Indian realism/ (Record no. 158987)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 11785nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| International Standard Book Number | 9788120800854 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Transcribing agency | CUS |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 149.254 |
| Item number | SIN/I |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Sinha, Jadunath |
| 245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Indian realism/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. | Jadunath Sinha |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Delhi : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | MBP, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 1999. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 287p. ; |
| Dimensions | 23cm. |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | I. The Yogacara Vijnanavada<br/>MsdhavScarya's account—No permanent external<br/>object is possible—A momentary object cannot be<br/>perceived—It is neither perceived as a simple atom<br/>nor as a complex body—Cognition alone is real—It is self-<br/>luminous and apprehends itself—^An external object<br/>cannot be related to a cognition and be apprehended<br/>by it—^The identity of an object with its cognition is<br/>proved by the law of simultaneous perception (saho-<br/>palambhaniyama)—^The distinction of subject and<br/>object is an illusory appearance due to subconscious<br/>impressions of difference (bhedavJsana) rooted in<br/>avidyJ—A similar argument in TogavaSistha—^The<br/>distinction of the red and the imaginary within<br/>cognitions—Comparison of the Yogacara idealism with<br/>Berkeley's subjective idedism and Hume's sensationism—<br/>Santaraksita and Kamalasila's exposition of the Yogacara<br/>idealism—^The Epistemological Arguments—K cognition<br/>is self-aware—Refutation of Kumarila's theory of<br/>imperceptibility of an act of cognition—Cognition<br/>is identical with th apprehension of an object-form<br/>which is iUusory—No cognition of an externd object—<br/>A formless (nirakara) cognition cannot apprehend it—<br/>A cognition with a similar form (sakara) cannot appre<br/>hend it—A cognition with a different form (anyakara)<br/>cannot apnrehend it—^Vacaspati's summary of these<br/>arguments—^The Yogacara criticism of the Sautrantika<br/>theory of correspondence (sarupya)—^The Law of<br/>Simultaneous Apprehension—No Evidence for the<br/>existence of an external object—It is neither perceptible<br/>nor inferrible—^The Metaphysicd Argument—^The<br/>so-called external object can neither be a conglomera<br/>tion of atoms nor a complex whole composed of atoms<br/>nor a gross body not made of atoms—^The Yogacara<br/>position.<br/>II. The SaxttrAntika Realism ; The Representa<br/>tive Theory of Perception<br/>Comparison of the Sautrantika ReaJism with Descartes<br/>and Locke's Representationism—^The SautrSntika<br/>criticism of the YogScara Subjectivism—Criticism of<br/>the law of simultaneous apprehension (sahopalam-<br/>bhaniyama)—An object is not identical with cognition-The<br/>physical (external) while cognition is<br/>psychical (internal)—Cognition is perceived as " I"<br/>while the object is perceived as " this" or not-self as<br/>distinguished from the self—Externality of the Object<br/>cannot be treated as an illusory appearance because<br/>it presupposes the real knowledge of externality—<br/>The circular argument of tlve YogScilra—Common<br/>Sense bears testimony to the existence of the object—<br/>Different forms or contents of cognitions are caused by<br/>the variety of external objects—Alayavij fiSna and<br/>PravrttivijfiSna—Criticism of the YogacSra doctrine<br/>that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of<br/>vasanSs.<br/>III. The Yocacara's Criticism of the Representa<br/>tive Theory of Perception<br/>Jayanta's account of the YogScSra's criticism of the<br/>Sautrantika Realism—Cognitions with definite forms<br/>or contents can serve all practical needs of life—^The<br/>existence of external objects is a needless assumption—<br/>Two forms of a cognition and an object are not<br/>perceived—The realist admits that a cognition is<br/>apprehended before it apprehends its object and that<br/>it has a definite form—Cognitions with definite forms<br/>apprehending themselves are the only reality—Objects<br/>cannot be inferred from forms of cognitions—^They<br/>are due to vSsanas—^Waking perceptions are without<br/>foundation in external objects like illusions, hallucina<br/>tion?, dreams and recollections—ParthasSrathi's account<br/>of the Yogaclra criticism of the Sautrantika Realism—<br/>Objectivity (arthatva), Causality (hetutva). Similarity<br/>(sSrupya), Pragmatic use (vyavahira), and Expressibility<br/>No cognition of an external object is possible—Sridhara's<br/>account ^The Vaibhasika criticism of the Sautrantika<br/>realism.