Indian realism/
Sinha, Jadunath
Indian realism/ Jadunath Sinha - Delhi : MBP, 1999. - 287p. ; 23cm.
I. The Yogacara Vijnanavada
MsdhavScarya's account—No permanent external
object is possible—A momentary object cannot be
perceived—It is neither perceived as a simple atom
nor as a complex body—Cognition alone is real—It is self-
luminous and apprehends itself—^An external object
cannot be related to a cognition and be apprehended
by it—^The identity of an object with its cognition is
proved by the law of simultaneous perception (saho-
palambhaniyama)—^The distinction of subject and
object is an illusory appearance due to subconscious
impressions of difference (bhedavJsana) rooted in
avidyJ—A similar argument in TogavaSistha—^The
distinction of the red and the imaginary within
cognitions—Comparison of the Yogacara idealism with
Berkeley's subjective idedism and Hume's sensationism—
Santaraksita and Kamalasila's exposition of the Yogacara
idealism—^The Epistemological Arguments—K cognition
is self-aware—Refutation of Kumarila's theory of
imperceptibility of an act of cognition—Cognition
is identical with th apprehension of an object-form
which is iUusory—No cognition of an externd object—
A formless (nirakara) cognition cannot apprehend it—
A cognition with a similar form (sakara) cannot appre
hend it—A cognition with a different form (anyakara)
cannot apnrehend it—^Vacaspati's summary of these
arguments—^The Yogacara criticism of the Sautrantika
theory of correspondence (sarupya)—^The Law of
Simultaneous Apprehension—No Evidence for the
existence of an external object—It is neither perceptible
nor inferrible—^The Metaphysicd Argument—^The
so-called external object can neither be a conglomera
tion of atoms nor a complex whole composed of atoms
nor a gross body not made of atoms—^The Yogacara
position.
II. The SaxttrAntika Realism ; The Representa
tive Theory of Perception
Comparison of the Sautrantika ReaJism with Descartes
and Locke's Representationism—^The SautrSntika
criticism of the YogScara Subjectivism—Criticism of
the law of simultaneous apprehension (sahopalam-
bhaniyama)—An object is not identical with cognition-The
physical (external) while cognition is
psychical (internal)—Cognition is perceived as " I"
while the object is perceived as " this" or not-self as
distinguished from the self—Externality of the Object
cannot be treated as an illusory appearance because
it presupposes the real knowledge of externality—
The circular argument of tlve YogScilra—Common
Sense bears testimony to the existence of the object—
Different forms or contents of cognitions are caused by
the variety of external objects—Alayavij fiSna and
PravrttivijfiSna—Criticism of the YogacSra doctrine
that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of
vasanSs.
III. The Yocacara's Criticism of the Representa
tive Theory of Perception
Jayanta's account of the YogScSra's criticism of the
Sautrantika Realism—Cognitions with definite forms
or contents can serve all practical needs of life—^The
existence of external objects is a needless assumption—
Two forms of a cognition and an object are not
perceived—The realist admits that a cognition is
apprehended before it apprehends its object and that
it has a definite form—Cognitions with definite forms
apprehending themselves are the only reality—Objects
cannot be inferred from forms of cognitions—^They
are due to vSsanas—^Waking perceptions are without
foundation in external objects like illusions, hallucina
tion?, dreams and recollections—ParthasSrathi's account
of the Yogaclra criticism of the Sautrantika Realism—
Objectivity (arthatva), Causality (hetutva). Similarity
(sSrupya), Pragmatic use (vyavahira), and Expressibility
No cognition of an external object is possible—Sridhara's
account ^The Vaibhasika criticism of the Sautrantika
realism.
IV. The Jaina Realism.
Mallisena's Exposition of the Yogacara Idealism—
The Metaphysical Argument—^The Epistemological
Argument—Comparison with Berkeley's argument—
Mailisena's Criticism of the Yogacara Idealism—^An
act of cognition must have an object—No cognitions are
objectless—External objects as distinguished from
imaginary ideas have practical efficiency—Both atoms
and gross bodies are real—The metaphysical argument
presents no difficulty to the Jaina who advocates
pluralistic realism or relativism—The denial of an
external object contradicts experience—Consciousness
of the self implies consciousness of the not-self—The
distinction of the self (subject) and the not-self (object)
is real—Criticism of sahopalambhaniyama—Cognition
by its very nature apprehends itself and its object—
Perception of an object in a particular place cannot be
explained by vasana—Criticism ofvSsana—The universal
experience of mankind testifies to the existence of
external objects—Objects cannot be identical with
cognitions because they possess opposite qualities—
The Jaina realism contrasted wiA the SautrSntika
realism—^The fitness (yogyata) of a cognition for
apprehending an object (Jaina).
