Rules and reason: perspectives on constitutional political economy
Rules and reason: perspectives on constitutional political economy
edited by Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
- Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2010.
- 320 p.
Foreword / James M. Buchanan --
Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller --
Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg --
The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon --
Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley --
The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman --
Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger --
Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds --
Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon --
The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence / Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite --
Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova --
A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger --
The Maastricht excessive deficit rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte --
Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.
0521659590
Diritto costituzionale -- Fattori economici.
FEDERALISMO
338.9 / MUD/R
Foreword / James M. Buchanan --
Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller --
Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg --
The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon --
Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley --
The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman --
Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger --
Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds --
Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon --
The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence / Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite --
Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova --
A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger --
The Maastricht excessive deficit rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte --
Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.
0521659590
Diritto costituzionale -- Fattori economici.
FEDERALISMO
338.9 / MUD/R