Politics of Identity: A Study of GorkhaAssertion for the National Identity in Darjeeling Hills

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By

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DECLARATION

Date: 05/02/2018

I, **Abinay Rai**, do hereby declare that the subject matter of this dissertation is the record of work done by me, that the contents of this dissertation did not form basis of the award of any previous degree to me or to the best of my knowledge to anybody else, and the dissertation has not been submitted by me for any research degree in any other university/institute.

This is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of **Master in Philosophy** in the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **"Politics of Identity: A Study of Gorkha Assertion for the National Identity in Darjeeling Hills"** submitted to Sikkim University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Philosophy** in Political Science is the result of bonafide research work carried out by **Mr. Abinay Rai** under my guidance and supervision. No part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree, diploma, associateship and fellowship.

All the assistance and help received during the course of the investigation have been duly acknowledged by him.

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"Politics of Identity: A Study of Gorkha Assertion for the National Identity in Darjeeling Hills"

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Dedicated to my Grandparents

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Nationalism as one of the potent principle of political legitimacy in the contemporary world holds that the nation should be inclusively and freely institutionally expressed and governed by its co-nationals. Numerous events substantiate nationalist movement holds the capacity to shake state and empires (O' Leary, 1997). It is also a principle of political legitimacy for us precisely because culture has become so ineluctable that it does not so much represents structure rather than it replaces it. Once social structure, the totality of social role was circumscribed, nested and ascriptive, the shared linguistic and cultural communication was not important to the preservation of social order and effective interaction, but now social roles are open and changeable, and those who communicate must speak the same language, in some sense or the other and the classification of people by 'culture' is classification by nationality (O' Leary, 1997).

Cultural identities are deeply rooted in histories. Just, like everything else which is historical, they also undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power. Identities are the names, we give to the different ways we are positioned by and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past'. Hence, as the phenomenon suggests, 'there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position' and therefore a politics of power relations– a fact which involves it with the question of autonomy. Autonomy suggests a resistance against a hegemonizing dominant culture or a homogenizing state power that refuses to negotiate difference. Hence, politics of identity is at the same time a politics of autonomy and politics of difference (Hall in Mongia, 1997).

The problem of identity stems out from the result of modernity. Weber held the terms like ethnicity and nationalism would decrease in importance and eventually vanish with the result of modernisation. With him, many early social scientists shared this similar view and it was eventually proven wrong. In fact, the terms like ethnicity,

nationalism and the forms of identity politics grew politically important into the 21st century (Eriksen, 2010).

Charles Taylor in his essay on ‘‘The Politics of Recognition’’ states there has been various demands in contemporary politics on behalf of minority and ‘subaltern’ groups, in some forms of feminism and this he calls as the politics of ‘‘multiculturalism’’(Taylor, 1994).

Before going to explore the problems of identity, it is very essential to look into the term ‘identity’ itself. The term identity comes from the Latin word *idem* (Buckingham, 2008) which means ‘the same’ and therefore, it logically invokes the concept of sameness. It also rests on the praxis of difference, i.e., difference of persons or groups from other groups (Subba et al., 2009). To live in any particular society, it can be extremely important to identify with others, in various different ways. In modern era, there are multiple identities that hinges on a nation region, class, gender, language, citizenship and others, and identity is always negotiated within a flow of multiple influences. Therefore, our identity has two dimensions ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ the former refers to who we are and the latter refers to what we think we are, and these two necessarily shape each other and ‘our identity is constant dialectical interplay between them’ (Chakrabarty, 2008). According to Brubaker and Cooper ‘identities are constructed, fluid and multiple’ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). So, an individual carries multiple identities. Based on this, Amartya Sen, puts forward two different types of reductionism form the discourse of social and economic analysis which he calls ‘‘identity disregard’’ and the other ‘‘singular affiliation’’. He says ‘identity disregard’ takes the form of ignoring and neglecting altogether, the influence of any sense of identity with others, on what we value and what we behave and the ‘singular affiliation’ takes the form of any person pre-eminently belongs, for all purposes, to one collectively only – no more and no less (Sen, 2006).

The decisive variable in defining a particular cultural or ethnic identity is *power*. Usually the majority has the power to define when minorities should become like themselves and when they should be defined as different – when to assimilate and when to segregate. Very often, potential elites are denied the right to be different

whereas low classes are denied the right to be equal. This kind of contradiction can be better described as the *paradox of multiculturalism* (Eriksen, 2010).

Anthropologists working in the field of politics of identity may well contribute to the conceptual clarifications here. However, philosophers and social theorists have for years discussed similar issues. One of the core controversies in contemporary political and social philosophy, which turns out the debates over ethnic dynamics and national integration, concerns the relationship between *communitarianism* and *liberalism*. Communitarian opines that the community is the primary feature of personhood, while liberals argue the primacy of the individual. The Communitarians argue that the liberal view of the individual is inadequate because people can only realise their humanity in a cohesive social and cultural community (Eriksen, 2010). Since, there has been lot of debates over politics of identity and struggles over cultural identity and social integration.

The relationship between Nepal and the Gorkhas[1]/Nepalis[2] in India has grown extremely complex in the rising political, social and cultural context of the last century. This complex relationship between Nepal, a sovereign country, and Gorkhas in India is one of the publicised crises of South Asia, and those who lose out due to this recognition are the Gorkhas in India, who are forced to live in a cultural shadow, without full recognition of their rights and identity in the land of their birth (Subba, 2002). Wenner states that the identity crisis of the Gorkhas refers to the perceived lack of recognition as Indian and stigmatisation as the citizens of Nepal (Wenner, 2016). The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal[3] becomes much more debatable and contentious issue here. B.C Upreti in his work ‘‘India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship: Nature, Problems and the Question of Identity of Indian Nepalis’’ highlights that the treaty remains a highly comprehensive document not only dealing with the politico-strategic issues but also dealing with

[1]The word `Gorkha' comes from the small principality, which is now a district in Nepal exactly by the same name. The origin of the word still abounds with various controversies and arguments. However, the terms `Gorkha' and `Nepali' are used interchangeably in India although political movements at different times have favoured the use of the word Gorkha over Nepali in order to differentiate between the citizens of Nepal and India. See T.B Subba, ‘‘Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling’’ and The Nepalis in the Northeast India: A Community in Search of Indian Identity.

[2]. The term Gorkha and Nepali have been used synonymously and both the terms refers to the same conglomeration of people.

[3] See Appendix I

economic and social interest of the people of the two countries. The leaders of Gorkha National Liberation Front of Darjeeling were also critical of the 1950 treaty, particularly Article VII[4], which provides for two way migrations and equal treatment to them in terms of employment, ownership of property and settlement (Upreti, 2009).Thus, the question of national identity of Gorkha who shares the physical proximities with the citizens of Nepal and also with regard to culture and language becomes an important issue.

The term Gorkha represents here the Indian citizens belonging to Nepali ethnicity. The Gorkhas belongs to both Aryan as well as Mongoloid group. Along with Chettris, Bahuns and Kamis (Aryan race) other communities such as Limbus (Subba), Gurungs, Magars (Thapa), Newars (Pradhan), Rais, Tamang, Bhutia, Lepcha and Sherpa (belongs to mongoloid race) also comes under the Gorkha ethnic group (Dasgupta, 1999).There exists variety of arguments regarding the term Gorkha. Various writers and researchers have used the term Gorkha and Nepali synonymously. Although the term Gorkha and Nepali have been used interchangeably in India (Golay, 2006) however different political movements of Gorkha have favoured the use of the term Gorkha over Nepali in order to differentiate between the citizens of Nepal and India. T.B Subba in his work, *Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling* tries to differentiate between the Gorkhas of India and those of Nepal. He writes the citizens of Nepal as ‘‘*Nepalese’’* and the Nepali speaking Indian as ‘‘*Nepalis’’* (Subba, 1992; Cited in Golay, 2006). He states that there is much controversy over the term Nepali and Gorkha. The term Gorkha may be politically more significant but conceptually the term Nepali is more important. Originally used in the 1950s by Late Ramakrishna Sharma, an All India Gorkha League (AIGL) leader and ex-judge of the Calcutta High Court and reiterated in late 80s by Subash Ghising, the president of Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), to distinguish the Indian Nepalis from those of Nepal. He further says the word ‘Gorkha’, however, could not compete with ‘Nepali’ primarily because both the words refer to the same conglomeration of peoples (Subba, 2003).

Indra Bahadur Rai one of the most influential Nepali writer says that ‘‘it is fear that has led to the adoption of the term Gorkha. The Nepalis of India fear that if they say

[4]See Appendix I

that I am a Nepali, then they might be asked to go back to Nepal or be discriminated by other communities in India. Thus, it is because of this fear and an attempt to hide from such questions and situations that the term Gorkha has been used by the Nepali jati''. He himself prefers the word Nepali over the term Gorkha and he further says that the word Gorkha have a military history but a word keeps changing its meaning so even the word Gorkha has now changed (Cited in Chettri, 2013).

I.B Rai states that the 'Indian Nepali nation' we mean the ethnically and linguistically distinctive community of people who are Nepali origin and are Indian citizens (Cited in Poddar and Prasad, n.d). Various efforts were made to find a more appropriate term that would be acceptable to the Gorkhas in India, which would carry precise and unambiguous understanding of the community. Subba informs that the terms such as Bhargoli and Bharpali were suggested but it was not acceptable to the community (Subba, et al., 2009). Since there is no unanimity over the term which would catch the imagination of the Gorkhas in India and give rise to the identity crisis of these group of people in India.

Bidhan Golay in his work, *Rethinking Gorkha Identity: Outside the Imperium of Discourse, Hegemony, and History* says that 'the process of Gorkha identity formation was the product of the cultural renaissance in Darjeeling' (Golay, 2006). He argues that the problem of the Gorkha identity arises when the Nepali historiography charted its path, and the Gorkha as a subject have to free them from the colonial discourse and he suggests, this could be done with the help of canonical texts, reading them against and unsettling the colonial discourse which binds them (Golay, 2006).

Darjeeling as one of the district of West Bengal lies in Eastern Himalayan range of India and northern most parts West Bengal, comprising majority Gorkha community. Historically, the hilly areas under Darjeeling were inhabited by the Lepchas, Limbus, Bhutias, and Tibetans since ancient time. The plains covered by thick forest, were populated by indigenous tribal groups like Meche, Koches, Rajbangshi, Dhimal and others mainly living upon nomadic cultivation and the Jhoom cultivation (Census, 2011). But in comparison to West Bengal, the state to which it belongs and the ethnic identity of state being Bengali, the Gorkhas are in minority. The Gorkhas are the unorganised minority group in West Bengal. The people have always looked upon themselves different from Bengal and Bengalis physically, culturally, traditionally

and linguistically. This coupled with relative sense of political and economic deprivation, the Gorkhas in Darjeeling demanded for their own state and a separate identity. Their demand is for a separation from Bengal but very much for their inclusion within India. It was before 1917, that the Hillmen's Association had been formed consisting of three ethnic groups for a separate administrative setup, the Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalis (Dutta and Gaur, 2012).The homeland demand raised around thirty times since 1907 (Bagchi, 2012). Therefore, before independence, the leaders of Gorkha people in Darjeeling had already demanded the separation of Gorkha people from the intellectually much more articulate Bengali people of West Bengal. Edward Said stressed that this struggle over geography is 'not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings' (Said, 2001) and in short, it is about 'imaginative geographies'(Wenner, 2016).

Gorkhaland is the name proposed for a separate state demanded by Gorkha ethnic group in Darjeeling and its adjoining Dooars region in West Bengal. The demand for Gorkhaland is therefore the demand that Gorkhas be recognized as Indians and be given their rightful place. Wenner says while the opponents of the movement regularly accuse the Gorkhas towards the creation of a 'Greater Nepal', which connotes an idea of Nepal based nationalists to reunite with the lost territories of Nepal but all Gorkha parties stress that their demand was raised within the framework of the Indian Constitution by referring to Article 3, which provides for change of state boundaries (Wenner, 2016).

It is the belief of Gorkhas in India that a state for Gorkhas once carved out from the state of West Bengal and for all solves the crisis of Gorkha Identity in India. A state for Gorkhas in India would prove that the Gorkhas are Indians. It is this belief that unites Gorkhas all over India. It is clear that the demand for Gorkhaland is not just for economic reasons. It is not about the region of Darjeeling and Dooars being in a state of neglect. Obviously, the region lacks in development and could be better administered but that is not the point. The people in Darjeeling know as much as the people outside do that the demand is about securing the identity of the Gorkhas as Indians (Dutta and Gaur, 2012). The present study seeks to analyse the Gorkha identity politics and their quest for separate state of Gorkhaland.

Statement of the Problem

The identity of the Gorkhas/Nepalis has been a debatable issue for many years and there is no unanimity over the terminology itself. It is also not easy to draw the line of distinction between the Nepalese of Nepal and Gorkhas in India. For, it is often forgotten that the linkages' between the Gorkhas in India and 'Nepal Nepalese' are much deeper and complex. The fact that the two population groups are the citizens of two sovereign countries and shares the physical proximities with each other and also with regard to culture and language becomes an important issue.

The Gorkha identity crisis results from the perceived lack of recognition as Indian and the stigmatisation of them as citizens of Nepal. They often claim their identity is legitimate by citing its contribution to the anti-colonial struggles. Their everyday experiences urge them to carve a political space for its cultural identity within India. They are seen as foreigners and they have attracted much attention of the political leaders in the region during the last couple of decades. Their nationality is invariably seen as a suspect. Coupled with these problems, they also feel a relative sense of political and economic deprivation by the state. This has led to the movement for the recognition of their national identity; mention may be made of the demand for Gorkhaland in Darjeeling over the last couple of decades, and this movement is invariably seen as a suspect by Bengali intellectuals and links with the concept of 'Greater Nepal' (Bagchi, 2012). By Gorkhas, we mean that they are ethnically and linguistically distinctive community of people who are of Nepali origin and are Indian citizens. The misconception persists and which is rather deliberately fostered regarding the genesis of Gorkhas in India is from Nepal. Here comes a problem of identity of Gorkhas in India that exposes the deliberate efforts of the state made so far for the recognition, misrecognition and non-recognition of the identity of Gorkhas in India.

The demand for Gorkhaland as a separate statehood is based upon the ethno-linguistic identity of Gorkhas and most of the writers considers Gorkha identity politics as one of the oldest movement which dates back to 1907. Perhaps with the change in time it has changed its intensity and dimensions. Time and again the movement have been subdued due to various factors. For instance, the West Bengal Government's alternative policy of providing developmental boards to different tribal communities

in Darjeeling to revive their ethnic identity is seen by the Gorkha leaders and intellectuals, as the policy of divide and rule to further disintegrate the Gorkha solidarity. Despite the above fact that the ethnic communities in Darjeeling are willing to accept the offer provided by the West Bengal Government for their economic and social development further complicates the situation and gives rise to the question whether the long drawn battle for their homeland is for their identity or it is for social and economic development.

1.1. Review of Literature

Identities are constructed, fluid and multiple and it carries subjective and objective connotations. It is a collective phenomenon and it denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among a particular group or category (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).Roger Brubaker & Frederick Cooper (2000) in their article "Beyond identity" explains the two important dimensions of identity which he calls as hard and soft and its relevance in social science and public discourse. For them identity is something all people have, or ought to have, or are searching for. Concept of identity has gained its relevance in U.S as individualistic or group conception and black movement. It also provides lucid information about the scholars who have worked upon the concept of identity politics. This article provides lucid information on the concept of identity and it doesn't give vivid description about the various struggles on the identity politics.

India is one of the most culturally diverse nation in the world which is inhabited by various ethnic communities. It offers the opportunities' for different ethnic groups to make their claims for separate state based on their particular ethnic identity which will largely determine its future stability. Amartya Sen (2006), in his book *'Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny'* argues that we are becoming increasingly divided among the lines of religion and culture, ignoring the many other ways in which people see themselves, from class and profession to morals and politics. He says when we are put into narrow categories the importance of human life becomes lost. Identity and Violence examines some of the most explosive problems of our time and shows how we can move towards peace and firmly as we have spiralled towards war. This book provides information about the concept of identity only form the perspectives of economic viewpoint and fails to provide that the fear of majority over minority also has led to the struggle for identities.

Amy Gutmann ed. (1994) in his edited volume on *'Multiculturalism'* brings together an even wider range of leading philosophers and social scientists to probe the political controversy surrounding multiculturalism. Charles Taylor initial enquiry, which considers whether the institutions of liberal democratic government make room-or should make room for recognising the worth of cultural traditions, remains the focal point of discussion. He also provides the extensive essay by Jurgen Habermas on the issues of recognition and the democratic constitutional state. Although he have mentioned above with regard to the study of identity politics covers wide ranging issues on the problems and prospects of identity politics and of multiculturalism. It does not the explains the clear picture why the various ethnic communities on postcolonial states are demanding recognition in terms of their particular ethnic identity whether it is the fear of majority of particular ethnic community or it is for their social and economic development.

Partha Chatterjee (1993) in his book *'The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial ad Postcolonial Histories'* explains copiously about the creative and powerful results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa that are posited not on identity but on difference with the nationalism propagated by the West. Arguing that scholars have been mistaken in equating political nationalism with nationalism as such, he shows how anticolonial nationalists in India produced their own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before beginning their political battle with the imperial power. Chatterjee shows how middle class elites first imagined the nation into being in the spiritual dimension and then readied it for political contest.

Brendan O' Leary (1997) in his work *'On Nature of Nationalism:An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's writings on Nationalism'* summarizes its expression and development before considering its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion centres on Gellner's functionalist mode of explanation, the place of nationalism in his philosophy of history, the predictive and retrodictive nature of his theory, and the merits of his typology of nationalism. The apolitical character of his writings is emphasized: in particular, though Gellner established the connections between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies, he did not emphasize the mutually reinforcing relationships between nationalism, egalitarianism and democratization; moreover, his

contempt for nationalist doctrine is not something liberals, socialists and conservatives.

A.C Sinha and T.B Subba ed. (2003) in their book the '*Nepalis in Northeast India: A Community in Search of Indian Identity'* is a collections of thoughts and writings of different scholars on the discourse and subject of Nepali diaspora. Many of the authors have the contributions to their own communities: history, culture, politics, settlement, and language and literature. Overall, it highlights the contributions of community in consolidations of the Indian Union, its shrinking employment opportunity, its effort to carve out a distinct Indian identity.

Romit Bagchi (2012) in his work *'Gorkhaland: Crisis of Statehood'*is an attempt to unravel the various layers of the ongoing crisis in the Darjeeling hills, where the Gorkha people is in a struggle with the state of West Bengal, of which it is a part. He delves into the deeper recesses of the psyche of the Gorkha community settled in Darjeeling hills. He examines the historical, cultural and psychological factors contributing to the problem and identifies the citizenship-identity crisis of the Gorkha settlers as a serious issue that also has international ramifications.

Abhijit Dutta and Gaur (2012) in their work *'Tackling Gorkhaland'* presents the picture of different issues regarding Gorkhaland. They also explore the different types of agreement made by the leaders of West Bengal Government towards their oppostional local regional hill leaders. Lastly, it highlights the different aspects and power and functions of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council and Gorkhaland Territorial Administration. It doesn't provide the clear picture about the evolution of term Gorkha identity.

Deepika Gahatraj in her work *'Identity formation and Identity Crisis: Nepalis in India'* discusses the historical reasons for presence of Nepalis in India. She also explains the evolution and growth of Nepali identity, how the identity evolved and grew over the several years. Moreover the paper will analyse how ethnic groups have submerged to develop a strong Nepali identity in India. While developing a strong Nepali identity in India, language and literature played a very important role. Lastly, her work explores the issues concerned with Nepali identity. The section will explain how Colonial construction of Nepali identity had adverse effects on the community.

And will further explain how Indian Nepalis despite being born in India are often treated at with the Nepalese citizens.

Bidhan Golay (2006:2009) in his work *''Rethinking Gorkha Identity: Outside the Imperium of Discourse, Hegemony, and History''* makes an attempt to study the colonial construction of the Gorkha identity and its later day crisis. The paper tries to map the formation of the Gorkha identity over the last two hundred years or so by locating the process of formation within the colonial public sphere that emerged in Darjeeling in the early part of the twentieth century. He relates the problem of identity is in fact the problem of modernity.

Basant B. Lama (2009) in his work *'The Story of Darjeeling'* is an attempt to understand the history of Darjeeling and political on goings in the light of turmoil for a separate statehood which has brought light many facts unknown to most people interested in Darjeeling. He states that the Deed of Grant of 1935 by which British occupied a small chunk of the Darjeeling land has been regarded as dubious by many. Lama's 'The Story of Darjeeling' is replete with many more such things that have happened since then.

Girindra Ray (n.d) in his work *'Politics of Identity and Autonomy in North Bengal Perspectives'* states that the identity and autonomy as concepts are two interrelated and presuppose each other. He says that they are problematical in that they always in supplement to become meaningful. He puts forward his argument of identity and autonomy to highlight the issues of politics of identity and autonomy in North Bengal.

Amiya K. Samanta, (2000) in his work *'Gorkhaland Movement: A Study in Ethnic Separation'* gives an account of the growth of a sense of ethnic exclusiveness among a community of Indian Nepali/Gorkha who had been migrated over a period of more than one hundred and fifty years. It tries to map the account of the Gorkhaland movement which reveals that sectarian considerations have been the guiding principle of our political parties rather than any constructive effort to integrate them to the nation building process. Further it does not provide the criteria for an ethnic community to be called as an ethnic community which is acceptable to other communities in a particular state or around the world.

A.C Sinha and T.B Subba ed. (2016) in their work *'Nepali Diaspora in a Globalised era'* explores Nepali diaspora in global context, across India and other parts of South Asia, Europe and Australia. It discusses the social, political and economic aspirations of the Nepali community worldwide. It is a collection of work of scholars working in the field of Nepali diaspora and it includes identity politics among Nepalese migrants, representation of Indian Nepalis in literature, diasporic consciousness, forceful eviction and displacement, and social movements. This work will be invaluable to scholars and students of Nepal studies, area studies, diaspora and migration studies, cultural studies and literature.

T.B Subba et. al, ed (2009) in their edited volume *'Indian Nepalis: Issues and Perspectives'* is a collection of work which is presented in the conference on 'Identity and Nationality of the Indian Nepalis: Issues and Perspectives' held on April 20-22 at Gangtok, East Sikkim. It provides lucid information about the issue behind the identity formation of the Gorkha. It explores the various dimensions of Gorkha identity, ranging from conceptual and theoretical issues to India-Nepal linkage: History, literature and people.

T.B Subba (2008) in his article *'Living the Nepali Diaspora in India: An Autobiographical Essay'*states that the Nepalis form the largest and most widespread communities in India neighbouring about 5 million and found in almost every part of India with greater concentrations in the states bordering Nepal. His article tries to fill the existing literature of identity crisis of Nepali speaking people of India with an autobiographical account of encounter and experience in India and leaves the question of economic problems faced by these groups of people in India.

Research Gap

Although the various works by different authors which have mentioned above with regard to the study of identity politics covers wide ranging issues on the problems and prospects of identity politics and of multiculturalism. It does not explain the clear picture why the various ethnic communities on postcolonial states are demanding recognition in terms of their particular ethnic identity whether it is the fear of majority of particular ethnic community or it is for their social and economic development. Further, it does not provide the criteria for an ethnic community to be called as an

ethnic community which is acceptable to other communities in a particular state or around the world. Talking about Gorkha identity, there has been various attempts by the various scholars to study the Gorkha identity politics and their craving for a separate state of Gorkhaland. Despite the presence of various works, it becomes remains an invincible terrain and it does not limpid portray why the people in the hills gets enthralled for a separate state of Gorkhaland. Herein lies the research gap and the study aims to fill this research gap.

1.2. Scope and Rationale of the Study

The study draws attention towards the politics of identity in general and Gorkha identity politics in India in particular. It makes a modest attempt to highlight how the politics of ethnic identity leads to identity movements. It dwells upon the issues and problems faced by the Gorkhas in terms of identifying them as an Indian citizen, and the misconception that exists between the Nepalese of Nepal and Gorkhas in India. The study makes an attempt to explore and analyse the formation of the Gorkha identity over the last couple of decades and how the Gorkhas has been struggling over the fight for Indian identity in India. Last but not the least, it provides insight upon the Gorkhas assertion for Indian identity in Darjeeling. However the present study has certain limitations and setbacks, as it only covers the areas of Darjeeling district because due to time constraint it is not possible to cover the entire aspect of Gorkha identity politics.

1.3. Objectives

The objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To understand the meaning of politics of identity and how it leads to identity movements and what role does ethnicity plays in shaping the movements.
2. To know why there is no unanimity over the nomenclature Gorkha and why it becomes debatable and a contentious issue over for many years.
3. To examine the problems faced by the Gorkha/Nepali community in terms of recognition as an Indian citizen.
4. To assess the various factors responsible for the Gorkha assertion for national identity in Darjeeling and responses of the state towards their movement.

1.4. Research Questions

In order to fulfil the objectives of the study mentioned above, the study aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What is identity politics? How it leads to identity movements and what role does ethnicity plays in shaping the movements?
2. Why there is no unanimity over the term Gorkha and why it remains debatable and contentious issue over for many years?
3. What are the various problems faced by the Gorkha/Nepali community in India with regard to identifying them as an Indian citizen?
4. What are the factors responsible for the Gorkhas assertion for national identity in the Darjeeling hills?

1.5. Methodology

The study undertaken is exploratory in nature and it is done on the basis of qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The data is collected through primary and secondary sources by employing both the qualitative research techniques like observation, unstructured schedule and quantitative research techniques like structured schedule and field visits. Primary resources consist of fieldwork; Government reports while secondary sources consist of books, articles, journals and other relevant literatures.

The area of study is located in Darjeeling hills consisting of 687 villages, 12 community development blocks along with 9,37,259 males 9,09,564 females out of 18,46,823 population as per census 2011. However, 46 respondents have been interviewed and selected on the basis of various indicators like sex, age, income, education, religion, social status, and the others. Among them five were political leaders and the rest were common people. Purposive sampling is used for the selection of the aforesaid number of respondents.

1.6. Chapterisation

The study is divided into following five chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter deals with regard to the statement of the problem, scope/limitations of the study, and objectives of the study. It includes the methodology used in the study and preparation of the dissertation.

Chapter 2: Politics of Identity: A Conceptual Framework

This chapter provides insight upon the concept of Identity politics, it highlights the role of ethnicity in identity movements and provides the features of Gorkha identity politics in Darjeeling hills.

Chapter 3: Gorkha Identity and demand for Statehood (1980-2012)

This chapter outlines a brief political history of Darjeeling hills and the various features of Gorkha identity formation in Darjeeling hills, and it also discusses the different phases, changing intensity and ideology of the political movement in Darjeeling and the demand of separate state of Gorkhaland and responses of the state.

Chapter 4: A Study of Gorkha assertion for National Identity in Darjeeling Hills

This chapter is based on the field work which makes an attempt to analyse the real issue regarding identity of the Gorkhas/Nepalis and it also makes an attempt to highlight how the Gorkhas have been struggling for Indian identity in Darjeeling hills.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This chapter is based on major findings, and includes suggestions and accordingly makes an overview remark regarding the issues and problems of identity politics of Gorkhas and their quest for separate state of Gorkhaland.

Chapter 2

Politics of Identity: A Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides insight upon the concept of Identity politics, it highlights the role of ethnicity in identity movements and provides the features of Gorkha identity politics in Darjeeling hills.

2.1. Identity Politics

The theme of identity has occupied a place of prominence in social science and it has been a concept which is contested and debated, and it is widely used in social science discourse. Just as Politics is ceaseless, endless and continuous (Benhabib, 1996), ‘‘identity politics’’ as a form of politics is endless, continuous because social relationships that individual shares with their community is the result of never ending social processes (Verkutyen, 2014). The emergence of identity in social science and public discourse occurred in the United Stated in 1960s, and due to various reasons, the term identity became highly resonant reaching across national boundaries, establishing itself in journalistic and academic lexicon, and as well as social and political analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Linda Nicholson argues that identity politics did not emerge eventually in the 1960s, it was alive in western societies long before the twentieth century, but the ideas about identity was put into practice in United States, in nineteenth century (Nicholson, 2010). Identity politics which started in the 1970s and early 1980s analysed under the new social movements showed its darker side (Benhabib, 1996) due to the rise of Black Power movement, and it simply provided the way for other ethnic movements, assertions of individual identity, upgraded to the group level (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). ‘Identity politics refers to politics driven by demands and concerns rooted in identities - religious, ethnic, linguistic, national, gender, etc.’ (Pingle and Vershney, 2005; Buckingham, 2008). Eric Hobsbawm argues that the ‘‘identity groups are about themselves, for themselves and nobody else’’ (Cited in Pritchett, 2005).