V. The Sankhya-Yoga Realism
The Sankhya criticism of Vijnanavada—The self and
the not-self radically opposed to each other—The latter
not reducible to the former—Criticism of vasana
and the metaphysical argument (Aniruddha)—Bondage
also reduced to an idea (Vijiianabhiksu)—^The Yoga
exposition of Vijnanavada—^The Epistemological Argu
ments—^No objects apart from cognitions but cognitions
apart from objects—Identity the condition of knowa-
bility—It is proved by the law of simultaneous per
ception—^The object, a construction of imagination—
The Yoga criticism of Vijnanavada—The existence
of external objects proved by perception which cannot be
invalidated by imagination (Vyasa)—Valid waking per
ceptions different from invalid dreams caused by bodily
and mental disorders (Vij n^nabhiksu)—Knowabillty
of an object by a cognition presupposes difference
between them—^The law of simultaneous perception
cannot prove identity because it is based on the method
ofagreement without the help of the method of difference
which is not applicable here—Vacaspati's anticipation
of tlie " ego-centric predicament"—A cognition
cannot possess externality and extension (Vacaspati)—
The object remaining the same, the ideas differ ; so they
are different from each other (Patanjali)—The explana
tion of the fact—External objects and cognitions
cannot come into existence together—^The past and
the future are real—External objects are real and
permanent.
VI. The Mimamsaka Realism
Savara's criticism ofVijn5nav5da—^Waking cognitions
essentially different from dream-cognitions—A formless
cognition apprehends an external object with a form—
A cognition is apprehended by inference only after it
has apprehended an external object—A cognition is
produced by an external object—Kumarila's elaborate
exposition and criticism of VijnSnavada—The existence
of external objects proved by perception which cannot
be invalidated by inference—Dreams, illusions, and
recollections have a foundation in external objects—
Difference between waking perceptions and dreams—
Technical flaws in the YogacSra argument—Detailed
critidsm of v5sana—^The cognitive act is directed to an
external object distinct from it—Cognition and object
cannot be identical with each other—^The subject-
object-relation between them unique in nature—^A
formless cognition apprehends an object with a form—
The diversity of cognitions due to the diversity of
objects—^Variation of appearances no proof of the
unreality of an object which may be multiform—
Explanation of the fact—Diversity of appearances due
to psychical dispositions (vJsana) or to comparison with
other objects—^The existence of external objects proved
by perception and inference, and practical considerations
of morality and religion—PSrthasarathimisra's exposition
and criticism ofVijnanavSda—Elaboration of Kumarila's
arguments—Prabhakara's exposition and criticism of
Vijnanavada—Cognitions apprehend themselves and
their objects—Prabhakara's criticism of the Sautrantika
Realism.
VII. The Nyaya-Vaisesika Realism
The Nyaya critique of VijnanavSda—Critical exposi
tion of it by Gautama and Vatsyayana—^The Nyaya
realism and rationalism—^Reality of the external world
It is amenable to analysis by reason—Illusions, desires,
and dreams have a foundation in external objectt
Udyotakara's criticism—Difference between cognitions
and feelings—Criticism of vSsana—Dreams and illusions
depend on external objects—^No distinction between
dreaming and waking, virtue and vice, on the Yoga^ra
theory—Criticism of perceptions of disembodied
spirits—Positive arguments for the existence of external
objects—Jayanta's elaborate criticism—Cognition and
object essentially different—Subject-object-distincdon
not possible within consciousness—Objects actually
perceived—Difference between cognition of an object
and cognition of the cognition—Consciousne-s ai^ self-
consciousness—Cognitions not self-luminous Cogni
tions produced by external objects—Formless copidons
apprehend external objects—Detailed critiasm of
V^asana—Real basis of illusions, hallucinations, and
dreams—Detailed criticism of sahopalambha, the
metaphysical argument, and the variability of appearances
(cf. Kumarila)—R&um6 of the Nyaya _ jrriticism—
Sridhara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada
Svarupasambandha between cognition and object
(Udayana)—^Their relation governed by the Law ol
Nature (Sridhara)—The sameness of the object of
perception proves its externality—Sridhara's cndcisni
of the Sautrantika theory of mediate knowledge of
external objects.
