The measure of mind: propositional attitudes and their attribution / Robert J. Matthews.

1. A Prospective Introduction
1.1. The Ascendancy of the Received View
1.2. Troubles with the Received View
1.3. The Persistence of the Received View: The Reiationalist
Conception
1.4. A Measurement-Theoretic Account of the Attitudes
1.5. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes: The Attitudes as
Intentional Aptitudes
1.6. Some Questions about the Proposed Account
1.7. A Final Advertisement
I. THE RECEIVED VIEW AND ITS TROUBLES
2. The Received View
2.1. The Basic Tenets
2.2. Three Entailments
2.3. Historical Origins and Development
2.4. Recap
3. Troubles with the Received View
3.1. The Empirical Status of the Received View
3.2. Thinkers as Representation-Using Systems
3.3. Explicit Representation
3.4. Why Behavioral Evidence Doesn't Suffice
3.5. The Argument from Linguistic Knowledge
3.5.1. Psycho linguistics: A Test Case for Claims of Empirical
Support 55
3.5.2. Speakers as Representation-Using Systems 56
3.5.3. Bresnan and Kaplan's Strong Competence Hypothesis 57
3.5.4. The Right View According to Fodor 60
3.5.5. The Computational Realization of Grammars 63
3.6. The Argument from Central Processing: Theories of
Human Reasoning
3.6.1. Knowledge of Language: Explaining Away the Potential
Counterexamples 69
3.6.2. Central Processes 70
3.6.3. Theories of Deductive Reasoning 71
3.6.4. Mental Logic Theories of Deductive Reasoning 74
3.6.5. Do Mental Logic Theories Provide Any Suppon for the
Received View? 78
3.6.6. A Concluding Remark 84
3.7. Explaining Away Apparent Counterexamples: Fodor s Way
3.8. The Abductive Argument for the Received View: The
Striking Parallelism
3.9. The Persistence of the Received View
3.10. A Weaker, Non-Reductive Construal of Propositional
Attitudes
4. Are Propositional Attitudes Relations?
4.1. The Received View's Relational Conception of the Attitudes
4.2. The Relational Logical Form of Belief Sentences
4.3. Problems with the Relational Conception of Belief
4.4. Semantic vs. Psychological 'Objects' of Belief
4.5. Reading Back Logical Form: The Problem for Relationalists
4.6. The Psychological Import of Logical Form: A
Measurement-Theoretic Way of Thinking about the Issue
II. A MEASUREMENT-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR
ATTRIBUTION
5. Foundations of a Measurement-Theoretic Account of the
Attitudes
5.1. The Basic Idea
5.2. The Historical Development of Measurement Theory
5.3. Homomorphisms and Other Structural Relations
5.4. Representation, Abstraction, Idealization, and
Representational Anifacts
5.5. A Second-Order Intensional Version of Measurement
Theor}'
5.6. Measurement Theory and Measure Predicates
5.7. The Knowledge Afforded by Measurement Theory
6. The Basic Measurement-Theoretic Account
6.1. Why Propositional Attitude Predicates Might Be Measure
Predicates
6.2. Measuring Propositional Attitudes
6.3. Goals and Strateg)'
6.4. The Structure of Natural Language Representations of
Propositional Attitudes
6.4.1. The Representational Domain 161
6.4.2. Properties and Relations of Representatives of Propositional
Attitudes 169
6.4.3. Recap 172
6.5. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes: What Are Natural
Language Representations of the Attitudes Images of?
6.5.1. Inferring the Empirical Structure of the Attitudes 173
6.5.2. Propositional Attitude Attributions and their Use 175
6.5.3. Propositional Attitudes, their Behavioral Manifestations,
andlUFs 176
6.5.4. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes 184
6.5.5. Recap 195
6.6. Informal Sketch of a Representation Theorem
6.7. The Uniqueness Problem: When Have We Attributed the
Same Propositional Attitude?
6.8. Recap
7. Elaboration and Explication of the Proposed
Measurement-Theoretic Account
7.1. The Explanatory Adequacy of the Account
7.1.1. Wliat Having a Propositional Attitude Amounts to 215
7.1.2. The 'Essential' Properties of Propositional Attitudes 216
7.1.3. Why We Have the Particular Predication Scheme that
We Do 223
7.1.4. Role of Attitude Attributions in Common-sense Causal
Explanations 227
7.1.5. Puzzles about Propositional Attitude Attributions 230
7.1.6. Iterated Propositional Attitude Attributions 235
7.2. The Intrinsic Nature of the Attitudes
7.3. Propositional Attitudes in Empirical Computational
Cognitive Science: A Minimalist Account of the
Computational Entailments of Propositional Attitude
Attributions
7.4. Further Implications of the Proposed Account
7.4.1. Intentional Realism and the Naturalization Project 249
7.4.2. Intentional Content Essentialism 251
7.4.3. Prepositional Attitude-Based Semantics Programmes 253
7.4.4. Schiffer's and Fodor's Translational Semantics
Programme 253
7.5. Summary Remarks