Computational models in political economy/
Computational models in political economy/
edited by Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page.
- Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003.
- vi, 283 p. ill. 24 cm.
1 A Dynamic Model of Multidimensional Collective Choice
David P. Baron and Michael C. Herron
2 Fluidity of Social Norms in a Hierarchical System
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
3 Learning, Central Bank Independence, and the Politics of
Excess Foreign Returns
Jude C. Hays and Diana Richards
4 A Computational Theory of Electoral Competition
John E. Jackson
5 A Computational Model of Voter Sophistication, Ideology, and
Candidate Position Taking
Scott de Marchi
6 The Other Side of the Coin: A Computational Analysis of
Publicly Financed Campaigns
Michael Bailey
7 Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model
Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page
8 Recovering Behavioralism: Adaptively Rational Strategic
Behavior with Endogenous Aspirations
Jonathan Bender, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting
978-0262112758 978026211258
Political science--Mathematical models
Economics--Mathematical models
320.0151 / KOL/C
1 A Dynamic Model of Multidimensional Collective Choice
David P. Baron and Michael C. Herron
2 Fluidity of Social Norms in a Hierarchical System
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
3 Learning, Central Bank Independence, and the Politics of
Excess Foreign Returns
Jude C. Hays and Diana Richards
4 A Computational Theory of Electoral Competition
John E. Jackson
5 A Computational Model of Voter Sophistication, Ideology, and
Candidate Position Taking
Scott de Marchi
6 The Other Side of the Coin: A Computational Analysis of
Publicly Financed Campaigns
Michael Bailey
7 Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model
Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page
8 Recovering Behavioralism: Adaptively Rational Strategic
Behavior with Endogenous Aspirations
Jonathan Bender, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting
978-0262112758 978026211258
Political science--Mathematical models
Economics--Mathematical models
320.0151 / KOL/C