secy. to Govt.

ANNEXURE III

TREATY OF SUGAULI, 2ND DECEMBER 1815 BETWEEN EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE COUNTRY OF NEPAL

TREATY of PEACE between the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND MAHARAJAH BIRKRAM SAH, Rajah of Nipal, settled between LIEUTENANT – COLONEL BRADSHAW on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS, EARL of MOIRA, KNIGHT of the MOST NOBLE ORDER of the GARTER, one of HIS MAJESTY's MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by SREE GOOROO GUJRAJ MISSER and CHUNDER SEEKUR OPEDEEA on the part of MAHA RAJAH GIRMAUN JODE BIKRAM SAH BAHAUDER, SHUMSHEER JUNG, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nipal, 2nd December 1815.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two States, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon:

ARTICLE I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE II

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two States before the war, and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

ARTICLE III

The Rajah of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company in perpetuity all the under-mentioned territories, viz-

First: – The whole of the low lands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti.

Secondly: – The whole of the low lands between the Rapti and the Gunduck. Third: The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and Coosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourth: All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.

Fifth: All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarcote leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and nagerr. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gurkha troops within forty days form this date.

ARTICLE IV

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such Chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunnuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-General for the pensions respectively.

ARTICLE V

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

ARTICLE VI

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest to disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any difference shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government by which award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.

ARTICLE VII

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE VIII

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

ARTICLE IX

This treaty, consisting of nine Articles, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver the ratification of the Governor-General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segowlee, on the 2nd day of December 1815.

PARIS BRADSHAW, Lt. Col., P.A.

Received this treaty from Chunder Seekur Opedeea, Agent on the part of the Rajah Nipal, in the valley of Muckwaunpoor, at half-past two o'clock p.m. on the 4th of March
1816, and delivered to him the Counterpart Treaty on behalf of the British Government.

D.D. OCHTERLONY,

Agent, Governor-General.

ANNEXURE IV

Deed ceding Darjeeling to the English, 1 February 1835

TRANSLATION of the DEED of GRANT making over DARJEELING to the EAST INDIA COMPANY, dated 29th Maugh, Sumbut 1891, A.D., 1st February 1835. The Governor-General having expressed his desire for the possession of the Hill of Darjeeling, on account of its cool climate, for the purpose of enabling the servants of his Government, suffering from sickness, to avail themselves of its advantages, I, the Sikkimputtee Rajah, out of friendship to the said Governor-General, hereby present Darjeeling to the East India Company, that is, all the land south of the Great Runjeet River, east of the Balasur, Kahail, and Little Runjeet Rivers, and west of the Rungno and Mahanuddi Rivers.

A. CAMPBELL,

Superintendent of Darjeeling,

and in charge of Political relations with Sikkim.

Seal of the Rajah prefixed to the document.

ANNEXURE V

Treaty of Tumlong 1861

Treaty, Covenant or Agreement entered into by the Hon`ble Ashley Eden, envoy and special Commissioner on the part of the British Government, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Hon`ble Charles, Earl Canning, Governor-General in Council, and by His Highness Sekeong Kuzoo, Maharajah of Sikkim on his own part, 1861.

Whereas the continued depredation and misconduct of the officers and subjects of the Maharajan of Sikkim, and the neglect of the Maharajah to afford satisfaction for the misdeeds of his people have resulted in an interruption for many years past of the harmony which previously existed between the British Government and the Government of Sikkim, and have led ultimately to the invasion and conquest of Sikkim by a British force, and whereas the Maharajah of Sikkim has now expressed his sincere regret for the misconduct of his servants and subjects, his determination to do all in his power to obviate future misunderstanding and his desire to be again admitted into friendship and alliance with the British Government, it is hereby agreed as follows.

Article I

All previous Treaties made between the British Government and the Sikkim Government are hereby formally cancelled.

Article II

The whole of the Sikkim territory now in the occupation of British forces is restored to the Maharajah of Sikkim, and there shall henceforth be peace and amity between the two states.

Article III

The Maharajah of Sikkim undertakes, so far as is within his power, to restore within one month from the date of signing this Treaty, all public property which was abandoned by the detachment of British troops at Rinchenpong.

