| 000 | 00375nam a2200145Ia 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c146353 _d146353 |
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| 020 | _a9781845426408 | ||
| 020 | _a1845426401 | ||
| 040 | _cCUS | ||
| 082 |
_a330.153 _bRAS/G |
||
| 245 | 0 |
_aGame theory and the law/ _cedited by Eric B. Rasmusen |
|
| 260 |
_aCheltenham, UK: _bEdward Elgar, _c2007. |
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| 300 | _a603 p. | ||
| 505 | _aPART I. GENERAL. Playing games with the law / Ian Ayres ; Review dialog : on game theory and the law / Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev ; Agency models in law and economics / Eric A. Posner ; Games economists play : a noncooperative view / Franklin M. Fisher -- PART II. BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE. Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution / Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld ; Strategic behavior in suit, settlement, and trial / I.P.L. P'ng ; Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs / Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde ; A new theory concerning the credibility and success of threats to sue / Lucian Arye Bebchuk ; An economic theory of the duty to bargain / Keith N. Hylton ; Fair driving : gender and race discrimination in retail car negotiations / Ian Ayres -- PART III. CONTRACTS. Strategic contractual inefficiency and the optimal choice of legal rules / Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner ; Explaining incomplete contracts as the result of contract reading costs / Eric B. Rasmusen ; Legal rules in repeated deals : banking in the shadow of defection in Japan / J. Mark Ramseyer -- PART IV. TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES. Toward an economic theory of liability / John Prather Brown ; Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation / A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che ; The tax compliance game : toward an interactive theory of law enforcement / Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde ; The economic theory of public enforcement of law / A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell -- PART V. COURTS. The selection of disputes for litigation / George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein ; A rational choice theory of Supreme Court statutory decisions with applications to the State Farm and Grove City cases / Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller ; Stability and reliability in judicial decisions / Frank H. Easterbrook | ||
| 650 |
_aLaw _xMathematical models |
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| 650 | _aGame theory | ||
| 700 | _aRasmusen, Eric B., ed. | ||
| 942 | _cWB16 | ||