Incentives and political economy/
Jean-Jacques Laffont
- New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- xii, 257 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
- (Clarendon lectures in economics) .
Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch -- The Design of Democratic Institutions -- Political Economy in Democratic Countries -- The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics -- The Complete Contracting Approach -- The Incomplete Contracting Approach -- Adding Asymmetric Information -- Endogenous Coalition Formation -- Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- A Simple Supervision Model -- The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision -- The Supervision Technology -- Optimal Incentives for the Politician -- Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution -- Equilibrium Collusion -- An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition -- A Model with Three Types -- Single Non-benevolent Politician -- Separation of Politicians -- Collusion-proof Constraints -- Optimal Constitution under Separation -- Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare -- Generalization of the Results -- Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences -- Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers -- Collusion Between the Politicians -- Checks and Balances -- The Model -- Optimal Symmetric Constitution -- Supervision and Division of Tasks -- Multidimensional Collusion Activities -- A Model with Three Politicians -- Optimal Supervisory Structures -- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off -- Ownership Matters -- Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule.
9780198294245
Commercial policy Economic policy Industrial policy Incentives in industry Industrial promotion Economics