Article IV

In indemnification of the expenses incurred in 1860 by the British Government in occupying portion of the territory of Sikkim as a means of enforcing just claim's which had been evaded by the Government of Sikkim, and as compensation to the British subjects who were pillaged and kidnapped by subjects of Sikkim, tile Sikkim Government agrees to pay to the British authorities at Darjeeling the sum of 7000 (seven thousand) rupees in the following instalments, that is to say:

May 1st, 1861 Rs.l000.

Nov 1st, 1861 Rs.3000.

May 1st, 1862 Rs.3000.

As security for the due payment of this amount, it is further agreed that in the event of any of these instalments not being duly paid on the date appointed the Government of Sikkim shall makeover to the British government that portion of its territory bounded on the south by the river Rummam, on the east by the great Runjeet river, on the north by a line from the Great Runjeet to the Singaleelah Range, including the monasteries of Tassiding, Pemonchi, and changacheling, and on the west by the Singaleelah Mountain Range, and the British Government shall retain possession of this territory and collect the revenue thereof, until the full amount, with all expenses of occupation and collection, and interest at 6 per cent annum, are realized.

Article V

The Government of Sikkim engages that its subjects shall never again commit depredations on British territory, or kidnap or otherwise molest British subjects. In the event of any such depredation or kidnapping taking place, the Government of Sikkim undertakes to deliver up all persons engaged in such malpractice, as well a the Sirdars or other chiefs conniving at or benefiting thereby.

Article VI

The Government of Sikkim will at all times seize and deliver up any criminals, Defeaters, or other delinquents who may have taken refuge within Its territory, on demand being duly made in writing by the British government through their accredited agents. Should any delay occur in complying with such demand, the police

of the British Government may follow the person whose surrender has been demanded into any part of the Sikkim territory and shall, on showing a warrant, duly signed by the British agent, receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution of their object from the Sikkim officers.

Article VII

In as much as the late misunderstandings between the two Governments have been mainly fomented by the acts of the ex-Dewan Namguay, the Government of Sikkim engages that neither the said Namguay, nor any of his blood relations, shall ever again be allowed to set foot in Sikkim, or to take part in the councils of, or hold any office under, the Maharajah or any of the Maharajah's family at Choombi.

Article VIII

The Government of Sikkim from this date abolishes all restrictions on travelers and monopolies in trade between the British territories and Sikkim. There shall henceforth be a free reciprocal intercourse, and full liberty of commerce between the subjects of both countries; it shall be lawful for British subjects to go into any part of Sikkim for the purpose of navel or trade, and the subjects of all countries shall be permitted to reside in and pass through Sikkim, and to expose their goods for sale at any place and in any manner that may best suit their purpose, Without any interference whatever, except as is hereinafter provided.

Article IX

The Government of Sikkim engages to afford protection to all travellers, merchants or traders of all countries, whether residing in, trading in, or passing through Sikkim. If any merchant, traveller or trader, being a European British subject, shall commit any offence contrary to the laws of Sikkim, such person shall be punished by the representative of the British Government resident at Darjeeling, and the Sikkim Government will at once deliver such offender over to the British authorities for this purpose, and will on no account, detain such offender in Sikkim on any pretext or pretence whatever. All other British subjects residing in the country to be liable to the laws of Sikkim; but such persons shall, on no account, be punished with the loss of limb, or maiming or torture and every case of punishment of a British subject shall be at once reported to Darjeeling.

Article X

No duties or fees of any sort shall be demanded by the Sikkim Government of any person or persons on account of goods exported into the British territories from Sikkim, or imported into Sikkim from the British territories.

Article XI

On all goods passing into or out of Tibet, Bhootan, or Nepal, the Government of Sikkim may levy a duty of customs according to such a scale as may, from time to time, be determined and published without reference to the destination of goods, provided, however, that such duty shall, on no account, exceed 5 per cent on the value of goods at the time and place of the levy of duty. On the payment of the duty aforesaid, a pass shall be given exempting such goods from liability to further payment on any account whatever.

Article XII

With the view to protect the Government of Sikkim from fraud on account of Undervaluation for assessment of duty, it is agreed that the customs officers shall have the option of taking over for the Government any goods at the value affixed on them by the owner.

Article XIII

In the event of the British Government desiring to open out a road through Sikkim, with the view of encouraging trade, the Sikkim Government will raise no objection thereto and will afford every protection and aid to the party engaged in the work. If a road is constructed, the Government of Sikkim undertakes to keep it in repair and to erect and maintain suitable travellers' rest-houses throughout its route.

