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<br/>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION<br/>1. Introduction<br/>2. The mandate of the commission<br/>3. Before I present my report<br/>4. An enquiry serves many purposes<br/>5. The magnitude and scope of the enquiry<br/>6. The nature of the enquiry<br/>7. The participants, willing and otherwise, in the enquiry<br/>8. The background to the dispute<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 2 : AYODHYA AND ITS GEOGRAPHY<br/>9. Ayodhya and its Geography<br/>10. Modern Ayodhya<br/>11. The "disputed structure"<br/>12. The layout of the Disputed Structure<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 3: THE POLICE ADMINISTRATION<br/>13. The Police Administration *<br/>14. Magistrates<br/>15. The Provincial Armed Constabulary<br/>16. Criminal Procedures, the police, administration and the.public<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 4: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS<br/>17. The Sequence of Events<br/>18. Background<br/>19. The formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and rise of the "Hindu Nationalism"<br/>20. The Hindu - Muslim Divide<br/>21. The events from 1949 onwards<br/>22. The emergence of the Sangh Parivar<br/>23. The 1960s and later events<br/>24. Ayodhya turns into an "issue"; the creation of specialized organisations<br/>25. The opening of the locks at Ayodhya<br/>26. Protests and other initiatives after the opening of the locks<br/>27. The events of 1989<br/>28. The architects of the Shiia Nyas and the Karseva<br/>29. February, 1990<br/>30. The incidents of 1991<br/>31. The events of 1992 . -<br/>32. February, 1992<br/>33. March, 1992"<br/>34. April, 1992 , , .<br/>35. May, 1992<br/>36. June, 1992 . .<br/>37. July, 1992 : • ' , , .<br/>38. August, 1992<br/>39. September, 1992 . n<br/>40. October, 1992 -<br/>41. November, 1992<br/>42. December, 1992<br/>43. The Fourth of December, 1992<br/>44. The Sixth of December, 1992<br/>45. A brief summation of the factual matrix<br/>46. Persons or leaders or Sadhus and Sants who participate.d in the movement<br/>47. Muslim leaders<br/>48. Leaders of movement with no particular role except participating in some negotiaiicns<br/>49. People to whom no definite role can attributsd owing to a complete lack of evidence against them, but who were participants in the so-called Dharam Sansad meetings<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 5 : THE ADMINISTRATION /<br/>50. The Administration<br/>51. The political climate at the time<br/>52. The complicity of the administration ;<br/>53. The prohibition on use of firearms<br/>54. The general psyche and the perceptions ^ •<br/>55. The concentration of executive power<br/><br/>CHARTERS: MOBILISATION OF KARSEVAKS<br/>56. The Mobilisation of Karsevaks<br/>57. The cleavage between Hindus and Muslims<br/>58. Mobilisation of the masses<br/>59. The intensification of the Ayodhya campaign<br/>60. Mobilisation around 1990<br/>61. Later events, leading up to December, 1992<br/><br/>CHAPTER 7: SECURITY SETUP AND ENVIRONMENT<br/>62. The Security Setup and Environment<br/>63. The State's duty to secure and to protect<br/>64. The power to police the state<br/>65. Good Governance<br/>66. The genesis of the dispute and the Sangh Parivar<br/>67. Bringing the "issue" to the forefront<br/>68. Ayodhya and the surrounding areas<br/>69. The Shilanyas and the Shila Pujan programme<br/>70. Formation of the BJP Government in UP in 1991<br/>71. BJP's Success in the elections<br/>72. The dismantling of the security apparatus<br/>73. The last quarter of 1991<br/>74. Planning for security<br/>75. State of the security arrangements in 1992<br/>76. December, 1992<br/>77. Gross mismanagement and dereliction of duty<br/>78. The inadequacy of planning and response<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 8: CIRCUMSTANCES<br/>79. Circumstances<br/>80. The Ayodhya "Issue"<br/>81. The role of the political leadership<br/>82. The legislators<br/>83. The wedge between the Hindus and the Muslims<br/>84. The post independence circumstances<br/>85. The growth of the RSS<br/>86. The changing nature of the polity<br/>87. The temple movement<br/>88. The police and the civil administration<br/>89. The nature of the movement<br/>90. TheKarsevaks<br/>91. The people at the helm of affairs<br/>92. The adherence to the manifesto<br/>93. The exploitation of religion<br/>94. The failure of the BJP as a responsible political party . • . -<br/>95. The 1990 Karseva<br/>96. The elections and the manifesto<br/>97. The BJP Government<br/>98. The Sadhus and Sants : n<br/>99. The failures of December 6th,<br/>100. A blinkered government<br/>101. The alternative suggestion<br/>102. Confucius said, "In human relationship, a gentleman seeks harmony but not uniformity"<br/>103. The state, incommunicado<br/>104. The civil servants<br/>105. The contradictory stand of the VHP<br/><br/>CHAPTER 