<br/>IV. The Jaina Realism.<br/>Mallisena's Exposition of the Yogacara Idealism—<br/>The Metaphysical Argument—^The Epistemological<br/>Argument—Comparison with Berkeley's argument—<br/>Mailisena's Criticism of the Yogacara Idealism—^An<br/>act of cognition must have an object—No cognitions are<br/>objectless—External objects as distinguished from<br/>imaginary ideas have practical efficiency—Both atoms<br/>and gross bodies are real—The metaphysical argument<br/>presents no difficulty to the Jaina who advocates<br/>pluralistic realism or relativism—The denial of an<br/>external object contradicts experience—Consciousness<br/>of the self implies consciousness of the not-self—The<br/>distinction of the self (subject) and the not-self (object)<br/>is real—Criticism of sahopalambhaniyama—Cognition<br/>by its very nature apprehends itself and its object—<br/>Perception of an object in a particular place cannot be<br/>explained by vasana—Criticism ofvSsana—The universal<br/>experience of mankind testifies to the existence of<br/>external objects—Objects cannot be identical with<br/>cognitions because they possess opposite qualities—<br/>The Jaina realism contrasted wiA the SautrSntika<br/>realism—^The fitness (yogyata) of a cognition for<br/>apprehending an object (Jaina).<br/>V. The Sankhya-Yoga Realism<br/>The Sankhya criticism of Vijnanavada—The self and<br/>the not-self radically opposed to each other—The latter<br/>not reducible to the former—Criticism of vasana<br/>and the metaphysical argument (Aniruddha)—Bondage<br/>also reduced to an idea (Vijiianabhiksu)—^The Yoga<br/>exposition of Vijnanavada—^The Epistemological Argu<br/>ments—^No objects apart from cognitions but cognitions<br/>apart from objects—Identity the condition of knowa-<br/>bility—It is proved by the law of simultaneous per<br/>ception—^The object, a construction of imagination—<br/>The Yoga criticism of Vijnanavada—The existence<br/>of external objects proved by perception which cannot be<br/>invalidated by imagination (Vyasa)—Valid waking per<br/>ceptions different from invalid dreams caused by bodily<br/>and mental disorders (Vij n^nabhiksu)—Knowabillty<br/>of an object by a cognition presupposes difference<br/>between them—^The law of simultaneous perception<br/>cannot prove identity because it is based on the method<br/>ofagreement without the help of the method of difference<br/>which is not applicable here—Vacaspati's anticipation<br/>of tlie " ego-centric predicament"—A cognition<br/>cannot possess externality and extension (Vacaspati)—<br/>The object remaining the same, the ideas differ ; so they<br/>are different from each other (Patanjali)—The explana<br/>tion of the fact—External objects and cognitions<br/>cannot come into existence together—^The past and<br/>the future are real—External objects are real and<br/>permanent.<br/>VI. The Mimamsaka Realism<br/>Savara's criticism ofVijn5nav5da—^Waking cognitions<br/>essentially different from dream-cognitions—A formless<br/>cognition apprehends an external object with a form—<br/>A cognition is apprehended by inference only after it<br/>has apprehended an external object—A cognition is<br/>produced by an external object—Kumarila's elaborate<br/>exposition and criticism of VijnSnavada—The existence<br/>of external objects proved by perception which cannot<br/>be invalidated by inference—Dreams, illusions, and<br/>recollections have a foundation in external objects—<br/>Difference between waking perceptions and dreams—<br/>Technical flaws in the YogacSra argument—Detailed<br/>critidsm of v5sana—^The cognitive act is directed to an<br/>external object distinct from it—Cognition and object<br/>cannot be identical with each other—^The subject-<br/>object-relation between them unique in nature—^A<br/>formless cognition apprehends an object with a form—<br/>The diversity of cognitions