


Extremism in North East India

**Edited by
Bimal J. Deb**



Over the years, North East India remained the hotbed of militant extremism largely attributable to identity politics seeking to institutionalise political aspirations of various ethnic communities. The emergence of educated middle class and a growing sense of alienation of the people from mainstream India has also had the effect of triggering growth of militant organizations adding substantially to political dynamics of the region. The proliferation of rebel groups coincided with the exclusion of economic issues and instruments in the ongoing peace process which has, so far, failed to address the core issues. In fact, the security dimensions of extremism often overshadowed development concerns of this resource rich region. The book attempts to analyse the sustaining force of state-specific extremism without which any possible political solution will only remain a far cry.

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EXTREMISM IN NORTH EAST INDIA

Edited by
Bimal J. Deb



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Prof. Zahid Husain Qureshi
Secretary,
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1

North East India

Maladies and Remedies

Ranjit S. Mooshahary

North-East is the most volatile territory in our country. Home of many autochthonous tribes who had lived on clan loyalties and in glorious isolation from each other in time and clime, the region is not a melting pot of a pan-tribal society but a veritable remake of the Tower of Babel with the tribes speaking in different tongues, expressing different thoughts and following different faiths and practices. Often they are at war with each other for supremacy or for preserving their identities from the assimilative advances of outsiders making the region hotbed of political irreconcilabilities.

The problem of the North East people in a broader frame is, therefore, twofold: (i) among themselves and (ii) with the rest of India. All the conflicts and clashes, contradictions and confrontations—be it the demand for sovereignty or separate statehood, special status for linguistic or cultural distinctiveness or for sixth schedule status issue forth from these two main roots. The fear of identity extinction runs deep in the veins of the northeasterners and it makes them emotive whenever they apprehend any threat to their identity. They are effusive in their joys and aggressive in their fears and like the turbulent Brahmaputra in summer months slicing its way through the friable soil wreaking havoc on the people they can create waves of lawlessness in the region and its attendant human misery.

Of the seven northeastern states, Assam has the highest diversity and density of population. Historically, she is the mother

state as from her womb other states have derived their entities in the crucible of history. The problems of Assam are extraordinarily complex—insurgency, terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, killings, demographic aggression, ethnic heterogeneity, student politics, border disputes with the neighbouring states, flood, poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment have mired the state in an imbroglio with no parallel anywhere.

The crux of the matter is that what happens in Assam has cascading impacts in the other six states of the region. The corridor to the North East runs through the Bodoland area in Kokrajhar district of Assam and also partly through Dhubri district of the state. The district is subjected to 50-55 days bandhs of various types a year effectively blocking the vital lifeline to the region. The West Bengal-Assam interstate border checkpoints at Srirampur and Chagalia are the bottlenecks restricting the flow of economic activities. An enquiry by a senior state government functionary, whose report was made public through an RTI petition, revealed glaring mismanagement and unchecked corruption in these checkpoints for which the people of the North East as a whole are made to bear higher cost of commodities.

Nagaland is the mother of insurgency. For over six decades the state has passed through various stages of insurgency situation, though the state has not witnessed any large scale violence after the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN, which is in force for 12 years now. Nevertheless, the underground runs its own affairs of governance in a challenge to the constitutionally elected government. The demand of sovereignty by the NSCN has practically become a thing of the past and settlement within the constitutional framework appears likely provided the main demand for Nagalim is addressed with a positive concern.

Manipur is virtually in a state of continuing insurgency with over thirty armed outfits running parallel administration and creating continuous violence and blood-shed. The valley inhabitants — the Meiteis — and the tribes in the surrounding hills are so completely divided that there seems no hope of their ever coming together again. There is no immediate prospect of insurgency and violence ceasing in Manipur.

Tripura is a state surrounded on three sides by Bangladesh and prone to the trans-border criminal exploits. It is one of the better governed states in the country and no doubt the best in the

North East. It is an example of how good governance can resolve human conflicts despite geographical disadvantage.

Meghalaya and Mizoram are peaceful states. Both these states had their share of militancy and violence but today these two states are as the islands of peace signifying the fact that there is a way to violence and there is also a way to peace. The fact that ethnically both the states are more homogeneous than others has helped in the return of peace.

Arunachal Pradesh is too sparsely populated and too spread over and underdeveloped to harbour armed movement right now. But it has the potential for conflict in future when education and development would arouse people's expectation. Its tribal heterogeneity may lead to social disharmony along the ethnic lines.