People are drawn to various identity issues, there has been various struggles raised by people on the basis of their religion, race, ethnicity etc. which results in integration of

states. These integrations has increasingly become a question of identity, where loyalty and the choice of new country of residence has priority. However, identity and group identity are important sociological constructs but these two phenomenon have received attention of the scholars lately and the scholars have systematically studied these phenomena in the past half century (Pritchett, 2005). The decade of 1990s saw the emergence of a distinctive set of related theoretical emphases, which have been disproportionately influential in defining recent sociological and other debates about identity (Jenkins, n.d). Richard Jenkins highlights four themes in particular which have been repeatedly emphasised, across a wide range of literature: personal self-identity and reflexivity; the variability and fluidity of identity, as against essentialism or primordialism; difference as the defining criterion or principle of identification; the definitive modernity (or post-modernity) of identity discourses, and of the fluidity of identity (Jenkins, n.d).

The problem of identity stems out from the result of modernity. Weber held that terms like ethnicity and nationalism would decrease in importance and eventually vanish with the result of modernisation. With him, many early social scientists shared this similar view and it was eventually proven wrong. In fact, the terms like ethnicity, nationalism and the forms of identity politics grew politically significant in the 21st century (Eriksen, 2010).

Charles Taylor in his essay on ‘‘The Politics of Recognition’’ states there has been various demands in contemporary politics on behalf of minority and ‘subaltern’ groups, in some forms of feminism and this he calls as the politics of ‘‘multiculturalism’’(Taylor, 1994). As Will Kymlicka further enlighten us that the traditional model of citizenship as rights, has been challenged from two directions. First, it emphasise the need to supplement the focus on rights with greater civic participation and secondly, it emphasises the need to supplement the focus on common rights with greater attention to cultural pluralism and group differentiated rights. He further states that the second factor postulates or reflects a broad ranging movement not only in philosophy, but also in real world politics which can be discussed under the various labels such as the ‘politics of difference’, ‘identity politics’, ‘multiculturalism’, and lastly as the ‘politics of recognition’(Kymlicka, 2002). Since the late 1980s, critics of multiculturalism has grown in the Western

Europe. Multiculturalism is not a simple term with a well-defined meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary, traces its appearance in an article about Switzerland which was published in 1957, defines it as ‘‘the characteristics of multicultural society; (also) the process whereby the distinctive identities of the cultural groups within such a society are maintained and supported (Eriksen, 2010). Taylor points out, that one of the heated controversy over the issue of multiculturalism, which is often debated today, is the imposition of cultures with assumed superiority of dominant culture on others (Taylor, 1994)

Before going to explain copiously about ‘identity politics’ or in other words we may call it as ‘politics of difference’ because ‘every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of creation of difference’ (Benhabib, 1996), it becomes very essential to clearly examine the term *identity* itself, and it is not easy to study the concept of identity due to the elusive and problematic nature of identity and most of the theorists regard that it remains an indispensable subject (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). The term identity comes from the Latin word *idem* (Buckingham, 2008) which means ‘the same’ and therefore, it logically invokes the concept of sameness. It also rests on the praxis of difference, i.e., difference of persons or groups from other groups (Subba et al., 2009). Thus, identity politics is that form of politics which stresses on human similarities, and also a politics focused more upon differences (Nicholson, 2010).

As Erik Erikson has opined, “Individual and society are intricately woven, dynamically related in continual change.” (Cited in Sokol, 2009). Therefore to live in any particular society, it can be imperative to identify with others, in various different ways (Sen, 2006). Identity as a social category or group to which you belong is not necessarily the same as the way you privately experience and feel about yourself. So the various categories of ‘ethnic, national, or religious identity is historically, culturally, politically contested and construed’ (Verkutyen, 2014). We can possibly make the distinction between notions of ‘personal identity’ and ‘social identity’. ‘‘Personal identities’ on the one hand are the self- designations and self-attributions that an individual enacts or asserts during the course of social interaction with others, and are essentially the meanings of the individual attributes to the ‘self’. The concept of ‘social identities’, on the other hand, provides a conceptual link between the

individual's representation of 'self' and the social structures and groups in which the 'self' is embedded and ultimately constituted'' (Harris et. al., 2013). Etienne Balibar remarks that ''all identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is historical or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behaviour and collective symbols'' (Balibar, 1999).

In modern era there are multiple identities that hinges on a nation region, class, gender, language, citizenship and others, and identity is always negotiated within a flow of multiple influences. Therefore, our identity has two dimensions 'ontological' and 'epistemological' the former refers to who we are and the latter refers to what we think we are, and these two necessarily shape each other and 'our identity is constant dialectical interplay between them' (Chakrabarty, 2008). Thus, when one likely to correspond to these two ontological and epistemological questions about identity, you likely tend to place yourself in various categories or groups (Verkutyen, 2014). According to Brubaker and Cooper 'identities are constructed, fluid and multiple' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), it is characterised by fragmentation, contradiction, ambiguity and variability, depending on the circumstances and conditions, identities can take different forms (Verkutyen, 2014), and there has been a lack of consistency and clarity in its definition and application (Harris et. al., 2013). So, an individual carries multiple identities. It is just because that the concepts of race, gender, ethnicity, religion are the main concern of modern politics and many of the social theorists have ignored them (Pritchett, 2005). Based on this, Amartya Sen, puts forward two different types of reductionism form the discourse of social and economic analysis which he calls ''identity disregard'' and the other ''singular affiliation''. He says 'identity disregard' takes the form of ignoring and neglecting altogether, the influence of any sense of identity with others, on what we value and what we behave and the 'singular affiliation' takes the form of any person pre-eminently belongs, for all purposes, to one collectively only – no more and no less (Sen, 2006).

Therefore, the concept of *identity* rests upon the category of practice and the category of social analysis. As a category of practice on the one hand, it lays emphasis on how an individual, in everyday life make sense of themselves, of their activities, of what they share with (Capon, 2012) and how they can differ from others. And as a category

of social analysis, on the other hand, how the concepts of nation and nationalism, ethnicity, race, perhaps religion, can be constructed or reified (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).

However, the problem of the term identity arises when one probes the praxis of the word ‘‘identity’’. For instance, the quest for identity can go in very different directions and results in many answers which brings the questions filled with doubt and uncertainties, such as ‘who am I, where do I belong, how am I perceived and valued, how do we differ from them’ (Verkutyen, 2014). As we have already noted earlier that the concept of identity rests on the praxis of difference i.e. difference of persons or groups from other groups. It includes the prospect of re-identification, that is, the possibility of holding distinct features over a period of time. Since the term allows space for sameness as well as difference (Subba et al., 2009). Also, the human condition is constantly in a state of flux (Subba et al., 2009), because an individual encounters different persons or groups while living in a society which shapes his behaviour, attitude and thinking towards himself as well as the other. Our identity is often shaped by the recognition and misrecognition of others, can suffer real damage or real distortion to a person or groups (Gutman, 1994). Erik Erikson, an eminent identity theorist and psychoanalyst who is credited for coining the term *identity crisis,* by using the Freudian psychoanalytic method, illustrated the psychological development of individual identity and highlights the role of culture on individual identity formation (Cited in Sokol, 2009). People are encouraged and expected to change constantly. There is no way for coherence and constancy because we live in a world of instantaneous communication and rampant consumerism fostered by the social media and the globalisation which has made the world smaller than ever before. In such a world the human self is everywhere and thus nowhere in particular. The identity of the human self is in a state of flux and change, giving a way to the ‘‘postmodern condition’’ as put forward by the French critic Jean-Francis Lyotard in his work *The Post-Modern Condition* (Lyotard, 1984). The analysis of the relation between discourse and power becomes very essential for studying ‘self and identity’ to ‘the postmodernists because it led to the distinctive view of the *nature of the self* which was a challenge to the individualist rationalism, and the emphasis on personal autonomy, of most liberals. So, the term preferred by postmodernists to apply to individuals is not so much ‘self’ as a ‘subject’, because to the latter term absolutely

draws attention towards ‘subject-ed’ condition of persons who are, whether they know it or not, controlled and constituted by ideologically motivated discourses of power which predominate in the society they inhabit’ (Butler, 2002). The break in self is a result of trying to negotiate the parameters of sameness and difference (Subba et al., 2009).

As we live in a world where there is instantaneous communication, the shared linguistic and cultural communication was not important to the preservation of social order and effective interaction, but now social roles are open and changeable, and those who communicate must speak the same language, in some sense or the other and the classification of people by ‘culture’ is classification by nationality (O’ Leary, 1997). Culture has become very essential in identifying a national particular community and Tom Nairn argues nationalism as a great historical failure for the Marxist (Panitch and Leys, 2002) because they believed that the nationalism is a product of class struggle and nothing more.

Cultural identities are deeply rooted in histories. Just, like everything else which is historical, they also undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power. Identities are the names, we give to the different ways we are positioned by and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past’. Hence, as the phenomenon suggests, ‘there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position’ and therefore a politics of power relations– a fact which involves it with the question of autonomy. Autonomy suggests a resistance against a hegemonizing dominant culture or a homogenizing state power that refuses to negotiate difference (Hall in Mongia: 1997). Hence, politics of identity is at the same time a politics of autonomy and politics of difference.

Politics refers to the legitimisation and public contestation, primarily by organised and unorganised social powers, over access to the resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity (Benhabib, 1996). Thus, politics of identity raises public contestation over access to the scarce resources available to the public authorities based upon the praxis of difference, upon the concept of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, cultural differences and so on and so forth.

The decisive variable in defining a particular cultural or ethnic identity is *power*. Usually the majority has the power to define when minorities should become like themselves and when they should be defined as different – when to assimilate and when to segregate. Very often, potential elites are denied the right to be different whereas low classes are denied the right to be equal. This kind of contradiction can be better described as the *paradox of multiculturalism* (Eriksen, 2010).

It will be very essential, if we bring Michel Foucault's concept of *power* in this context because he analyses power from bottom up, and not simply as an imposition of the interests of the class above. He shows how the 'exercise of power beats humanitarian egalitarianism every time, and states that the Enlightenment reliance upon the universal principle and reason is always incipiently totalitarian, because the appeal to an always correct reason is itself a system of control and will always exclude what makes it marginal' (Cited in Butler, 2002). Foucauldian arguments show the ways in which discourses of power are used in all societies to marginalise subordinate groups. For instance, he cites an example, 'when the medically trained 'reasonable' people define themselves against 'unreasonable' and having made their judgement, proceed them in lock them up in asylums. He says that the sexists, racists, and imperialists all use similar techniques – they make their 'normalizing' discourse prevail, and, in doing so, they can actually create or bring into being the deviant or what many postmodernists call the other. Their discourse actually helps to create the subordinate identities of those who are excluded from participation in it' (ibid, 2002). So, from the above arguments made by Foucault, we can understand how the *power* have been using certain group of people in defining *others* or perhaps, we can say, othering of subject in the words of Postcolonialists, and marginalised those subjects.

Will Kymlicka argues that nowadays, however, the previously excluded groups are longer willing to be silenced or marginalised, or to be defined as 'deviant' simply because they differ in race, culture, gender, ability or sexual orientation from the so-called 'normal' citizen, and they are demanding a more inclusive conception of citizenship which recognises their identities and accommodates their differences (Kymlicka, 2002). Identity politics is that form of politics, which is based on the recognition of that aspects of identity, that have been previously denied, marginalised or stigmatised (Buckingham, 2008). Identity movements differs from the previous

class based political movements of workers or farmers, is that they are about identity, and hence forms of 'identity politics' unlike earlier movements of farmers and workers which were about economic interests. However, in reality, politics is almost always a matter of both identities and interests. The question is always which identities and interests are being promoted (ibid, 2002). As Charles Taylor has eloquently argued, two such developments such as the demand for *dignity* and the urge to find one's authenticity or *equality* become important for understanding the identity politics of individuals and groups (Cited in Gutman, 1994).

The trend towards democratisation in the world is real, but there are the oppositions and antagonisms asserting themselves against themselves against this trend in the various forms of 'difference' – ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and cultural. Today, a new form of politics is emerging in terms of recognition all around the world (Benhabib, 1996). The demand for the recognition of these various group is based on the democratic principles, two of the those important principles are the principle of equality of opportunity and equal treatment of all individuals, in spite of their creed, caste, sex and religion etc. So, there is nothing like hyperbole in arguing that principles of Democracy itself provides that bargaining space for the assertion of these various groups. Today, I think Democracy in a procedural form and as a philosophy needs to be debated.

The various groups such as ethnic, linguistic, religious and others those who feel marginalised and stigmatised is not only because of their socio-economic status, but also because of their socio-cultural identity – 'their difference' (Kymlicka, 2002). There have been the rise of the philosophical books on the normative issues involved in secession, nationalism, immigration, group representation and multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2002).

Anthropologists working in the field of politics of identity may well contribute to the conceptual clarifications here. However, philosophers and social theorists have for years discussed similar issues. One of the core controversies in contemporary political and social philosophy, which turns out the debates over ethnic dynamics and national integration, concerns the relationship between *communitarianism* and *liberalism*. Communitarian opines that the community is the primary feature of personhood, while liberals argue the primacy of the individual. The Communitarians argue that the

liberal view of the individual is inadequate because people can only realise their humanity in a cohesive social and cultural community (Eriksen, 2010).

Furthermore, there has been lot of debates over politics of identity and struggles over cultural identity and social integration.The first debate was the pre 1989, and the theorists both liberal-communitarian in the years of 1970s and 1980s revolved around the priority of individual freedom. Liberalist argue that the 'individual is morally prior to the community: the community matters because it contributes to the well-being of the individuals who compose it. If those individuals no longer find it worthwhile to maintain existing cultural practices, then the community has no independent interest in preserving those practices, and no right to prevent individuals from modifying or rejecting them' (Kymlicka, 2002).

Communitarians oppose this conception of the 'autonomous individual'. They view 'people as embedded in particular social roles and relationships. Rather than viewing group practices as the product of individual choices, communitarians view individuals as the product of social practices. Privileging individual autonomy is therefore seen as destructive of communities. A healthy community maintains a balance between individual choice and protection of the communal way of life, and seeks to limit the extent to which the former can erode the latter' (Kymlicka, 2002).

Therefore both the views oppose each other and they never go hand in hand, and therefore the liberal- communitarian debates revolving over the priority of the individual freedom remains unending.

One of the important thing in fostering a strong national identity and to evade the problem of disintegration is to embed different communities into a common national culture. Groups accept the idea of national integration because the people feel wrongly excluded from their own national culture. As Gellner (1981) and Anderson (2006) and others have argued that standardised educational systems is an essential prerequisite for the emergence of a homogenised national identity, it stands to reason that a self-confessed culturally diverse society to adapt its educational system to accommodate the contradictory demands for equality and difference (Gellner, 1981; Anderson, 2006).

The main task of any particular nation or country is how to accommodate different groups in a common national culture because from the point of view of thestate, it is easier for a state to govern a society when its citizens share a common national language, culture and identity (Kymlicka, 2002). Common national language also plays an important social role for containing a particular identity because language is the only means of understanding groups and individuals. Language is the primary social bond, the sole means of communication and association between men, though communities are the product of various factors such as biological, geographical and psychological, they are held together by human communication (Smith, 1981). For example, extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. Kymlicka also argues that groups who accept the idea the national integration feel that they are excluded from the national culture and this exclusion is not any economic inequality. For instance, he writes, gay people feels excluded from their own national culture not because of lack of education or material resources but because of the status hierarchy within that national culture, which demeans and degrades them, and treats them as less worthy of concern or respect (Kymlicka, 2002).

Thomas Hylland Eriksen in his book, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (2010) tries to draw the certain characteristic features of identity politics. He has identified three social and five cognitive features which he considers as universal.

First, there is *competition over scarce resources*. Group conflict in contemporary societies involve perceptions of scarcity and struggles to retain or attain hegemony or equality.

Second, *modernisation actualises differences and triggers conflict.* Contemporary ethnicity can be described as the process of making cultural differences comparable, and to that extent, it is a modern phenomenon.

Third, *the groups are largely self-recruiting*. Although biological reproduction is by no means necessary for a strong collective identity to come about, it should be kept in mind kinship remains an important organising principle for most societies in the world.

Cognitive features as highlighted by Eriksen are as follows:

First, at the level of ideology, *cultural similarity overrules social equality*. Equality values are discarded for ostensible cultural reasons.

Second, *images of past suffering and injustice are invoked.* Indigenous Fijian leaders compare their plight to that of other indigenous peoples that have suffers from foreign invasions.

Third, *the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experiences*. This is perhaps the most important ideological feature of identity politics in general.

Fourth, *first comers are contrasted with invaders*. Although this ideological features is by no means universal in identity politics.

Fifth, and finally, *the social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrasts*. Internal differences are under communicated in the act of delineating boundaries in relation to the demonised other (Eriksen, 2010).

These are characteristic features of identity politics as given by Thomas Hylland Eriksen which he considers universal in any ethnic movement. It is also a fact that many ethnic movements in contemporary times is goaded by one of these factors mentioned above.

The politics of identity has become a feature of social fabric in a great number of societies, and a major politics project for most of the societies – from Fiji and Malaysia to Bolivia and Canada – consisting in reconciling equity and expressed cultural difference (Eriksen, 2010). As identity politics is a politics based on difference, perhaps can be termed as politics of difference rests mainly upon the concept of cultural differences.

Homi Bhaba, an eminent postcolonial thinker provides an influential argument on the notion of cultural diversity and cultural differences. "Cultural diversity is an epistemological object—culture as an object of empirical knowledge — whereas cultural difference is the process of the enunciation of culture as 'knowledgeable', authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification. If

cultural diversity is a category of comparative ethics, aesthetics, or ethnology, cultural difference is a process of signification through which statements of culture or on culture differentiate, discriminate, and authorize the production of fields of force, reference, applicability, and capacity. Cultural diversity is the recognition of pre-given cultural 'contents' and customs, held in a time-frame of relativism; it gives rise to anodyne liberal notions of multiculturalism, cultural exchange, or the culture of humanity. Cultural diversity is also the representation of a radical rhetoric of the separation of totalized cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations, safe in the Utopianism of a mythic memory of a unique collective identity'' (Cited in Ashchroft et. al. 2003).

From the two influential arguments of Homi Bhaba, we can make out that the cultural difference is constructed based on empirical knowledge. So, the two notions of 'cultural diversity' and 'cultural difference' revolves around the ontological and epistemological questions. The former concerns around the culture is an object of empirical knowledge and the latter concerning how that knowledge can be constructed or how it can be identified.

Aijaj Ahmad regards culture as a site of domination and resistance. Ahmad highlights 'there was 'a vast tradition' of Marxist work on cultural imperialism, the recent criticism came into being to fill the vacuum created by the perspective of those studies which either regarded overseas empire as inessential to the production and reproduction of western capitalism, and hence to the making of metropolitan society, or were indifferent to the political power of culture. Ahmad reiterates, but without citation, the existence of many previous studies on 'the constitutive presence of the colonial experience'' in European literatures, as well as numerous critiques of colonial cultural domination' (Ahmad, 1992). Culture always remains a prime site for political contestation and dominance, particularly by the technologically advanced centre over the marginalised periphery.

Arjun Appadurai on drawing on the similar lines makes a critical argument about the 'cultural dimensions of globalisation' where he talks about theglobal cultural flows and how the western power particularly America is using its technological power to homogenise the economically less advance countries through the power of media and other forces. He probes further his argument how the global cultural flows occur

through the growing disjunctures between ‘‘ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes’’. He regards that ‘‘the critical point is that both sides of the coin of global cultural process today are products of the infinitely varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created in and through these disjunctures’’ (Cited in Williams and Chrisman, 1994).

So the contemporary world that appear to us becomes more similar and more different at the same time, due to the forces of modernity and globalisation. Modern society is both more homogenous and diversified at the same time. Ethnicity enable us to see this contradiction as a fundamental duality between similarity and difference, between exclusion and inclusion, between homogenisation and fragmentation. Ethnicity amounts to making cultural differences comparable and most of the ethnic movements tend to make their claims based on their uniqueness (Eriksen, 2010).

The struggle for ethnic identity has led to the numerous struggle for power contestations and ethnic movements around the world and it remains continue even today. The assertion for Gorkha ethnic identity in the form of Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling hills provides a glimpse of ethnic struggle in India, and this has to be dealt elaborately. Based on the above framework of identity politics, one can simply draw that identity politics exists at two levels. Firstly, the dominant culture which holds the power has the power to define the minorities as different which in turn produces the other. Secondly, these groups who have been marginalised or considered as the other, assert their rights for recognition based on their differences, and these differences as according to Charles Taylor relies on universal principle of the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity, as an individual and also as a culture (Cited in Gutman, 1994). In a similar manner, the Gorkha ethnicity fear the domination of majority culture over their ethnic identity and this has led to the assimilation of different communities into Gorkha ethnicity and they are asserting ethnic identity based on their differences, and their inclusion into the national culture of India through their long drawn demand for separate state of Gorkhaland.

2.2. Ethnicity/Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Movements

The word ‘ethnicity’ was first used by the US sociologist David Riesman in 1953, it made it appearance in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in the year 1972. The word ‘ethnic’, however is much older and it is derived from the Greek *ethnos* (derived from the word ethnikos) which meant heathen or pagan (Eriksen, 2010). It is also a term that has been used increasingly since the 1960s to account for human variation in terms of cultural tradition, language, social patterns and ancestry, rather than the discredited generalisations of race with assumptions of hierarchy divided into fixed genetically determined biological types (Ashcroft et. al. 2007). Ethnic group have multiple attributes like religion, caste, region, descent, race, colour, language, culture and others. The combinations of these various attributes goes on to make an ethnic group and ethnicity (Samanta, 2000).

Anthony D. Smith in his book *The Ethnic Revival* (1981) defines ‘ethnicity’ or ethnic community as ‘‘a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity’’. He goes on further to argue that ‘ethnicity refers not just to classifiable populations, to locate ethnic categories. For the most part, an ‘ethnic group’ is a type of community, with a specific sense of solidarity and honour, and a set of shared values and symbols’ (Smith, 1981). Horowitz remarks, ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which could be beaded on common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (Cited in Eriksen, 2010). In the words of Eriksen, the term refers to ‘relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and these groups often ranked hierarchically within a society’’ (Eriksen, 2010). For Max Weber ethnic groups are “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration” (Cited in Mateos, 2014).Schermerhorn defines ethnicity as a term that ‘‘refers to the fusion of many traits that belong to the nature of any ethnic group: a composite of shared values, beliefs, norms, tastes, behaviours, experiences, consciousness of kind, memories and loyalties’’ (Cited in Ashcroft et. al. 2007). According to Stuart Hall, the term ‘ethnicity is constructed (historically, culturally, and politically) – for contestation,

representation and recognition and it acknowledge the place of history, language and culture in the contestation of subjectivity and identity' (Cited in Ashchroft et. al. 2003). So, from the above definitions over the nomenclature ethnicity, we can generalise that any ethnic group feels a sense of shared values, history of common origin, uniqueness and memories, perhaps of colonisation and migration according to Weber.

At the individual level, ethnicity is a social-psychological process which gives an individual a sense of belonging and identity. 'Ethnic identity can be defined as a manner in which persons, on account of their ethnic origin, locate themselves psychologically in relation to one or more social systems, and in which they perceive others as locating them in relation to those systems' (Isajiw, 1993). In general, however the term ethnicity has been commonly referred to a common descent, shares a common culture and traces descent to a common ancestor.

There are three major approaches or schools of thought in studying ethnicity – Primordialist, Constructivist and Instrumentalist. *Primordialist* regards ethnicity is an ascribed or assigned status, something inherited from one's ancestors. Secondly, it is an important corollary of ascribed identity; ethnic boundaries, which demarcate who is a member of an ethnic group and who is not, are fixed and immutable. *Constructivist* school of thought started in the year 1970s and it says ethnicity is socially constructed. Secondly, it is an extension of constructed identity, ethnic boundaries, flexible or changeable. It is dynamic. Lastly, ethnic affiliation or identification is determined or constructed by society. *Instrumentalist* approach or school views ethnicity is an instrument or strategic tool for gaining resources. According to this school of thought, people become ethnic or remain ethnic when their ethnicity yield significant returns for them (Yang, 2000). From these three different schools of thought on ethnicity, it becomes clear that the term ethnicity is constructed based on their shared memories of remembrance and nostalgia, and it is not static, it is flexible and changeable.

The contemporary world appears to us more ethnically diverse rather than ethnically homogenised. The principle of right of self-determination fosters the ethnic groups to protect and safeguard the cultural rights of their ethnic minorities. Despite the homogenisation policy of states there has been a proliferation of ethnic movements of

all kinds and few states have remain immune in witnessing the remarkable flowering of such movements (Smith, 1981). Anthony D. Smith cites the example of different ethnic movements all around the globe, few that I would like to mention here – ethnic riots in Malaysia, Ambonese and Achinese in Indonesia, between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Chinese conflict with Tibetans, ethnic and linguistic conflicts in India and Pakistan, the Quebecois in Canada, the Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and Blacks in the United States. Ethnic movements have arisen among the smaller communities as well, and these includes the Azoreans, Anguilians, Bahamans, the Saharauis, Chagga, Sindhis, Naga, Mizo, Uzbeks, Yakuts, Mongols, the Chakma of Bangladesh and many others (Smith, 1981).

In the postcolonial states of Asia and Africa, there is a common tendency of discrimination against ethnic groups by the state and the dominant nation or nationality in the field of economic opportunities, civil rights and political privileges even though they have been residents of their particular territories for several decades (Samanta, 2000). This has led to the assertion of ethnic identity and several ethnic movements in these states based on religion, language and mainly upon cultural differences.

The primary desire of an ethnic group to preserve its cultural identity is mainly for their motive for state formation and the ethnic group believe that their cultural identity can be maintained only if they can secure a state (Samanta, 2000), and it shares a reciprocal relationships. Ethnic groups can be either homelands societies or diaspora communities. Homelands societies on the one hand, 'usually make territorial claims over the area where they live based on long-term residence'. By contrast on the other hand, 'diaspora communities are mostly concerned with protecting and promoting the political, economic and socio-cultural rights and opportunities of their members in a foreign country' (Ganguly, n.d)

Ethnic identity or ethnic separatism is often based upon cultural differences and sense of cultural distinctiveness. Therefore ethnic movements' makes their claims of recognition of political demands upon the cultural differences from others and their members are both united with each other by a shared culture that differentiates others by the possession of that culture. Hence, separation not only becomes an end in itself but also a means of protecting a cultural identity formed by their unique cultural ties

which in turn becomes essential for the survival of that particular ethnic group (Smith, 1981).

The assertion of ethnic identity and the way members identify and define themselves seems to be more political than cultural mobilisation (Biswas and Suklabaidya, 2008). As we have already identified that the culture remains a prime site of political contestation, recognition and dominance.

So the emergence of ethno nationalism is to preserve the differences in culture which is vital for inclusion and recognition. New theories of identity politics have shifted explanations from interests and norms to identities and solidarities. The ethnic movements also represents as challenge against the subject positions by the hegemonic dominant culture. It is a revolt against the hegemonic domination and cultural impoverishment by the dominant culture (Agrawal, 1986).

Canadian Political theorist, Will Kymlicka says that the major challenge in Canada has been the accommodation of cultural difference. To accommodate these ethnic and national differences they have adopted three forms of differentiated citizenship in Canada. These are: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. *Self-government rights* are enjoyed by 'the aboriginal peoples and Quebecois demand certain powers of self-government in certain matters, to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of their people'. *Polyethnic rights* are those 'rights which are enjoyed by the ethnic groups and religious minorities for various forms of public support and recognition of their cultural practices – from the funding of bilingual education and ethnic studies in schools to exemptions from laws that disadvantage them given their religious practices'. *Special representation rights,* there has been increasing interest by the nonethnic social groups in the idea of special representation rights and these 'rights are often defended as a response to some systemic barrier in the political process that makes it impossible for the group's views and interests to be effectively represented' (Benhabib, 1996).