9 : ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR INTER SE LINKS<br/>106. The Organisations and their Inter-Se Links<br/>107. A conscious attempt to deny and obscure the linkages<br/>108. The relevance of theories and ideologies<br/>109. The foundation of the Hindu movement and the Sangh Parivar<br/>110. The commonality of thought<br/>111. The genealogy of the Sangh Parivar<br/>112. The Swayam Sevaks<br/>113. The hierarchy of the RSS<br/>114. The pervasive command and control of the RSS and its guidance of the Ayodhya movement '<br/>115. The Bajrang Dal<br/>116. ShivSena<br/>117. Ram Janambhoomi Nyas<br/>118. Dharam Sansad<br/>119. Vishwa Hindu Parishad<br/>120. The Sangh Parivar, Hinduism and Hindu <br/><br/>CHAPTER 10 : THE JOINT COMMON ENTERPRISE<br/>121. The Joint Common Enterprise<br/>122. The seeds of the conspiracy<br/>123. The organizations involved ' /<br/>124. The prominent individuals and their link with the RSS "<br/>125. The methods employed<br/>126. The use of slogans as war cries<br/>127. The key events<br/>128. The patent objectives of the movement and the crowds gathered at Ayodhya on the 6th of December, 1992<br/>129. The acquisition of the land<br/>130. The subversion of the UP government<br/>131. The RSS's saffron bands<br/>132. The attack on the disputed structure<br/>133. The Joint Common Enterprise<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 11: PRESIDENT'S RULE<br/>134. President's Rule<br/>135. Background<br/>136. Emergency powers of the President of India<br/>137. An emergency in Ayodhya<br/>138. The perception of the Union Government<br/>139. The proceedings before the Supreme Court<br/>140. The handicap of the Central Government<br/>141. The Sarkaria Commission's recommendations<br/>142. The article of last resort • ,<br/>143. The vital questions<br/>144. A strong centre for a strong country<br/><br/>CHAPTER 12 ^ : SECULARISM<br/>145. Secularism<br/>146. The definition of Secularism<br/>147. Intolerance in Ayodhya<br/>148. The Sangh Parivar and secularism<br/>149. The need for a concerted effort for change<br/>150. What can be done to defend to secularism?<br/><br/>CHAPTER 13: THE ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA<br/>151. The Assault on the Media<br/>152. The presence of the media<br/>153. The bias against the media<br/>154. Crossing the boundaries<br/>155. The timing of the attacks<br/>156. Gaps in the evidence<br/>157. In conclusion<br/><br/>CHAPTER 14 : CONCLUSIONS<br/>158. Conclusions<br/>159. The sequence of events leading to, and all the facts and circumstances relating to, the occurrence in the Ram Janambhoomi - Babri Masjid Complex at Ayodhya on 6th December, 1992 involving the destruction of the Ram Janambhoomi - Babri Masjid structure;<br/>160. The role played by the Chief Minister, Members of the Council of Ministers, officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and by the individuals, concerned organizations and agencies in or in connection with the destruction of the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid structure;<br/>161. The deficiencies in the security measures and other arrangements as prescribed or operated in practice by the Government of Uttar Pradesh which might have contributed to the events that took place in the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid Complex, Ayodhya town and Faizabad on 6th December, 1992<br/>162. The sequence of events leading to, and all the facts and circumstances relating to, the assault on media persons at Ayodhya on 6th December, 1992<br/>163. Any other matter related to the subject of inquiry<br/>164. The standards of culpability<br/>165. The Sangh Parivar<br/>166. The pseudo-moderate elements within the Parivar<br/>167. The Muslim Organizations<br/>168. The civil servants and police officers of Uttar Pradesh<br/>169. The government. Chief Minister and the cabinet of Uttar Pradesh<br/>170. The attacks on the press<br/>171. Individual culpability<br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 15 : RECOMMENDATIONS<br/>172. Recommendations<br/>173. Civil Services<br/>Riot Control<br/>174. Intelligence agencies<br/>175. Centre State relations<br/>176. Religious and cultural sites<br/>177. The Press<br/>178. Afterword<br/><br/>CHAPTER 16 : AFTERWORD<br/><br/>ANNEXURES<br/>List of witnesses who appeared before the Commission c/<br/>Commission's Witnesses<br/>Central Government's Witnesses<br/>Defence Witnesses<br/><br/>MAPS<br/>MEMORANDUM OF ACTION TAKEN ON THE REPORT OF THE LIBERHAN AYODHYA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY<br/>1. General<br/>2. Recommendations pertaining to the Civil Services<br/>3. Recommendations pertaining to the Riot Control<br/>4. Recommendations pertaining to the Intelligence Agencies<br/>5. Recommendations pertaining to the Centre State Relations<br/>6. Recommendations pertaining to the Religious and Cultural Sites<br/>7. Recommendations pertaining to the Press<br/> |