Common Maladies of North East

The region has been ravaged by terrorism and militancy by both underground and over-ground actors. There are also disguised terrorists who subvert the system to advance their agenda and are actually more harmful to the society and the people.

All the states of North East, Tripura expected, suffer from the syndrome of governance deficit. Absence of effective, responsive and transparent governance make people desperate and it leads to anger and violence.

Total absence of any mechanism to curb corruption has only made it no risk high return industry thereby accentuating the deprivation quotient, which fuels militancy and violence.

Immune corruption is the twin brother of extortion; both misappropriate resources with impunity.

All the states in the region have to depend heavily on central assistance on financial matters. Their own revenue collection is not enough even to pay their employees' salary. If corruption is controlled their revenue collection will improve.

Sclerotic civil administration not only hampers development pace but also makes people cynical as they lose faith in the system. This is one reason why in the North East we see so many organizations trying to destroy the system to derive personal aggrandizement.

Militancy and terrorism have become money spinners in the region; there are vested interests who do not want them to end.

Only an efficient political leadership as in Tripura can check this menace.

People are by nature apprehensive of the intention of outsiders and it fuels the crisis of confidence, which often erupts in violence.

Common Remedies

- Efficient and effective political leadership can stem the rot. The region requires visionary and dynamic political leadership. Political parties—the national parties in particular—need to ponder on this and encourage people to join them.
- States need to create institutional mechanisms to fight corruption. This can be easily done if there is will, but since many are involved in this lucrative practice of corruption it is difficult to curb it. Civil society must create people's war against corruption through protests and demonstrations, exposure and non-cooperation.
- Political resolution of issues is the key to control violence. Too long operation by the armed forces becomes counterproductive and there is immediate need to strengthen the civil police to enable them to take control of the situation.
- Pace of development must be accelerated and employment generation through micro, small and medium projects to be rapidly created. DONER and NEC can play much larger role in addressing the development issues.

Suggestions and Combating Terrorism

- Terrorism cannot be put down merely by enacting new laws howsoever stringent such laws may be. We introduced death penalty in the IPC by inserting Section 364(A) in 1993 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with the objective of curbing the menace of kidnapping. It was believed that capital punishment, which is provided only in murder case under Section 302 IPC, would deter people from committing the crime of kidnapping for ransom. But today we find kidnapping has become an industry in many parts of the country even where there is

no insurgency or militancy. It is so because we have failed to send even a single kidnapper to the gallows.

- Law is value neutral. It is its implementation that makes it effective. Therefore, more important than law is the quality of the enforcement personnel. We have to train and motivate the enforcement officers and facilitate their efficient functioning by providing them with the tools and techniques for implementing the law.
- We over deploy our uniformed personnel. India is the only country where even the VVIP security is done with visible presence of men in uniform, which is rather a disadvantage. Demonstrative deployment of men in uniform is necessary to control crowd, regulate traffic, procession etc. but such deployment to prevent terrorism, it is counter-productive. Instead we should emphasize on plain cloth police deployment to oversee the activities of the terrorists. The cities and towns/villages can be divided into policing zones and assigned to specific groups of plain cloth policemen making them accountable for securing the area from the visitation of crimes and militancy.
- Intelligence can never be perfect. It is analytical interpretation of it that leads to actionable inputs and that is where we fail. There is need for enhancing the quality of intelligence gathering and its analysis that will help intelligence units to correlate different types of inputs.

The Merging of the North East with the Mainstream

It is an encouraging sign that today the North East is much closer to the mainstream. People have come to realize that India offers opportunities for development without having to abandon one's faith and practices, custom and culture and that democracy in India is better than anywhere among our neighbours. This is a paradigm shift in the mindset of the people of North East and with the passage of time the bond of integration of its people with the rest of India is going to be even stronger. This will resolve many issues that tend to distance this region from India now.

Note: Speech delivered by Shri Ranjit S. Mooshahary, Governor of Meghalaya at the seminar organized by the North East India Council for Social Science Research on "Extremists in North East India" on March 6, 2009 at Shillong.