Eriksen argues, to develop any theory on ethnicity or nationalism inIndia is a tough job because it is not based on cultural similarity or even equality in the Western sense; and it has considerable number of internal cultural variation. The people are divided

along the lines of language, religion, caste and culture, and it has often been said that India is culturally more complex than continents such as sub-Saharan Africa or Europe (Eriksen, 2010). Partha N. Mukherjee in his work, *Comprehending ethnic movements in India*, in a multi-ethnic society like India, he found the ethno-national project problematic because ethnicity involves internal cultural and structural differentiations (Cited in Sharma, 1996).

In India, 'identities were constructed by the colonisers as 'subjects' of ethnographic disciplines and later brought under their rule. It further became the subject of nationalist discourses and, as citizens, they were determined by the capacities and constraints of state discourses (Biswas and Suklabaidya, 2008). By the late nineteenth century, it was difficult for the colonisers to rule based only on the knowledge of political economy alone because they began to see to the 'subjects' suspicious after the 1857 'Mutiny' though there were few communities who remain loyal to the colonisers and the colonisers began to shift their emphasis also on the knowledge of peoples and culture. In the words of Nicholas Dirks, 'anthropology supplanted history as the principal colonial modality and rule' (Dirks, 2004). Based on these ethnographical knowledge they have adopted and enacted laws and rules which structured Indian society in fundamental ways.

The struggle for identity is an inherent phenomena of individuals, collectivities and nations. Previously the colonial literature and discourses dominated the marginalised subject and their identity claims were marked by essentialist methodology of domination. As decolonised subjects, they now position themselves as India as Europe's Other and Europe as India's Other and both represent as the *Other of* both'. The postcolonial subjects write their own history various articulations that describes their true self, alternative to the construction of national identity, to struggle against the politics of appropriation However, with the emergence of post-colonial discourses there has been shift in the subject positions and power configurations. This has led to the questions and challenges of the west's image of identity and their assertion by subjects hitherto marginalised. This kind of assertions is being reflected in the emergence of new social movements (Agrawal, 1996). So, the resurgence of ethnic movements, perhaps, can also be regarded as an attempt of the subjects to liberate itself from the hegemony of the colonial discourse. On the contrary, there is little

effort on the part of the scholars to liberate the Gorkha subject from the pre-colonial hegemonic discourse. There remains numerous works on Gorkha ethnicity which is dominated colonial constraints of their valour and sacrifice.

2.2.1. Gorkha Ethnic Identity

The term Gorkha represents here the Indian citizens belonging to Nepali ethnicity. The Gorkhas belongs to both Aryan as well as Mongoloid group. Along with Chettris, Bahuns and Kamis (Aryan race) other communities such as Limbus (Subba), Gurungs, Magars (Thapa), Newars (Pradhan), Rais, Tamang, Bhutia, Lepcha and Sherpa (belongs to mongoloid race) also comes under the Gorkha ethnic group (Dasgupta, 1999). There exists variety of arguments regarding the term Gorkha. Various writers and researchers have used the term Gorkha and Nepali synonymously. Although the term Gorkha and Nepali have been used interchangeably in India (Golay, 2006:2009), however different political movements of Gorkha have favored the use of the term Gorkha over Nepali in order to differentiate between the citizens of Nepal and India. T.B Subba in his work, *Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling,* tries to differentiate between the Gorkhas of India and those of Nepal. He writes the citizens of Nepal as ‘‘*Nepalese’’* and the Nepali speaking Indian as ‘‘*Nepalis’’* (Subba, 1992; cited in Golay, 2006:2009). However, the term Gorkha and its root still abounds with various controversies and issues, and there has been various interpretation over the term Gorkha. Apart from that, there remains various interpolations about the fountain of the term Gorkha. Some say that the term ‘Gorkha’ comes from the small principality which is now a district in Nepal by the same name and others have linked with the forces of Prithivinarayan Shah were called Gorkhas. As according to T.B Subba, ‘‘the Gorkha identity in India was born in the battlefields – in the military history of the Gorkhas’’ (Subba, 1992: p. 55). According to A. C. Sinha the word Gorkha was used by the Britishers while recruiting the Nepali speaking people in the British Indian Army (Sinha:2003, p.12). Bidhan Golay remarks that the term ‘‘Gorkha’’ is a colonial construction and it is a Brithish discovery of race based on their physical and emotional strength. He says that the figure of a ‘‘brave’’ and ‘‘martial’’ Gorkha is actually an *orientalized*and idealized object (Golay, 2009: pp. 73-94).

However there is not much of an agreeable consensus about the origin and the nomenclature Gorkha. It is merely because the term represents both the citizens of Nepal and India, which therefore adds to the confusion thereby leading to misrecognition. So various efforts has been made to resolve these confusions. Pratapaditya Pal in an article published in the Statesman (Calcutta) on January 31, 1989 states that that the term ‘‘Gorkhali’’ equally smacks of Nepalese nationality in Indian eyes (Cited in Subba, 1992: pp. 72-73). He suggested of using the term ‘‘Parbatiya’’ instead of ‘‘Gorkhali’’ or ‘‘Nepali’’ which was not acceptable for two reasons as according to T.B Subba because the word ‘‘Parbatiya’’ means ‘‘hill people’’ who are already divided into three distinct ethnic groups – Lepchas, Bhutias, and Nepalis/Gorkhas and secondly it cannot simply be the substitute for ‘‘Gorkha’’, ‘‘Gorkhali’’ or ‘‘Nepali’’ which is a source of bewilderment and annoyance for the scholars (Subba, 1992: p. 74). Apart from that the terms like ‘‘Bhargoli’’ or ‘‘Bharatiya Nepali’’ was suggested which wasalso not acceptable and could not catch the imagination of these groups of people. However, over the years, scholars have favored to usethe term Gorkha and Nepali rather than the above suggested terms.

In the words of Anthony D. Smith, ‘ethnicity’ or ethnic community represents‘‘a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity’’ (Smith, 1981). The Gorkha ethnic community in this context shares a similar colonial history of colonialism and exploitation, and their main motive or destiny is to create their definite territory which for them is separate state of Gorkhaland and their ethnic identity is further solidified by the domination and subjugation by the state. According to Stuart Hall, the term ‘ethnicity is constructed (historically, culturally, and politically) – for contestation, representation and recognition and it acknowledge the place of history, language and culture in the contestation of subjectivity and identity’ (Cited in Ashchroft et. al. 2003). The Gorkha ethnic identity also shares this similar feature that their identity is constructed on the idea that they are different from other communities culturally, physically and they feel that they share different topographical feature (Edward Said regards this feeling as an imaginative geography, (Said, 2001)), which provides them a sense of security and solidarity. Their identity is constructed on the basis of distinct history of colonial exploitation, language and culture which acts as a source for political contestation and economic resource mobilisation.

There are various approaches in understanding the nomenclature Gorkha. So, the development of Gorkha ethnic identity in Darjeeling hills[5] has many disputed theories and arguments. The credit to the construction of Gorkha ethnic identity or Nepali Jati which is a conglomeration of various ethnic groups on the basis of common language goes to the educated elites in the Darjeeling hills (Onta, 1996). However, both the terms Nepali or Gorkha represents the Nepali speaking population of India and Nepal. But there remain little differences on accent, vocabulary and socio-cultural aspect between Gorkhas of both the country. The Nepali speaking population of India and particularly of Darjeeling hills shares its own unique socio-cultural orientation and history of colonial exploitation. This Nepali speaking population of India forms the Gorkha ethnicity in India. Their presence did not remain within specific geographical territory. They are sparsely populated in almost every regions of India and in Darjeeling district they form the majority. So, they are raising voices and demanding Darjeeling hills and Dooars region as their homeland, and their demand for homeland[6] is raised and within the framework of Article 3 of the Indian constitution, which provides for a change of state boundaries.

There is no doubt about the fact that the role of Nepali literature in the formation of ethnic identity, which is perhaps, similar to the history of the resurgence of other ethnicities. According to Gayatri Chakraarty Spivak, 'literature and art proceeds the task of massive rememoration project, saying "we all suffered this way, you remember, this is what happened, you remember", so that history is turned into cultural memory' (Spivak, 2009). In her words literary imagination feeds nationalism. In a similar way, the Nepali literary writing depicted the sorrows of migration and colonisation which made a way towards the consolidation of Gorkha ethnic identity outside Nepal. In modern times, the modern literary narratives from Indra Bahadur Rai with his third dimensional movement or *tesro aayam* in Nepali (i.e. past, present and future deciding the fate of Nepalis living in India) is strengthening the bond of Gorkha ethnic solidarity.

[5]Darjeeling is comprised of three subdivisions, Kurseong, Kalimpong and Darjeeling and together they comprises Darjeeling hills and famous being the Darjeeling because it was first to have a hill station and it is high in altitude than the two hills and it is named Darjeeling hills. From here onwards Darjeeeling Hills and Darjeeling is used synonymously in subsequent paragraphs and chapters.

[6] Here homeland means a separate state within Indian Union.

The Gorkha ethnic identity, as already mentioned before, were composed of various endogamous groups belonging to Aryan and Mongoloid race. Despite these ethnic complexities in Darjeeling hills a composite culture began to take shape in the end of the 17th century. According to Atis Dasgupta, this bond was provided by the Nepali language which in Nepal used to be known as *Khaskura* (also refferedas *Parbate, Pahadiya, Gorkhali and Gorkha bhasa* (Onta, 1996; Bomjan, 2008))and it was confined to the upper caste Brahmins and Chettris. However in Darjeeling, the low caste communities, such as Rais, the Limbus, the Pradhans, the Gurungs, the Tamangs and others who were the speakers of Tibeto Burman dialects picked up *Khaskura* as their second language. The influence of *Khaskura* did not remain confined to these different ethnic groups, even the Lepchas[7] and Bhutias, in spite of their religious and linguistic differences with the Nepalis, slowly but ultimately accepted Nepali or *Khaskura* the lingua franca in the three hill sub-divisions. This language provided and forged into a common bond of cultural unity and an ethnic link between different ethnic groups who were migrated and residing in different places in India in general, and Darjeeling in particular (Dasgupta, 1999).

I.B Rai one of an eminent Nepali literary and a renowned figure writes that 'there is a misconception that persist regarding the genesis of Indian Nepalis. Those who claim to be delvers into the past and yet describe Indian Nepalis as settlers or immigrants betray their blatant ignorance of the history of the region. After the Anglo Nepalese war, through the treaty of the Sugauli of 1816, Nepal was made to cede lakh of square miles of Nepalese territory to the British East India Company, together with the Nepali living thereon' (Rai, 1994). Therefore, it becomes clear that along with these Nepali people living thereon and different ethnic groups or tribes who forged Gorkha ethnicity also migrated from Nepal mainly as tea garden labourers, soldiers, and other low profile jobs under the influence of colonialism (Dash, 2011; Dasgupta, 1999) began to identify themselves as Gorkha ethnic community. So these groups shares a similar history of colonial exploitation and migration and language acts as a vehicle for fostering their ethnic solidarity.

Bidhan Golay in his work, *Rethinking Gorkha Identity: Outside the Imperium of Discourse, Hegemony, and History*(2006), says that 'the process of Gorkha identity

[7] Lepcha is considered one of the primitive tribe in Darjeeling hills

formation was the product of the cultural renaissance in Darjeeling' (Golay, 2006). He argues that 'the problem of the Gorkha identity arises when the Nepali historiography charted its path, and the Gorkha as a subject have to free them from the colonial discourse and he suggests, this could be done with the help of canonical texts, reading them against and unsettling the discourse' (Golay, 2006;2009)). It remains an undeniable fact that colonial discourse of martial race that dominates the present studies on Gorkha identity and Gorkha as a colonial subject have to free themselves from the domain of martial race theory.

The resurgence and assertion of Gorkha ethnic identity in Darjeeling hills in the form of separate statehood claims results from lack of resource access and utilization and that the protracted struggle of the Gorkhas for separate statehood is that trajectory wherein both the 'cultural and material aspects of routine life coalesce' (Sarkar, 2010).

He further regards that many scholars who is working on the problem of Gorkha ethnicity have ''concentrated their focus on economic factors as the root cause of ethnic antagonism and conflict in the Darjeeling Hills. 'Economic stagnation', 'uneven implementation of development policies', 'economic deprivation and negligence', 'petty-bourgeoisie aggrandisements against the dominance of monopoly capitalists of the Centre and the State', 'economic negligence, exploitation, and unavailability of white-collar jobs', 'growing unemployment and step motherly attitude of the state regarding the overall development of the hill areas', 'uneven development', 'endemic poverty, underdevelopment, and the perception of being "malgoverned", are some such factors many scholars put as the root cause of the Gorkhaland movement in the Darjeeling Hills'' (ibid, 2010). So, these factors makes a clear point in arguing that many of these scholars working in the field of Gorkha identity assumes that the Gorkha ethnicity feels that they are marginalised and subjugated in all spheres of economic life which in turn results into solidarity of the Gorkha ethnic identity and their desire for carving out a separate state from West Bengal.

In the present day scenario, Darjeeling which is often remarked as the *Queen of hills* is going under a series of protest by the Gorkha people to consider their legitimate demand of separate state within theIndian Union. The Gorkha ethnic identity is reified

as the *self* through the framework of political and economic subjugation by the state, and their identity politics operates through the notion of *Jati*. Their demand for a separate state is about securing their identity of Gorkha as an Indian legal citizens, which they believe that it will act as a definite resolution for solving the problem of socio-political identity of Nepali speaking Indians settled in different regions in India.

Chapter 3

Gorkha Identity and Demand for Separate Statehood (1980-2012)

This chapter provides a brief and precise political history of Darjeeling hills and the history of its inhabitants. It also makes a modest attempt to highlight the Gorkha identity politics over a couple of decades in the region of Darjeeling and its surrounding areas.

3.1. A brief Political History of Darjeeling Hills

Before we move into the Gorkha identity politics and the demand for separate statehood it becomes ineluctable for us to have a look at the history of Darjeeling hills.

The political history of Darjeeling hills and the evolution of Gorkha identity is complicated and has been a matter of curiosity and great interest amongst the scholars. Let me begin with the history of the origin of the name Darjeeling. There has been various interpretations over the origin of the name Darjeeling. It must be due to the fact that the history of Darjeeling is not written by trained historians and it remains mostly an account written by botanists, travellers and administrators. An account can be traced back to the available information from the old records, which draws reference to the building of a monastery, a branch of the Buddhist Pemiongchi Monastery in Sikkim by the Tibetan monks in 1757 on the flat land at the top of the Observatory Hill which was completed in the year 1763. The Chief Abbot of this newly built monastery was known by the name Rinzing *Dorji* Legden La, so the Tibetans called it *Dorji-Ling* (Ling means house or abode or monastery) (Lama, 2008) and hence the name Darjiling. In this context even the Earl of Ronaldsey in his work, *Lands of Thunderbold: The Sikkim, Chumbi and Bhutan* also highlights that the word Dorje in the first half of Darjeeling in connection to the name of a Lama, Dorze Rinzing, who founded the monastery which stood on the Observatory hill (Cited in Samanta, 2000). Another information as opposed to the previous one informs us that the Observatory Hill as the highest point on the Darjeeling ridge attracted an awful lot of thunder and lightning during the monsoon storms. Hence the place came to be known as Dorji-Ling or *the Place of the Thunderbolt* (Dorji also means *Thunderbolt*).

As according to B.B Lama, in the *Rong* language of the Lepchas, all the hilly regions south of the Kanchenzonga mountains where the Lepchas used to live was known as Dar-Tzu-Lyang meaning *the abode of the heavenly goddess of beauty*. So he says, *Dar-jee-ling* is probably a corruption of *Dar-Tzu-Lyang* (Lama, 2008). In an official report published in March 1838, after the arrival of British East India Company it was written as *Dorje-Ling*. Many of the scholars accept that the name Darjeeling has been derived from Dorje-ling which was name of the monastery on the Observatory hill, and it was removed to Bhutia busty when the hill was occupied by the British (Samanta, 2000).

The history of Darjeeling hills is old and complicated, and it becomes an uphill task to wade through the maze of history endowed with several treaties made from time to time (Bagchi, 2012). Historically, Darjeeling was under the dominions of the Raja of Sikkim. The parts of the hilly areas of Sikkim were annexed by the neighbouring kingdom of Nepal and Bhutan. In 1706, Kalimpong which is one of the subdivision of Darjeeling district and recently in the year 2016, it had acquired the status of District was taken from the Raja of Sikkim by the Bhutanese (Dash, 2011). At that time the political unification of Nepal was taking place by expanding its territories under the leadership of Gorkha king Prithivi Narayan Shah. So the Nepalese after seizing their power in Nepal invaded Sikkim in 1780. They became successful and overran Sikkim as far east as the Tista and conquered and annexed the Terai i.e. the belt of country along the lower hills between that river and the Mechi, which is now covered by the valuable tea gardens of the Darjeeling planters (O' Malley, 2001).

According to the History of Sikkim (1908, compiled by Chogyal Thutob Namgyal and Gyalmo Yeshey Dolma), the Kingdom of Sikkim comprised of bigger area than its present size. It included all the territories of Dibadala in the North, Shingsa Dagpay, Walung, Yangmag Khangchen, Yarlung and Timar Chorten in the West, down along Arun and Dud Kosi rivers down to the Maha Nodi, Naxalbari, Titalia in the South, on the east Tagong La and Tang la on the North and it was once known as Greater Sikkim (Cited in Lama, 2008: p. 11). The borders of the kingdom of Sikkim occupies a strategic occupation because it touched four countries, viz. China, Nepal, Bhutan and India. The small kingdom not only occupies strategic importance but also

facilitates commercial interests as it commanded the historic Kalimpong-Lhasa trade route which was the shortest one from India to the heart of Tibet (Dasgupta, 1999).

Prior to the year 1816 the whole of the territory of Sikkim belonged to Nepal, which the latter had won by conquest from the Sikkimese (Dozey, 1922). Hamilton in the history of Sikkim says that Rabdangtse was taken ‘‘shortly previous to the 28th October, 1788, as in a letter from Mr Pagan of that date he had just received accounts of the entire conquest of Sikkim by the Gorkhalese’’ (Cited in Pradhan, 1882: p. 7; 2009 p. 145). It was prior to 28 October 1788 under the leadership of Purna Ale, commander in chief of the Gorkhali force, Rabdangtse which happened to be the capital of Sikkim was captured by the Gorkhas. Till March 1789 the boundary of Teesta and the whole of the hills except Kalimpong and plains was under the kingdom of Nepal. So, the Gorkhas spread in every nook and corner of the Sikkimese territory (Pradhan, 1982) The term Nepal was only referred to the *Kathmandu* Valley, and the people inhabiting there identified themselves simply as Newars as did all the other people of the Himalayan hills who identified themselves by their ethnic, cultural, religious or caste groupings. They were Chetttri, Bahun, Thakuri, Magar, Gurung, Newar, Rai, Limbu, Tamang, Sherpa, Lepcha, Bhutia, Drukpa and so on (Lama, 2008).

The territories of Nepal was expanding just like the British East India Company. It was due to the disagreement over the frontier policy of the Nepal that a war was declared towards the close of 1813 by the British, and two campaigns followed in the second of which they were defeated by General Ochterlony. The Gorkhali force were finally humbled by the British East India Company and they signed a treaty at Sugauli at the end of 1816[8] in which the Nepalese ceded the 4,000 square miles of territory to the British. The British East India Company in turn by a treaty signed at Titalya on February 10th, 1817[9], handed over this territory to the Rajah of Sikkim (Dozey, 1922; Pradhan, 1982:2009; O’ Malley, 2001) and Sikkim was maintained as a buffer state between Nepal and Bhutan (Dash, 2011). It was from the Nepal War in 1817, the British East India Company intervened in the internal affairs in Sikkim and they obtained the paramount position of in Sikkim (Buchanan, 1917). According to many

[8]See Appendix II
[9]See Appendix III

sources available the present state of Nepal acquired its shape from thatmoment onwards.

The Rajah of Sikkim finally got his lost kingdom after the treaty of Titalya and he was assigned to the role of arbiter for the disputes between the British subjects and those of neighboring states. Ten years later the disputes arose between Sikkim Nepal frontiers arose and were referred to the Governor General (O' Malley, 2001; Dozey, 1922). The Governor General in his part deployed two officers, Captain Llyod and Mr Grant in 1828 to settle the disputes which was famously known as *Ontoo boundary dispute* between the Nepal and Bhutan found their way into Chungtong to the west of Darjeeling, and were much impressed with the possibilities of the station as a sanatorium (Dozey, 1922). In a much later visit, Lloyd spent six days in February 1829 in ''the old Goorkha Station of Darjeeling'' as he was attracted by its advantages as a site for sanatorium. Mr Grant in his part also reported accordingly to the then Governor General Lord William Bentick regarding the numerous advantages possessed by the Darjeeling (Dozey, 1922; Dash, 2011; Pradhan, 2001).The then Governor General then deputed Captain Herbert, then Deputy Surveyor General to examine the country in company with Mr Grant to observe the advantages and importance of Darjeeling and its feasibility for sanatorium. Captain Herbert also recommended favourably on the situation of Darjeeling hill (O'Malley, 2001; Dozey, 1922).The Court of Directors of the East India Company approved the project and they accordingly directed that Lieutenant General Lloyd be deputed to start negotiations with the Sikkim Raja for a cession of the hill either for an equivalent in money or land (Dozey, 1922; Pinn, 1990; O'Malley, 2001). It becomes however important to note that the British wanted to hold Darjeeling because of its geo political importance as being an integral part of Sikkim and to get political hold on Tibet with which British commercial interests was associated. After getting their hold on Darjeeling and the containment of Nepal, the English traders started to increase trade with Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan, and these countries serve the commercial interests and security of the British throughout 19th century (Dasgupta, 1999).

According to Fred Pinn in his book, *The Road of Destiny: Darjeeling Letters* (1996), it was on 23 January 1835 the proceedings of open negotiation started with the Chogyal of Sikkim for the transfer of Darjeeling to the British Government (Pinn,

1990). On 1st February 1835 Lloyd became successful in getting a deed of grant from the Raja of Sikkim (Dozey, 1922; O'Malley, 2001). The deed of grant as provided in the *Bengal District Gazeeter: Darjeeling* authored by O' Malley reads as follows:

> *The Governor-General, having expressed his desire for the possession of the hill of Darjeeling on account of its cool climate, for the purpose of enabling the servants of his Government, suffering from sickness, to avail themselves of its advantages, I, the Sikkimputtee Rajah, out of friendship for the said Governor-General, hereby present Darjeeling to the East India Company, that is, all the land south of the great Rangit river, east of the Balasun, Kahali and little Rangit rivers and west of Rungpo and Mahanadi rivers*(O' Malley, 2001: p. 26).

The deed of Grant of Darjeeling remains a mystery from the day of its inception and it led to misconceptions, wrong beliefs, harmful actions, and erroneous statements. As from the information provided by the Fred Pinn in his work, enlighten us that the Council on 15th June, sent a peremptory order to the Major Lloyd stating that 'from your (Major Lloyd) letter that the Raja of Sikkim is not to cede Darjeeling', ''You are therefore desired to abstain from urging any further negotiation having that object in view'' (Cited in Pinn, 1990). The Chogyal of Sikkim asked for the expansion of western boundary of Sikkim and demanded Dabgong in exchange with Darjeeling. For various reasons, the demand of Chogyal was not met by the company. In a letter to the Rajah of Sikkim from the Governor General after the cession of Darjeeling, Governor General writes ''I regret that I was unable to comply with your requests for the cession of Dabgaon and for compelling Rummoo Pradhan to render an account. Dabgaon could not be given to you because it had already became the property of another, and it is not consistent in our practice to call people to account for money transactions which have taken place in Foreign Territories'' (Cited in Pinn, 1990). From that time onwards that the seed of hostility is sown between the Raja of Sikkim and the Company, and the formerwas waiting for his gift equivalent to the Darjeeling hill. The Government at Calcutta had no idea of their obligation, for the cession of Darjeeling had been unconditional (Pinn, 1990). Eventually, the Government provided the Rajah of Sikkim did receive the first allowance of 3000 rupees and then

it raised to 6000 rupees per annum in 1846 (Pinn, 1990; Dozey, 1922; O'Malley, 2001).

The ''deed of grant'' made the British as the owner and caretaker, and the development of Darjeeling was solely in the hands of the British East India Company. Immediately, after the cession General Lloyd and Dr. Chapman in 1836 were sent to explore and investigate the climate and capabilities of the place where finally theydecided to develop Darjeeling as a sanatorium (Pinn, 1990; O'Malley, 2001; Dozey, 1922). With the growing significance of Darjeeling and the relative use of it by the Britishers the relations between the Rajah and the British deteriorated when the former witnessed a loss of revenue which also resulted in sowing the seeds of frustration to the Lamas and leading men of Sikkim, who were headed by Dewan Namguay, asthey were sharers in a monopoly of all trade in Sikkim and with the coming of the Britishers they virtuallylost their rights over those slaves who settled as free men and British subjects in the Darjeeling. On November 1849, the relationship between them further deteriorated when Sir Joseph Hooker and Dr. Campbell were taken as prisoners, while travelling in Sikkim with the permission of Raja and of the British Government. Eventually on the 24th December 1849, after various demands for their release, the Sikkimese released them unconditionally. The outcome of this incident was the suspension of Rs. 6000 per annum which the British Government had to pay to the Raja of Sikkim as compensation for Darjeeling. It also led to the loss of control over some of the territories by the Raja of Sikkim, as in February 1850 a small punitive force entered Sikkim and annexed the Sikkim Terai, and extended the Darjeeling tract all the way to the Mechi River bordering Nepal frontier on the west and upto Ramman and Tista in the east, and the Nepal frontier on the west. (Dozey, 1922; Basnet, 1974; Dash, 2011).

The whole of the Darjeeling Tract including all of the Terai lands of Siliguri, Kharibari and Phansadewa, belonging to the Kingdom of Sikkim was forever lost to the British. Kalimpong and Dooars were also annexed by East India Company from Bhutan after the Anglo Bhutanese war of 1864-65. It was by the *Treaty of Sinchula*[10] signed on 11th November, 1865, British annexed 486 sq. miles of land in the east of river Teesta from Bhutan. It was only in 1866 Kalimpong was transferred to the

[10] See Appendix IV

Darjeeling District (Dozey, 1922; O'Malley, 2001). Thus the Darjeeling district took its final shape and size. It must be remembered that the Dooars was also a part of Sikkim conquered by Bhutan and annexed to the British India in 1865 (Subba, 1992). Since then Darjeeling has been rendered the position of 'Non Regulation District'[11] (by the Regulating Act of 1773), 'Scheduled District' (Scheduled District Act of 1874), 'Backward Tract'[12](Government of India Act, 1919) and 'Excluded or Partially Excluded Areas'[13] (Government of India Act 1935).

3.2. The Evolution of the Gorkha Ethnic Identity in Darjeeling hills

The history of the evolution and assimilation of Gorkha/Nepali community in India and Darjeeling in particular is more complicated than the history of Darjeeling. It has led to many disputed theories and arguments. So, there are many schools of thought which are at discord with one another, regarding the extent to which the Gorkha community has become assimilated into the politico-cultural mainstream of the country (Bagchi, 2012). The present study presents the glimpse of the story which is rather long, interspersed with personal anecdotes of narrators. The term Gorkha remains much more debatable and contested issue for scholars and also for political leaders over many decades. Some says that the term Gorkha emerged from the name of small principality in Nepal and many others argue that it is taken after the name of a saint Gorakhnath who was considered as the guru of then ruler of Nepal Prithivi Narayan Shah. According to T.B Subba in his book, *Ethnicity State and Development: A Case Study of Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling* (1992), states that 'little was known about the Gorkhas who have ruled in Nepal for over four

[11]Until 1834, the territory or province which came under British India, each Presidency i.e. Bengal, Madras and Bombay under its Governor and Council was empowered to enact a code of so called 'Regulations' for its government. However, in the case of provinces or territories that were acquired but were not annexed to any of the Presidencies, their official staff could be provided as the Governor General pleased, and was not governed by the existing regulations of those three Presidencies. Such a provinces came to be known as 'Non-Regulation Provinces' or 'Non Regulation District.

[12] Backward tract means the rules and regulations of the British Government were not actually come into force unless they were specially extended to it. Darjeeling district was granted 'Non-Regulated area' but it was made 'Backward Tract' by the Act of 1919.