Article XIV

If the British Government desires to make either a topographical or geological survey of Sikkim, the Sikkim Government will raise no objection to this being done and will afford protection and assistance to the officers employed in this duty.

Article XV

In as much as many of the late misunderstandings have had a foundation in the custom which exists in Sikkim of dealing in slaves, the Government of Sikkim binds itself, from this date, to punish severely any person trafficking in human beings, or seizing persons for the purpose of using them as slaves.

Article XVI

Henceforth the subjects of Sikkim may transport themselves without let or hi 1dranceto any country to which they may wish to remove. In the same way the Government of Sikkim has authority to permit the subjects of other countries, not being criminals or defaulters, to take refuge in Sikkim.

Article XVII

The Government of Sikkim engages to abstain from any act of aggression or hostility against any of the neighbouring states which are allies of the British Government. If any disputes or questions arise between the people of Sikkim and those of neighbouring states, such disputes or questions shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, and the Sikkim Government agrees to abide by the decision of the British Government.

Article XIX

The whole military force of Sikkim shall join and afford every aid and facility to British Troops when employed in the Hills.

Article XIX

The Government of Sikkim will not cede or lease any portion of its territory to any other state without the permission of the British Government.

Article XX

The Government of Sikkim engages that no armed force belonging to any other country shall pass through Sikkim without the sanction of the British Government.

Article XXI

Seven of the criminals, whose surrender was demanded by the British Government, having fled from Sikkim and taken refuge in Bhootan, the Government of Sikkim

engages to do all in its power to obtain the delivery of those persons from the Bhootan Government, and in the event of any of these men again returning to Sikkim, the Sikkim Government binds itself to seize them and to make them over to the British Authorities at Darjeeling without delay.

Article XXII

With a view to the establishment of an efficient Government in Sikkim, and to the better maintenance of friendly relations with the British Government, the Maharajah of Sikkim agrees to remove the seat of his Government from Tibet to Sikkim, and reside there for nine months in the year. It is further agreed that a Vakeel shall be accredited by the Sikkim Government, who shall reside permanently at Darjeeling.

Article XXIII

This Treaty, consisting of twenty-three articles, being settled and concluded by the Honorable Ashley Eden, British Envoy, and His Highness Sekeong Kuzoo Sikkimputee, Maharajah, at Tumlong, this 28th day of March 1861, corresponding with 17 Dao Neeepoo 61, Mr. Eden has delivered to the Maharajaha copy of the same in English, with translation in Nagri and Bhootiah, under the seal arid signature of the said Honourable Asley Eden and His Highness the Sikkimputtee Maharajah, and the Sikkimputtee maharajah has in like manner delivered to said Hon'ble Asley Eden another copy also n English, with translation In Nagn and Bhoonsh, bearing the seal of His Highness and the said Hon'ble Asley Eden. The Envoy engages to procure the delivery to highness, Within Six weeks from this date, of a copy of this Treaty, duly ratifies by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council and this treaty

Shall in the meantime be in full force.

Seal)

Sd) **(Sd)**

Sekrong Kuzoo Sikkimputtee **Asley Edan,**

Envoy

Sd)

(Sd)

Canning (Seal)

Ratified by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Calcutta on the Sixteenth day of Apn1 1861.

(Sd)

C.U. Aitcheson

Under Secretary to the Government of India.

ANNEXURE VI

Convention of 4 March 17th 1890
between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet
(Ratification exchanged at London, August 27th, 1890)

[English Text]

WHEREAS Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, his Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.L, G.C.M.G., G.M.LE., Marquees of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India; And His Majesty the Emperor of China, his Excellency Sheng Tai, lmperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor; Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:-

I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.

II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of tile British Government neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggressions from their respective sides of the frontier.

IV. The questions of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.

VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof. In witness whereof, the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1890, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 27th day of the second moon of the 16th year of Kuang Hsu.

LANSDOWNE
Signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

ANNEXURE VII

(D

No. 777 /E.

From

C. A. Bell, Esquire, C. M. G.,
Political Officer in Sikkim,

To

His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim,

GANGTOK.

Dated Gangtok, the 27th March 1916.

