The problem of universals in Indian philosophy/ (Record no. 159047)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 00341nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Transcribing agency | CUS |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 181.4 |
| Item number | DRA/T |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Dravid, Raja Ram |
| 245 #4 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The problem of universals in Indian philosophy/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. | Raja Ram Dravid |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT | |
| Edition statement | 2nd. ed. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Delhi : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | MBP, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2001. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | xvi,473p. ; |
| Dimensions | 22cm. |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | THE EXTREME REALISM OF THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA<br/>The definition of the universal {jdti)<br/>The universal as distinct from the particular<br/>Universal as the determinant of causality<br/>Jali and Upddhi<br/>Existence as the Highest Universal<br/>Existence versus Being and Reality<br/>Criticism of the Nyaya view of'existence'<br/>by other schools<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>THE REALISM OF THE MIMAMSA<br/>Rumania's Theory of universals<br/>The relation between universal and particular<br/>Criticism of the Nyaya view<br/>The Prabhakara view of universals<br/>Criticism of Rumania's view<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>THE BUDDHIST CRITICISM OF REALISM AND<br/>THE REALIST REPLY<br/>I. The Buddhist Criticism<br/>Universal a thought-construction<br/>Refutation of the realist theory of general cognition<br/>Difficulties in the realist theory of universals<br/>The Buddhist explanation of recognition<br/>II. The Realist Reply<br/>Universals are real entities<br/>General cognitions imply universals<br/>Difficulties raised by the Buddhist answered<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>ARE UNIVERSALS PERCEIVED?<br/>I. The Buddhist Position<br/>The Realist's view of Perception<br/>The Buddhist view of Perception<br/>The universal not a percept<br/>Determinate cognition not perceptual<br/>II. The Realist's Criticism<br/>Universal a perceived fact<br/>Determinate cognition perceptual<br/>Refutation of the Buddhist arguments for<br/>momentariness<br/>Some more objections answered<br/>Defence of substance-attribute relation<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>THE TAINA THEORY OF UNIVERSALS<br/>The nature of the object of knowledge<br/>Identity of Existence<br/>Arguments for the reality of the universals<br/>The two kinds of universals<br/>Criticism of the Buddhist and the Nyaya views<br/>The Jaina conception of the universal<br/>Comparison with the Visistadvaita view<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>THE ADVAITA VIEW OF UNIVERSALS<br/>The universal Existence and the empirical particular<br/>Criticism of the realist theory of universals<br/>The Advaitic explanation of general cognition<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>IMPORT OF WORDS<br/>The Individualist theory<br/>The Configuration theory<br/>The Universalist theory<br/>The Theory of Composite denotation<br/>The Advaitic criticism of the realist theory of<br/>meaning<br/>The Advaitic theory of import of words<br/>THE GRAMMARIAN'S VIEW OF WORD AND MEANING<br/>The word as the Ultimate Reality<br/>The sentence as universal<br/>The word as universal<br/>Import of words<br/>Bhartrhari'sview<br/>The theory of superimposition<br/>All words denote universals<br/>Justification from the Advaitic stand-point<br/>An account of the nature of universals<br/>A defence of the existence of universals<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>THE BUDDHIST NOMINALISM (APOHAVADA)—I<br/>1. TheTheoiyofDigndgaandDharmaktrti<br/>Concepts or universals are thought-constructions<br/>Words signify mere negations<br/>All distinctions are purely conceptual<br/>Criticism of the realist theory of meaning<br/>I<br/>II. Criticism by Kumdrila and Uddyolakara<br/>III. Defence of Apohavdda by Sdntaraksifa<br/>The meaning of apoha<br/>Import of words explained<br/>Objections of Kumarila answered<br/>IV. Vdcaspali Misra's Criticism of Apohavdda<br/>THE BUDDHIST NOMINALISM (APOHAVADA)—II<br/>I. Defence of Apohavdda by Jhdnasn and Ratnakirti<br/>The import of words<br/>The objects of perception and conception<br/>distinguished<br/>Judgments empirically refer to real external things<br/>n. Udayana's Criticism of Apohavdda<br/>Negation not a felt element in conceptual cognition<br/>The object of conceptual cognition not unreal<br/>Volitional activity not explained<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>UNIVERSALS IN GREEK AND MEDIEVAL THOUGHT<br/>The Extreme Realism of Plato<br/>The Moderate Realism of Aristotle<br/>The Controversy over Universals in the Middle Ages<br/>Porphyry's Problem<br/>Extreme Realism<br/>( Adversaries of Extreme Realism<br/>I Moderate Realism<br/>Conceptualism<br/>CONTRIBUTION OF MODERN THINKERS<br/>1. Hobbes' Nominalism<br/>2. The Conceptualism of Locke<br/>3. Berkeley's Criticism<br/>4. Hume's Theory of Disposition and Resemblance<br/>5. The Rationalist Protest<br/>UNIVERSALS VERSUS RESEMBLANCES IN<br/>CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY<br/>1. Russell's Defence of Universals<br/>2. The Theory of Stout<br/>3. Moore's Analysis<br/>4. The Protagonists of Resemblance<br/>5. Concluding remarks |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Indian philosophy - western philosophy - universals |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | General Books |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Full call number | Accession number | Date last seen | Date last checked out | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Library, Sikkim University | Central Library, Sikkim University | General Book Section | 29/08/2016 | 181.4 DRA/T | P13879 | 14/07/2018 | 14/07/2018 | General Books |