[13] The Simon Commision recommended the use of the term 'Excluded Areas' instead of 'Backward Tracts', and proposed that their administration should be transferred from Provincial Governments to the Government of India. It is proposed that the powers of a Provincial Legislature shall not extend to any part of the Province which is declared to be an 'Excluded Area' or a 'Partially Excluded Area. In case of the former, the Governor would himself direct and control the administration while in the case of the latter he was declared to have a special responsibility. See, Karma T. Pempahishey, Roadmap on the Trail to Gorkhaland: Partially Excluded Area-The Constittutional Guarantee p.10.

centuries until the consolidation of Nepal by the Prithivinarayan Shah' (Subba, 1992). The consolidation of Gorkha dynasty had taken place under Dravya Shah whose ancestors are said to be of Rajput origin (ibid, 1992). There are various accounts regarding the consolidation of Gorkha dynasty by Dravya Shah, but it is generally believed that it was established by Dravya Shah by killing its Khasa Kharga chief (Pradhan, 1982: 2001). And as Daniel Wright in this context writes ''The Gorkhas, or Gorkhalis, so named from the former capital of their country, are the dominant race. They formerly occupied the district around the town of the Gorkha, which is about forty miles west of Kathmandu. They are said to be of Rajput descent, and to have been driven out of Rajputana on the occasion of an invasion of Musulmans. They first settled near Palpa, having passed through the Kumaon hills, and gradually extended their dominion over Gorkha'' (Cited in Subba, 1992: p. 52).

Kumar Pradhan, who is an eminent historian from Darjeeling in his book, *The Gorkha Conquests: The process and consequences of Unification of Nepal, with particular reference to eastern Nepal* (2001), puts another perspective regarding the genesis of the term Gorkha, he says, ''it is generally believed that the land came to be called Gorkha because a Nath Yogi has installed an idol of Goraknath there even before its capture by Dravya Shah. But what seems more probable is the derivation of the name from a (Tibeto Burman) word *garkha*, meaning a cluster of villages. Others have tended to associate the name with *kharka*, meaning grassland or pasture'' (Pradhan, 2001). Kumar Pradhan in his seminal work, *Pahilo Pahar*, further enlighten us that the word *Nepali* is used in three different ways- Firstly, it connotes the Nepali language; secondly, it means as citizens of Nepal irrespective of speaking any language and; thirdly, as a cultural sameness among community those who remain outside Nepal (Pradhan, 1982: p.1).

Till the end of the eighteenth century the ''Gorkhas'' referred only to the Aryan or Khas Nepalis, Tamangs and Sunuwars and Prithivinarayan Shah himself talked of four castes in his army: Bahun, Khas, Magar and Thakuri (Subba, 1992). The British after the Anglo Nepal war (1814-15) got the opportunity of enlisting the Gorkha troops in their army. It was the British writers who highlighted the term Gorkha in their writing and formulated the *martial race theory*, and they never saw the Gorkhalis as agriculturalists but as mercenaries. Under the colonial rule it

represented only those Nepalis like Gurungs and Magars who joined the British army. Later on Kami, Damai, Chettri, Bahun, Newar also subsumed under the Gorkha nomenclature. Till then other communities such as Bhutia, Sherpa, Limboo, Tamang, Rai etc. were also outside the Gorkha community. Kumar Pradhan highlights that the Gorkha community can be divided into two different races the Aryan and Non-Aryan (Mongoloid) and in their society they are divided in two sections- "tagadhari" (sacred thread wearer) and "matwali" (liquor drinkers). These two terms were not opposite to each other, but however, it categorise Chettri, Bahun and Thakuri under the "tagadhari" category and, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Rai. Limboo, Sherpa, Lepcha, Bhutia etc., under the "matwali" category. Other castes like Kami, Damai and Sarki belongs to Aryan race but they are termed as "matwali" because of the habit of taking liquor and meat in their rituals. It becomes interesting to note that, ''tagadhari'' occupied higher position in Nepali society and ''matwali'' who were the speakers of Tibeto Burmese dialects occupied lower position and were under them (Pradhan, 1982)

The Gorkha ethnic identity has been treading a difficult and undulating path. In this process, it has accommodated many caste or tribes which did not recognize themselves as Gorkhas before (Subba, 1992). The Gorkha ethnic composition in the Darjeeling hills has its own history and processes. As Kumar Pradhan and Pratyoush Onta rightly argues that Nepali nationalism grew outside Nepal and Darjeeling was the nerve centre to that feeling (Pradhan, 1982; Onta, 1996). It was only in Darjeeling that the feeling of Nepali ethnicity emerged. The Nepalis were residing there from beginning of modern Darjeeling and at that the process of unification of Nepal was already ended. After the process of unification of Nepal, the British identified the residents of Nepal and their language as Nepali, but they lacked the feelings of nationalist sentiment for their nation. When people migrated to Darjeeling from Nepal they did not hadNepali sentiment because in contemporary Nepal different group of people used to live within their own socio-cultural domain and used to speak their own dialect (Prahan, 1982; 2009). For them Nepal denoted only the present Kathmandu valley not the whole of Nepal and Nepali as one form~~s~~ of dialect. It was only in Darjeeling that Nepali language becamepopular among those who used to work and live together (Pradhan, 1982; Lama, 2008). Though the Darjeeling hills comprises many castes and different dialect speaking people but

Nepali language becamethe lingua franca and it also provided the opportunity for the formation of the Gorkha ethnic identity. Hence the present chapter focusses on the various aspects which have contributed towards the formation of strong Gorkha ethnic identity.

3.2.1. Migration and the label of Immigration

Some scholars argue that the *Gorkhas* who are in majority in Darjeeling hills was a British discovery of race. They argue on the ground that the development of Nepali society found its root in Darjeeling district under theEast India Company rule. After the takeover of Darjeeling hill by the colonial rulers in 1835, they made Darjeeling an important economic hub. They also had a strong desire to make Darjeeling as a sanatorium and health resort just like other hill stations in India, the summer capital for the high class officials of chief city of British India (Pinn, 1990). It is generally believed that when the colonial rulers acquired Darjeeling from the Raja of Sikkim, the place was almost entirely under forest and practically uninhabited. For instance, the*Bengal District Gazetteers* by Arthur Jules Dash and O'Malley states that the hill tract of 138 miles have been uninhabited probably and that it was inhabited by a population of 100 souls (O'Malley, 2001; Dash, 2011). In 1840, Dr. Campbell who was the first Superintendent of Darjeeling calculated that the Lepcha who were regarded as the original inhabitants of Darjeeling was about 3,000 and the Tibetan population was nearly 2,000. There were no traces of Nepali speaking population (Samanta, 2000). Campbell in the year 1850, reported that the number of inhabitants have risen to 10,000 (O'Malley, 2001). However there stands another school of thought which criticises the interpretation of the human settlement in Darjeeling. For instance, D.S Bomjan argues that some writers with malafide intention, on the basis of compulsion of the British for encouraging immigration in those days to carry the development, have been writing that the present population of the region as a lineage and scion of immigrants. He further argues, ''they seemed determined to ignore the historical information which states on the fact assimilated from the archaeological relics found in Badamtam about 14 K.M far from Darjeeling a few years back, it has been apparent that there was a mixed civilisation in the undivided Sikkim which dates back to 12^{th} century, where we find traces of the Mangar, the Lepcha and Limbu Kings ruling this part of the world'' (Bomjan, 2008: p.4).

It becomes difficult to argue that no civilisation existed before in Darjeeling, Fred Pinn in his work, *The Road of Destiny*, which I consider by far most excellent literature on the history of Darjeeling and Sikkim has cited the Major Lloyd description of that place in 1829, which is as follows:

> *Formerly occupied by a large village or town (an unsual circumstance in the country) and some shops were set up in it; one of the principal Lepcha Kajees resided here, and the remains of his house, and also of a Gompah or temple…both substantially built of stone, are still extant; also several stone tombs of chytas of different forms, Kajees and Lamas. A stream of water issues from the hill; a short distance below, from the place having been so long neglected, the space which was formerly inhabited is now covered by a grass jungle…*(Pinn, 1990: p.120)

So it becomes much clear in arguing that there existed a civilisation in Darjeeling from the account of Fred Finn but his account does not throw much light on what kind of civilisation that have existed there. In a much similar way, Kumar Pradhan argues that the Superintendent of Darjeeling, Campbell provides the accounts of few huts and estimated the population of Darjeeling as 100 people was only the people residing around the vicinity of the Observatory hill (presently Mahakal Dara, Darjeeling town) but it does not takes into account of whole 138 square miles which was ceded in the 'deed of grant' by the Raja of Sikkim and there were villages and busty which were scattered. At that time regions like Pool Bazar, Mirik, Sukiapokhari, Siliguri and Kalimpong subdivisions were not under the command of colonial rulers. The *Gazetteers* follows the account of Campbell and highlights the population of Darjeeling from 100 souls in 1839 to 10,000 in 1849, they count the population of not only Darjeeling town but the whole regions like Darjeeling Sadar, Kurseong, Siliguri subdivisions. So, the history of population figures and region is presented manipulatively and the source of information for is not authentic (Pradhan, 1982).

There are persons like CPRM leader, R.B Rai and writers like D.S Bomjan and topmost thinker of Nepali literary world Indra Bahadur Rai, who questions the population figure provided in the *Gazetteers* and documents, which highlights the population of Darjeeling as 100 souls (Bomjan, 2008). For instance, R.B writes ''In

the midst of distortions and confusions regarding the aborigines, a cursory look on the prehistoric and historical events gives an indelible imprint of our primitiveness in Darjeeling'' (Cited in Bomjan, 2008: p.5). D.S Bomjan also draws a similar line of argument, he writes, ''But the reason for distortion of fact and showing of then Darjeeling with sparse population was the political and diplomatic exigency of the British so as to prove and convince the erstwhile Chogyal of Sikkim that the lands taken were desolate, uninhabited forest and unsuitable for revenue collection. Hence the alleged fact of uinhabited place as mentioned by the British was nothing except political, diplomatic and administrative design for serving their best for occupying the place'' (Bomjan, 2008: p.5-6). So, we can understand that there were Nepali speaking population residing there in Darjeeling from the beginning.

Romit Bagchi in his book, *Gorkhaland: Crisis of Statehood* (2012), states that migration in the hills startedwith the development gaining momentum, with the introduction of tea plantations and Darjeeling Himalayan Railways. They migrated to Darjeeling from Rana ruled Himlayan Kingdom of Nepal in search of livelihood and economic well-being (Bagchi, 2012). It is generally believed that lower regions of Darjeeling hills or Terai region from the early times was inhabited by aboriginal Koches and Meches and the hills by aboriginal Lepchas who followed animistic religion and primitive methods of agriculture, and the Meches were more likely to increase than the Lepchas (Dash, 2011; Pinn, 1990). With the introduction of the tea gardens in the year 1856 in *Aloobari*, then after Lebong, Dhotrey in 1859, 1860 to 1864 *Ging, Ambootay, Phubshering, Tukvar, Takdah, Makaibari*, *Pandam* and *Steinthal*, there was huge influx of migration in Darjeeling particularly from Nepal (Pradhan, 1982). In Terai, the first tea garden was opened at a place called Champta, near the present day military base at Khaprail, Sukna (Lama, 2008). Tea plantations needed large numbers of labourers in Darjeeling, the Lepchas were far too independent to bother about jobs as their needs were few, there wants even fewer and they could easily live off the land (Lama, 2008; Dash, 2011). The British also forcibly brought up natives from the Chotanagpur hilly regions of the Deccan Plateau to Darjeeling to work as a bonded labour on the tea plantations but they couldn't cope with the cold and damp of the Darjeeling hills and ran away from home and settled in the jungles of the Darjeeling Terai where their descendants still live today (Lama, 2008).

Therefore, we can find that there were three waves of migration of people to the Darjeeling after the Anglo Indian War ended in 1816. The first wave of migration with the enlistment of the Nepalis in the army and their employment as a suitable labour to clear the large swathes of virgin forest for cultivation and to build the towns and roads by replacing the plainsmen who couldn't cope with the cold and damp of the hills. The second wave especially after the opening up of the tea plantations in the late 1850s (Pradhan, 1982; Lama, 2008). The last and the final one, came in the late 1870s to work on the construction of the railway lines (Lama, 2008). As Kumar Pradhan highlights the story of ''Chiyako botma paisa falcha'' and Bidhan Golay also narrate the stories like "Chiyako botma paisa falcha" (money grows on tea bushes) which led to the acceleration of the migration in the region (Pradhan, 1982: p. 19; Golay, 2011: p. 7). Bidhan Golay writes ''It was not such a bad deal for a people who had left everything behind saying, '*ek maana khannchu, ek jhoomro launchu*', meaning I will live frugally. They believed in a story of money growing on tea bushes – *chiyako botma paisa flcahha*'' (Golay, 2011: p. 7). Human migration further strengthened with the annexation of the Kalimpong in the Anglo Bhutan war through the Treaty of Sinchula, 1865 (O'Malley, 2001).

Kumar Pradhan says, that there were two factors behind the migration of people from Nepal and scholars famously regard that factors as 'Push' and 'Pull factors'. Pull factor as already mentioned before that is with the opening up of tea gardens which is economically advantageous for them (Pradhan, 1982). Push factor which is the real cause of migration for him, was ''the economic hardship suffered as a result of the political, social and economic dimension of the high case *tagadhari* caste over *matwalis* of Mongoloid origin and 'untouchable' lower caste who constituted the overwhelming majority of the humble toiling folk. Thus many people left their lands because they were left with no other place'' (Pradhan, 2009; p. 193). There are many scholars after him who holds the view that these 'push' and 'pull' factors were mainly responsible for the human migration from Nepal. Scholars like T.B Subba, A.C Sinha, Tejimala Gurung, Romit Bagchi, Monimala Devi and many others claims that the quest for livelihood and economic well-being as the pull factors, and the brutal autocratic Rana regime of Nepal led to the domination and subjugation of socio-economic life by the *tagadhari* caste (Indo Aryans) over the *matwali* caste

(Mongoloids) (Sinha, 2003: Subba, 2003: Monimala, 2008; Tejimala, 2003, Bagchi, 2012).

With the development of the trade and communication, together with Nepali, there was a good deal of migration from other Indian states as well, mention may be made of Rajputana, Mewar, Alwar and Oudh, which was independent kingdom at that time and also a good number of Muslims from the state of Darbhanga (Lama, 2008). Despite the strong numerical position of the Nepali, development of communication and trade led to exploitation and complete domination in economic sphere by Marwari, Behari and Bengali traders and professional men over the Nepali in the Darjeeling (Dash, 2011).

The result was the mixed and heterogeneous population that not only developed the economy of Darjeeling but also developed the socio-cultural bondages among themselves. With these, new composite culture began to grow in the Darjeeling different from the other regions of India. In their native country, Nepal the '*the matwali of mongoloid origin or lower caste*' were unable to pay debts or taxes, or a social caste or he had been condemned to slavery or was politically victimised. In Darjeeling the Gorkha was free from the bondages and the constricted traditional social hierarchy of his native country (Lama, 2008; p. 160). The Gorkhas of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds mixed quite freely with each other and caste taboos, social restriction were ignored. A different kind of culture and social sprang up when they *without loss of caste* much less *loss of face*, high caste married low caste, Tibetans, Rais, Limboos, Gurungs, Tamangs, Chettris-Bahuns, Newars and Lepchas freely intermarried, and this gave birth to a new customs devoid of religious or cultural restrictions (Lama, 2008). The migrated people who were residing in the tea gardens used to share the feeling of happiness and sorrow with each other while working together developed mutual relationship among them. On the one hand, the feeling of being far away from the home land, families and villages, and on the other hand, they used to share same story of domination and subjugation, somehow act as a 'cultural bond' to hold the feeling of one-ness among the migrated population in colonial Darjeeling hill. As mentioned by Kumar Pradhan, that the different tribes were losing their own different community based identities and slowly they were in

the process of making greater Nepali cultural identity and society in Darjeeling (Pradhan, 1982).

3.2.2. Language and Literature

There is no doubt about the fact that there are various factors responsible for the formation of Nepali cultural identity in India, the role played by the Nepali language is one of the most monumental among them. To be honest, if one is to analyse the role played by the language and literature in the formation and raising the consciousness among the Nepali *Jati* in India would consume much more time and effort than the time permitted in writing this thesis. So, this is my humble attempt to narrate or to provide precise story about the task played by the Nepali language in the formation of Nepali cultural identity in India. As a matter of fact, the term *Gorkha* is an amalgamation of various tribes or communities carrying their own distinct identities such as Rai, Limbu, Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Newars, Bahun-Chettri and many others speaking their own dialects or *kura* among their particular community. So, the Nepali language used by the Gorkha community in India in general and Darjeeling in particular has emerged in turn as a result out of an amalgamation or pidgin of numerous separate Kura (dialects or speech) known as *Khas-Kura* or *Gorkhali or Parbatiya* (Chattopadhyay, 2008).

Let me dwell on a precise manner, how the Nepali language was previously regarded as *Khaskura or Parbatiya*. After the establishment of Mughal empire in India in 1526 after defeating the Lodi Kings in the battle of Panipat, some of the minor Rajahs and their courts fled from the Mughal onslaught escaped to the hills of Kumaon and Garhwal and then deeper into west Nepal. This migration led a huge impact on the eastern Himalayas where the Rais and Limboos lived. These Indo Aryans (Chettri-Bahuns) entered the Khasa kingdoms of the '*Khasa*' people of *Thakuri, Thapa, Basnyet*, etc. in the Far and Mid-West Nepal. They brought with them a culture and language which soon dominated the rest, evolving into a common medium of communication in the hills known as *Khaskura.* It was then more commonly referred as *Parbate* and it was confined to upper caste Brahmins and Chettris (Lama, 2008). Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, an eminent linguist writes, 'the original dialect of the Khas was completely killed; being overlaid and absorbed by the Indo-Aryan or Hindusthani speech, a new group of dialect evolved, the Western

Central and Eastern Pahari dialects. The Eastern Pahari dialect or the Khaskura flourished and spread eastwards. This language of the Khas, that is Khaskura, rapidly became the language of communication among the multilingual tribes of the Himalayan hill country' (Cited in Karr, 2009). It portrays that the name Khas Jura itself was given by the Tibeto-Burman speaking Mongoloids (Golay, 2011).

The term Nepal was only referred to the *Kathmandu* Valley, and the people inhabiting there identified themselves simply as Newars as did all the other people of the Himalayan hills who identified themselves by their ethnic, cultural, religious or caste groupings. They were Chetttri, Bahun, Thakuri, Magar, Gurung, Newar, Rai, Limbu, Tamang, Sherpa, Lepcha, Bhutia, Drukpa and so on (Lama, 2008). In the Malla Kingdom of Kathmandu Valley language like Newari and Maithili was used and other small tribes such as Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Limboo, Murmi, Khusunda, Kirati used their own dialects. So, the formation of social structure was based on distinct class base cultural practices and dialectical presentation, there was a lack of integration opportunity among different socio-cultural groups in Nepal. As a result, there did not emerged the feeling of oneness among different tribes and communities. However in Darjeeling, although they used to speak their own dialects of their particular community but the usage of Nepali language spread rapidly. In haat-bazaar, busty, cantonment and in their working places such as tea gardens, Nepali language became the medium of communication replacing the dialects of their particular communities. So, the different tribes were losing their dialects and they were in the process of making Nepali cultural identity and society (Pradhan, 1982).

The adoption of Nepali language among the different communities of diverse origins was a natural process because their migrants sense of being, a very small minority in a very large country. It also provided a sense of security and solidarity among them (Chalmers, 2009). As according to Rhoderick Chalmers, Nepali language ''as the one tangible cultural feature that all came to share, rapidly became a crucial symbol of the Nepalis' distinct identity. Language rights were sought for their own sake and then became a rallying point for wider political demands as Nepali-speakers developed a sophisticated sense of a supra-ethnic, but sub-national, identity'' (Chalmers, 2003: p. 96). It was only after the formation of kingdom of Nepal that the language known variously as Khaskura, Parbate and Gorkhali assumed another

name, Nepali. It was Lord J.A. Ayton, Assistant Professor of Fort William College in Calcutta, who first used the name *Nepali* and his first grammar of the Nepali language was published in 1820 (Pradhan, 2009).

The name Nepali was used and made popular outside Nepal and it was only in 1930s, Nepali language was recognised in Nepal (Pradhan, 2009). It was in Darjeeling, Nepali language emerged as language of entire Nepali community in a true sense (Pradhan, 1982). So, in this context, it can be said that in India in general and Darjeeling in particular, the Nepali language has helped to bring about the closer integration of the Kirats, Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Newars, Brahmans, Chhetris and others. They spoke Nepali as their first language or mother tongue. There are various socioeconomic factors behind the rise of feeling of Nepali identity in India, andlanguage serves as a bond of unity among them (Pradhan, 2009). So it can be argued that the Nepali speaking people had grown into compact nationality in India living in the region comprising Darjeeling Terai and Dooars. Nepali region in its nascent stage was the lingua franca of the region. It was in Darjeeling that the name of Nepali for an organisation was given and it was regarded as *Nepali Sahitya Sammelan* which was established in 25th May, 1924 for the development of language and literature (Bomjan, 2008; Pradhan, 1982). In Nepal at that time *Gorkha Bhasa Prakashini Samity* was there and their newspaper was called as *Gorkhapatra* (Pradhan, 1982). The Nepali Sahitya Sammelan after treading many difficult path stands as the oldest literary organisation of Gorkhas in India (Bomjan, 2008).

It was the spread and development of Nepali language and literature which became the focal point for the composite ethnic culture of the hill sub-divisions of the district (Dasgupta, 1999). At that time Nepali language was taught in the name of *'Nepali Pahadiya or Khaskura'* in Calcutta University till the graduation level (Pradhan, 1982). It was only after the emergence of a middle class Nepali literati led by the personalities like Parasmani Pradhan, Dharanidhar Koirala and Surya Bikram Gyawali who are famously regarded as *'Su-Dha-Pa'* that the ethnic cultural identity of the Nepalis of Darjeeling began to assert itself (Dasgupta, 1999). They had identified *Nepali* bhasa as an essential element of unifying a historical narrative for their own self-identity as a community (Onta, 1996).

In one of the Dharnidhar Koirala's poem entitled *Udodhan* (clarion call) edited by Parasmani Pradhan which is published in the third edition of *Chandrika* captures the essence of those times (Golay, 2011).

The poem goes like this:

> *Jaga jaga aba jagana jaga;*
> *Laga unnati vise aba laga;*
> *Ghora nindra aba parityaga;*
> *Bho bhayo ati suteu aba jaga;*
> *Desh bandhu haru ho utha jaga;*
> *Laga unnati vise aba laga;*
> *Hera lau aru haru saba jage;*
> *Desa unnati vise saba laga;*
> *Hami haru pani lau aba jagaun;*
> *Desa unnati vise saba lagaun.* (Cited in Golay, 2011:p.13).
>
> *Rise up now, you rise;*
> *Now march towards the path of progress;*
> *Forsake the slumber now;*
> *Enough you have slept, get up now*
> *My dear countrymen get up, rise up;*
> *March towards the path of progress;*
> *Look around you; others have already woken up;*
> *They are working hard for the progress of their country;*
> *So let us also now wake up;*
> *Let us also work hard for the progress of our country.* (Translated by Golay, 2011: p.13).

This poem calls for the urge of progress for the development of Gorkha people. The Nepali literary novels also narrated the stories of migration and exploitation. Some of the famous literary works provides a vivid description of migration and exploitation, viz. novels like Lilbahadur Chhetri's, '*Basai'* (Settlement), and *'Brahmaputra Ko Chheu Chhau'* (On the Banks of Brahmaputra), Laina Sing Bangdel's *'Muluk Bahira'* (Outside the Homeland), and Rudraraj Pande's

'*Prayaschit*' (Golay, 2011). Apart from novel literary works, the reasons were similar for the instant favor of Manbahadur Mukhia's drama, Ani Deorali Rooncha (And the Valley Cries) in Darjeeling (Golay, 2011). There was a flurry of social movements and organizations (particularly Gorkha Dukh Niwarak Sammelan (G.D.N.S) established on June 3rd, 1932 and Sri Hitkari Sammelan established in 1945) which also helped to develop the Gorkha/Nepali ethnicity in Darjeeling. Mention may be made of religious movement founded by Shashidhar which is known as *Joshmani* sect. It was against the caste system, superstition and against animal sacrifice. The Joshmani saints and poets flourished in different parts of India, one of the *Joshmani* saint Jnandil Das (c. A.D 1821-1883) made Darjeeling as the centre of the movement. He also finished his poetical work *Udayalahari* in 1877 at Darjeeling which contains one hundred and nine stanzas (Rai, n.d: pp. 174-175) which was critique of the contemporary society. It provides us the doctrine of *Joshmani* movement in Darjeeling. These are the few lines of Udayalahari as presented by Bidhan Golay which is translated by Kumar Pradhan. Those lines are as follows:

> *Ain bajro dhaniko firyo jagamaaha;*
> *Ghurya bichari nisap herchha kaahaa;*
> *Ghusyaha bichari jagatama firchhan;*
> *Dhana bhannya Sadhu jani jani girchan.*
>
> *Law are made for the rich, such appears the universal rule;*
> *From judges taking bribes none can get justice;*
> *There are many in the world who are untrue;*
> *Like friars who run after wealth;*
> *Be sure, they will fall down the precipice.* (Cited in Golay, 2011: pp.11-12).

Another stanza of Jnandil Das poem reads as follows:

> *Flour pounded of millet from the Rumja plain (a Gurung area) is spiced with nothing but water or nirguna (Brahma).*
> *Gurungs (who are Vaishyas) mastered spiritual knowledge and religious duties, and Brahmas were left wondering* (Rai, n.d: pp.175).

It was because of their efforts in general and trios (*Su-Dha-Pa*) efforts in particular that the West Bengal Governmentissuedthe official notification on 30th July 1926 thereby declaring the use of Nepali language in place of *'Nepali Pahadiya or Khaskura'* in different institutional examinations. On 8th January 1927 the West Bengal Government regarded Bengali, Urdu, Hindi and Nepali as its chief language. It was the sincere efforts of Parasmani Pradhan, Suryabikram Gyawali and Dharnidhar Koirala that the Calcutta University on 30th May 1932 recognised 'Nepali (Parbatiya)' as Nepali language (Pradhan, 1982). The Nepali language brought socio-political consciousness among the people in Darjeeling hills.

Kumar Pradhan in his work *Pahilo Pahaar* argues that ''some people might suspect that the *Nepali Sahitya Sammelan* is trying to uplift the language spoken by the Gorkhalis but it is not right to think in that way because nowadays this language has become the lingua franca of the Himachal Pradesh…Also it does not suit for any *Jati* to claim that this language is only their language'' (Pradhan, 1982: p.34). Kumar Pradhan cites the writing of Gyawali *Nepali Sahitya Tatha Usko Awasyaktha,* he quotes ''No matter whether we are Nepalis of Nepal, or Nepalis of Hindustan, we call ourselves as independent Jati. Indeed we are. But the chief identity of independence is an autonomous language and literature'' (Pradhan, 1982: p.34-35). It was later in Nepal that the *Gorkha Bhasa Prakishini Samiti* was renamed as *Nepali Bhasa Prakishini Samiti* and their language as Nepali (Pradhan, 1982).

Among the other notable contributions, the Nepali Sahitya Sammelan published several books including reprint editions of Dharanidhar's Naivedthya and Motiram Bhatta's 1891 biography of Bhanubhakta in 1927 and 1938. The Sammelan between 1933 and 1949 published a number of biographies of Nepali heroes written by Gyawali and an annual magazine entitled Nepali Sahitya Sammelan Patrika between 1931 and 1937 (Onta, 1996).

As a premier literary organization of the Nepalis in India, the Nepali Sahitya Sammelan carried out the task of promoting Nepali language through publication of books on various issue and nature. In the guidance of Sammelan, Gorkha Bhasa not only changed into Nepali bhasa but it also gained popularity not only in Darjeeling hills but all over India (Bomjan, 2008). During the period of 1970s there was a mass mobilization of Nepali population all over the India to include the Nepali Language

in the VIIIth schedule of Indian Constitution. After this time Nepali Language ceased to became the "promoter" of Gorkha identity in India. On 31st January 1972, All India Nepali Bhasa Samiti was formed. The main purpose for establishing the Samiti was to get recognition ofNepali language in the VIII schedule of the Indian Constitution. The Samiti along with other institutions All India Nepali Bhasa Samiti, Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad and other social and political organization after getting through the numerous struggles in their way to recognise the Nepali language, finally became successful in enlisting the Nepali language under the VIIIth Schedule of Indian Constitution on 31st August 1992. On that day, Nepali along with two other language, Manipuri and Konkani (official language of Manipur & Goa) was included into the VIIIth schedule of India Constitution by enacting the 71st Constitutional Amendment Act (Lama, 2008). Thus one can say that Nepali language/literature brought the socio-political awareness among the Nepali speaking people in India and Darjeeling in particular, and it became the vehicle in fostering and strengthening Nepali cultural identity in Darjeeling hills.