Your Highness,

I have the honour to inform Your Highness that the Government of India have authorised me to make over to Your Highness the control of the following Departments of the Sikkim State, with effect from the 1st April 1916, namely:-

(a) Excise
(b) Income tax
(c) Police
(d) Jail and
(e) Judicial and revenue Stamps.

I am,

Your Highness's sincere friend,

Sd/- C. A. Bell,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

R. R. No. 246
Date 29/3/16 Memo No. 778 /E.
File No.
Collection

The Superintenednt, Sikkim State, Gangtok.

Gangtok 29th March 1916

Copy forwarded for information.
Postage Jamadar
for Political Officer in Sikkim

ANNEXURE VIII

POLITICAL OFFICER SIKKIM

P.R. No. 773 G.B.
9-10/7/19

THE RESIDENCY,
GANGTOK,
SIKKIM.

the 9th July, 1919.

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

The Government of India have suggested to Local Governments that the 19th July should be notified as a public holiday, this being the date fixed for the Peace Celebrations in England. As the hot weather is unsuitable for celebrations in India the general celebrations will take place in India next cold weather but it is thought that the actual signing of the peace treaty should not pass unnoticed in India. The public holiday on the 19th July is therefore being arranged and I am notifying it for my own offices and subordinate offices. Flags will be flown and such other methods adopted as may be suitable to indicate that the day is one of public rejoicing. The Government of India have suggested to Local Governments the advisability of arranging at all principal centres throughout each province of all officials and as many as possible of the non-official population to whom the peace terms in connection with Germany would be publicly summarized by the head of the district or other chief local civil authority. I should like to arrange

THE RESIDENCY,
GANGTOK,
SIKKIM.

that any non-officials ~~you~~ who care to do so may be present at the meeting which I propose to hold for Government servants on the 19th July as the Government of India think it desirable that the nature of the peace terms imposed on Germany should be made known as widely as possible.

The weather makes it unlikely that an outdoor meeting can be arranged and so I propose to hold the meeting in one of the vacant barracks as being perhaps the largest room available. I shall be grateful for Your Highness's cooperation in letting the general public know that the meeting is open to all and hope to have an opportunity of discussing details at an early date.

I remain,
Yours very sincerely,
W. Campbell

His Highness
Maharaja Tashi Namgyal, C.I.E.,
Maharaja of Sikkim,
The Palace,
Gangtok.

ANNEXURE IX

SIKKIM STATE.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

****

No. 919/G.B.,

From

The SECRETARY to

HIS HIGHNESS the MAHARAJA of SIKKIM.

To

Barmiak Lama.

G a n g t o k.

Dated Gangtok, Sikkim, the 3rd July, 1919.

In view of the signing of the Peace Treaty between the Allies and Germany, His Highness the Maharaja has ordered that special Peace prayers in all the monasteries in Sikkim should be repeated for three days that the coming year of Peace may ever be happy and prosperous.

DTC.

Secretary to

His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim.

3/7/19

ANNEXURE X

To

His Highness Maharaja Tashi Namgyal, C.I.E.,
Maharaja of Sikkim.

My Esteemed Friend,

Your Highness has no doubt seen the Royal Proclamation of His Majesty the King Emperor dated the 18th August, 1920, which concludes with the following gracious words :

"Although it has not pleased Providence that OUR DEAR SON should carry OUR GREETINGS on this occasion, We shall send in his stead OUR UNCLE, HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT to inaugurate on OUR behalf the Chamber of Princes ....., to take part in other ceremonies which he would have performed, and to convey to the Princes and peoples of India the messages which it had been OUR hope to entrust to him".

In accordance with the message of His Majesty the King Emperor I invite Your Highness to be present at Delhi on the occasion of the ceremony of the inauguration of the Chamber of Princes to be held at the Diwan-i-Am on the 8th of February 1921.

I remain, with much consideration,
Your Highness' sincere friend,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Delhi :
The 22nd November 1920.

ANNEXURE XI

" The Palace "

Gangtok, Sikkim.

The 9th October, 1920.

My Friend,

I send you, for your information, a post copy of my telegram of today's date respecting my going to Delhi to attend the inauguration ceremony of the "Chamber "of Princes".

I shall write more fully, if need be, later. I am confined to my room, but am very glad to say that at last there is marked improvement. Thanks to kindly aid from local helpers.

Yours very sincerely,

O/C.

Maharaja of Sikkim.

