| 000 | 00499nam a2200145Ia 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c177285 _d177285 |
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| 020 | _a9780804781329 | ||
| 040 | _cCUS | ||
| 082 |
_a361.7095491 _bBAN/B |
||
| 245 | 0 |
_aBreakdown in Pakistan/ _bhow aid is eroding institutions for collective action _cBano,Masooda |
|
| 250 | _a1st.ed. | ||
| 260 |
_aStanford, California: _bStanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press, _c2012. |
||
| 300 | _axiii, 220 pages | ||
| 505 | _a1 Revisiting the Collective Action Dilemma 2 Intrinsic or Extrinsic Incentives: The Evolution of Cooperative Groups in Pakistan 3 Why Cooperate? Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Other-Regarding Groups 4 Why Cooperate? Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Self-Regarding Groups 5 Does Aid Break Down Cooperation? 6 Why Aid Breaks Down Cooperation 7 Fixing Incentives: The Way Forward | ||
| 942 | _cAC8 | ||