due to the diversity of<br/>objects—^Variation of appearances no proof of the<br/>unreality of an object which may be multiform—<br/>Explanation of the fact—Diversity of appearances due<br/>to psychical dispositions (vJsana) or to comparison with<br/>other objects—^The existence of external objects proved<br/>by perception and inference, and practical considerations<br/>of morality and religion—PSrthasarathimisra's exposition<br/>and criticism ofVijnanavSda—Elaboration of Kumarila's<br/>arguments—Prabhakara's exposition and criticism of<br/>Vijnanavada—Cognitions apprehend themselves and<br/>their objects—Prabhakara's criticism of the Sautrantika<br/>Realism.<br/>VII. The Nyaya-Vaisesika Realism<br/>The Nyaya critique of VijnanavSda—Critical exposi<br/>tion of it by Gautama and Vatsyayana—^The Nyaya<br/>realism and rationalism—^Reality of the external world<br/>It is amenable to analysis by reason—Illusions, desires,<br/>and dreams have a foundation in external objectt<br/>Udyotakara's criticism—Difference between cognitions<br/>and feelings—Criticism of vSsana—Dreams and illusions<br/>depend on external objects—^No distinction between<br/>dreaming and waking, virtue and vice, on the Yoga^ra<br/>theory—Criticism of perceptions of disembodied<br/>spirits—Positive arguments for the existence of external<br/>objects—Jayanta's elaborate criticism—Cognition and<br/>object essentially different—Subject-object-distincdon<br/>not possible within consciousness—Objects actually<br/>perceived—Difference between cognition of an object<br/>and cognition of the cognition—Consciousne-s ai^ self-<br/>consciousness—Cognitions not self-luminous Cogni<br/>tions produced by external objects—Formless copidons<br/>apprehend external objects—Detailed critiasm of<br/>V^asana—Real basis of illusions, hallucinations, and<br/>dreams—Detailed criticism of sahopalambha, the<br/>metaphysical argument, and the variability of appearances<br/>(cf. Kumarila)—R&um6 of the Nyaya _ jrriticism—<br/>Sridhara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada<br/>Svarupasambandha between cognition and object<br/>(Udayana)—^Their relation governed by the Law ol<br/>Nature (Sridhara)—The sameness of the object of<br/>perception proves its externality—Sridhara's cndcisni<br/>of the Sautrantika theory of mediate knowledge of<br/>external objects.<br/>VIII. The Vedanta Critique of Subjective<br/>Idealism<br/>Sahkara's Absolute Idealism contrasted with the<br/>Subjective Idealism of the Yogacara—Sahkaras exposi<br/>tion and criticism of Vijnanavada—The epstence of<br/>external objects proved by perception which cannot<br/>be invalidated by abstract speculation—The law of<br/>parsimony cannot be invoked to falsify facts of ex<br/>perience—The law of simultaneous perception proves<br/>the difference of objects (upeya) and cognitions (upaya)<br/>—The difference in the contents of cognitions due to<br/>the difference in their objects—Cognitions cannot be<br/>related to each other as subject and object—Cognitions<br/>apprehended by the permanent Self—Different between<br/>waking cognitions and dreams—^Variety of Cognmons<br/>not due to variety of vasanas—^VacaspaumiSra and<br/>Sad^nandci Yati s elaboration of Sankara's arguments<br/>The empirical reality of the external world—Ramlnaja's<br/>exposition and criticism of Vij nanavada—Distinction<br/>between the self and the not-self condition of con<br/>sciousness ^The law of simultaneous perception proves<br/>difference of cognitions and objects—Practical function<br/>of knowledge—Cognitions enable the Self to react to<br/>objects—Difference between waking cogniuons and<br/>dr^ms both of whicli have a foundation in external<br/>objects—The Yogacara subjectivism invalidates his<br/>own inference—Ramanuja's criticism of the Sautrantika<br/>realism—Nimbarka, Srinivasa, Kes'ava Kaimirin.<br/>Madhva, Vallabha, Purusottamaji Maharaja, and<br/>BaJadeva Vidya-Bhusana's criticism of Vij nanavada. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Hindu Philosophy. |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | General Books |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Full call number | Accession number | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Library, Sikkim University | Central Library, Sikkim University | General Book Section | 29/08/2016 | 149.254 SIN/I | P13819 | 29/08/2016 | General Books |