2

Extremism and Conflict Resolution

(In the Context of Militancy in Assam)

Harekrishna Deka

It is necessary to be clear about the term 'extremism' before I undertake further discussion on my subject. This term is found used in historical context particularly when the historians were dealing with India's struggle for national independence in the early part of the twentieth century. With the change of time and with tremendous changes in the socio-political scenario occurring in this country since independence, the term appears to have acquired a different connotation and it is even in the process of being replaced by another 'terrorism', which, of course, was also used in the past but with a meaning distinctly different from the other term. The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, which I often consult, has not defined 'extremism' and indicates that it is a noun derivative of the adjective 'extremist', who is 'a person who holds extreme or fanatical political or religious views and esp. resorts to and advocates extreme action.' In today's context, when violence has become an everyday affair, it is often presumed that violence is a necessary ingredient of extreme actions. But during the early part of India's national struggle, those who were called the extremists were those who did not speak of violent actions though they wanted to radicalize the methodology of the struggle to achieve *Swaraj*. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal were the examples of such extremists, unlike the moderates like Gokhale. Instead of direct action advocated by the extremists, which were, of course, non-violent, the moderates believed in petition and

representation and at the most wanted recognition of the Indian's political rights through constitutional method.¹ Interestingly, a Gandhian, Martin Luther King, who launched a non-violent struggle for the civil rights of the black people in America did not hesitate to use the word extremist, when he said 'the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be...The nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists.' Though his words have a tinge of sarcasm, since it referred to what others said of his methodology, his coinage of the term 'creative extremism' is novel and points to his non-violent strategy.

I notice that, the present trend in our country is to define 'extremism' in the context of violent actions adopted by radicalized groups seeking political change. When I was in the intelligence Branch of Assam Police, I found the term mainly used to describe the kind of activities the Naxalite groups were indulging in and we referred to this mode of political violence as 'left-wing extremism'. I think this description is still in use. On the other hand, it became customary to name the mode of actions of the radicalized groups of the North East who particularly adopted the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) pattern of hostility as 'insurgency'. The most recent term 'terrorism' has been defined in many ways, though, each differ subtly from the other. This term usually refers to the extremely violent actions of the non-state political groups who aim at creating panic in civilian population to weaken an established rule in a state of traumatizing a recalcitrant community with a view to compelling them to concede demands on issues of politico-religious, politico-ethnic or politico-economic nature. With the frequency of bomb blasts occurring in Assam, the term 'terrorism' now finds mention while describing the activities of the militant groups active in the state.

Roger Scruton considers 'extremism' to be a vague term², which means — (1) a political idea with the intention not only to confront but also to *eliminate* opposition, (2) intolerance towards all views other than one's own, and (3) adoption of means to political ends which disregard accepted standard of conduct, in particular which show disregard for the life, liberty and human rights of others.

While I do not question Scruton's categorization, my focus will be on a kind of extremism which fits the third category given by him. In my discussion, I will not make any reference to the form of

actions adopted by non-violent political actors advocating direct action to achieve political goals. My discussion will remain confined to a form of extreme action where violence is adopted as a necessary radical means in disregard of life, liberty and human rights of others. Though it is done at the cost of human lives, the radicalized group may seek legitimacy from a segment of a people amongst whom it works and whom it may consider its constituency. Under this rubric, the militancy of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which is often termed insurgency, is a kind of extremism. There is a tendency to dismiss ULFA as a group of misadventurists intolerant of human values but while their actions are dangerously subversive of accepted standards of conduct, their own conduct sprang from the social soil—a soil of which the foundation got weakened due to non-realization of socio-economic expectations. Therefore, dealing with ULFA is not just dealing with a group of people intolerant of others but is addressing the underlying societal failures which surfaced through the minds of these people as lack and manifested as political demands.

The ULFA in adopting a form of extremism with its attended violence set Assam's liberation from India as its mission. This outfit was not the first to demand severance of ties from India. Even when the idea of a pan-Indian nationalism was sweeping through the minds of the people of British India, the question of Assam's inclusion was raised by Jnannath Bora, an Assamese intellectual in 1936 and 1938. Even before that Kamalakanta Bhattacharyya (1855-1936), editor of Assamese magazine, '*Asom Hitoishi*' advocated for an independent and self-reliant Assam.³ Though the Indian nationalistic upsurge had a stronger impact on the Assamese middle class, there were still many who subscribed to the views expressed by the Late Bora. In the post-Independence era, disillusionment with the national leadership was growing and it stemmed mainly from the slow rate of economic development with its concomitant unemployment problem, which was politically expressed as neglect of a peripheral region by a unitary centre alleged to be concerned mainly with the well-being of a heartland. An undercurrent of linguistic nationalism has continued to be there amongst major linguistic groups of this country from the days of the national struggle and it took shape even when Indian nationalism was being formulated. This found expression when the states were reorganized on linguistic basis.⁴ Language