3.3. Gorkha Identity Politics and the demand for Separate Statehood (1980-2012)

There remains many strands and approaches regarding the emergence and how does an ethnic identity of the Gorkhas/Nepalis have been marred by the political connotations over the years in Darjeeling hills. Since, the demand for the statehood made by the Gorkha ethnic community have always changed its intensity and dimensions with the constant reoccurrence, it becomes an invincible terrain for the academicians to provide a precise cause concerning the issue of the Gorkha ethnic identity over the years and their quest for separate statehood. Perhaps, one can argue that the historical and geographical flux, a continuous feeling of exclusion and perceived cultural dominance by others have aggravated the demand for the creation of Gorkhaland. On the one hand, the demand for their separate statehood is based on the idea that they have no historical, ethnic, social, linguistic, or cultural links with the rest of Bengal, and on the another, they feel that they have been politically and economically marginalised by the numerically superior ethnic Bengalis. They resists every attempt, official or otherwise, to submerge his language and culture to the numerically superior regional language and culture – ''therefore his very identity is

at stake'' (Lama, 2008: p. 276). However, Romit Bagchi says, that ''the statehood agitation in the Darjeeling hills is a manifestation of 'a differentiation syndrome', discernible among the enlightened sections of the long marginalised Gorkha community settled over there'' (Bagchi, 2012: p. 96).

The demand for the separate statehood of Gorkhas have always been marred by the question of 'identity and development'. However, the different issues and challenges faced by the people in the region and their aspiration for protecting sociocultural practices that emerged in the Darjeeling hills unique to the other communities in India resulted in the emergence of Gorkha identity politics and Gorkhaland movement. As G. Jordon and C. Weedon views ''culture' as both a contested category and a contested space, involving power at several levels—individual, social and institutional—and, hence, leads to a broadening of our understanding of the ways in which meanings, subjectivities and cultures remain contested and challenged'' (Cited in Ganguly, 2015). Acccording to Michel Foucault in one of his lecture entitled, *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heteropias* ''there are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society— which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted…'' (Foucault, 1984: p. 3). So, the question remains how the cultural identity of Gorkhas can be contested, represented and how it can be inverted.

Ethnic movements in Darjeeling have over hundred years old history, 110 years to be precise. The history of ethnic movements in Darjeeling dates back to 1907, with the first ever demand for ''separate administrative set-up for the district of Darjeeling was placed before the government by the leaders of the hill people. The ''hill people'' here referred to the Lepchas, Bhutias, and the Nepalis'' (Subba, 1992: p. 76). The ''hill people'' also introduced before the Montague Chelmsford Report on 8th November 1917 'one point' agenda for the 'creation of separate unit comprising Darjeeling District with the portion of Jalpaiguri District' (Pempahishey, 2013: p.6). The members of the Hillmen's Association also presented a memorial for inclusion of some 'some special reservations be made' for the Gorkhas in India in order to preserve their solidarity (Pempahishey, 2013: pp.12). Since then, there have been

various demands raised time and again for the homeland of the Gorkhas. The undivided Communist Party (CPI) and AIGL demanded for an independent nation for Gorkhas i.e. *Gorkhasthan,* comprising of the present day Nepal, Darjeeling district and Sikkim(Subba, 1992). The CPI in April 1954 for the first time also spoke for the ‘‘regional autonomy’’ for the hill areas of Darjeeling. The demand for ‘‘regional autonomy’’ was jointly placed by the Congress, the CPI and the AIGL before the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru when he visited Darjeeling (Subba, 1992). Swatahsiddha Sarkar says that ‘‘the experience of Gorkha ethnic movement throughout its more than hundred years’ history has been guided by two major claims: firstly, an aspiration to govern themselves without jeopardising the sovereignty of the nation state (i.e. self-determination without secession); and secondly, the urge to recognise collective rights and almost all salient cultural and social issues that earmarked their distinction and distinctiveness from an ‘inescapable’ other (i.e. politics of culture, ‘identity’ and ‘recognition’) (Sarkar, 2013: p. 3). However, the present study focuses upon the ethnic movement of the Gorkhas from 1980’s. One of the prime reason for this is that, it was from the year 1980, the Gorkha agitation for separate status within the Indian federation as an organised and serious political movement that called for separate statehood and was willing to indulge in violent agitations emerged under the leadership of Subash Ghising with the formation of his Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) (Ganguly, 2005) on 3rd April 1980 (Lama, 2008).

3.3.1. Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and their quest for Gorkhaland

The emergence of Subash Ghising and his Gorkha National Liberation Front changed the intensity and dimensions of the Gorkha identity politics. Prior, to the formation of GNLF and the emergence of Subash Ghising, there was a loose combination of 16 political parties led by the disgruntled factions of the *All India Gorkha league* to form the *Pranta Parishad.* It was formed for the demand of ‘‘Pranta’’ meaning ‘‘land’’ i.e. land for the Gorkhas in India in the form of separate State comprising Darjeeling and Dooars to be carved out from the West Bengal (Lama, 2008). The Pranta Parishad was in fact the first political party of the Gorkhas to highlight the demand for separate state in a more organised way for the first time since the

emergence of demand for homeland of Gorkhas. It had successfully enlisted the support from the intellectuals for the first time with concrete data based on history, politics, economics and socio-cultural aspect of the people inhabiting the region. But the Pranta Parishad could not sustain against the administrative, politics and diplomacy of the government machinery which led to the premature death of the Pranta Parishad (Bomjan, 2008). It was after the unpopularity of Pranta Parishad, we can find the emergence of Subash Ghising and his Gorkha National Liberation Front and started the movement for Gorkhaland by separating the region from West Bengal (Bomjan, 2008). Rajat Ganguly pays credit to Subash Ghising for his achievement, he regards,"Almost overnight, he has done what the Gorkha League, Pranta Parishad and the Nepali Bhasha Parishad have been trying to do for years: to make the inhabitants of the hills aware of their deprivation and instil a sense of deep insecurity in them. He has also managed to convince them that the land belongs to them and that they were doing nothing more than rightfully claiming what is theirs'' (Ganguly, 2005: p.475)

The GNLF raised the demand for separate State referring Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. It was for the first time Article 3 of the Indian Constitution was invoked and many leaders bestow the impression that demanding a separate statehood as an Indian citizens is a constitutional right (Subba, 1992). It was the fear of the eviction from the land and a sense of homeland in the tea garden areas which provided a strong rural mass base and consolidated the movement led by the GNLF. The GNLF led movement under the leadership of Subash Ghising was more intensified and violent than the previous movements led by the other leaders. There were frequent clashes between the GNLF and the paramilitary forces. It was in the year of 1986 that the movement took a violent turn and it will always be remembered in the history of movement of Gorkhas.

Subash Ghising brought up the issue of 'identity and land' in their struggle for the separate statehood (Subba, 1992: Bagchi, 2012). However, T. B Subba questions the identity issue highlighted by Ghising, because it is quite confusing whether Ghising is talking about ethnic identity or political identity- whereas the first connotes a cultural linguistic and the latter embracing the question of a nationality. He stated that the statehood may certainly help an ethnic group maintain its ethnic identity

within its political boundaries but it can do little about the same living outside the state (Subba, 1992) and with regard to development he even feltthat Darjeeling was better in terms of development than most of the districts of West Bengal and rendered that their struggle is for land and identity (Bagchi, 2012). Perhaps, it was also a movement against the political and sociocultural hegemony of West Bengal over the numerically inferior people and it was a movement striving for self-rule and a fight for internal colonialism. It was the issue of land and identity that brought the mass participation of the people and the West Bengal Government to tackle the demand used the paramilitary force against the leaders and the people in the region. But the use of force led to more and more participation of the people with anger resentment. It was due to the growing popularity and mass resentment of the people against the Government of West Bengal, the Government was startled and labelled the movement as antinational (Bomjan, 2008).

The undergoing ethnic movements in Northeast India provided the fertile grounds for the statehood movement in Darjeeling like the anti-foreigner campaign launched by the All Assam Students Union and All Meghalaya Khasi Students Union for the expulsion of foreigners from Meghalaya. The most immediate cause which ignited the fire for the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling was the expulsion of few hundred Nepali citizens working in Jowai hills coalmine on the grounds that they did not possess necessary entry permits (Sarkar, 2014; Ghosh, 2009). The expulsion of Nepalis in Meghalaya provoked the Nepalis in Darjeeling regarding their status in India and further helped Ghising to gather support in unleashing the movement for the creation of their homeland outside the province of West Bengal (Dasgupta, 1999). All these were the external factors which shaped the Gorkha identity politics in 1980s under the leadership of Ghising.

The GNLF carried forward the demand of abrogation of Articles VI and VII of the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty[14], under these articles both the Governments of Nepal and India have agreed to grant on reciprocal basis to the nationals of one country in territories of other, same privileges in matters of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, and equal opportunities to the citizens of one

[14] See Appendix I

country in terms of industrial and economic development [15](Subba, 1992; Samanta, 2000; Bagchi, 2012). According to Ghising, these articles were responsible for the identity crisis of Nepalis in India. For him, the Article VII of the aforesaid treaty made the Gorkhas living in India for more than a century as a reciprocal citizens and not the real legal citizens of India (Samanta, 2000). Ghising burnt the copies on Indo Nepal friendship Treaty on June 29th 1986 (Chadda, 2005) as a sort of protest against the injustice done to the minority Gorkha community in India as it rendered them the status of immigrants after 1950 on the basis of theprovisions provided by the treaty. So, he fought against the provisions granted by the Articles VI and VII and he himself favoured the use of theterm Gorkha in order to distinguish between the Nepali citizens of India and from those of Nepal counterparts.

Amiya K. Samanta tries to highlight the objectives of the GNLF based on Ghising's plans and programmes as follows. These are:

a) creation of separate homeland for the Gorkhas in India, b) recognition of the Nepali language in the Eight schedule of the Constitution, c) abrogation of the Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950 with a view to removing uncertainty in Nepalis minds, d) employment of the 'sons of the soil', with emphasis on the recruitment in the army (Samanta, 2000: p 117). However, D.S Bomjan says that, Ghising was not in favour of the recognition of the Nepali language, instead he forwarded the demand for inclusion of Gorkha language in the Indian Constitution rather than Nepali (Bomjan, 2008).

Subash Ghising who was the President of the newly formed GNLF Party on 2nd August 1980, submitted a memorandum to the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi demanding a separate state of Gorkhaland within the provisions of the Indian Constitutions. The Memorandum highlights, ''…this is the second time we remind you that we the Indian Gorkha after independence are stateless and futureless and futureless all over India. Our future was murdered by the Indian Constitution when our land and territory was wrongly and blindly merged with West Bengal in 1956…as a result…Indian Gorkhas were politically tortured all over India…Please correct the mistake…and return our land and territory from West Bengal. Under no

[15]Ibid

circumstances we can remain in West Bengal. We want our Gorkhaland Government as other citizens of India enjoying the fruits of their toil of independence as promised by the First Independence Resolution of the Congress Party on 26th January, 1930…'' (Cited in Lama, 2000: p. 214).

He also wrote a telegram to the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, it states, ''…please now take back your prison administration of Bengal from our Gorkhaland within six months. We firmly believe in democracy but not slavery. Slavery cannot be compared with any ''ism'' of the world. Slavery is slavery. Gorkhaland state will always honour to its state Bengal and Bengali people…'' (Cited in Lama, 2000: p. 214). Since from the very first inception, it becomes clear that the GNLF had a strong desire for the creation of Gorkhaland within Indian Union and they wanted to stay outside the domain of West Bengal. Ghising was the first leader who raised the emotive and sensitive issue of 'identity and land' and reached the toiling masses for the very first time in the history of the separate statehood movement since 1907. It provided him a strong support from the chunk of the people and further consolidated the demand for Gorkhaland into a much higher level and became a matter of national importance.

On 13th March 1986, the GNLF held its first public meeting at Ghoom (station of Darjeeling) and started thirteen point programme for the demand of Gorkhaland (Lama, 2008; Samanta, 2000). Their basic motive was to disrupt and paralyse public life by repeatedly calling for shutdowns (Lama, 2008). As according to the thirteen point programme adopted in the meeting, they demonstrated and observed the 'black flag' on 13th April, 1986 and they boycotted state election and decided not to pay the taxes (Samanta, 2000). On 23rd March 1986, a meeting was held in Kalimpong, and then on 23rd April another public meeting was again called in Darjeeling, where about 3500 people attended. In both the meetings Ghising gave speeches on Gorkhaland and tried to rouse ethnic passion. On 4th May about 30 supporters of GNLF drew blood from their thumbs in order to render their support for Gorkhaland[16]. The period between May 1986 and December 1988 was dominated by the series of violence and counter violence in the hills of Darjeeling hills, terai and

[16] Information Documents (1987). Gorkhaland Agitation: Facts and Issues, Government of West Bengal, p.34.

Dooars. There were frequent clashes mainly between the GNLF and CPI (M), and between the GNLF and the police and paramilitary force (Subba, 1992). On May 11, 1986, the GNLF called for a series of ‘‘bandhs’’ on May 12, 13, 14 (Subba, 1992) which completely paralysed life in the district. It was the failure of West Bengal Government to prevent the bandhs despite the ‘pre-emptive arrests’ and preventive measures led the full force of its Government machinery to supress the violence, bandhs and the growing influence of the GNLF movement (Lama, 2008). During the six year course of the GNLF led movement, the movement did not went violent and the protestors were protesting peacefully and democratically. But as the years progressed the movement under the hills went under the trauma of violent mass agitation and the nature of the Gorkhaland movement turned violent. There were frequent burning of houses and killings became everyday scene.

On 25th May 1986, the paramilitary forces opened a fire at the crowd of peaceful protestors at Kurseong which resulted in the loss of lives of six people, and later on 27th July 1986 a peaceful rally was once again stopped by a hail of bullets resulting in 13 dead and more than 50 injured (Lama, 2008). The counter by the then Chief Minister Jyoti Basu led Government against the GNLF led leaders further added fuel to the fire which led to the massive turmoil in Darjeeling. More than 500 houses were burned down and more than 1000 people lost their lives. On the other hand, huge economic impact could also be seen on the Darjeeling hills (Subba, 1992), as the movement has disturbed the three aspects of the economy of Darjeeling hills i.e. tea, timber and tourism (Dasgupta, 1999). On 6th August, the State Committee of CPI(M)’s in Calcutta was reported to have asked the CITU (Centre of Indian Trade Union) in Darjeeling to observe 24 hour bandh to expose GNLF’s ‘secessionist’ activities and also planned to organise programmes on the Independence day which could not happened because the GNLF had planned to hoist black flags on that day[17]. Later on August 10th, Indrajit Pradhan of Ambootia Tea Estate who was a local leader of CPI(M) was assassinated by the members of GNLF for his anti-GNLF activities marking the first killing by the party and then on September 6, 3 GNLF supporters were injured in a clash with CPI(M) supporters (Subba, 1992). In this way, the movement which was started for the realisation of Gorkhaland not only led the leaders and cadres of CPM, but even the common people having sympathy to the

[17]Ibid

party were subjected to harassment. As D.S Bomjan statesin Darjeeling hills ‘‘a situation was developed in which the armed rowdies, criminals and hoodlums associated with the GNLF took lead the movement targeting CPM and its supporters as well as sympathizers. In the name of Gorkhaland movement the armed attacks by GNLF and its supporters and taking of defensive measures by the later, there ensued a war of fratricidal nature. The attack, defence and counter attack had become the order of the day of the Gorkhaland movement that cost the lives of several hundred helpless and innocent people’’ (Bomjan, 2008: p. 120,121).

The violence and counter violence which started from mid-1986 in Darjeeling hills, some parts of terai and Dooars between the GNLF and CPI(M) or the police but also between the GNLF and the Gorkha Volunteer Corps (GVC) lasted for about two and half years (Subba, 1992). Finally on January 14th 1987, apparently the first steptowards harmonising the situation was taken. The then Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, and the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed to pursue a negotiated settlement. There started a constant negotiation between the GNLF, Jyoti Basu, and the Prime Minister, as per the wishes of the then Home Minister Buta Singh, suspended the movement on February 3, for about two months. But the then Prime Minister Rajiv Ganghi rejected the demand for Gorkhaland (Subba, 1992). The step towards reconciliation led to the formation of the proposed council comprising of three hill subdivisions and its adjacent areas which is known as Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council on June 29th 1988 in a meeting held at Delhi (Samanta, 2000) and a tripartite agreement was finally signed between the GNLF, the West Bengal state government, and the Indian government on 22 August 1988 (Ganguly, 2005). Ghising already facing the dissension and possible rebellion from within his party was not in a position to prolong the agitation and finally agreed to the accord of Darjeeling *Gorkha Hill Council* (DGHC)[18] (Lama, 2008) which was provided with executive and financial powers but no legislative powers (Chadda, 2005).

The memorandum of agreement states, ‘‘in the overall national interest, and in response to the Prime Minister’s call, the GNLF agrees to drop the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland’’ (Cited in Lama, 2008: p. 286). After the killings of

[18]See AppendixV

more than 1200 people and theburning of more than 500 houses, the violence finallycame to an end. Thus, the movement for Gorkhaland in 1980s became a matter of national importance and Gorkha ethnic identity politics wasraised to a new level of heightened importance in Indian political historiography. Darjeeling hills became the place for contestation of culture and power. Ghising accepted without the will and consent of the people for the more power and money and he remains snollygoster in the minds of the people of Darjeeling. Nonetheless, the movement of 1980s still today has its own historical importance, as it raised the question for the national identity of Gorkhas in India and it became the first demand of Gorkha ethnic community which incorporated the support of the huge masses of people in rendering their support for Gorkhaland.

3.3.2. Resurgence of the demand for Gorkhaland and the emergence of Bimal Gurung in the Political scenario of Darjeeling hills

The Gorkha identity politics and the demand of statehood associated with it flared up once again after 20 years and this time under the leadership of Bimal Gurung who happened to be one of the member of GNLF and led GVC in 1986 agitation for separate statehood and became one of the councillor after the creation of DGHC in Darjeeling hills. There are several factors responsible for the rise of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) and the demand of separate statehood in 2007. Perhaps, one of the prime factor was that the people were never satisfied with the acceptance of the DGHC because it did not fulfil the aspirations of large chunk of Gorkha people and most of them remarked the acceptance of DGHC as a betrayal against their own people by murdering the future of Gorkhas in India and Darjeeling in particular. The wounds deepened further, as the GNLF President Subash Ghising was in favour of the Sixth Schedule status for the Darjeeling hills while most of the people and the other leaders of Gorkha hill parties' viz. CPRM, ABGL were not in favour of inclusion of Darjeeling under theSixth Schedule status. It was the silent protest against the proposed sixth schedule from the rank and the file of the party that led to the expulsion of Bimal Gurung from the GNLF (Bomjan, 2008; Lacina, 2013). After being expelled from the GNLF and his post as Councillor, he formed the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) on 7th October, 2007 in a meeting attended by large number of people at Chowk Bazaar, Darjeeling (Bomjan, 2008; Lama, 2008; Ghosh, 2009)

and thereby spearheaded the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland. He declared and even announced in some of his public speeches that he would adopt non-violent Gandhian ideology in the struggle for separate statehood.

There is also one of the important factor responsible for the intensification of Gorkha identity politics in 2007 which is famously regarded as 'Prashant Tamang phenomenon'. In 2007, Prashant Tamang from Darjeeling got selected and became one of the contestant in the 'Indian Idol', a national level singing contest, and as a Nepali from Darjeeling, he became the representative of the millions of Nepali speaking people in India, as well as symbol of Nepali ethnic identity and solidarity for Nepalis inhabiting in different parts of the world. So the campaign for voting for Prashant Tamang started in a huge scale in Darjeeling and Nepali speaking people residing in other parts of India supported the cause as he was representing the millions of Nepali speaking Indians. It was the ecstasy and support of the Nepali people thatnot only led to Prashant winning the competition but also eventually led to the ousting of Ghising in the political arena of the Darjeeling hills and the formation of the GJM. Ghising who was heading DGHC at that time and was the political representative of the Darjeeling hills never lent his support to the cause of Prashant Tamang whereas Bimal Gurung fully lent his support and thereby won the heart of the people in Darjeeling hills. Bimal Gurung capitalising the moment, renewed the demand for Gorkhaland and turned GJM into a mass based political party that became a challenge for the GNLF.

As Anjan Ghosh, aptly remarks the formation of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha was based on twofold objectives. ''Its first move was to scuttle the inclusion of the Hill Council under the Sixth Schedule. Secondly, it united the veteran Gorkha army personnel and led them to express their solidarity for Gorkhaland'' (Ghosh, 2009: p.12). Within a short period of time, the GJM led a massive rally to Lal kothi,the headquarter of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council taking a demand for ousting of Subash Ghising from the chairman of DGHC because he was appointed as thecaretaker chairman of the DGHC without holding elections for the last two and half years. But the procession got obstructed by the police force near about kilometre away from Lal Kothi on 7th November, 2007 (Bomjan, 2008). Ghising headed towards Delhi with his party members to plead his case (Lama, 2008). It was through press statement by the CPM

and the then Chief Minister of Bengal, Ashok Bhattacherjee and M.P Suraj Pathak, the sixth schedule bill was publicised which was slated to be placed in the winter session of Parliament scheduled to begin from 15th November, 2007. The GJM after listening the statement made by them announced the burning of the copies of 'Memorandum of Agreement' which was made between the Government of India (GOI), Government of West Bengal and the chairman of the DGHC, Subash Ghising, for the conferment of the sixth schedule status to DGHC. Despite the burning of the copies of Memorandum of Agreement throughout the DGHC administered areas on 15th November, the copies of the proposed Sixth Schedule were distributed to the members of the Lok Sabha on 20th November, 2007 for its approval on 4th December, 2007 (Bomjan, 2008) and the Parliament referred *6th Schedule Amendment Bill* to the *Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home affairs* (Lama, 2008).

While returning to Darjeeling from Delhi, Ghising was debarred from entering the hills, people's blockades along the entire 78 kilometre stretch from Siliguri to Darjeeling prevented him to entering hills. A group of 138 people across the district from every community – Gorkha, Marwari, Bihari, Muslim, even from Bengali community started observing mass hunger strike from 17th February demanding the withdrawal of the 6th schedule Bill, and the removal of Ghising from DGHC (Lama, 2008).

After being referred the proposed Bill to the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the Committee recommended a review of the ground realities (Lama, 2008). People from Darjeeling and Terai and Dooars region started sending representations to Smt. Sushma Swaraj the then Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee, Home Affairs, with requests of rejecting the proposed Sixth Schedule for Darjeeling. The Parliamentary Standing Committee, Home Affairs, at last formally invited the hill parties of Darjeeling viz. Gorkha National Liberation Front, All India Gorkha League, Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists, Gorkha National Liberation Front C, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha and lastly Gorkha Rashtriya Congress to place their views before the Committee on 20th December, 2007 (Bomjan, 2008). All the parties except GNLF expressed their views against the proposed Bill and even the Congress Member of Parliament, Dawa Narbula stated his views 'against the Sixth Schedule Bill and instruct the Committee, that the formation of separate state would

be the only solution to the Darjeeling hills political problem' (Cited in Bomjan, 2008). It was the common people from all walks of life and the unity and solidarity shown by the hill parties of Darjeeling that debarred the Sixth Schedule Bill from imposing upon the hills.

On the 6th of January 2008, the GJM organised public ralliesat Lebong, Darjeeling, and the Central leader of GJM swear their allegiance to the party and programme to be pursued by them for achieving Gorkhaland in front of the people (Bomjan, 2008). In the same consecutive year, on 10th March 2008, couple of weeks before the expiry of the tenure on 31st March 2008, Ghising was compelled to resign from his post (Lama, 2008). After getting mass support from the people of the hills Gurung focused his attention towards the plains, Siliguri and its adjoining Dooars region. The GJM organised meetings and rallies in a more democratic and peaceful manner order to extent his influence in Siliguri, Terai and Dooars region. While there were some incidents of ethnic confrontation between the supporters of Amra Bengali and Jan Jagaran Manch. The GJM wants Darjeeling hills and its adjoining Terai and Dooars to be carved out from West Bengal in order to create new state of Gorkhaland.

The Government of West Bengal seemed determined to impose sixth schedule against the wishes of the people that led GJM to put pressure upon the Government by declaring strike from February 2008. Even the GJM decided to hold the fast unto death programme at the premises of the Sub divisional Office at Siliguri on 21st February, 2008. As a sort of response to that decision of GJM, the police began to barricade and blockade the different places where the roads connecting Siliguri and arrested indiscriminately the people having mongoloid face (Bomjan, 2008).

There were hunger strikes led by the GJM protestors at Panighata More, Bagdogra and inside the campus of the Block Development office of West Bengal[19] Government at Naxalbari. D.P Kar, one of the oppositional leader of Janchetana, as opposite to the claims of claims made by GJM states in his work, *The Gorkhaland Movement: A Clandestine Invasion*, ''Those hunger strikes centres became the informal camp office of GJM and were buzzing with perpetual gathering[20] of slogan

[19] https://mygorkhaland.wordpress.com/2008/09/12/responding-to-ujjm-uttarbanga-janajagaran-mancha/
[20] Ibid

shouting GJM activists throughout day and night. These were the centres of fright and danger for the simple peace living people of the area irrespective of the community…'' (Karr, 2009: p. 83).

The Government of West Bengal stands remains clear that it won't led further partition of Bengal as opposed to the claims made by the Gorkha Jamukti Morcha leaders regarding the separation of Darjeeling hills and its adjoining areas in order create separate state of Gorkhaland. But the leaders of Gorkha hill parties, including GJM try to demonstrate their uniqueness and differences by stressing their ethnic, historical, cultural and physical differences with Bengal. The wearing of *Daura Suruwal, Dhaka Topi, Chaunbandi Choli*[21]during the GJM led movement were to portray the differences with the rest of Bengal in order to legalise their claims for separate state. They even portrayed Darjeeling as a unique topographical region with an entirely different climate. For instance, the Darjeeling hills differences with the rest of Bengal can be drawn from the fact that it had never been an integral part of Bengal as even during the colonial times the district had been given special administrative status. It had been rendered the position of 'Non Regulation District' (by the Regulating Act of 1773), 'Scheduled District' (Scheduled District Act of 1874), 'Backward tract' (Government of India Act, 1919) and 'Excluded or Partially Excluded Areas' (Government of India Act, 1935) (Pempahishey, 2013), so that the rules and regulations of Bengal regarding land revenue did not apply to the area. Harka Bahadur Chhetri, (who was one of the member of GJM and today leading his own Jan Andolan Party (JAP)) in some of the public speeches and debates on television based on his intellectual rigour in history stresses that none of the proposed areas of Gorkhaland during the colonial period was ever possessed by any king of the 'plains of Bengal', but only by the kings of kings of Sikkim and Bhutan, and it had been incorporated into India through various treaties and agreements. Therefore, the hill people disable their opponents' argument, especially of Government of West Bengal that the creation of Gorkhaland would lead to second division of Bengal.

The GJM finally engaged in the first tripartite dialogue in Darjeeling held on 21 December 2009 which led to a much hype debate that in the meeting the Centre and the State Government stood against the demand made by the GJM and they would

[21]Traditional dress of the Gorkha/Nepali people in India and Nepalese of Nepal

provide an interim set up for the betterment of the people of the hills (Bagchi, 2012). The AIGL President late Madam Tamang, even claimed that the GJM would have submitted to an interim council proposal but the collective pressure had forced the GJM to insist on the statehood demand (Cited in Bagchi, 2012). Later on, he slammed the GJM leaders in some of his public speeches at Darjeeling that the GJM is betraying its people by engaging in secret dialogues for a separate interim arrangement for its people rather than supporting the statehood cause.

The GJM unlike the previous predecessor GNLF, instead of boycotting the Parliamentary and Assembly elections, welcomed and supported the BJP in both the Parliamentary elections held in 2009 and 2014. In 2009 they have supported BJP candidate Jaswant Singh and in 2014 S.S Ahluwalia, the GJM hoped that if the BJP came to power at the centre that they would fulfil the promise of promoting the Gorkhaland issue in the Lok Sabha.

