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Incentives and political economy/ Jean-Jacques Laffont

By: Laffout, Jean-JacquesMaterial type: Text

TextSeries: (Clarendon lectures in economics)Publication details: New York: Oxford University Press, 2000Description: xii, 257 p. : ill. ; 23 cmISBN: 9780198294245Subject(s): Commercial policy | Economic policy | Industrial policy | Incentives in industry | Industrial promotion | EconomicsDDC classification: 330

Contents:

Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch -- The Design of Democratic Institutions -- Political Economy in Democratic Countries -- The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics -- The Complete Contracting Approach -- The Incomplete Contracting Approach -- Adding Asymmetric Information -- Endogenous Coalition Formation -- Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- A Simple Supervision Model -- The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision -- The Supervision Technology -- Optimal Incentives for the Politician -- Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution -- Equilibrium Collusion -- An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition -- A Model with Three Types -- Single Non-benevolent Politician -- Separation of Politicians -- Collusion-proof Constraints -- Optimal Constitution under Separation -- Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare -- Generalization of the Results -- Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences -- Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers -- Collusion Between the Politicians -- Checks and Balances -- The Model -- Optimal Symmetric Constitution -- Supervision and Division of Tasks -- Multidimensional Collusion Activities -- A Model with Three Politicians -- Optimal Supervisory Structures -- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off -- Ownership Matters -- Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
General Books	Central Library, Sikkim University General Book Section	330 LAF/I (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		P03293

Total holds: 0

Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch --
The Design of Democratic Institutions --
Political Economy in Democratic Countries --
The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics --
The Complete Contracting Approach --
The Incomplete Contracting Approach --
Adding Asymmetric Information --
Endogenous Coalition Formation --
Politicians as Informed Supervisors --
The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design --
A Simple Supervision Model --
The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision --
The Supervision Technology --
Optimal Incentives for the Politician --
Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution --
Equilibrium Collusion --
An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers --
Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition --
A Model with Three Types --
Single Non-benevolent Politician --
Separation of Politicians --
Collusion-proof Constraints --
Optimal Constitution under Separation --
Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare --
Generalization of the Results --
Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences --
Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers --
Collusion Between the Politicians --
Checks and Balances --
The Model --
Optimal Symmetric Constitution --
Supervision and Division of Tasks --
Multidimensional Collusion Activities --
A Model with Three Politicians --
Optimal Supervisory Structures --
Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design --
Political Economy and Industrial Policy --
Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off --
Ownership Matters --
Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule.

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