VIII. The Vedanta Critique of Subjective
Idealism
Sahkara's Absolute Idealism contrasted with the
Subjective Idealism of the Yogacara—Sahkaras exposi
tion and criticism of Vijnanavada—The epstence of
external objects proved by perception which cannot
be invalidated by abstract speculation—The law of
parsimony cannot be invoked to falsify facts of ex
perience—The law of simultaneous perception proves
the difference of objects (upeya) and cognitions (upaya)
—The difference in the contents of cognitions due to
the difference in their objects—Cognitions cannot be
related to each other as subject and object—Cognitions
apprehended by the permanent Self—Different between
waking cognitions and dreams—^Variety of Cognmons
not due to variety of vasanas—^VacaspaumiSra and
Sad^nandci Yati s elaboration of Sankara's arguments
The empirical reality of the external world—Ramlnaja's
exposition and criticism of Vij nanavada—Distinction
between the self and the not-self condition of con
sciousness ^The law of simultaneous perception proves
difference of cognitions and objects—Practical function
of knowledge—Cognitions enable the Self to react to
objects—Difference between waking cogniuons and
dr^ms both of whicli have a foundation in external
objects—The Yogacara subjectivism invalidates his
own inference—Ramanuja's criticism of the Sautrantika
realism—Nimbarka, Srinivasa, Kes'ava Kaimirin.
Madhva, Vallabha, Purusottamaji Maharaja, and
BaJadeva Vidya-Bhusana's criticism of Vij nanavada.
9788120800854
Hindu Philosophy.
149.254 / SIN/I
Indian realism/ Jadunath Sinha - Delhi : MBP, 1999. - 287p. ; 23cm.
I. The Yogacara Vijnanavada
MsdhavScarya's account—No permanent external
object is possible—A momentary object cannot be
perceived—It is neither perceived as a simple atom
nor as a complex body—Cognition alone is real—It is self-
luminous and apprehends itself—^An external object
cannot be related to a cognition and be apprehended
by it—^The identity of an object with its cognition is
proved by the law of simultaneous perception (saho-
palambhaniyama)—^The distinction of subject and
object is an illusory appearance due to subconscious
impressions of difference (bhedavJsana) rooted in
avidyJ—A similar argument in TogavaSistha—^The
distinction of the red and the imaginary within
cognitions—Comparison of the Yogacara idealism with
Berkeley's subjective idedism and Hume's sensationism—
Santaraksita and Kamalasila's exposition of the Yogacara
idealism—^The Epistemological Arguments—K cognition
is self-aware—Refutation of Kumarila's theory of
imperceptibility of an act of cognition—Cognition
is identical with th apprehension of an object-form
which is iUusory—No cognition of an externd object—
A formless (nirakara) cognition cannot apprehend it—
A cognition with a similar form (sakara) cannot appre
hend it—A cognition with a different form (anyakara)
cannot apnrehend it—^Vacaspati's summary of these
arguments—^The Yogacara criticism of the Sautrantika
theory of correspondence (sarupya)—^The Law of
Simultaneous Apprehension—No Evidence for the
existence of an external object—It is neither perceptible
nor inferrible—^The Metaphysicd Argument—^The
so-called external object can neither be a conglomera
tion of atoms nor a complex whole composed of atoms
nor a gross body not made of atoms—^The Yogacara
position.