To,

C. A. Bell, Esquire., C.M.G., C.I.E.,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

ANNEXURE XII

VICEREGAL LODGE,
SIMLA.

9th May 1919.

My Friend,

I greatly regret to inform Your Highness that the Amir Amanulla has, without warning and without provocation, moved troops to the Indian frontier and has committed acts of hostility which render inevitable a collision between our forces and those of Afghanistan.

I enclose for Your Highness' information a copy of the official announcement which has been issued on the subject. From this it will be seen that after the assassination of the late Amir Habibulla, his third son Amanulla Khan seized the throne, and with the enforced approval of an assembly of elders and notables, specially convened for the purpose, condemned to death Colonel Ali Raza, the supposed murderer, and imprisoned for life Sardar Nasrulla Khan, the brother of the late Ruler. The suspicion soon grew, however, that the real assassins had escaped and that innocent persons had been made to suffer in their stead. The occupants of high offices, and even Amanulla himself, were suspected of complicity in the crime, and discontent and disaffection appear to have spread rapidly through the State. As Amanulla's position became more and more insecure, he evidently resolved, like many another Ruler in similar case, to lead his people into war in order to divert their thoughts from internal affairs, and in the hope that victory might unite them in allegiance to him.

In making this wanton and audacious attack upon India, the Amir is guilty of the basest ingratitude because, as the world knows, the Government of India have given constant and generous proofs of their friendship towards his country. Amanulla's insensate policy contrasts deplorably with the wisdom and statesmanship which characterised Habibulla's reign, and it will sooner or later be condemned by all sober and right-minded people in the State.

We are fully prepared to meet the attack, since we possess overwhelming superiority in the materials of war, such as artillery, machine guns, aeroplanes and transport, while our troops are numerous and well trained and ample reserves are at our disposal from the recent theatres of war, should they be required. We therefore have every hope that, if the conflict must occur, victory will be speedy.

To the many Muslims, both in British India and the States, the outbreak of war with a neighbouring Muslim power must necessarily be a matter of distress. They will learn however from the terms of the public announcement that the quarrel was unsought and unprovoked by us, and I am convinced that, true to their splendid traditions, they will remain firm in their devotion to the British Government, which has brought peace and prosperity to them and to the other peoples of India.

I need hardly ask that Your Highness will do all that lies in your power to guide and encourage your Muslim subjects at this moment.

Further, we must anticipate that, both in British India and in the States, a war on the frontier may swell the forces of disorder, since to ill-balanced minds it will appear to afford an opportunity for rejecting restraints

which are imposed in the interests of order and good government. For this reason it is necessary to watch closely the activities of persons who may be bent on creating excitement and trouble, and to be prepared with measures for the prevention or suppression of any agitation or disturbance that may manifest itself.

In all these matters I feel assured that I can place full reliance, as in the past, on Your Highness' utmost support and co-operation during the period of stress which may lie before us.

I remain,

Your Highness' sincere friend,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

To

His Highness Maharaja Tashi Namgyal, C.I.E.,

Maharaja of Sikkim.

ANNEXURE XIII

THE PALACE,
Gangtok,
The 18th May 1919.

My friend,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's favour of the 9th May 1919 and to express my surprise at hearing of the audacity shown in the unprovoked act of hostility on the part of the Amir of Afghanistan.

I however feel quite sure that he will soon be brought to his senses and compelled to see the folly of the step he has presumed to take against the India Government.

I beg to assure Your Excellency of the firm faith and loyalty of my little State and of my own sincere allegiance to the King Emperor and my readiness to do my best.

The number of Muslim subjects in my little State is so small that I am sure to be able to prevent them from creating any trouble.

I Subscribe myself,
Your Excellency's Sincere friend,

T. Namgyal

MAHARAJA of SIKKIM.

ANNEXURE XIV

Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950

The president of India and His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim being desirous of further strengthening the good relations already existing between India and Sikkim have resolved to enter into a new treaty with each other and the President of India has for the purpose appointed as his plenipotentiary Shri Harishwar Dayal, Political Officer in Sikkim and His Highness the Maharaja having examined Hariswar Dayal's credentials and found them good and in due form the two have agreed as follows:

Article I

All previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim, which are at present in force as between India and Sikkim, are hereby formally cancelled.

