Computational models in political economy/ 
edited by Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page. 
 - Cambridge:  The MIT Press,  2003. 
 - vi, 283 p.  ill.  24 cm. 
<br/><br/>1 A Dynamic Model of Multidimensional Collective Choice<br/>David P. Baron and Michael C. Herron<br/><br/>2 Fluidity of Social Norms in a Hierarchical System<br/>Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.<br/><br/>3 Learning, Central Bank Independence, and the Politics of<br/>Excess Foreign Returns<br/>Jude C. Hays and Diana Richards<br/><br/>4 A Computational Theory of Electoral Competition<br/>John E. Jackson<br/><br/>5 A Computational Model of Voter Sophistication, Ideology, and<br/>Candidate Position Taking<br/>Scott de Marchi<br/><br/>6 The Other Side of the Coin: A Computational Analysis of<br/>Publicly Financed Campaigns<br/>Michael Bailey<br/><br/>7 Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model<br/>Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page<br/><br/>8 Recovering Behavioralism: Adaptively Rational Strategic<br/>Behavior with Endogenous Aspirations<br/>Jonathan Bender, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>978-0262112758 978026211258   
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Political science--Mathematical models<br/>Economics--Mathematical models
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>320.0151  / KOL/C