II. The SaxttrAntika Realism ; The Representa
tive Theory of Perception
Comparison of the Sautrantika ReaJism with Descartes
and Locke's Representationism—^The SautrSntika
criticism of the YogScara Subjectivism—Criticism of
the law of simultaneous apprehension (sahopalam-
bhaniyama)—An object is not identical with cognition-The
physical (external) while cognition is
psychical (internal)—Cognition is perceived as " I"
while the object is perceived as " this" or not-self as
distinguished from the self—Externality of the Object
cannot be treated as an illusory appearance because
it presupposes the real knowledge of externality—
The circular argument of tlve YogScilra—Common
Sense bears testimony to the existence of the object—
Different forms or contents of cognitions are caused by
the variety of external objects—Alayavij fiSna and
PravrttivijfiSna—Criticism of the YogacSra doctrine
that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of
vasanSs.
III. The Yocacara's Criticism of the Representa
tive Theory of Perception
Jayanta's account of the YogScSra's criticism of the
Sautrantika Realism—Cognitions with definite forms
or contents can serve all practical needs of life—^The
existence of external objects is a needless assumption—
Two forms of a cognition and an object are not
perceived—The realist admits that a cognition is
apprehended before it apprehends its object and that
it has a definite form—Cognitions with definite forms
apprehending themselves are the only reality—Objects
cannot be inferred from forms of cognitions—^They
are due to vSsanas—^Waking perceptions are without
foundation in external objects like illusions, hallucina
tion?, dreams and recollections—ParthasSrathi's account
of the Yogaclra criticism of the Sautrantika Realism—
Objectivity (arthatva), Causality (hetutva). Similarity
(sSrupya), Pragmatic use (vyavahira), and Expressibility
No cognition of an external object is possible—Sridhara's
account ^The Vaibhasika criticism of the Sautrantika
realism.
IV. The Jaina Realism.
Mallisena's Exposition of the Yogacara Idealism—
The Metaphysical Argument—^The Epistemological
Argument—Comparison with Berkeley's argument—
Mailisena's Criticism of the Yogacara Idealism—^An
act of cognition must have an object—No cognitions are
objectless—External objects as distinguished from
imaginary ideas have practical efficiency—Both atoms
and gross bodies are real—The metaphysical argument
presents no difficulty to the Jaina who advocates
pluralistic realism or relativism—The denial of an
external object contradicts experience—Consciousness
of the self implies consciousness of the not-self—The
distinction of the self (subject) and the not-self (object)
is real—Criticism of sahopalambhaniyama—Cognition
by its very nature apprehends itself and its object—
Perception of an object in a particular place cannot be
explained by vasana—Criticism ofvSsana—The universal
experience of mankind testifies to the existence of
external objects—Objects cannot be identical with
cognitions because they possess opposite qualities—
The Jaina realism contrasted wiA the SautrSntika
realism—^The fitness (yogyata) of a cognition for
apprehending an object (Jaina).
V. The Sankhya-Yoga Realism
The Sankhya criticism of Vijnanavada—The self and
the not-self radically opposed to each other—The latter
not reducible to the former—Criticism of vasana
and the metaphysical argument (Aniruddha)—Bondage
also reduced to an idea (Vijiianabhiksu)—^The Yoga
exposition of Vijnanavada—^The Epistemological Argu
ments—^No objects apart from cognitions but cognitions
apart from objects—Identity the condition of knowa-
bility—It is proved by the law of simultaneous per
ception—^The object, a construction of imagination—
The Yoga criticism of Vijnanavada—The existence
of external objects proved by perception which cannot be
invalidated by imagination (Vyasa)—Valid waking per
ceptions different from invalid dreams caused by bodily
and mental disorders (Vij n^nabhiksu)—Knowabillty
of an object by a cognition presupposes difference
between them—^The law of simultaneous perception
cannot prove identity because it is based on the method
ofagreement without the help of the method of difference
which is not applicable here—Vacaspati's anticipation
of tlie " ego-centric predicament"—A cognition
cannot possess externality and extension (Vacaspati)—
The object remaining the same, the ideas differ ; so they
are different from each other (Patanjali)—The explana
tion of the fact—External objects and cognitions
cannot come into existence together—^The past and
the future are real—External objects are real and
permanent.