The GJM leaders tried to convince the statehood demand through the national security perspective. In a meeting with former Union home minister P. Chidambaram at his North Block Office, the leaders linked the issue of national security vis-à-vis Gorkhaland. They apprised the former Union home minister that if the Centre concedes the demand of 'Gorkhaland that it would not only stabilise the chicken's neck area of North Bengal but also stabilises internal security' providing security against illegal migrants and terrorism. But the Union home minister insisted and advised them to engage on tripartite meetings (The Telegraph, 31st December, 2008).

On 21st May, 2010, the assassination of AIGL President, Madan Tamang sent a shockwave to the hills. He was hacked to death while arranging for meeting at Clubside motor stand near to Planters Club in Darjeeling. As per the information provided by the investigators of that assassination, the top leaders of GJM were accused of their involved in the assassination with the latter denying the accusations. Even for the time being a number of senior leaders of GJM including the media secretary Harka Bahadur Chhetri, Amar Lama (Madan Tamang's younger brother), Anmol Prasad, and Amar Rai resigned from the GJM as a sort of protest against the party's perceived involvement in the assassination. But afterwards all the leaders except Amar Lama returned to the party. The assassination of Madan Tamang still remains bounds with controversies and arguments.

After engaging themselves on various rounds of political negotiation at the ministerial and official levels, the GJM although having propagated and revived the demand for statehood signed tripartite agreement on 18th July, 2011[22] at Pintail village, Darjeeling district in the presence of P. Chidambaram, Union Home Minister and Mamta Banerjee led Government of West Bengal for the establishment of an autonomous council, Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) to replace the DGHC. Just like the DGHC, the GTA was given executive and financial powers but in some instances unlike the DGHC, the GTA had more legal control over to the aspects of the administration than the former DGHC, as it has been promised nearly 50 departments under it (Government of West Bengal, 2011). The GJM leaders convinced the people of Darjeeling hills that this interim arrangement would be a way forward for the demand of Gorkhaland by shattering the hopes and dreams of their people.

The issue of separate statehood movement resurfaced again in Darjeeling hills when the Union Government decided to make Telengana as the 29th State of India by bifurcating Andhra into Andhra Pradesh and Telengana. The creation of new states like Chhattisgarh Uttaranchal and Jharkhand is based on socio-political issue (Hardgrave, 2000) and this time the creation of Telengana is based on economic issues rather than linguistic line. After the Union Government's decision to break away the Andhra Pradesh, Bimal Gurung resigned from the post of chief executive of GTA and decided to hold meetings, public rallies and strikes for the pending demand of Gorkhaland. He began to call it as the 'antim larai' or the final battle for the status of separate statehood. In the month of July, the act of self-immolation by Mangal Singh in Kalimpong became one of the causal factor for the Antim larai.

The West Bengal Government's response to the agitation resulted in the deployment of paramilitary forces, the renewing of all the pending cases against the GJM party workers and leaders. As per the agreement of GTA, the Government had agreed to make efforts to release prisoners in custody (except those charge in murder). The strike occurred in different forms, including Janta curfew, in which the people expressed their dissent by remaining indoors and refrain themselves from the danger of arrest. Government of West Bengal arrested a couple of business class people by

[22] See Appendix VI

alleging their role in supplying money and food stops to provide continuation to the movement during August and September (Sarkar, 2014). The Joint Action Committee (JAC) was formed comprising all the political groups in the hills in August for the purpose of determining the course of that renewed agitation. They ruled negotiating with the Government of West Bengal and instead demanded Centre's involvement towards the issue to which the Government of West Bengal denied. The stand of the Centre towards this renewed agitation for statehood remained ambivalent. Political parties in West Bengal refrained from directly involving the steps taken by the State Government to dissipating the Darjeeling crisis but some of the organisations such as the Bengal-based Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR), All India Students' Association (AISA), Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh (BGP) and Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists (CPRM) raised their voice against the human rights violations by the state (Sarkar, 2014). But the agitation did not last much longer, the power and position of the GTA restored after various political level talks and negotiation between the concerned GJM party and the Government of West Bengal, and it brought peace and normalcy in the hills.

Darjeeling hills simmered up once again after five years recently in the year 2017, just after the decision made by Mamta Banerjee led Trinamool Congress Government in West Bengal to impose Bengali language from Class I to Class IX standard in pedagogical institutions of the hills even having their own mother tongue Nepali language. On 6th June, the GJM supporters took out processions in the Darjeeling during the visit of Mamta Banerjee. After two days on 8th June, the paramilitary forces were deployed in the region and alleged the protestors indulged in violence and arson. The *hills are burning* became once again the topic of heated debate in national television news and even some of the newspapers entitled it to whack the issue. The renewed agitation have led to the death of a number of people in the hills by the paramilitary forces which have imposed in the region and it has created a terror and fear in the minds of the people. As a sort of protest, the people in the hills raised their voices against the injustice done by the paramilitary forces and the state government for violating the human rights. They have been participating in public rallies and chanting the slogans of their demand for Gorkhaland since very long time as their voices are never been heard by the Centre and Government. Perhaps, the observation of more than two months strikes in the region for their

grievances is one of the longest than any other strikes which have been observed in the political history of India. The observation of strikes in the region had ghastly paralysed the economy and the normal life of the people in the region.

The GJM leaders frequently accused her playing the card of divisive politics in the Darjeeling hills by making separate boards for Lepchas and other communities, and step motherly attitude of West Bengal Government's towards GJM and its people which makes them as second class citizens (The Indian Express, 2017). The GJM leader, Bimal Gurung after resigning from the GTA said ''we were being fooled by state government when we signed the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA). Nearly 50 departments[23] were to come under GTA but only three or four came. Nearly five years have passed and nothing happened. We were not allowed to work and GTA became a sham…Then suddenly, the government imposed Bengali on us, making it a mandatory to be studied in schools. What about our mother tongue Nepali? Then police lathicharged us'' (The Indian Express, 2017). The state government to counter the argument regarded that the GTA officials were corrupted and they did not want to allow the financial audit team to do their work and wants to cover their issue of corruption, so they have renewed the demand of Gorkhaland once again to infuriate the hills.

But the leaders in the region insists that an autonomous bodies like DGHC and GTA will not solve the issues of the hill and regards that the separate of Gorkhaland will only solve the problem of region and fulfil the aspirations of the people in the region. The resurgence of Gorkha identity politics and the demand of separate statehood associated with it needs to be thoroughly and carefully analysed, the Centre and the State Government are mainly responsible for Darjeeling crisis over the years (Benedikter, 2009), perhaps they should find a better solution to solve the issues and problems of the concerned region in a more permanent way.

[23] See Appendix VI

Chapter 4

A Study of Gorkha Assertion for National Identity in Darjeeling hills

The chapter is based on the field survey which is done to fulfil the objectives of the study. The Gorkha identity politics in Darjeeling hills coalesce together with their desire for the separate state of the Gorkhaland. It has a long history over 100 years, first within the British colonial scenario, and then after Indian independence for a separate state to be taken out from the state of West Bengal, within Indian Union. A more organised form of movement started by the Gorkha National Liberation Front during 1980's under the leadership of Subash Ghising which invoked the Article 3 of the Indian Constitution which provides the provisions for the alteration and change of state boundaries for the first time since 1907, but it did not fulfil their dreams of separate state of Gorkhaland. Once again, people of Darjeeling hills infuriated under the leadership of Bimal Gurung expressing their demand for the separate of Gorkhaland and the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha regarded the search for their identity will only end in a separate state for all Gorkhas (GJM, 2009). People of Darjeeling hills have addressed more than 27 official demands to India's official institutions for a separate statehood (Benedikter, 2009).

Statehood movements aims at the change of existing set-up of state power over defined territories. Along with the demand of Gorkhaland, 'currently there are more than 30 statehood movements in various regions of India among at an 'internal remapping' of the administrative state boundaries, officially in order to better accommodate their ethnic, identity-related or developmental aspirations' (Wenner, 2017).

As accordingly, a field survey was conducted, taking a short errand to Darjeeling hills for to examine and analyse the genuine issue regarding identity of the Gorkhas.

Area of the Study

The area of study is located in Darjeeling hills, it is one of the district of West Bengal lying in Eastern Himalayan range of India and northern most parts West Bengal,

comprising majority Gorkha community. It is comprised of 687 villages, 12 community development blocks along with 9, 37,259 males 9,09,564 females out of 18,46,823 population as per census 2011 (Census, 2011).

Historically, the hilly areas under Darjeeling were inhabited by the Lepchas, Limbus, Bhutias, and Tibetans since ancient time. The plains covered by thick forest, were populated by indigenous tribal groups like Meche, Koches, Rajbangshi, Dhimal and others mainly living upon nomadic cultivation and the Jhoom cultivation (Census, 2011). But in comparison to West Bengal, the state to which it belongs and the ethnic identity of state being Bengali, the Gorkhas are in minority. The Gorkhas are the unorganised minority group in West Bengal. The people have always looked upon themselves different from Bengal and Bengalis physically, culturally, traditionally and linguistically.

The data is collected with the help of survey schedule through interview method. For the purpose of the study, 46 respondents have been interviewed, among them six were political leaders and the rest were common people. While during the survey several questions have been asked to study the 'Gorkha identity politics' which deserves to be analysed in a systematic way. The schedule which was administered to the political leaders and common people needs to be analysed separately. Those questions which have been asked is analysed with the help of the following tables and figures.

Sample size:

Table 4: 1. Sample size

Respondents	**Male**	**Female**	**Total no. of respondents**
Political leaders	6	-	6
Common people	29	11	40

Source: Field Work

Out of the total respondents, six of them were political leaders and rest of them were common people. All of the political leaders were male. Among the common people, 29 (72.5%) of them were male and the rest (27.5%) of them were female respondents.

Common people:

Age of the respondents:

Table 4: 2. Age of the respondents

Age of the Respondent	**No. of Individual**	**In percentage (%)**
20-30	9	22.5
31-40	17	42.5
41-50	4	10
51-60	8	20
Above 60	2	5
Total	**40**	**100%**

Source: Field Work

The maximum number 42.5% of respondents falls in the age group of 31-40 years followed by 22.5% in the age group of 20-30 years. About 20% of the respondents fall under the category of 51-60 years**,** 20% belong to the age of 51-60 years and only 6.66% of the respondents were above the age group of 60 years respectively.

Education:

Table 4: 3. Education of the respondents

Education	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Illiterate	-	-
Primary	5	12.5
Secondary	7	17.5
Senior secondary	15	37.5
Graduation	9	22.5
Post-Graduation	4	10
Others	-	-

Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

Out of the total 40 respondents, the maximum number (37%) of respondents have passed the higher secondary education followed by graduation (22.5%). About 17.5% respondents have passed Senior secondary and the rest 12.5% have only primary education, 10% respondents of them were Post graduates.

Monthly Income:

Table 4: 4. Monthly Income

Monthly Income	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Below 5000	6	15
5,001-10,000	17	42.5
15,001-20,000	9	22.5
20,001-25,000	5	12.5
30,001-35,000	3	7.5
Above 35,000	-	-
Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

The maximum number of respondents (42.5%) have monthly income of 5,001-10,000 followed by 22% in the income category of 15,000-20,000. About 15% of respondents have the monthly income of below 5000 and the rest 12.5% and 7.5% have the monthly income of 20,000-25,000 and 30,001-35,000 respectively.

View on the Gorkhaland Movement:

All of the respondents agreed that the demand for Gorkhaland is basically a question of political identity of the Gorkhas in India – as they are labelled as ‘foreigners’ and the fear of evictions continues to haunt them. Four of the respondents regarded that they came to India with *land* which means – ‘they came with the territory that

became British India under various treaties as a part of the population movement' and regarded that 'we are claiming what is rightfully belong to ours'.

Apart from that, most of the respondents feel that they are subjugated and marginalised by the Government of West Bengal in all spheres of life. They stated that if there will be Gorkhaland, it will safeguard the future of Gorkhas in India and it will also lead to socio-economic independence. The demand for Gorkhaland is also a fight for their self-respect, pride and dignity of the Gorkhas in India.

Gorkhaland movement a question of identity or Development or both.

Figure 4: 1. Gorkhaland movement is about - Identity or Development or both.



Source: Field Work

About 90% of the respondents regarded that the demand for Gorkhaland is securing about the identity of Gorkhas as an Indian because they have been labelled as foreigners and they feel themselves as second class citizens. They stated that they have a distinct socio-cultural entity and regarded that only the formation of a separate state within the Indian Union will preserve, protect and promote their distinct identity. Only 10% of the respondents regarded that the demand for Gorkhaland is both about securing identity and development. They regarded the development in terms of infrastructure and education because the Government has not been encouraging in terms of establishing new colleges and the appointments are political-biased.

Understanding about the term Gorkha:

Figure 4: 2. Understanding about the term Gorkha



Source: Field Work

About 23% of respondents regarded that the term Gorkha signifies brave and loyal community. Most of the respondents about 77% of the respondents regarded that the term Gorkha means- ‘‘people speaking Nepali language referred as Gorkha Jati’’ sharing physical proximities with the citizens of Nepal but different from them in socio-cultural orientations and sharing a different colonial history.

Identification as a Gorkha or as Nepali:

Table 4: 5. Identification as a Gorkha or as Nepali

Nomenclature	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Gorkha	40	100
Nepali	-	-
Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All of the respondents wants to identify themselves as Gorkha rather than identifying themselves as Nepali because the term Gorkha provides them a sense of security, a fortress in which they feel safe and secure. If they call themselves as Nepali, it would mislead in identifying themselves as citizens of Nepal and would be labelled as foreigners. They fear that this would lead to forceful evictions as it happened in North-east India and in the case of Lhotshampas.

Misrecognition has increased insecurities amongst the Gorkhas in India thereby leading to such assertions:

Table 4: 6. Misrecognition has increased insecurities amongst the Gorkhas in India thereby leading to such assertions

Misrecognition leads to assertions	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	40	100
No	-	-
Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All of the respondents regarded that the misrecognition, deprivation and misrepresentation has led to the insecurities amongst them and now they have realised that they have been deprived and discriminated against in all spheres of life. About 23.33% percent of the respondents stated that the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950 especially Article VII has contributed towards the misrecognition of Gorkhas in India.

Differences between the Gorkhaland movement of the 1986 under Subash Ghising and the movement under Bimal Gurung:

Figure 4: 3. Differences



Source: Field Work

Most of the respondents, about 76% was apodictic about the intensity of the movement and considered the movement under 1980's much more violent than his successor Bimal Gurung. They stated that the movement under Subash Ghising led to

the death of many people around 1200 people. Whereas the other respondents i.e. 24% regarded that there exist an ideological differences between Bimal Gurung and Subash Ghising. Apart from that, while the other differences they regard that the people during 1980's was not much educated and they were not much politically conscious than during the recent agitations under the leadership of Bimal Gurung.

Opinion on Developmental boards: Healthy or not?

Table 4: 7. Opinion on Developmental boards: Healthy or not?

Healthy	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	3	7.5
No	37	92.5
Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

Most of the respondents (92.5%) regarded that the developmental boards provided by the Government of West Bengal is a strategy to divide the Gorkha community into various groups and to diffuse the Gorkha ethnic identity. They stated that it is a strategy adopted by the Government to weaken the democratic demand for the creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland, so that they would not free themselves from the yoke of West Bengal Government. While the rest of the 7.5% hold a different view on the developmental boards and stated that it is healthy to preserve and protect the cultural identity of a particular group unless and until it will not disturb the harmony, prosperity and unity among different communities.

Opinion on recent Gorkhaland agitation:

All of the forty respondents regarded that it first started as a protest against the imposition of the Bengali language in the Government pedagogical institutions and then suddenly it acquired the form of statehood movement. One of the prime reason for the agitation was the failure of the interim arrangement like GTA which could not fulfil the aspiration of the people in the Darjeeling hills. All of the respondents stated that it was peoples led movement because the political leaders were absent from active participation and providing direction to the agitation.

Creation of a separate state will help secure the Gorkha national identity:

Table 4: 8. Creation of a separate state will help secure the Gorkha national identity

Gorkhaland will secure national identity	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	40	100
No	-	-
Total	**40**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All of the respondents were apodictic about the Gorkhaland as it will help to secure the national political identity of the Gorkhas in India because they will have a state named Gorkhaland and they can say without hesitation that they are from Gorkhaland. Most of the respondents stated 'right now, we don't have a state and our identity is questioned', if there will be state of Gorkhaland we can say that 'I am Gorkha and I am from Gorkhaland'. Hence, all the confusions about our identity and all those marginalisation will end and our ever ending search for identity will only end by the creation of the separate state of Gorkhaland.

Political leaders:

View on the Gorkhaland movement:

All of the respondents, regarded that Gorkhaland is about securing for Indian Political Identity for Gorkhas. One of them stated that it was not started as an identity movement initially but after 1980's it became an identity movement and the credit for coining the term and issue of political identity goes to Subash Ghising. Another respondent stated 'we (Gorkhas) came here with land and we are not immigrant'. So the demand for Gorkhaland is a fight against for attaining political rights and justice and the formation of Gorkhaland will undo years of injustice committed by the British imperialism in incorporating Darjeeling hills and Dooars region to the province of Bengal.

One of the respondent also stated that the demand for Gorkhaland is an expression of the Right to self-determination and the main thrust of the demand is to be completely free from the administrative jurisdiction of the Bengal Government.

Deducing the nomenclature Gorkha:

All the five respondents have a different idea on the term Gorkha. One of them stated that the term 'Gorkha' is an umbrella term, it binds different ethnic communities inhabiting Darjeeling hills such into one single ethnic category. Another respondent stated that term comes from the word *Bhurakshak* by which he meant defender of the land. As one of them remark that the term Gorkha is more of political identity rather than a cultural identity. One of the respondent stated people having a distinct socio-cultural entity sharing s social, cultural and linguistic affinity with the tribals of the Dooars region i.e. Santhals, Uraons, Mundas etc. and concentrated in contiguous districts of North Bengal fighting for the formation of a separate state within the Indian Union in order to preserve, protect and promote their distinct identity. Lastly, one of the responded regarded that the term is used to differentiate Gorkha from Nepal speaking citizens of Nepal.

Gorkhaland movement is about - Identity or Development or both:

Table 4: 9. Gorkhaland movement is about - Identity or Development or both

Gorkhaland is about-	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Identity	5	83.33
Development	-	-
Both	1	16.66
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

Out of the total 6 respondents, five of them (80%) regarded Gorkhaland movement is about securing Indian national identity for Gorkhas. One of them stated it is about both identity and development. He said 'Gorkhaland is no doubt about identity' but it is also about development of the Darjeeling hills and Dooars region because these region have been economically exploited and neglected. The two major sources of

sustenance – Tea and Tourism are marked by deplorable conditions. Whatever resources that are accrued are transferred. Forests are depleted and tourism, on which so many families depend for their livelihood is in a state of neglect due to lack of infrastructure and proper planning. These are also some of the factors responsible for the desire for having a separate state of Gorkhaland.

Identification as a Gorkha or as Nepali:

Table 4: 10. Identification as a Gorkha or as Nepali

Nomenclature	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Gorkha	5	83.33
Nepali	1	16.66
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

Out of the total six respondents, four of them wants to identify themselves as Gorkha and one of the respondent wants to identify himself as Nepali speaking Indian Gorkha (NEBAGOLI). One of the importatnt reasons in identifying themselves as Gorkha for them is Gorkha is a strong political identity rather than Nepali. But one of them has no problem in identifying themselves as Gorkha or as Nepali.

Articles VII and VIII of the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty (1950) has contributed towards the misrecognition and marginalisation of Gorkhas in India:

Table 4: 11. Articles VII and VIII of the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty (1950) has contributed towards the misrecognition and marginalisation of Gorkhas in India

Contributes to Misrecognition and Marginalisation	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	6	100%
No	-	-
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All the respondents agreed that it has contributed and contributes towards the misrecognition and marginalisation of Gorkhas in India. One of the respondent states that it is because of the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty, our loyalty and identity is questioned and there is a closer scrutiny of the mentioned treaty. If there will be a separate state of Gorkhaland, all the illegal immigration and extremist from the neighbouring countries, as the proposed area of Gorkhaland shares international borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal can be effectively checked as the Gorkhas of India have always proved their loyalty to the Indian nation.

Another respondent also regarded that the word 'reciprocal' has been incorporated in Article VII of the aforesaid treaty which many political pundits interpret this particular word as the root cause for misconception and confusion in respect of the 'nationality' of Nepali speaking Gorkhas in India. For instance, he says that the marginalisation of Gorkhas, especially in the North East region of India exists till date and that the confusion created by the Treaty is often reflected in some unpleasant incidents in major cities of India too. Majority of Indians still view the Gorkhas as 'foreigners' 'tresspassers' and citizens of Nepal.

In the name of Development, the Gorkhaland movement has lost its course:

Table 4: 12. In the name of Development, the Gorkhaland movement has lost its course

Development has lost its course	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	5	83.33
No	1	16.66
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

Except one them, five of the respondents agreed that in the name of development, Gorkhaland movement has lost its course. One of them regarded it would have been a different movement 'if we have demanded on the ground of development' but people gets enthralled by their identity and not by the development. Lastly, one of

them responded stated that the movement has lost its momentum and not the course. He regarded, political and economic exploitation is the root cause of the movement where no development was witnessed for the last 70 years.

Opinion on Developmental boards: Healthy or not?

Table 4: 13. Opinion on Developmental boards: Healthy or not?

Healthy	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	-	-
No	6	100
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All of the respondents agreed that it is not healthy for the development of the hill communities and the policy of divide and rule. One of the respondent stated that it will provide benefit to the people, it is good to protect and preserve culture of a particular community but in the long run it will divide the people in various ethnic categories and will diffuse the Gorkha identity. Basically, it is a strategy adopted by the Government of West Bengal to counter the movement for separate state of Gorkhas. Another respondent regarded that the State Government is running an illegal and unconstitutional boards. Lastly, one of them said that the development boards were formed with the malafide intention of the West Bengal Government to divide the hill people and especially the Gorkha community on casteist lines with the basic aim to contain the Gorkhaland movement. It is a divisive strategy of the West Bengal Government to weaken and decimate the Gorkhaland movement.

Creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland will help secure the Gorkha national identity:

Table 4: 14. Creation of a separate state will help secure the Gorkha national identity

Gorkhaland will secure national identity	**No. of Individual**	**In Percentage (%)**
Yes	6	100
No	-	-
Total	**6**	**100**

Source: Field Work

All the respondents agreed that it will help to secure the Gorkha national identity because the demand for Gorkhaland is basically a question of the Gorkha Indian political identity. One of the respondent argued 'why is there this ''identity crisis'' for the Gorkhas despite being Indian citizens for centuries? Why do they have to emphasize their nationality by compounding their identity with their nationality as ''Indian Gorkhas''? They have to treated equally and trust as other citizens of this country. A separate state will reiterate their ''Indian political identity'' their Indian-ness and act only as a possible solution to the identity crisis.

As one of the responded stated that 'in a federal state like India only a State can fulfil the economic and political aspirations of the people. A state small or big, can empower each and every legitimate citizen full political power and economic benefits, and it also upholds the fundamental rights of its citizens and residents. In the context of the demand for Gorkhaland, the final and permanent solution of the political unrest and the century old demand is to grant them a separate state and not any interim short term arrangements like the DGHC and GTA'.

State responses towards the Gorkha community in the Darjeeling hills and Gorkhaland movement:

All of them are not satisfied with the attitude of the state towards the movement and responses towards the hill communities in the Darjeeling hills. One of them said that 'the demand for Gorkhaland is a legitimate and democratic but they label it as illegal,

undemocratic and unconstitutional'. As one of the respondent also regarded that any time the demand for Gorkhaland arises in the front, the Government uses its paramilitary force, so that we can't raise our voice and the Government is ruthless and exploitative in nature.

Lastly, one of them responded that 'it is the state policy of the Bengal Government since independence to silence the voice of the Gorkhas and crush the demand of Gorkhaland demand by any means. West Bengal Government knows that the territories of proposed state for Gorkhaland does not belong to them and one day Gorkhaland will come into existence as per the constitutional process. Otherwise, apart from Bengal, the other Indian mainstream political parties very well aware and supports a constitutional demand. Bengal Government is the main impediment before Gorkhaland'. He also regards that 'the attitude of the Bengal Government is very much negative towards the Gorkhas but at the same time, it should be remembered that ''an unpredictable ally (BJP) is more dangerous than an open political adversary (TMC)''. So it is the political will of the Prime Minister which is of more importance than the negative attitude of the Bengal Government towards the Gorkha community and the Gorkhaland movement.

Major Findings:

From the fact finding study which have been taken to examine and analyse the *Gorkha identity politics* fabricates that the desire of the hill people in the Darjeeling hills for a separate is absolutely based on their identity not much on economic grounds. It becomes much easier to discern from the study that the people in the hills gets more enthralled by their identity and not much on the issue of development. By generalising the fact, I being an amateur researcher don't want and mean to dismiss the arguments which have been put forward by some of the expertise working on the dynamics of Darjeeling hill politics which regards the development as the genuine issue of Gorkha identity politics. Obviously, mobilisation of resources plays a major role in most of the identity politics around the world and Gorkha identity politics in some way is in no exception. It has become a farrago of *identity and development* because some of the leaders and political strategies of the movement regards that 'the political and economic exploitation is the root cause of the movement where no development was witnessed for the last 70 years'.

From the study, one can deduce the fact that the Gorkhaland is basically a question of political identity of the Gorkhas in India – as they are labelled as 'foreigners' and the fear of evictions continues to haunt them. Some of them regarded that they came to India with *land* which means – 'they came with the territory that became British India under various treaties as a part of the population movement' and regarded that 'we are claiming what is rightfully belong to ours'. So the demand for Gorkhaland is an expression of the Right to self-determination and the main thrust of the demand is to be completely free from the administrative jurisdiction of the Bengal Government.

Apart from that, they feel that they are subjugated and marginalised by the Government of West Bengal in all spheres of life. They stated that 'if there will be Gorkhaland, it will safeguard the future of Gorkhas in India and it will also lead to socio-economic independence'. So the demand for Gorkhaland is a fight for their self-respect, pride and dignity of the Gorkhas in India and also for attaining political rights and justice and the formation of Gorkhaland will undo years of injustice committed by the British imperialism in incorporating Darjeeling hills and Dooars region to the province of Bengal. They had a firm belief that only the formation of a separate state within the Indian Union will preserve, protect and promote their distinct socio-cultural entity and identity. As one of the leader stated that 'in a federal state like India only a State can fulfil the economic and political aspirations of the people. A state small or big, can empower each and every legitimate citizen full political power and economic benefits, and it also upholds the fundamental rights of its citizens and residents. In the context of the demand for Gorkhaland, the final and permanent solution of the political unrest and the century old demand is to grant them a separate state and not any interim short term arrangements like the DGHC and GTA'. All of these are the main factors which goads towards the assertion for national identity in Darjeeling hills.

Some of them regards 'why is there this ''identity crisis'' for the Gorkhas despite being Indian citizens for centuries? Why do they have to emphasize their nationality by compounding their identity with their nationality as ''Indian Gorkhas''? They believes that they have to be treated equally and trust as other citizens of this country. A separate state will reiterate their ''Indian political identity'' their Indian-ness and act only as a possible solution to the identity crisis. This shows how their quest for

separate state of Gorkhaland is inextricably linked with the national identity of Gorkhas in India. They believe that a state of Gorkhaland will be an emblematic home for all the Gorkhas in India. It will remove ambiguity about their identity. It will ensure their political and economic development from which they have been hitherto excluded.

Apart from earlier mentioned factors, the misrecognition, deprivation and misrepresentation has led to the insecurities amongst them and they have been deprived and discriminated against in all spheres of life. The Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950 especially Article VII has also contributed towards the misrecognition of Gorkhas in India and renders them as second class citizens. It is also because of the Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty, they feel that their loyalty and identity is questioned and there has to be a closer scrutiny of the mentioned treaty. They pledged that if there will be a separate state of Gorkhaland, all the illegal immigration and extremist from the neighbouring countries, can be effectively checked as the proposed area of Gorkhaland shares international borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal and the Gorkhas have always proved their loyalty to the Indian nation.

