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The economic theory of auctions/ edited by Paul Klemperer

Contributor(s): Klemperer, Paul, edMaterial type: Text

TextPublication details: Cheltenham: Elgar Pub., 2000Description: 2 v. : ill. ; 25 cmISBN: 1858988705; 9781858988702Subject(s): AuctionsDDC classification: 330.01

Contents:

Acknowledgements -- Part X. Multiunit Auctions -- A. Optimal -- 1. Optimal Multi-unit Auctions -- 2. Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information -- B. Simultaneous -- 3. Auctions of Shares -- 4. Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment -- 5. Coordination in Split Award Auctions -- 6. Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty -- 7. Auctions with Endogenous Quantity -- C. Sequential -- 8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II -- 9. Rational Frenzies and Crashes -- 10. The Declining Price Anomaly -- 11. Multiple-Object Auctions -- Part XI. Royalties, Incentive Contracts and Payments for Quality -- 12. Ex Post Information in Auctions -- 13. Auctioning Incentive Contracts -- 14. Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions -- Part XII. Double Auctions, etc. -- A. Double Auctions -- 15. Bargaining under Incomplete Information -- 16. Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions -- 17. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information -- 18. A Dominant Strategy Double Auction -- B. Related Two-Sided Trading Mechanisms -- 19. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading -- 20. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently -- Part XIII. Other Topics -- A. Budget Constraints -- 21. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders -- B. Externalities between Bidders -- 22. Strategic Nonparticipation -- C. Jump Bidding -- 23. Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions -- D. War of Attrition -- 24. The Generalized War of Attrition -- E. Competing Auctioneers -- 25. Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers -- Part XIV. Testing the Theory -- A. Empirical -- 26. Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data -- B. Experimental -- 27. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research -- Name Index.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
General Books	Central Library, Sikkim University General Book Section	330.01 KLE/E (Browse shelf(Opens below))	v.2	Available		P07575

Total holds: 0

Acknowledgements --
Part X. Multiunit Auctions --
A. Optimal --
1. Optimal Multi-unit Auctions --
2. Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information --
B. Simultaneous --
3. Auctions of Shares --
4. Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment --
5. Coordination in Split Award Auctions --
6. Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty --
7. Auctions with Endogenous Quantity --
C. Sequential --
8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II --
9. Rational Frenzies and Crashes --
10. The Declining Price Anomaly --
11. Multiple-Object Auctions --
Part XI. Royalties, Incentive Contracts and Payments for Quality --
12. Ex Post Information in Auctions --
13. Auctioning Incentive Contracts --
14. Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions --
Part XII. Double Auctions, etc. --
A. Double Auctions --
15. Bargaining under Incomplete Information --
16. Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions --
17. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information --
18. A Dominant Strategy Double Auction --
B. Related Two-Sided Trading Mechanisms --
19. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading --
20. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently --
Part XIII. Other Topics --
A. Budget Constraints --
21. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders --
B. Externalities between Bidders --
22. Strategic Nonparticipation --
C. Jump Bidding --
23. Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions --
D. War of Attrition --
24. The Generalized War of Attrition --
E. Competing Auctioneers --
25. Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers --
Part XIV. Testing the Theory --
A. Empirical --
26. Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data --
B. Experimental --
27. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research --
Name Index.

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