was the main formula around which the major linguistic groups under the dominance of the middle class elite foregrounded their identity. The Assamese also cherished a similar linguistic identity and conceptually it was nationalistic. The smaller people-groups, particularly who did not have a long tradition of literary culture formulated their identity around the idea of ethnicity. And this also took nationalistic turn in many instances. A particular instance is the Naga people whose ethnic identity as one people was formed during the British rule when different Naga tribes shared common administration and common religion. They even adopted a common language Nagamese derived from Assamese as a communicating link. It may be said that Naga pride was so much based on this identity that it even rebelled against the idea of sharing sovereignty with the Indian Union when it came into being. Effort at integration through different political strategies adopted by the Centre has, of course, succeeded in mellowing this strong sense of separate identity in recent time but the Centre need to move cautiously so that the pride of Naga identity does not get hurt. I leave this context here as my discussion mainly centres on security scenario in Assam.

The Assamese having found themselves at a lower trajectory of development than the rest of the country after the first decade of Independence developed an anti-outsider syndrome. At first accepting the alleged blame that the community was slow in enterprise to grab opportunities, it soon discovered other causes for the negative growth of the region and found that most middle class opportunities had been grabbed by the outsiders except in the State Government services. Trade and commerce went to the hands of the Marwaries, tea capital slipped to Kolkata, the Bengalis dominated the service sector except in the State Government services, Biharis dominated the labour segment and the immigrants from the erstwhile East Bengal, later Bangladesh, gradually spread over to all vacant lands and became an important political factor in vote-bank politics. Actually, all this happened in an economic situation when India's adoption of Mahalanobis model⁵ for development, that banked on heavy industry, did not create any opportunity for capital formation in a region where poor communication and its frontier character became disadvantage for economic take off on this model. Regional imbalance became pronounced and the heartland-vision of the Centre also failed to

address this lack in time to remove the sense of neglect. Economic underdevelopment coupled with demographic changes created a feeling amongst the Assamese that their identity was threatened at home and they were being marginalized. Among the youth, two different readings were taken. The All Assam Students Union, whose leadership had their schooling in the linguistic nationalism and in whose vein this ran as sub-nationalism without supplanting the Pan-Indian nationalism, read that the ills lay in continuous migration from outside the state – initially assumed to be from the East and the North of the country, when the term '*Bahiragata*' was coined, but later modifying the reading as demographic invasion from erstwhile East Bengal (Bangladesh), as it became clear from the census reports⁶. But a radical group took a different reading. They read it as exploitation of the region's resources by a colonial Centre, only the dramatis personae having changed, i.e. the Indian colonialists substituting the British. The radical group adopted a nationalistic concept and aimed for national liberation. Thus manifested ULFA. Unlike All Assam Students' Union (AASU) adopting a strategy of democratic movement to preserve the Assamese identity within the nation called India, it embarked on a violent liberation movement having adopted the NSCN model of insurgency. Like all other North East groups having schooled in the lessons of insurgency by the Naga rebels, ULFA too adopted the NSCN model in this respect.

Though ULFA accepted the NSCN as a role model, and the core concept of their demand emanated from a sense of nationalism, both nationalisms (of NSCN and ULFA) differed in substance. As said already, a common British administration allowed the Naga tribes living in isolation to come together and the concept of Naga as one nation developed. While the British administered them loosely allowing customary laws to prevail, they facilitated a common system of Western education and the missionaries gave them a common church. From my reading, these appear to be the three pillars on which Naga nationalism took birth and it was claimed as sovereign. I admit that my reading may be wrong. But I feel that a sense of nationhood gave them a sense of territorial separation and an urge to preserve this. If in course of time a major part of this Naga nation has reconciled itself to remain in the Indian Union their own sense of nation has not evaporated from their psyche. A nation in its pride does not want

to remain at subsistence level and wants economic development in order to earn a place of pride in human society. So the economic factor plays its role even if the sense of nationalism sprang from other factors. To preserve its national identity, the Naga wants its territorial integrity and wants to develop economically. By giving a state within the Union and providing the hope of developing the state economically India has partially fulfilled these conditions and the participation of the Nagas in the democratic process of the country has become a reality. But yet this has not satisfied the rebels. They are yet to give up the demand for sovereignty will get mellowed over time and the concept itself will get reformulated to bring it nearer to the concept of autonomy but the more difficult question may be territorial integrity of the Naga nation.