Article II

Sikkim shall continue to be a protectorate of India and subject to the provisions of this, Treaty shall enjoy autonomy m regards to Its Internal affairs.

Article III

1. The Government of India will be responsible for the defense and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defense of Sikkim and security of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.

2. The measures referred to in Para 1 will as far as possible be taken by the Government of India in consultation with the Government of Sikkim.

3. The Government of Sikkim shall not import any arms ammunitions, military sores or stores other warlike materials of any description for any purpose whatsoever without the previous consent of the Government of India.

Article IV

1. The external relations of Sikkim whether political, economic or financial shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.

2. Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign countries shall be treated as Indian protected for the purpose of passports and shall receive from Indian representatives abroad the same protections and facilities as Indian nationals.

Article 1V

The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy any import duty, transit duty or other imports on the goods brought into, or in transit through Sikkim, and the Government of India agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.

Article VI

1. The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in their constructions, maintenance and protection.

2. The Government of Sikkim may, however, construct maintain and: regulate the use of railways and aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities to such extent as may be agreed to by the Government of India.

3. The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain in Sikkim the roads for strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving communications with India and other adjoining countries; and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in the construction, maintenance and protection of such roads.

Article VII

1. Subjects of Sikkim shall have the right of entry into and free movement within India, and Indian nationals shall have the right of entry into and free movement within Sikkim.

2. 'Subject to such regulations as the Government of Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government of India, Indian nationals shall have:

(a) The right to carry on trade and commerce in Sikkim; and

(b) When established in any trade in Sikkim, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of any property, movable or immovable, for the purposes of their trade or residence in Sikkim.

3. Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same right;

(i) To carry on trade and commerce in India, and to employment therein; and

(ii) Of acquiring, holding and disposing of property, movable and immovable as Indian nationals.

Article VIII

1. Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject to the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within India shall be subject to the laws of India.

2. Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated in Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in the service of Government of India or any foreigner, the Government of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative of the Government of India in Sikkim (hereinafter referred to as the Indian Representative) with particulars of the charges against such person.

In the case of any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner it is so demanded by the Indian Representative, such person shall be handed over to him for trial before such courts as may be established for the purpose by the Government of India either in Sikkim or outside.

Article IX

1. The Government of Sikkim agree to seize and deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim who has taken refuge therein on demand being made by the Indian Representative. Should any delay occur in complying with such demand, the Indian Police may follow the person whose surrender has been demanded into any part of Sikkim, and shall on showing a warrant signed by the Indian Representative, receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution of their object from the Sikkim Officers.

2. The Government of India similarly agrees, on demand being made by the Government of Sikkim, to take extradition proceeding against and surrender, any fugitive offender from Sikkim who has taken refuge in the territory of India.

3. In this article, "fugitive offender" means a person who is accused of having committed an extradition offence as defined in the First Schedule b the Indian Extradition act 1903 or any other offence which may hereafter be agreed upon between the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim as being an extradition offence.

Article X

The Government of India, having in mind the friendly relations already existing between India and Sikkim and now further strengthened by this Treaty, and being desirous of assisting in the development and good administration of Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government of Sikkim a sum of rupees three lakhs every year so long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim. The first payment under this article will be made before the end of the year 1950 and subsequent payments will be made in the month of August every year.

Article XI

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.

Article XII

If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred to the Chief Justice of India whose decision therein shall be final.

Article XIII

This Treaty shall come into force without ratification from the date of signature by both the parties.

Done in duplicate at Gangtok on this 5th day of December 1950.

(Sd)	**(Sd)**
HARISHWARDAYAL	**TASHNAMGYAL**
Political Officer in Sikkim	**His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim**

ANNEXURE XV

Agreement Between

The Government of India, The Chogyal of Sikkim

And

The leaders of the political parties of Sikkim

May 8, 1973

Whereas the Chogyal and the people of Sikkim are convinced that their interest and the long-term interest of Sikkim as a whole call for:

(i) the establishment of a fully responsible government in Sikkim with more democratic constitution, the guarantee of fundamental rights, the rule of law and an independent judiciary, and greater legislative and executive powers for the elected representatives of the people;

(ii) a system of elections based on adult suffrage which will give equitable representation to all sections of the people on the basis of the principle of one man one vote;

(iii) the strengthening of Indo-Sikkim co-operation and inter-relationship; and Whereas the Chogyal as well as the representatives of the people had requested the Government of India:

