Normal view MARC view ISBD view

The economic theory of auctions/ (Record no. 152793)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field	00330nam a2200133Ia 4500
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number	1858988705
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number	9781858988702
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Transcribing agency	CUS
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number	330.01
Item number	KLE/E
245 #4 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title	The economic theory of auctions/
Statement of responsibility, etc.	edited by Paul Klemperer
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Name of publisher, distributor, etc.	Elgar Pub.,
Date of publication, distribution, etc.	2000.
Place of publication, distribution, etc.	Cheltenham:
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent	2 v. :
Other physical details	ill. ;
Dimensions	25 cm.
505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note	Acknowledgements --<br/>Foreword --<br/>Part I. Introduction to the Papers --<br/>1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature --<br/>Part II. Early Literature --<br/>2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders --<br/>3. Auction and Bidding Games --<br/>4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV --<br/>Games with Unknown Costs --<br/>5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" --<br/>6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow --<br/>7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information --<br/>Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature --<br/>8. Auctions and Bidding --<br/>9. Auction Theory with Private Values --<br/>Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues --<br/>10. Optimal Auction Design --<br/>11. Optimal Auctions --<br/>12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions --<br/>Part V. Risk Aversion --<br/>13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers --<br/>14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View --<br/>Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation --<br/>15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding --<br/>16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent --<br/>17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions --<br/>Part VII. Asymmetries --<br/>A. Private Value Differences --<br/>18. Government Procurement and International Trade --<br/>19. Asymmetric Auctions --<br/>B. Almost Common Values --<br/>20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions --<br/>21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications --<br/>C. Information Advantages --<br/>22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction --<br/>Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders --<br/>A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders --<br/>23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry --<br/>24. Optimal Auctions Revisited --<br/>25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions --<br/>26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding --<br/>B. The Value of Additional Bidders --<br/>27. Auctions Versus Negotiations --<br/>C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders --<br/>28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition --<br/>29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding --<br/>Part IX. Collusion --<br/>30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction --<br/>31. Bidding Rings --<br/>32. Collusion in Auctions --<br/>Name Index --
650 ## - SUBJECT
Keyword	Auctions
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name	Klemperer, Paul, ed.
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type	General Books

Holdings
Withdrawn status	Lost status	Damaged status	Not for loan	Home library	Current library	Shelving location	Date acquired	Serial Enumeration / chronology	Full call number	Accession number	Date last seen	Koha item type
				Central Library, Sikkim University	Central Library, Sikkim University	General Book Section	28/08/2016	v.1	330.01 KLE/E	P07574	28/08/2016	General Books