The ULFA's formulation of Assamese nation has also a territorial concept but it is confusing. It refers to Assam as it existed before the Yandaboo Treaty but at the same time it also refers to the *Kalika Purana* where the kingdom of Kamarupa is said to have spread over to areas beyond North Bengal. But the main formulation of its nationalism is linked to the concept of colonialism. Economic exploitation is the theme, which is in fact grounded in real situation, that underlies the identity formulation of both the AASU and the ULFA, but read differently by each as already indicated. Hence, the economic factor is a primary factor in ULFA's formulation of nationhood, though sought to be realized through sovereignty. The AASU has seen it as the neglect of a sub-nation by a Nation because of which is the exploitation by others. In ULFA's eyes it is exploitation of one Nation by another Nation, which is colonization.

In case of AASU's movement, the State sought to deal with it initially as a law and order problem. But when the movement took an upswing then the Government read it as a political problem to be solved politically. By the time negotiations started it became a mass movement, which the leaders of the agitation ironically exploited to come to power instead of asking for a solution through a developmental strategy based on specific agenda to remove regional inequality. The Assam Accord reached through negotiations was a compromise between the leaders of the agitation and the Government but it failed to satisfy the people. The leaders of the agitation who came to power could not deliver the goods

promised to the people. ULFA had appeared in the scene as the agitation was going on in full-swing but could not make headway as long as the people continued to support the agitation. It gained space only when the people became disillusioned with the agitation leaders turned rulers who failed to address the developmental issues with the sense of purpose they should have had. Against this background, ULFA tried to gain a foothold in the popular mind undertaking some rudimentary social agenda through an overground front in rural areas, showcasing these as people-oriented developmental programmes. By this strategy, it not only developed a constituency in highly backward rural areas but even did get some foothold in the middle class mind already disillusioned with the leaders of the agitation who became failed rulers. I am raising this point here to emphasize that behind the political issues lurked the social need for economic development as a key factor. ULFA continues to have influence in very backward areas where the people have not seen the administration at work though it has lost much ground amongst the influential urban middle class because of reckless violence it unleashed showing its terror-teeth to a people who abhor violence. Even then, the popular demand is that the Government negotiate with them instead of seeking a military solution. Extremism is a complex phenomenon and many factors play and interplay in bringing about this complexity. Often the state tries to tackle its manifestations, but the root causes which spring from the psycho-social soil deprived of economic nourishment remain unattended. Social imbalances do not get corrected and as a result extremism tries to take a deeper root. But the actors who are drawn to extremism for a kind of justice and aim for redressal of societal imbalances through a violent doctrine, too, in course of their actions lose touch with reality, over-interpret their capability and start confusing between what is form and what is substance. The form of violence then becomes the end and not the means to reach the goal aimed at. This degeneration results in terrorism.

Far too long the State Government has adopted a counter-insurgency strategy in the military mode stressing on form rather than on content of the rebellion. In this mode, the success is calculated in numbers that is how many guerillas are eliminated or neutralized. The root causes that emanate from socio-economic discontent are not properly addressed. A cycle of violence is

created in which the rebel's action is met with counter-action, human rights violations take place either by mistake or by design, innocents suffer in between, this causes disaffection in the midst of ordinary sufferers, from amongst the sufferers new volunteers join the rebel camp, more counter actions take place and discontent further extends. Thus instead of the cycle of violence being broken it expands or moves to a new era. This counter-insurgency strategy has been followed for several decades in the North East but has achieved only temporary successes mainly in causing split in the outfit. Such splits cannot be called real successes because insurgency with various intensity has continued in Assam and in other parts of the North East. The only success in the North East was in Mizoram but here the solution was found politically and after promises were made to provide developmental aid. The rebels after accepting the constitutional ways became the ruling party in the state (then Union Territory).

It is quite necessary that the root causes of all forms of protected socio-political conflicts are identified and attempts made to remove those causes so that the frustration arising out of these causes do not find expression in explosive violence. As Late Edward Azar, a Lebanese social scientist who conducted a large number of case-studies in protracted social violence in the 1990s said once,

“Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure in their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well.”

He also said that the critical factor in protracted social conflict was that it represented the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.⁷ In place of ‘communal group’ we may use the term ‘ethnic group’ so far as the North East of India is concerned.