(i) to take responsibility for the establishment of law and order and good administration in Sikkim following the breakdown of all three;

(ii) to ensure the further development of constitutional government, communal harmony, good administration and rapid economic and social development in Sikkim;

(iii) to provide the head of administration (Chief Executive) in Sikkim to help achieve and to safeguard all the above needs and objectives;
And whereas the Government of India have agreed to discharge the responsibilities hereby renewed to them;
Now, Therefore, the Government of India, the Chogyal of Sikkim and the leaders of the political parties of Sikkim,

Have Agreed as follows:

1. The three hereby recognise and undertake to ensure the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Sikkim. The people of Sikkim will enjoy the right of election on the basis of adult suffrage to give effect to the principle of one man one vote.
2. There shall be an Assembly in Sikkim. The Assembly shall be elected every four years. Elections shall be fair and free, and shall be conducted under the supervision of a representative of the Election Commission of India, who shall be appointed for the purpose by the Government of Sikkim.
3. (1) In accordance with this agreement, the Assembly shall have power to propose laws and adopt resolutions for the welfare of the people of Sikkim on any of the matters enumerated herein below, namely:-
   - (i) Education
   - (ii) Public Health
   - (iii) Excise
   - (iv) Press and Publicity
   - (v) Transport
   - (vi) Bazars
   - (vii) Forests
   - (viii) Public Works
   - (ix) Agriculture
   - (x) Food Supplies
   - (xi) Economic and Social Planning, including State Enterprises
   - (xii) Home and Establishment
   - (xiii) Finance
   - (xiv) Land Revenue

   (2) The Assembly shall not discuss or ask questions on the following:

   (a) The Chogyal and the members of the ruling family;

   (b) Any matter pending before the court of law;

(c) The appointment of Chief Executive and members of the Judiciary; and

(d) Any matter which concerns the responsibilities of the Government of India under this Agreement, or under any other agreement between India and Sikkim.

4. There shall be an Executive Council consisting of elected members of the Assembly who shall be appointed to the Executive Council by the Chogyal on the advice of the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive will preside over the meetings of the Executive Council.

5. The system of election shall be so organised as to make the Assembly adequately representative of the various sections of the population. The size and composition of the Assembly and the Executive Council shall be such as may be prescribed from time to time, care being taken to ensure that no single section of the population acquires a dominating position due mainly to its ethnic origin and that the rights and interests of the Sikkimese of Bhutiya Lepcha origin and of the Sikkimese of Nepali, which included Tsong and Scheduled Castes, origin are protected.

6. The Chogyal shall perform the functions of his high office in accordance with the constitution of Sikkim as set out in this Agreement.

7. To head the administration in Sikkim there shall be a Chief Executive, who shall be appointed by the Chogyal on the nomination of the Government of India.

8. The Chief Executive shall have all the powers necessary for the discharge of his functions and responsibilities, and shall exercise his powers in the following manner:

(i) With respect to matters allocated to a member of the Executive Council, he shall act in consultation with the member to whom administrative functions in this regard have been allocated.

(ii) He shall submit all important matters to the Chogyal for his information and for his approval of the action proposed to be taken, except where immediate action is required. In the latter case, he shall obtain the Chogyal's approval as soon after the action has been taken as possible.

(iii) He shall have a special responsibility to ensure the proper implementation of the constitutional and administrative changes in Sikkim, the smooth and efficient running of its administration, the continued enjoyment of basic rights and fundamental freedoms by all sections of the population of Sikkim, and the optimum utilisation for the benefit of the people of Sikkim of the funds allocated for the economic and social development of Sikkim.

(iv) In case involving amity between the various sections of the population of Sikkim, or the development of democratic government and efficient administration in Sikkim, any differences of opinion between him and the Chogyal shall be referred to the Political Officer in Sikkim, who shall obtain the advice of the Government of India, which shall be binding.

9. There shall be equality before law in Sikkim. The Judiciary shall remain independent.

10. The Palace Establishment and the Sikkim Guards shall remain directly under the Chogyal.

11. The Government of India, who are solely responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim, who are solely responsible for the conduct and regularisation of the external relations of Sikkim, whether political, economic or financial, reaffirm their determination to discharge these and their other responsibilities for the benefit of the people of Sikkim, for their communal harmony, good administration and economic and social development. It is hereby reaffirmed that they shall have the necessary powers for carrying out these responsibilities.