The word 'reciprocal' has been incorporated in Article VII of the aforesaid treaty have led to many political pundits interpret this particular word as the root cause for misconception and confusion in respect of the 'nationality' of Nepali speaking Gorkhas in India. For instance, one of the respondent said that the marginalisation of Gorkhas, especially in the North East region of India exists till date and that the confusion created by the Treaty is often reflected in some unpleasant incidents in major cities of India too. Majority of Indians still view the Gorkhas as 'foreigners' 'tresspassers' and citizens of Nepal.

The identity crisis which has been widely discussed theme in the case of Gorkhas also results from the nomenclature Gorkha itself. For some people, the term Gorkha means- ''people speaking Nepali language referred as Gorkha Jati'' sharing physical proximities with the citizens of Nepal but different from them in socio-cultural orientations and sharing a different colonial history. For the other, the term 'Gorkha' is an umbrella term, it binds different ethnic communities inhabiting Darjeeling hills such into one single ethnic category. Some even deduced that term comes from the

word *Bhurakshak* which means defender of the land as opposed to the *Gorakshak* – meaning defender of cow. As one of them remarks that the term Gorkha is more of political identity rather than a cultural identity. It is a term is used to differentiate Gorkha from Nepal speaking citizens of Nepal.Lastly, the term also means people having a distinct socio-cultural entity sharing social, cultural and linguistic affinity with the tribals of the Dooars region i.e. Santhals, Uraons, Mundas etc. and concentrated in contiguous districts of North Bengal fighting for the formation of a separate state within the Indian Union in order to preserve, protect and promote their distinct identity. It is because of the lack of unanimity over the term, it has become a debatable and a contentious issue over for many years. There is yet to arrive a much agreeable consensus over the term Gorkha.

One of the prime reason for Gorkha attaining a strong political identity rather than the cultural identity is because the term Gorkha provides them a sense of security, a fortress in which they feel safe and secure. If they call themselves as Nepali, it would mislead in identifying themselves as citizens of Nepal and would be labelled as foreigners. They fear that this would lead to forceful evictions as it happened in North-east India and also in the case of Lhotshampas.

The people of Darjeeling hills are not satisfied with the responses of the state towards the movement. They were apodictic about the West Bengal Governement policy of providing developmental boards is not healthy for the development of the hill communities and takes it as a policy of divide and rule. They believe that it will provide benefit to the people and it will protect and preserve culture of a particular community but in the long run it will divide the people in various ethnic categories and will diffuse the Gorkha identity. One of the political strategiest of the movement said that ‘the development boards were formed with the malafide intention of the West Bengal Government to divide the hill people and especially the Gorkha community on casteist lines with the basic aim to contain the Gorkhaland movement. It is a divisive strategy of the West Bengal Government to weaken and decimate the Gorkhaland movement’. Basically, they regard it is a strategy adopted by the Government of West Bengal to counter the movement for separate state of Gorkhas by running an illegal and unconstitutional boards.

The recent Gorkhaland agitation which was first started as a protest movement against the imposition of the Bengali language in the Government pedagogical institutions and then suddenly acquiring the form of statehood movement also shows the craving of Gorkhas having their own separate state. Some of the other reasons for the agitation was the failure of the interim arrangement Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) successor of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) which could not fulfil the aspiration of the people in the Darjeeling hills. The experiences with these autonomous councils or interim arrangement depicts that it did not fulfil the aspirations of people in Darjeeling hills or in some way it also shows they are not capable of running the affairs of administration in a more efficient way.

The people in Darjeeling hills considers the demand for Gorkhaland is a legitimate and democratic but the government label it as illegal, undemocratic and unconstitutional. Any time the demand for Gorkhaland arises in the front, the Government uses its paramilitary force, so that they can't raise their voice because the Government is ruthless and exploitative in nature. They regard that it is the state policy of the Bengal Government since independence to silence the voice of the Gorkhas and crush the demand of Gorkhaland demand by any means. People in Darjeeling hills shares the similar view that 'the West Bengal Government knows that the territories of proposed state for Gorkhaland does not belong to them and one day Gorkhaland will come into existence as per the constitutional process. Otherwise, apart from Bengal, the other Indian mainstream political parties very well aware and supports a constitutional demand. Bengal Government is the main impediment before Gorkhaland'. They holds the view that the attitude of the Bengal Government is very much negative towards the Gorkhas and Union Government non commitment towards the issue, as one of the respondent stated that 'it should be remembered that ''an unpredictable ally (BJP) is more dangerous than an open political adversary (TMC)''.

The Gorkha identity politics and the demand of separate statehood associated with it needs a careful attention of the Centre and the Governement of West Bengal, it has be studied thoroughly and to be analyzed carefully. Perhaps, the Centre and the State Government should find a better solution to solve the issues and problems of the concerned region in a more permanent way.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This study attempted to overture the Gorkha identity politics in Darjeeling hills. It has explored and analysed the Gorkha identity politics and provided the features of Gorkha identity formation in Darjeeling hills. It has discussed and analysed their demand for separate statehood (1980-2012) and highlighted how they have been struggling for Indian identity in Darjeeling hills.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Gorkha identity politics is inextricably linked with their demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland. However, it has taken many twists and turns in their intensity over the years and ideology with the coming up of new leaders but the goal remains the same which is to separate them ethnically majority Bengali community and to grant them fuller autonomy in governing themselves. It remains an undeniable fact that the movement is about securing the identity of Gorkhas as Indians because they have been labelled as intruders and foreigners. Most of the communities in India views them through the lens of hegemonic discourses which is not written on their behalf. Thus, it renders their very identity at stake. There remains handful of them who are able to speak and write about themselves or so to say engage themselves in canonical and polemical discourse against those hegemonic discourses which marginalise and subjugates them.

Based on the survey findings and writings over the dynamics of Gorkha identity politics, one can discern that the identity crisis of Gorkhas also results from the nomenclature itself. People have varied understandings and interpretations over the term Gorkha. It has resulted mostly because their description about themselves and region inhabited by them is based on oral narratives which is not an authentic source for drawing reference. Though there are couple of works providing vivid description about them and region inhabited by them written mostly by travellers, botanists and administrators, not by professional and trained historians. Apart from that, various writers and researchers links the term Gorkha has its fountain in Nepal. As Bidhan Golay rightly says that ‘‘readers familiar with studies on Nepalis in Darjeeling will recall that it is almost impossible to think of a work that is without any reference to

Nepal. Nepal has truly become the template for understanding the history, society and culture of Nepalis in India'' (Golay, 2011: p. 5). Furthermore, it is difficult to clearly delineate the boundary between the citizens of Nepal and Gorkhas in India because they share physical and cultural proximities with each other. This has resulted in the identity crisis of the Gorkhas in India and they assert their identity through the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland.

The term Gorkhas/Nepalis have been used by the scholars and writers in order to differentiate between the citizens of Nepal. For instance, as already mentioned before T.B Subba makes an interesting way of differentiate between the Gorkhas in India and citizens of Nepal. He writes the citizens of Nepal as *Nepalese* and the Nepali speaking India as *Nepalis* (Subba, 1992; Cited in Golay 2006: 2009)). Even today, the term Gorkha evokes various debates and controversies, and there has been various efforts to find a more appropriate term that would be acceptable to the Gorkhas in India which would carry precise and unambiguous understanding of the community. But the term which have been suggested before such as Bhargoli and Bharpali was not acceptable to these groups of people in India. P. Arjun one of the political strategist (GJM) of the movement wants to call and identify himself as *Nebagoli* (Nepali bhasi Gorha Jati). There is yet to find a much more agreeable consensus over the term which would fit the imagination of the Gorkhas in India. One may find while studying the dynamics of the Gorkha identity politics that the lexical juggleries over the term and the debate it evokes would be unending. However, over the years, scholars have favored the used of the term Gorkha and Nepali rather than the above suggested terms. But we can certainly argue that the term Gorkha Gorkha has attained a strong political identity rather than the cultural identity is because the term Gorkha provides them a sense of security, a fortress in which they feel safe and secure. If they call themselves as Nepali, it would mislead in identifying themselves as citizens of Nepal and would be labelled as foreigners. The present demand for the separate state of Gorkhaland is also based on these hackneyed notion and ideas of migrants and foreigners, and those of marginalisation and subjugation.

In a multicultural and diverse country like India which is based on numerous differences such as in terms of caste, language, religion, ethnicity and culture. Identity politics is manifested in these socio-cultural aspects in India. Gorkhaland movement

depicts one of the limpid portray of how the identity politics operates in India. As already highlighted before, *identity politics* exists at two levels. First, the dominant culture which holds the power has the power to define the minorities as different which in turn produces the other. Second, these groups who have been marginalised or considered as the other, assert their rights for recognition based on their differences. In a similar manner, the Gorkha ethnicity fears the domination of majoritarian culture and values over their ethnic identity and this has led to the assimilation of different communities which have not been recognised as Gorkhas before into Gorkha ethnicity and language acts a source of bond between them. Today, they are asserting their identity based on their socio-cultural differences and their inclusion into the national culture of India through their long drawn demand for separate state. The Gorkha ethnicity feels marginalised and subjugated because they have been excluded from their own national culture because their history and culture has not been recognised as one of the history of nation.

The demand for a separate statehood of Gorkhas have been marred by the question of 'identity and development' because some of the leaders and political strategies of the movement regards that 'the political and economic exploitation is the root cause of the movement where no development was witnessed for the last 70 years'. Merriam Wenner also states that the 'identity-crisis' of the Gorkhas ''is linked to the perceived lack of development in the hills in terms of water, roads, medical and educational institutions, unemployment, and so on and the lack of scope for participation in the decision making processes'' (Wenner, 2017: p.p. 120). In a much similar manner, while during my field survey, I came across one of the leader of the movement who is more vocal about the view that the 'Gorkhaland is no doubt about identity' but it is also about development of the Darjeeling hills and Dooars region because these region have been economically exploited and neglected. The two major sources of sustenance – Tea and Tourism are marked by deplorable conditions. Whatever resources that are accrued are transferred. Forests are depleted and tourism, on which so many families depend for their livelihood is in a state of neglect due to lack of infrastructure and proper planning. So we can argue that the Gorkhaland movement has certainly become a farrago of *identity and development*. But most of the people in the region regards that ''if we have an identity, then the development will automatically follow''. However, the different issues and challenges faced by these

group of people in the region and their aspiration for protecting sociocultural practices that emerged in the Darjeeling hills unique to the other communities in India resulted in the emergence of Gorkha identity politics and Gorkhaland movement. Just like any other statehood movements, which are concerned with the changing the existing set-up of state power over defined territories, the craving of Gorkhas in India for a separate state is solely based on the recognition of their identity and desire to govern themselves by making a separate state within Indian Union outside the domain and jurisdiction of the Bengal.

The Union and State Governments tried to settle these subsequent movements raised by the Gorkha ethnic group by granting them autonomous councils DGHC (1988)[24] and GTA (2012)[25]. The experimentation with these autonomous councils or interim arrangement depicts that it did not fulfil the aspirations of people in Darjeeling hills or in some way it also shows they are not capable of running the affairs of administration in a more efficient way.

The Gorkha identity politics over the years have heightened the issue of national importance because of the involvement of the national parties in order to contain the influence of the regional parties of the West Bengal. In a way, it shows that the Gorkha identity politics and the demand for Gorkhaland will have a major role to play in the matter of national politics. The formation of the separate state of Gorkhaland will depend upon how the regional Gorkha parties will be able to bargain and negotiate with those national political parties. While there are many rival parties as opposed to the construction of a separate statehood for Gorkhas, viz. the CPI(M), the Bangla O Bhasa Bachao Samiti (BOBBHS), the Dooars Tarai Nagarik Manch (DTNM), the Akil Bharatiya Adivasi Parishad (ABAVP) and the present government headed by Mamata Banerjee. The presence of diverse communities in the foothold region of the Darjeeling hills also have a major role to play in the Gorkha identity politics and their demand for separate statehood in the years to come.

In the end, we can say that the Gorkha identity politics and the demand of separate statehood associated with it, as already mentioned before needs a careful attention of the Centre and the Government of West Bengal. But the question remains, 'if

[24] See Appendix V
[25] See Appendix VI

tomorrow there will be a separate state for Gorkhas, how far this separate state of Gorkhaland will solve the identity crisis of these group of people in India'.

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Appendices

Appendix I

Indo-Nepal Treaty

31.07.1950

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal recognizing the ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries for centuries;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;

Have resolver therefore to enter into Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, ad have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely, the Government of India, his Excellency SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, Ambassador of India in Nepal; the Government of Nepal, MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme-Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, who having examined each other‟s credentials and found them good and in due form having agreed as follows:

Article I

There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The twoGovernment agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

Article II

The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each-other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring States likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments.

Article III

In order to establish and maintain the relation referred to in article I the two Governments agree to continue diplomatic relation with each other by means of representatives with such stuff as is necessary for the due performance of their function.

The representative and such of these staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on a reciprocal basis. Provided that in no case shall these be less than those

granted to persons of a similar status of any State having diplomatic relation with either government.

Article IV

The two Government agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice Consuls and other Consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other‟s territory as may be agreed to.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents shall be provided with exequators or authorization of their appointment, such exequatur or authorization liable to be withdrawn which issued to, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal ba sis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other state.

Article V

The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for to this agreement shall be worked out by the two governments acting in consultation.

Article VI

Each government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the national of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contract relating to such development.

Article VII

The Government of Indiaand Nepal agree to grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of similar nature.

Article VIII

So far as matter dealt with herein are concerned, the Treaty cancels all previous treaties, agreements, and engagements entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

Article IX

This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both the Governments.

Article X

The Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

Done in duplicate at Kathmandu the 31st day of July, 1950.

Sd/-

Chandreshwar Prasad

Narain Singh

For Government of India

Sd/- Muhun Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana

For Government of Nepal.

Appendix II

Treaty of Sugaulee, 1815

Treaty of Peace between the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY and MAHA RAJAH BIKRAM SHAH, Raja of Nepal, settled between LIEUTENANTCOLONEL BRADSHAW on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS, EARL of MOIRA, KNIGHT of the MOST NOBLE ORDER of the GARTER, one of HIS MAJESTY‟S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said HONOURABLE Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by SREE GOOROO GUJRAJ MISSER and CHUNDER SEEKUR OPENDEEA on the part of MAHA RAJAH GIRMAUN JODE BIKRAM SHAH BAHADUR, SHUMSHEER JUNG, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nepal,-2nd December 1815.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honorable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which, previously to the occurrence of the late difference, had long subsisted between the two States, the following terms of peace have agreed upon;-

Article 1st

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

Article 2nd

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two States before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the Sovereignty of those lands.

Article 3rd

The Rajah of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity all the under mentioned territories, viz,

First- The whole of the low lands between the River Kali and Rapti.

Second-The whole of low lands (with the exception of Bootwul Khass) lying between the Rapti and the Gunduck.

Third- The whole of low lands between the Gunduck and Coosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourth- All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.

Fifth- All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarcote leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and Nagree. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gurkha troops within forty days from this date.

Article 4th

With a view to identify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such Chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-General for the pensions respectively.

Article 5th

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

Article 6th

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any difference shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjexts of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government b which award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.

Article 7th

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

Article 8th

In order to secure and improve the relation of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

Article 9th

This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver the ratification of the Governor-General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segowlee, on the 2nd day of December 1815,

PARIS BRADSHAH, Lt.-Col., P.A.

D.D.OCHTERLONY

Agent, Governor-General.

Appendix III

Treaty of Titalya, 1817

TREATY, COVENANT, or AGREEMENT entered into by CAPTAIN BARRE LATTER, AGENT on the part of His Excellency the RIGHT HONOURABLE the EARL of MOIRA, K.G., GOVERNOR-GENERAL, &c., &c., &c., and by NAZIR CHAINA TENJIN and MACHA TEINBAH and LAMA DUCHIM LONGDOO, Deputies on the part of the RAJNI of SIKKIMPUTEE, being severally authorized and duly appointed for the above purpose-1817.

Article 1st

The Honourable East India Company cedes, transfers and makes over in full sovereignty to the Sikkimputee Rajah, his heirs or successors, all the hilly or mountains country situatd to the eastward of the Mechi River and to the westward of the Teesta River, formaly possessed and occupied by the Rajah of Nepaul, but ceded to the Honourable East India Company by the Treaty of Peace signed at Segoelee.

Article 2nd

The Sikkimputee Rajah engages for himself and successors to abstain from any acts of aggression or hostility against the Goorkhas or any other State.

Article 3rd

That he will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between his subjects and those of Nepual, or any other neibouring State, and to abide by the decision of the British Government.

Article 4th

He engages for himself and successors to join the British Troops with the whole of his Military Force when employed within the Hills, and in general to afford the British Troos every aid and facility in his power.

Article 5th

That he will not permit any British subject, nor the subject of any European and American State, to reside within his dominions, without the permission of the English Government.

Article 6th

That he will immediately seize and deliver up any dacoits or notorious that may take refuge within his territories.

Article7th

That he will not afford protection to any defaulters of revenue or other delinquents when demanded by the British Government through their Accredited Agents.

Article 8th

That he will afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company‟s Province, and he engages that no duties shall be levied on the transit of merchandise beyond the established custom at the several Golahs or marts.

Article 9th

The Honourable East India Company guarantees to the Sikkimputtee Rajah and his successors the full and peaceable possession of the tract of hilly country specified in the first Article of the present Agreement.

Article 10th

This Treaty shall be ratified and exchanged by the Sikkimputtee Rajah within one month from the present date, and the counterpart, when confirmed by His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General, shall be transmitted to the Rajah.

Done at Titalya, this 10th day of February 1817, answering to the 9th of Phagoon 1873 Sumbut, and to the 30th of Maugh 1223 Bengallie.

Barre Latter
Nazir Chaina Tinjin
Macha Timbah
Lama Duchim Longadoc

Moira
N.B. Edmonstone
Archd. Seton
Geo. Dowdeswell

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, at Fort William, this fifteenth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen.

Appendix IV

TREATY OF SINCHULA, 1865

Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B., K.S.I., Viceroy an Governor-General of Her Britannic Majesty‟s possessions in the East Indies, and their Highness the Dhrum and Deb Rajahs of Bhutan concluded on the one party by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B. by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him b te Viceroy and Governor-General, and on the other part by Samdojey Deb Jimpey and Themseyrensey Donai according to full powers conferred on them by the Dhrum an Deb Rajahs-1865.

Article 1st

There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and the Government of Bhootan.

Article 2nd

Whereas in consequence of repeated aggression of the Bhootan Government and of refusal of that Government to afford satisfaction for those aggressions, and of their insulting treatment of the officers sent by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council for the purpose of procuring an amicable adjustment of differences existing between two States, the British Government has been compelled to seize by an armed force the whole of the Dooars and certain Hill posts protecting the passes into Bhootan, and whereas the Bhootan Government has now expresses its regret for past misconduct and a desire for the establishment of friendly relations with the British Government, it is hereby agreed that the whole of the tract known as the Eighteen Doars, bordering on the District of Rungpoor, Cooch Behar, and Assam, together with the Talook of Ambaree Fallacottah and the Hill territory on the left bank of the Teesta up to such points as may be laid down by the British Commissioner appointed for the purpose is ceded by the Bhootan Government to the British Government forever.

Article 3rd

The Bhutan Government hereby agree to surrender all British subjects,as well as subjects of the Chiefs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar who are now detained in Bhootan against their will, and to place no impediment in the way of the return of all or any of such person sinto British territory.

Article 4th

In consideration of the cession by the Bhootan Government of the territories specified in Article 2 of this treaty, and of the said Government having expressed its regret for past misconduct, and having hereby engaged for the future to restrain all evil disposed persons from committingcrimes within British territory or the territories of the Rajah of Sikkim and Cooch Behar and to give prompt and full redress for all such crimes which many be committed in defiance of their commands, the British Government agree to make an annual allowance to the government of Bhootan of a sum not exceeding fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50000) to be paid to officers not below the rank of Jungpen, who shall be deputed by the Government of Bhootan to receive the same. And it is further hereby agreed that the payments shall be made as specified below;

On the fulfilment by the Bhootan Government of the conditions of this Treaty twenty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 25,000). On the 10th January following forty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 45,000). On every succeeding 10th January fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000)

Article 5th

The British Government will hold itself at liberty at any time to suspend the payment of this compensation money either in whole or in part in the event of misconduct on the part of the Bhootan Government ot its failure toc heck the aggression of its subjects to comply with the provisions of the treaty.

Article 6th

The British Government hereby agree on demand being duly made in writing by the Bhootan Government to surrender under the provisions of Act VII of 1854 of which a copy shall be furnished to the Bhootan Government, all Bhootanese subjects accused of any of the following crimes who may take refuge in British dominions. The crimes are murder, attempting to murder, rape, kidnapping, great personal violence, maiming, dacoits, thug gee, robbery, or burglary, cattle stealing, breaking and entering a dwelling house and stealing therein, arson, setting fire to a village, house, or town, forgery or uttering forged documents, counterfeiting current coin, knowingly uttering base or counterfeit coin, perjury, subordination of perjury, embezzlement by public officers or other persons and being an accessory to any of the above offences.

Article 7th

The Bhootan Government hereby agree on requisition being duly made by, or by the authority of, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to surrender any British subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the above Article who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Bhootan Government, and also any Bhootanese subjects who after committing any of the above crimes in British territory shall flee into Bhootan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local Court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

Article 8th

The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with or cause of compliant against the Rajah of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government, and the British Government hereby engage to enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints in such manner as justice may require and to insist on the observation of the decision by the Rajah of Sikkim and Cooch Behar.

Article 9th

There shall be free trade and commerce between the two Governments. No duties shall be levied on Bhootanese goods imported into British territories, not shall the Bhootan Government levy any duties on British goods imported into, or transported thorough the Bhootan territories. Bhootanese subjects residing in British territories shall have equal justice with British subjects and British residing in Bhootan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Bhootan Government.

Article 10th

The present Treaty of ten Article having been concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of NOVEMBER 1865, corresponding with the Bhootea year Shim Lung 24th day of the 9th month, and signed and sealed by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., and Samdojey Deb Jimpey and Themseyrensey Donai, the ratifications of the same by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-general in Council and by their Highnesses the Dhrum and Deb Rajahs shall be mutually delivered within thirty days from this date.

Sd. /- H.Bruce, Lieut-Col.
Chief Civil and Polt. Officer.
Sd. /- In Deb
Nagri

Sd. /-In Bhootea language.

This Treaty was ratified on the 29th November 1865 in Calcutta by me.

25th January 1866 Sd. /-

John Lawrence,

Governor General

25th January 1866 Sd. /-

Muir,

Secy. the Govt.

of India

Appendix V

MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT Dated: 22.08.1988

Between Government of India, Government of West Bengal and Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council for creating a New Council for the Hill areas of Darjeeling District, under the Sixth Schedule of Constitution of India.

1. The Government of India and the Government of West Bengal have been making concerted efforts to fulfill the aspirations of Hill people of Darjeeling District (West Bengal) relating to their cultural identity, language, education and economic development.

2. On consideration of various demands of Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and consequent upon Tripartite Meeting held on 25.7.1988 at New Delhi between the Union Home Minister, Government of West Bengal and Shri Subash Ghisingh, President, GNLF, a Memorandum of Settlement (Darjeeling Accord) was signed on 22.8.1988. Pursuant to another meeting between the Union Home Minister and Shri Subash Ghisingh, President GNLF at New Delhi on 25.7. 1988, a further Memorandum of Settlement was signed on 23.8.1988.

3. Pursuant to the above mentioned Settlement, GNLF agreed to drop the demand for a separate State of Gorkhaland and an autonomous hill council, viz, Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), was set up under „The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Act, 1988" notified by the Government of West Bengal on 15.10.1988. The hill areas under DGHC comprised of the three hill Sub-Divisions of Darjeeling District, viz, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong and 13 mouzas of Siliguri Sub-Division of that District.

4. However, Shri Subash Ghisingh (former Chairman and Chief Executive Councilor, DGHC, presently Administrator) had been demanding constitutional status for the DGHC as, according to him, the abovementioned Settlements could not fulfill the aspirations of the people of Darjeeling. A series of tripartite meetings were held between Government of India, Government of West Bengal and Shri Subash Ghisingh to review the implementation of Darjeeling Accord and further issues arising from it. As a result of these meetings, it is hereby agreed in principle to create a selfgoverning body for the Darjeeling hill areas in the State of West Bengal.

5.The objectives of this agreement are to replace the existing Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council by an Autonomous Self Governing Council to be known as Gorkha Hill Council, Darjeeling under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India following due consultative, Legislative and constitutional processes by the State and Central Governments so as to fulfill economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights, socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the hill people; and to speed up the infrastructure development in the hill areas.

6. **Area:** The area of the proposed Council under the Sixth Schedule shall comprise all the mouzas, villages and areas as per Annexure A to be notified by the State Government. Any further alteration to the list can be made on the basis of mutual agreement between the Govt. of West Bengal and DGHC, prior to the enactment of Constitution Amendment Act. The above mentioned mouzas, villages and areas shall be comprised in 3 contiguous hills SubDivisions viz, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong of Darjeeling District after reorganization of the existing Sub-Divisions of Darjeeling district by the Government of West Bengal within a period of 3 months of the signing of this agreement.

7. **Status of New Council:**

7.1 The Government of West Bengal would repeal at appropriate time the existing „The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Act, 1988" to pave the way for creation of a new autonomous Council under Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Government of India would initiate necessary consultative, legislative and constitutional steps to amend Article 244 of the Constitution appropriately, to include administration of the hill areas of State of West Bengal in the Sixth Schedule.

7.2 The provisions of the Sixth Schedule as and when amended and other relevant Articles of the Constitution of India will apply to the new Council, mutatis mutandis in terms of this Settlement. The safeguards for the non-tribal in the new Council area, inter-alias, will include the following:

7.2.1 Provisions of para 1(2) of Sixth Schedule regarding Autonomous Regions will however not be applicable to the new Council.

7.2.2. A provision will be made in para 2(1) of the Sixth Schedule for increasing the number of members for new Council up to 33 out of which 10 will be reserved for Schedule Tribes, 15 for non-tribal communities, 3 open for all communities and 5 to be nominated by Governor of West Bengal from the unrepresented communities. From new Council area, at least two should be women. Nominated members will have the same rights and privileges as other members including voting rights. Election from the 28 constituencies of the new Council shall be on the basis of adult franchise. The terms of the elected members of the new Council shall be for 5years.

7.2.3. Safeguards for the settlement rights, transfer and inheritance of property etc, of non-tribal will be suitably incorporated in Para 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Any such Law may be made by the new Council in this regard will not in particular:

(a). Extinguish the rights and privileges enjoyed by any citizen of India is respect of his land at the commencement of the new Council, and

(b). Bar any citizen from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, allotment, settlement or by way of transfer if such citizens were eligible for such bonafide acquisition of land within the new Council area.

7.2.4. Provision will be added in para 6 of Sixth Schedule that in the new Council area, language and medium of instruction in educational institutions will not be changed without approval of the State Government.

7.2.5. Para 10 of the Sixth Schedule will not be applicable to the new Council area.

7.2.6. The amendments to the Sixth Schedule shall include provision is such a manner that non-tribal are not disadvantaged in relation to the rights enjoyed by them at the commencement of the new Council and their rights and privileges including land rights are fully protected.

7.3. These amendments will be carried out after following due consultative and legislative processes.

8. **Powers and functions**

8.1. The new Council shall have legislative powers in respect to subjects mutually agreed with State Government to be transferred to it. The list of Subjects is given in *Annexure B. Any further alteration to this list can be made on the basis mutual.*

8.2. There shall be an Executive Council comprising not more than 6 Executive Members from amongst the members of the General Council, one of whom shall be the Chief and another one the Deputy Chief of the said Executive Council. To ensure adequate representation for the non-Tribal members in the Executive Council, at least 2 members of the Executive Council would be non-Tribal. There shall be no bar on nominated members being appointed as members of the Executive Council.

8.3. The New Council shall have the full control over the officers and staff appointed by it and this and connected with the delegated subjects working in the Council area. In case of all India Service Officers and State Government officer on deputation to the Council, it can only recommend suitable action to the State Government. Annual Confidential Reports of all the officers shall, however be written by the appropriate authority in the new Council.

8.4. The new Council shall also be competent to make appointments for all posts under its control in accordance with the rules of appointment followed by the Government of West Bengal. However, the posts, where recruitment is made on the recommendation of West Bengal Public Service Commission, shall not be covered under this provision. The new Council may constitute a Selection Board for appointments to be made by it and may also make rules, with the approval of the Governor of West Bengal, to regulate appointments and to ensure adequate representation for all communities living the new Council area.