Counter-insurgency strategy undertaken in the military mode is a strategy of containment and does not lead to the resolution of the main problem. I have emphasized elsewhere the role of civil society in reducing social tension and for seeking an alternative to

violence by democratic means. Remaining apart from the State and untouched by a doctrine of violence, civil society can have a clearer vision from a neutral standpoint. Antonio Gramsci thought that civil society is a contested area and often the ruling class tries to appropriate it. Louis Althusser said that the 'Ideological State Apparatuses' are the means by which the ideology of the ruling classes is injected into the subject and they are thus manipulated to imagine the same to be real. On the other hand, Robert Putnam argued that a kind of social capital is formed in civil society and democratic values are sustained by means of such social capital. Religious institutions like Satras, Namghars, Churches, Social Clubs, educational institutions, Worker's Unions, Associations, Women's organizations etc. all bring groups of people together and social values develop through their fraternal relationship. Putnam believed that networking of civil society is an important way through which social capital could be produced. What I see is this—the State through its governmental mechanism develops an official discourse which circumscribes its perspective. Being boxed into the narrow confines of this discourse, it cannot emerge to locate an alternative discourse. On the other hand, the non-state actors who choose the extremist path to challenge the State's monopoly on law and the use of force are also boxed into a counter-discourse from which they refuse or fail to grow out. Civil society through their dialogic discourses can acquire a different kind of social capital and can remain clear of this contested zone. Therefore, they can provide a neutral voice *vis-à-vis* the voices of the two contested sides and can generate an alternative discourse for untangling the complexity. Of course, this could happen only if the State is inclined to fulfil the following conditions: (1) it has to make some room for civil society institutions to freely activate society's goodwill in form of social capital, and (2) the governmental obligations for economic development and for balancing divergent socio-political elements need to be met so that the development fruits reach all sections of the people in an equitable manner. Even civil society may get frozen if the masses remain highly dissatisfied.

I believe that extremism in the long run fails as a strategy to achieve a mission and it often degenerates into terrorism. When this happens it loses direction and becomes a self-defeating doctrine. But at the same time, the state cannot dismiss it simply

as a senseless ideology and itself use only extreme measures to crush the extremists abandoning all other modes of action or strategy. Often groups seeking recognition or justice resort to extremism in desperation when there is absence of a dialogic path. The state's response to extremism has to be a combination of hard options and soft power. I recognize that the state needs to exercise hard option when a culture of violence is deliberately spread by certain elements but the state should avail this choice for the purpose of restoring rule of law only when it tends to break down under the weight of culture of violence. An important component of the state's strategy has to be reduction of social discontent by means of developmental plan and political dialogue. Terrorism may be self-defeating, but what causes terrorism becomes enduring and contaminates the social soil if the soil is not nourished properly.

NOTES

1. See *India's Struggle for Independence* by Bipan Chandra (Penguin).
2. See *Dictionary of Political Thought* by Roger Scruton (Palgrave Macmillan).
3. See *Periphery Strikes Back*, Chapter-IV by Udayon Mishra (Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla).
4. Ramchandra Guha has amply discussed this in his book *India After Gandhi* (Picador India).
5. Manmohan Agarwal and Sudip Ranjan Basu have discussed the effect of the Mahalanobis Development Strategy in their article 'Development Strategy and Regional Inequality in India' included in '*India's North East, Development Issues in a Historical Perspective*' edited by Alokesh Barua (Manohar).
6. In 1978, Guwahati city witnessed a wall-writing and postering campaign against the so-called Indian outsiders. But by 1979, the campaign turned against the illegal migrants from Bangladesh and then the Assam Movement against foreign nationals took birth. This happened due to convergence of several factors: (1) Myron Weiner's book '*Sons of the Soil*' published in 1978 highlighted the immigration problem affecting Assam's demography, (2) M.L. Sakhder, the then Chief Election Commissioner spoke about suspected non-citizens' names finding large-scale entry in the electoral rolls, referring particularly to Assam, while addressing a conference of state election commissioners in 1978, (3) In 1979, the revision of electoral rolls of the Mangaldai constituency in Assam was taken up for a bye-election

following the death of the sitting M.P. Hiralal Patowary. During this exercise numerous complaints were raised against inclusion of the names of a large number of suspects who were illegal migrants, and (4) Two new political parties were formed on sub-nationalist agenda in 1978 and 1979. They were Purbanchaliya Loka Parishad and Asom Jatiyatabadi Dal respectively. The PLP particularly raised the question of 'native identity' from the beginning.

7. For a discussion on this see Chapter IV of the book '*Contemporary Conflict Resolution*', second edition written by Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and High Mial (Poloty). Azar was a Lebanese intellectual who moved to the U.S.A. He died in 1991. The world has become more violent since his death, but many of the points he made are still valid.