VI. The Mimamsaka Realism
Savara's criticism ofVijn5nav5da—^Waking cognitions
essentially different from dream-cognitions—A formless
cognition apprehends an external object with a form—
A cognition is apprehended by inference only after it
has apprehended an external object—A cognition is
produced by an external object—Kumarila's elaborate
exposition and criticism of VijnSnavada—The existence
of external objects proved by perception which cannot
be invalidated by inference—Dreams, illusions, and
recollections have a foundation in external objects—
Difference between waking perceptions and dreams—
Technical flaws in the YogacSra argument—Detailed
critidsm of v5sana—^The cognitive act is directed to an
external object distinct from it—Cognition and object
cannot be identical with each other—^The subject-
object-relation between them unique in nature—^A
formless cognition apprehends an object with a form—
The diversity of cognitions due to the diversity of
objects—^Variation of appearances no proof of the
unreality of an object which may be multiform—
Explanation of the fact—Diversity of appearances due
to psychical dispositions (vJsana) or to comparison with
other objects—^The existence of external objects proved
by perception and inference, and practical considerations
of morality and religion—PSrthasarathimisra's exposition
and criticism ofVijnanavSda—Elaboration of Kumarila's
arguments—Prabhakara's exposition and criticism of
Vijnanavada—Cognitions apprehend themselves and
their objects—Prabhakara's criticism of the Sautrantika
Realism.
VII. The Nyaya-Vaisesika Realism
The Nyaya critique of VijnanavSda—Critical exposi
tion of it by Gautama and Vatsyayana—^The Nyaya
realism and rationalism—^Reality of the external world
It is amenable to analysis by reason—Illusions, desires,
and dreams have a foundation in external objectt
Udyotakara's criticism—Difference between cognitions
and feelings—Criticism of vSsana—Dreams and illusions
depend on external objects—^No distinction between
dreaming and waking, virtue and vice, on the Yoga^ra
theory—Criticism of perceptions of disembodied
spirits—Positive arguments for the existence of external
objects—Jayanta's elaborate criticism—Cognition and
object essentially different—Subject-object-distincdon
not possible within consciousness—Objects actually
perceived—Difference between cognition of an object
and cognition of the cognition—Consciousne-s ai^ self-
consciousness—Cognitions not self-luminous Cogni
tions produced by external objects—Formless copidons
apprehend external objects—Detailed critiasm of
V^asana—Real basis of illusions, hallucinations, and
dreams—Detailed criticism of sahopalambha, the
metaphysical argument, and the variability of appearances
(cf. Kumarila)—R&um6 of the Nyaya _ jrriticism—
Sridhara's exposition and criticism of Vijnanavada
Svarupasambandha between cognition and object
(Udayana)—^Their relation governed by the Law ol
Nature (Sridhara)—The sameness of the object of
perception proves its externality—Sridhara's cndcisni
of the Sautrantika theory of mediate knowledge of
external objects.
VIII. The Vedanta Critique of Subjective
Idealism
Sahkara's Absolute Idealism contrasted with the
Subjective Idealism of the Yogacara—Sahkaras exposi
tion and criticism of Vijnanavada—The epstence of
external objects proved by perception which cannot
be invalidated by abstract speculation—The law of
parsimony cannot be invoked to falsify facts of ex
perience—The law of simultaneous perception proves
the difference of objects (upeya) and cognitions (upaya)
—The difference in the contents of cognitions due to
the difference in their objects—Cognitions cannot be
related to each other as subject and object—Cognitions
apprehended by the permanent Self—Different between
waking cognitions and dreams—^Variety of Cognmons
not due to variety of vasanas—^VacaspaumiSra and
Sad^nandci Yati s elaboration of Sankara's arguments
The empirical reality of the external world—Ramlnaja's
exposition and criticism of Vij nanavada—Distinction
between the self and the not-self condition of con
sciousness ^The law of simultaneous perception proves
difference of cognitions and objects—Practical function
of knowledge—Cognitions enable the Self to react to
objects—Difference between waking cogniuons and
dr^ms both of whicli have a foundation in external
objects—The Yogacara subjectivism invalidates his
own inference—Ramanuja's criticism of the Sautrantika
realism—Nimbarka, Srinivasa, Kes'ava Kaimirin.
Madhva, Vallabha, Purusottamaji Maharaja, and
BaJadeva Vidya-Bhusana's criticism of Vij nanavada.
9788120800854
Hindu Philosophy.
149.254 / SIN/I