8.5. All new posts within the Council are created with the concurrence of State Government. The Council shall also abide by the decision of the Government of West Bengal in respect of abolition of temporarily keeping vacant any post.

8.6. Development functions and bodies within the competence of DGHC shall be transferred to the new Council.

8.7. The new Council would have the same powers of supervision over the lower tiers of Panchayats as the existing DGHC. The existing arrangement of lower tiers of Panchayats would continue under the new Council. In the event, Panchayati Raj System ceases to be in force in the new Council area, the powers of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in such matters shall be vested with the new Council.

8.8. The Offices of the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police will be outside the superintendence and control of the new Council.

8.9. The State Government would provide an amount, to be decided every year on population ration basis, as grants-in-aid in two equal installments to the new Council for executing development works. The proportionate share for new Council shall be calculated on the basis of the plan funds available after setting aside the funds required for earmarked sectors and the salary. This amount may be reduced proportionately if the State plan allocation is reduced or there is plan cut due to resource problem. In addition, the new Council will be paid a suitable amount of plan funds and non-plan funds to cover the office expenses and the salaries of the staffs working under their control. The new Council shall disburse the salaries of the staffs under their control and would ensure strict economy in the matter.

8.10. The new Council shall prepare a plan with the amounts likely to be available for development works, both under State share and Central share, covering any or all the activities of the departments under their control. The Council shall have full discretion in selecting the activities and choosing the amount for the investment under the same in any year covering all groups of people in a fair and equitable manner. This plan will be a sub set of the State plan and would be treated as its integral part. Once the plan of the State, including the new Council plan, gets the approval of the Planning Commission, the new Council authority shall start execution of their plans in the new Council area. Modifications, if any, made by the Planning Commission in the new Council proposal shall be binding on the new Council authority. The State Government shall not divert the funds allocated to the new Council to other heads and also ensure its timely release. The new Council may have Planning Department to prepare the plans for the new Council is to be submitted to Planning Commission through the Government ofWestBengal.

8.11. The Executive functions of the new Council shall be exercised through its Principal Secretary who shall be an officer of the rank not below that of Commissioner/Secretary of Government of West Bengal. The sanctioning powers of Government of West Bengal shall be vested with the Principal Secretary of the new Council and sanctioning powers of head(s) of the Department(s) including for technical sanction shall be conferred on the senior most officer of that Department preferably not below the rank of Additional Director, who may be designated as

Director of the new Council for that department. The principal Secretary and other officers shall exercise their powers under the overall guidance and supervision of the new Council.

9. **Additional Development Packages for the new Council**:

9.1. The State Government, within the limitation of financial and other constraints, may offer or allow the new Council to offer, possible and sustainable additional incentives for attracting private investment in the new Council area and would also support projects for external funding.

9.2. In order to accelerate the development of the region and to meet the aspirations of the people, the Government of India will provide financial

assistance of Rs 30 crore per annum for 5 years for projects to develop the socio-economic infrastructure in the new Council areas over and above the normal plans assistance to the State of West Bengal. Suitable mechanism will be built in the system to ensure that the funds are transferred to the new Council in time and a regular interval. A list of projects which should be considered to be taken up in the new Council are as is Annexure C.

10. Interim administration: Immediately after signing of the Agreement and till such time the process of Constitutional amendment is carried out, and the new Council is put in place, the administration of the area shall continue to be with the existing DGHC constituted under the existing Act. To achieve the objectives of the present MoS, The steps as enumerated hereunder would be taken by the parties to the settlement:

Sd/-

Subash Ghisingh.

President GNLF.

Sd/-

V.K. Duggal.

Home Secretary,

Government of India.

Sd/-

K. Deb.

Chief Secretary, Government of WB.

Appendix VI

Memorandum of Agreement

Whereas the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) has been demanding for quite sometime past a separate State of Gorkhaland for the hill areas of Darjeeling district including some areas of Siliguri Terai and Dooars (hereinafter referred to as the Region) ;

And

Whereas both the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal have repeatedly emphasized the need for keeping the region as an integral part of the State of West Bengal ;

And

Whereas after several rounds of tripartite meetings at the ministerial and at the official levels, the GJM, while not dropping their demand for a separate State of Gorkhaland, has agreed to the setting up of an autonomous Body (hereinafter referred to as the new Body) empowered with administrative, financial and executive powers in regard to various subjects to be transferred to the said Body for the development of the region and restoration of peace and normalcy there at;

And

Whereas the objective of this Agreement is to establish an autonomous self governing Body to administer the region so that the socio-economic, infrastructural, educational, cultural, and linguistic, development is expedited and the ethnic identity of Gorkhas established, thereby achieving all round development of the people of the region ;

And

Whereas all issues including issues relating to transfer of subjects to the new Body have been agreed in various tripartite meetings at the official level;

And

Whereas after several round of Tripartite discussions between the Government of India, the Government of West Bengal and the GJM, an agreement was reached in respect of all the issues;

Now, therefore, the Government of India, the Government of West Bengal and the GJM, keeping on record the demand of the GJM for a separate State of Gorkhaland, agree as follows:-

1) An autonomous Body, which shall be called the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), will be formed through direct election. A Bill for this purpose will be introduced in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly;

2) While under the provisions of the Constitution transfer of legislative powers to the new Body is not possible, the power to frame rules / regulations under the State Acts to control, regulate and administer the departments / offices and subjects transferred to the new Body will be conferred upon the new Body ;

3) The administrative, executive and financial powers in respect of the subjects transferred will be vested in such a way that the new Body may function in an autonomous and effective way;

4) The subjects alongwith all Departments / Offices to be transferred to the new Body is appended as Annexure – 'A'.

5) The area of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration shall comprise the areas of the entire sub-divisions of Darjeeling, Kalimpong with extended areas of Kurseong. In regard to transfer of additional areas of Siliguri Terai and Dooars to the new Body, a High-Powered Committee will be formed comprising four representatives of GJM, three representatives of the State Government (one from the Home Department; the District Magistrate, Darjeeling; the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri); the Director of Census Operations representing Government of India, apart from the Chairman of the Committee to be appointed by the State Government. The Chairperson of the Board of Administrators, DGHC will be the convener of this Committee. The Committee will look into the question of identification of additional areas in Siliguri Terai and Dooars that may be transferred to the new Body, having regard to their compactness, contiguity, homogeneity, ground level situation and other relevant factors.

The Committee will be expected to give its recommendations within a short period, preferably within six months of its constitution.

6) The work of this High-Powered Committee will run parallel to the electoral process which will be based on the existing area delimitation. However, the empowering statute will have a provision for transfer of the additional areas from Siliguri Terai and Dooars that may be agreed upon, based on the recommendation of this Committee.

7) In regard to transfer of all forests including reserved forest, it was agreed that the State Government will make a reference to the Central Government on the issue of reserved forest as the power delegated to the State Government under the Central statute cannot be delegated to any other authority straightaway. However, all offices catering to the unreserved forests under the jurisdiction of GTA would also be transferred to GTA.

8) Regarding Tribal status to Gorkhas except the Scheduled Castes, the GJM or any organisation representing the Gorkhas will make an application to the Backward Classes Welfare Department of the State Government, which is the authority to process such claims. The Department, upon receiving such application supported by necessary documents will conduct a study through the Cultural Research Institute, Kolkata. After examination by the Department, the matter will be referred to the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. The recommendations already submitted to the National Commission will be followed up by the State Government. The Government of India will consider for granting ST status to all the Gorkhas excepting SC.

9) In regard to regularization of all ad-hoc, casual, daily wage workers of DGHC, regularization by way of outright absorption is not feasible due to the current legal position as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, those employees who have put in 10 years of continuous service would be guided by the Finance Department's order of 23rd April, 2010. Those outside this ambit would be extended an enhancement in wages. This would be equivalent to 75% of the remuneration admissible under the order of the Finance Department subject to a minimum of 5,000/- per month for those who have not completed 10 years of continuous service. As and when they complete 10 years of continuous service, they will be eligible for the full benefit in terms of the order of 23rd April, 2010. The employees will, however, have the liberty to apply for normal recruitment to any other posts of State Government. It was also agreed that the State Government will make necessary financial provisions for bearing the additional non-plan expenditure for this purpose.

10) There shall be a GTA Sabha for the GTA. There shall be a Chairman and Deputy Chairman to conduct the business of Council. The GTA Sabha shall consist of forty-five elected members and five members to be nominated by the Governor to give representation to members of SC, ST, women, and minority communities. The M.Ps, M.L.As, and Chairpersons of municipality(s) of the region shall be Ex-officio Members to this GTA Sabha. The term of the GTA shall be five years.

11) The Executive Body shall consist of a Chief Executive who will nominate fourteen members out of the elected / nominated members as Executive Member. One of them shall be the Deputy Chief to be nominated by the Chief Executive.

12) Every member of the GTA shall before taking seat make and subscribe before the Governor or one of the elected members appointed in that behalf by him an oath or affirmation. The Chief Executive shall be administered an oath or affirmation by the Governor.

13) There shall be a Principal Secretary of the GTA, who shall be of the rank of the Principal Secretary/Secretary to the State Government and who shall be selected by the Chief Executive from the panel sent by the State Government and shall be paid from the GTA Fund such salaries and allowances as may be fixed by the State

Government. The Principal Secretary once deputed to the GTA shall not be transferred for a period of at least two years without the consent of the GTA.

14) The Government of India and the Government of West Bengal will provide all possible assistance to the GTA for the overall development of the region. The Government of India will provide financial assistance of Rs. 200 crore (Rupees Two Hundred Crore) per annum for 3 years for projects to develop the socio-economic infrastructure in GTA over and above the normal plan assistance to the State of West Bengal. A list of projects which may be considered to be taken up by the GTA is at Annexure 'B1'. List of projects to be separately taken up by the GTA with the State/Central Government is at 'B2'.

15) The Government of India/ State Government will provide one time financial assistance required for development of administrative infrastructure viz., GTA Sabha House, Secretariat Complex and the residential quarters for the elected members of GTA and the senior officers.

16) The allocation sanctioned in the budget of GTA and all funds sanctioned by the State or the Union Government which remain unspent at the close of the financial year shall be taken into account for the purpose of providing additional resources in the Budget of the following year or years and the fund requirements will be met on a yearly basis.

17) The Government of West Bengal shall provide formula based plan fund with 60 per cent weightage on population and the balance weightage on area backwardness, hill areas and border areas in two equal installments every year for executing development works.

18) The Government of West Bengal shall provide Non-plan grant including provisions for bearing the additional Non-plan expenditure for existing employees payable in two installments in respect of the offices / departments transferred to GTA.

19) The fund received from the Government of India shall not be diverted and the State Government shall release the fund in time.

20) The GTA will have the power of creating Group B, C and D posts with the approval of Governor. The recruitment to Group B, C and D posts will be through a Subordinate Service Selection Board to be set up for this purpose.

21) The State Public Service Commission shall be consulted for the recruitment of Group 'A' officers.

22) The State Government will set-up a separate School Service Commission, College Service Commission; open an office of the Regional Pension and Provident Directorate; and set up an office for Registration of land, building etc., marriage, society etc. in the GTA area, subject to extant rules and regulations.

23) The Governor of West Bengal shall obtain a report on the functioning of the GTA and cause that report to be laid on the table of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly annually.

24) The Government of West Bengal will initiate action to re-organize / re-constitute the territorial jurisdictions of sub-divisions and blocks.

25) The GTA, once established, will separately take up the issues relating to grant of incentives, subsidies, waiver of taxes and tariff and other benefits as appropriate to the region's backwardness, with the Central and State Governments.

26) A three-tier Panchayat will be constituted by elections in the GTA region, subject to the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution of India. Notwithstanding anything contained in the West Bengal Panchayat Act 1973, or the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993, the GTA shall exercise general powers of supervision over the Panchayats and the Municipalities.

27) Since the formation of new authority will take some time and since the developmental works in the hills, which have already suffered badly, cannot be allowed to suffer further, there will be a Board of Administrators in DGHC which would be fully empowered to exercise all the powers and functions of the Chief Executive Councilor under the DGHC Act, 1988 and to decide on the much needed developmental works in the hills. The Board of Administrators will comprise MLA, Darjeeling; MLA, Kurseong ; MLA, Kalimpong ; District Magistrate, Darjeeling and Administrator, DGHC in keeping with the provisions of the sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the DGHC Act as amended vide Kolkata Gazette Notification of 22nd March, 2005.

28) The GJM agrees to ensure that peace and normalcy will be maintained in the region.

29) A review will be done by the State Government of all the cases registered under various laws against persons involved in the GJM agitation. Steps will be taken in the light of the review, not to proceed with prosecution in all cases except those charged with murder. Release of persons in custody will follow the withdrawal of cases.

30) The GTA youth would be considered for recruitment in the Police, Army and Para Military Forces subject to their suitability for such appointment.

31) The implementation of the provision of the Memorandum of Agreement shall be periodically reviewed by a committee representing the Government of India, Government of West Bengal and GJM.

32) The Government of West Bengal shall repeal the DGHC Act, 1988 along with formation of GTA to be constituted by an Act of the legislature.

Signed on 18th July, 2011 at Darjeeling in the presence of Shri P. Chidambaram, Hon'ble Union Home Minister and Mamata Banerjee, Hon'ble Chief Minister, west Bengal.

(Dr. G.D. Gautama)

Additional Chief Secretary,

Home and Hill Affairs Department

for or on behalf on the Government of West Bengal

Shri Roshan Giri

General Secretary

Gorkha Janmukti Morcha

for or on behalf of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha

(Shri K.K. Pathak)

Joint Secreatry to the Government of India

Ministry of Home Affairs

for and on behalf of the

Government of India

Annexure 'A'

List of Subjects to be transferred to the GTA

(1) Agriculture, including agricultural education and research protecting against pest and prevention of plants diseases; Horticulture, Floriculture and Food processing;

(2) Animal Husbandry and Veterinary, that is to say preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practices, cattle pounds; Dairy development;

(3) Cooperation;

(4) Information and Cultural Affairs

(5) School Education including primary education, secondary education, and higher secondary education (including vocational training): Physical Education; Government Schools.

(6) College Education including Agricultural and Technical Colleges, Local Management of Government sponsored Colleges; Mass Education and Physical Education; Engineering, Medical, Management, and Information Technology with Government and Government sponsored colleges for which wings /cells shall have to be created by the GTA for the area under its jurisdiction;

(7) Adult Education and Library Services;

(8) Fisheries;

(9) Irrigation, drainage and embankments, floods and landslide protection;

(10) Food and Civil Supplies; Consumer Affairs;

(11) Management of any forest, not being Reserved Forest; [Explanation – 'Reserved Forest' shall mean a reserved forest as constituted under Indian Forest Act 1927 (16 of 1927)];

(12) Cottage & Small Scale Industries including sericulture, handloom and textiles; handicrafts and Khadi and Village industries;

(13) Cinchona plantation and settlement of land in possession of the plantation inhabitants: management of lease of cinchona lands etc. under it.

(14) Woman and Child Development and Social Welfare;

(15) District Sainik Board;

(16) "Health including Public Health and Family welfare" including hospitals, dispensaries, health centres and sanatoriums, establishing a Nurses Training School;

(17) Intoxicating liquors, opium derivatives subject to the provisions of Entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; distilleries – control and regulation, Bonded House and raising of revenue;

(18) Irrigation;

(19) Water Resources Investigation and Minor Irrigation;

(20) Labour and Employment;

(21) Land & Land Revenue including allotment, occupation or use, setting apart of land other than land with reserved forest for the purposes of agriculture or grazing or for residential or other non-agricultural purposes to promote interest of the people;

(22) Library services (financed and controlled by the State Government);

(23) Lotteries (subject to the provisions of the Entry 40 of the List I of the Seventh

Schedule);

(24) Theatre, dramatic performances and cinemas (subject to the provisions of the Entry 60 of List I of the Seventh Schedule); Sports; entertainment and amusements;

(25) Markets and fairs;

(26). Municipal corporation, improvement of trust, district boards and other local authorities; Fire Services;

(27) Museum and archeology institutions controlled or financed by the State, ancient and historical monuments and records other than those declared by or under any Law made by Parliament to be of national importance;

(28) Panchayat and Rural Development including District Rural Development Agency

(DRDA);

(29) Planning and Development;

(30) Printing and Stationery;

(31) Public Health Engineering;

(32) Public Works Department including work relating to State Highways as well as responsibility discharged by the State Government for maintenance of National Highways within the jurisdiction of GTA;

(33) Publicity and Public Relations including Regulation of Media – both Print and Electronic media;

(34) Registration of births and deaths;

(35) Relief and Rehabilitation, establishing a branch of disaster management in consultation with NDMA under the extant laws/rules.

(36) Sericulture;

(37) Small, cottage and rural industry subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule;

(38) Social Welfare; including part of SC & ST Development and Finance Corporation under GTA area;

(39) Soil conservation;

(40) Sports and Youth Welfare;

(41) Statistics;

(42) Tourism: Tourism infrastructure within the jurisdiction of the GTA catering to the area of GTA would be transferred to GTA. However, GTA may set up its own wing of Tourism Development Corporation for the area under its jurisdiction;

(43) Transport (roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communication not specified in List I of the Seventh Schedule, municipal tramways, ropeways, inland waterways and traffic thereon, subject to the provision of Entry 40 of List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule with regard to such waterways, vehicles and other mechanically propelled vehicles);

(44) The State Government will consider opening an RTO Office in the GTA area however; powers vested with the DM at present would remain with him only.

(45) Tribal research institution controlled and financed by the State Government;

(46) Urban development – town and country planning;

(47) Weights and measures subject to the provisions of Entry 50 of List I of the

Seventh Schedule;

(48) Welfare of plain tribes and backward classes subject to the area being under GTA only;

(49) Welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes;

(50) Welfare of Minorities;

(51) Management and settlement of land including markets and market sheds controlled by the Darjeeling Improvement Fund;

(52) Minor Minerals and Mineral development (subject to the provisions of Entry 23 of List II of the Seventh Schedule);

(53) Rural electrification;

(54) Renewable sources of energy including water-power (subject to Entry 56 of List I and Entry 38 of List III of the Seventh Schedule);

(55) Sharing electricity with GTA subject to evolving a mutually agreeable formula with the State government.

(56) Pounds and prevention of cattle trespass;

(57) Management of burial grounds and cremation grounds;

(58) Regulation of Cable channels; to the extent the powers of Central Act, i.e. the Cable Television Network (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2002 vests with the State government;

(59) Tauzi: Tauzi Department of the Collectorate.

Annexure 'B1'

LIST OF PROJECTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE GTA TO DEVELOP THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE GTA AREA IN ORDER TO ACCELERATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION

1. Comprehensive water supply system in the new body area;

2. Multi-super specialty Medical College and Hospital;

3. Establishment of Hospitality and Tourism Management Institute;

4. Establishment of a College of Nursing;

5. Establishment of a Gorkha House at New Delhi;

6. Establishment of an Institute for Research and Development of the Nepali Language;

7. Establishment of a Cultural Institute to preserve, promote and develop culture, tradition, heritage of the people of the region;

8. Establishment of Research and Development Institute for Tea and Cinchona;

9. Research and Development Institute for Horticulture, Floriculture;

10. Balasan Drinking Water Project to be taken up by the Union Government and be declared as a National Project;

11. Sidrabong Hydro Project has been declared a National Heritage but neglected. Funds for its maintenance and upkeep;

12. Food processing, agro-processing complex and cold storage;

13. Creation and development of the IT industry in this region;

14. A new bridge connecting Dooars to be constructed over the Teesta River as the only

Coronation Bridge has become very old and it may collapse any time;

15. Mini and Micro Hydro Projects in GTA;

16. Establishment of Eight Multi disciplinary College different areas of the Region;

17. Establishment of Veterinary Hospitals;

18. High School/Higher Secondary School for every twenty-five villages;

19. Processing plants for Cinchona at Mungpoo;

20. Establishment of Polytechnics for all subdivisions;

21.

2 ITIs / Vocational Institutes in each subdivision;

22. Construction of Multi storied Car Parking at Darjeeling, Kurseong and Kalimpong;

23. Construction of Circular Road connecting Darjeeling Town-Lebong-Pandam Jorebunglow-Darjeeling Town;

24. Construction of Rope way at Kalimpong(Delo – Relly), at Darjeeling (Tukvar-Singla) and (Batasia-Roack Garden), at Mirik (Mirik – Kurseong), at Kurseong (Giddeypahar- Rohini);

25. Special Fund for the construction of Super-speciality Hospitals in every Sub-Division;

26. Creation of an Industrial zone in an area of at least 1000 acres in the plain areas of the proposed GTA and to be accorded status of special economic zone;

27. Institute of Capacity Building & Livelihood School.

Annexure 'B2'

LIST OF PROJECT PROPOSALS WHICH GTA MAY TAKE UP WITH THE STATE/CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1. Establish a Central Institute of Technology.

2. Establishment of a Central University;

3. National Institute of Technology (NIT) including IT and Bio-technology;

4. Construction of an alternative National Highway from Siliguri via Mirik along Balasan River to Darjeeling;

5. Establishment of a Fashion Technology Institute;

6. Establishment of a Sainik School;

7. Establishment of National Games and Sports Academy;

8. Establishment of a Tea Auction Centre at Darjeeling;

9. Darjeeling Himalayan Railway to be revitalized for boosting Tourism sector;

10. To establish a Broad-gauge Railway Terminal Station at Sukna;

11. Strengthening and Widening of National Highway 55 and 31 A;

12. Central Government Engineering College funded by GOI;

13. Revival of Trade route to Tibet via Jelep-la from Kalimpong;

14. Reservation of seats for students of this region in College/Institution of higher education including Engineering, Technical, Medical and Management etc all over India;

Appendix VII

Schedule for common people

"POLITICS OF IDENTITY: A STUDY OF GORKHA ASSERTION FOR THE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN DARJEELING HILLS"

To be filled by the Respondent

[Please fill or use tick ( ) mark wherever necessary]

Section I

Profile of the Respondents:

1. Name:

2. Address:

a. Town/Village: .....

b. Municipality/Block: .....

3. Sex/Gender: Male [ ] Female [ ]

4. Age: 20-30 [ ] 31-40 [ ] 41-50 [ ] 51-60 [ ] Above 60 [ ]

5. Category: SC [ ] ST [ ] OBC [ ] General [ ]

6. Religion:

7. Education: Illiterate [ ] Primary [ ] Secondary [ ] Senior Secondary [ ] Graduation [ ] Post Graduation [ ] Others [ ]

8. Marital status: Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Separated [ ]

9. Occupation: Agriculture Worker [ ] Daily Wage Owner [ ] Service Holder [ ] Small Business [ ] Unemployed [ ] Others [ ]

10. Monthly Income:

Below 5,000 - [ ]

5,001-10,000 – [ ]

15,001-20,000 – [ ]

20,001-25,000 – [ ]

30,001-35,000 – [ ]

Above 35,000 – [ ]

11. Total no. of family members:

Section II

12. What is your view on the Gorkhaland movement?

……

13. Do you know about the history of the Gorkhaland movement?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

(If yes then) State the reasons for its simmering of time and again: ……

14. Do you support the Gorkhaland movement?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes then) Why do you support it: ……

15. What do you think the Gorkhaland Movement is about – Identity or Development or both? Give your opinion?

……
….

16. What do you understand by the term 'Gorkha'?

……..

17. Do you want to identify yourself as a Gorkha or as Nepali?

……..

a. Why do you want to identify yourself as Gorkha?

……..

b. Why do you want to identify yourself as Nepali?

……

18. Do you feel that you lack your identity as an Indian?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/no then) Why? .....

19. Have you ever face any difficulties in identifying yourself as an Indian?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes then) State what sort of difficulties and why? ……

20. Do you think that the misrecognition has increased insecurities amongst the Gorkhas in India thereby leading to such assertions?

……..

21. Do you find any differences between the Gorkhaland movement of the 1986 under Subash Ghising and the movement under Bimal Gurung?

…….

22. What is your opinion on developmental boards provided by Trinamool Congress led Government of West Bengal?

……

23. Is the developmental boards provided by the Government of West Bengal healthy for the development of hill communities?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/no then) Why? ……

24. Do you consider that the two autonomous bodies DGHC and GTA as a failure?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/ not so then) State the reasons: ……

25. What is your opinion on the recent Gorkhland agitation?

……

26. Do you consider the Gorkhaland agitation under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, President of Gorkha Janmukti Morha (GJM) is for the making of Darjeeling hills and some of its adjoining areas as the 30th state of Indian Union?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

(If yes/not so then) Why? ……

27. Is it the recent Gorkhaland agitation which have been started off from 6th of June is peoples led movement?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/not so) State the reasons for considering it as so: ……

28. Do you believe that the creation of a separate state of the Gorkhaland will help secure the Gorkha national identity?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/not so then) State the reasons: ……

29. Do you believe that Gorkhaland will be 30th state of Indian Union?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/not so then) State the reasons: ……

Respondent's signature

Appendix VIII

Schedule for Political leaders

"POLITICS OF IDENTITY: A STUDY OF GORKHA ASSERTION FOR THE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN DARJEELING HILLS"

To be filled by the Respondent

[Please fill or use tick ( ) mark wherever necessary]

Section I

Profile of the Respondents:

1. Name:

2. Address:

a. Town/Village: .....

b. Municipality/Block: .....

3. Sex/Gender: Male [ ] Female [ ]

4. Age: 20-30 [ ] 31-40 [ ] 41-50 [ ] 51-60 [ ] Above 60 [ ]

5. Category: SC [ ] ST [ ] OBC [ ] General [ ]

6. Education: Illiterate [ ] Primary [ ] Secondary [ ] Senior Secondary [ ] Graduation [ ] Post Graduation [ ] Others [ ]

7. Marital status: Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Separated [ ]

8. Occupation:

9. Designation:

10. Monthly Income:

11. Total no. of family members:

Section II

12. How do you define the Gorkhaland movement?

……..

13. As a political representative of the Gorkhas, what does the term 'Gorkha' signifies to you?

……..

14. According to you, what are the important reasons for Darjeeling hills simmering off time and again?

15. What do you think the Gorkhaland Movement is about – Identity or Development or both? Give your opinion?

……

16. Is the Gorkhaland movement as expression of the Gorkha National Identity?

……..

17. Whether you call yourself as a Gorkha or as Nepali?

……..

a. Why do you want to call yourself as Gorkha?

……..

b. Why do you want to call yourself as Nepali?

……..

18. Do you believe Gorkhas lacks an identity as Indian?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/no then) Why? .....

19. Why are the Gorkhas facing serious issues in terms of recognition of their national identity?

.....

20. Have you ever encountered any difficulties in identifying yourself as an Indian?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes then) State what sort of difficulties: ……

21. Do you think that the Articles VII, VIII of Indo Nepal Friendship Treaty (1950) has contributed towards the misrecognition and marginalisation of Gorkhas in India?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes then) State the reasons: ……

22. Do you think that the misrecognition has increased insecurities amongst the Gorkhas in India thereby leading to such assertions?

……..

23. What you think that lack of development is the cause of the movement?

……....

24. Do you think in the name of development the Gorkhaland movement has lost its course?

……..

25. Do you find any differences between the Gorkhaland movement of the 1986 under Subash Ghising and the movement under Bimal Gurung?

……..

26. What is your opinion on developmental boards provided by Trinamool Congress led Government of West Bengal?

……....

27. Is the developmental boards provided by the Government of West Bengal healthy for the development of hill communities?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/no then) Why? ……

28. What is your take on Sixth Schedule? Is it beneficial or suitable for all round development of hill communities in Darjeeling hills?

……

29. Why the two autonomous councils DGHC and GTA failed?

……

30. Do you consider the recent Gorkhaland agitation which have been started off from 6th of June is peoples led movement?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/not so then) State the reasons for considering it as so: ……

31. Do you believe that the creation of a separate state of the Gorkhaland will help secure the Gorkha national identity?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

a. (If yes/not so then) State the reasons: ……

32. What type of role is being played by your political parties to lead the movement ahead?

……..

33. What kind of democratic means or tactics are employed by your political party to bridge between the voice of the Gorkhas for Gorkhaland and the Governments?

……..

34. What do you think is the reason behind the winning down of the subsequent Gorkhaland movement?

……..

35. Do you think that the movement lacks momentum?

……..

36. What is your take upon the state responses towards the Gorkha community in the Darjeeling hills and Gorkhaland movement?

……..

Respondent's signature