Fighting talk: forty maxims on war peace and strategy/ Colin S. Gray

pt. 1. War and peace. The contexts of war are all important --
War is about peace, and peace can be about war --
It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war --
War works!-but always has unintended and unanticipated consequences --
Peace and order are not self-enforcing, they have to be organized and kept by somebody --
Not only polities, but societies and their cultures make war and peace --
Reason reigns over war, but passion and chance threaten to rule --
There is more to war than warfare --
Policy is king, but often is ignorant of the nature and character of war --
War is always a gamble --
pt. 2. Strategy. Knowledge of strategy is vital: the flame of strategic understanding has to be kept lit --
Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics --
Bad strategy kills, but so also do bad policy and tactics --
If Thucydides, Sun-Tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying --
The strategic "concept du jour" will be tomorrow's stale left-over, until it is rediscovered, recycled, and revealed as a new truth --
The enemy too has a vote --
Time is the least forgiving dimension of strategy --
Friction is unavoidable, but need not be fatal --
All strategy is geostrategy: geography is fundamental --
Strategy is not wholly military --
The impossible is impossible; it is a condition, not a problem for which a solution has yet to be found --
pt. 3. Military power and warfare. People matter most --
Military power is trumps in politics --
Military excellence can only be verified by performance in war --
Military excellence cannot guarantee strategic success --
Victory in battle does not ensure strategic or political success, but defeat all but guarantees failure --
There is more to war than firepower: the enemy is not just a target set --
Logistics is the arbiter of strategic opportunity --
pt. 4. Security and insecurity. Bad times return --
There are always thugs, villains, rogues, and fools out there, as well some in here, who mean us harm --
Super-threats do appear --
Prudence is the supreme virtue in statecraft and strategy --
Strategic history punishes good intentions --
Defense costs are certain, but security benefits are uncertain and arguable --
Arms can be controlled, but not by arms control --
pt. 5. History and the future. Nothing of real importance changes: modern history is not modern --
History can be misused to "prove" anything, but it is all that we have as a guide to the future --
The future is not foreseeable: nothing dates so rapidly as today's tomorrow --
Surprise is unavoidable, but its effect is not --
Tragedy happens.