Done in triplicate at Gangtok on this eight-day of May of the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Three, A.D.

Sd/ Kewal Singh

Foreign Secretary,

Government of India.

Sd/ Palden Thondup Namgyal

The Chogyal of Sikkim,

LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF SIKKIM

For Sikkim Janata Congress	For Sikkim National Congress	For Sikkim Nation Party
Sd/	Sd/	Sd/
1. K.C. Pradhan	1. Kazi Lhendup Dorji	1. Netuk Tshering
2. B.B. Gurung	2. C.S. Roy	2. M.B. Basnet
3. S.K. Rai	3. C.B. Chhetri	3. Tasha Tengey
4. B.P. Dahal	4. N.K. Subedi	4. Padam Kharel
5. B. Kharel	5. D.N. Tewari	5. K. Wangdi

ANNEXURE XVI

R.R. No. 516 D/ 19-9-16. No. 2369/G.

From

C. A. Bell, Esquire, C.M.G.,
Political Officer in Sikkim,

To

The Superintendent, Sikkim State,,
Gangtok.

Dated Camp via Gangtok, the 18th September 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to state that from the records of my office it appears that in 1904 the strength of the Sikkim Military Police was increased by 20 temporary men on account of the Tibet Frontier Commission. The sanction of the Government of India (through the Bengal Government) was accorded to the supply on loan of 20 carbines and bayonets and necessary accessories with ammunition for the 20 temporary men, on the condition that these would be returned to the Fort William Arsenal, when the services of the temporary force had been dispensed with.

2. Would you kindly let me know whether the abovementioned weapons, etc., have since been returned to the Fort William Arsenal or not; and, if not, how the matter stands?

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

C A Bell
16/9

Political Officer in Sikkim.

16/9/16.

ANNEXURE XVII

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet September 7th 1904

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects , and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F.E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full of powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and Losang Gyaltsen, The Ga-den Ti -Rimpoche, and the representatives of the council , of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet:-

I. The Government of Thibet to engage to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II. The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forth with trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as Yatung. The regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the AngloChinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned. In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or the Chinese authorities . The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of the replies.

VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000-equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees to the British Government. The indemnity shall be payable such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of rupees each on the 1s t January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX. The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government –

No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

No Representative or agents of any Foreign power shall be admitted to Thibet.

No concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to the British Government; No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any foreign power.

X. In witness whereof the negotiations have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord, 1904,
corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon
year.

(Thibet Frontier Commission) F.E. YOUNG HUSBAND, Colonel, British Commissioner (Seal of Dalai Lama, affixed by the Ga-den Ti –Rimpoche) (Seal of British Commissioner) (Seal of Dre-pung Monastery) (Seal of Sera Monastery) (Seal of Ga-den Monastery) (Seal of Ga-den Monastery)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Seal of Council) (Seal of Dre-pung Monastery) (Seal of Sera Monastery) (Seal of National Assembly)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Thibet Frontier Commission) F.E. YOUNG HUSBAND, Colonel, British Commissioner (Seal of Dalai Lama affixed by the Ga-den Ti –Rimpoche) (Seal of Council) (Seal of Dre-pung Monastery) (Seal of Sera Monastery) (Seal of National Assembly)

AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India

ANNEXURE XVIII

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RESPECTING TIBET, APRIL 27, 1906

(Ratifications exchanged at London July 23 1906)

(British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XCIX, pp. 171-173)

WHEREAS His Majesty of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exists between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regulations of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotententiaries, that is to say:-

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland:
Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extra-ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China:
His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:-

I. The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

II. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

III. The Concessions which are mentioned in Article IX (d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

IV. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

V. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

VI. This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang Hsu.

ERNEST SATOW.

(Signature and Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary)

ANNEXURE XIX

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA RELATING TO PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET, AUGUST 31, 1907

(As related to Tibet)

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicholson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:-

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING THIBET

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangements:-

Article I

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

Article II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities

provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

Article III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to
Lhasa.

Article IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

Article V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

ANNEXE TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA CONCERNING THIBET

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the Ratification of the Convention of the 7th September 1904, to the effect the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi

Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The presence Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at St. Petersburgh as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburgh, the 18th (31st) August 1907.

Sd